Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B
each with specific IC Dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.4
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and
P5CC080V0B each with specific IC
Dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 5. July 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3,
ADV_HLD.3, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions
of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance
families are relevant.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The products NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B
and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software have undergone
the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-0404-2007. For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process
based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 were re-used.
The evaluation of the products NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC
Dedicated Software was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-
Sicherheit. The T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
Stresemannallee 101
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 5. July 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-24 and D1 to D-4.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B
and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software has been included
in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
Stresemannallee 101
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
A-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
5 Architectural Information 14
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 15
8 Evaluated Configuration 16
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Comments/Recommendations 20
11 Annexes 20
12 Security Target 20
13 Definitions 20
14 Bibliography 23
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The TOE is the hardware of the microcontroller chip P5CD080V0B of the Smart
Card Controller IC family produced by NXP. The TOE includes also IC
Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and IC Dedicated Support Software,
both stored in the Test-ROM of the microcontroller. The Smart Card Controller
hardware comprises an 8-bit processing unit, volatile and non-volatile memories
accessible via a memory management unit, cryptographic co-processors,
security components and three communication interfaces.
The TOE includes a Data Sheet, a document describing the Instruction Set and
the Guidance Document. This documentation contains a description of the
architecture, the secure configuration and usage of the chip by the Smartcard
Embedded Software.
The security measures of the P5CD080V0B are designed to act as an integral
part of the complete security system in order to strengthen the design as a
whole. Several security measures are completely implemented in and controlled
by the hardware. Other security measures are controlled by the hardware and
allow a configuration by software or software guided exceptions. With the
different CPU modes and the memory management unit the TOE is intended to
support multi-application projects.
The non-volatile EEPROM can be used as data or program memory. It contains
high reliability cells which guarantee data integrity. This is ideal for applications
requiring non-volatile data storage and important for the use as memory for
native programs. Security functions protect data in the on-chip ROM, EEPROM
and RAM. In particular when being used in the banking and finance market or in
electronic commerce applications the smart card must provide high security.
Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in the
memories of it and
• maintain the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for
configuration and memory access and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
These features are ensured by the construction of the TOE and the security
functions it provides. The "NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller"
(TOE) mainly provides a hardware platform for a smart card with
• functions to calculate the Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) with up to
three keys,
• functions to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with
different key lengths,
B-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
• support for large integer arithmetic (multiplication, addition and logical)
operations, suited for public key cryptography and elliptic curve
cryptography.
• a random number generator,
• memory management control features,
• cyclic redundancy check calculation (CRC),
• ISO 7816 contact interface with UART,
• contact-less interface supporting MIFARE and ISO 14443A (configuration
P5CD080V0B) or S²C interface (configuration P5CN080V0B).
In addition several security features independently implemented in hardware or
controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operation as well as
integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures
for memory protection and sensors to allow operation only under specified
conditions.
Note: The arithmetic co-processor for large integer arithmetic operations is
intended to be used for the calculation of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms.
Any asymmetric cryptographic algorithm needs to be implemented in software
by using the calculation functions provided by the co-processor. Therefore the
co-processor without software does not provide a security function itself e.g.
cryptographic support. This means that Smartcard Embedded Software that
implements e.g. the RSA cryptographic algorithm is not included in the
evaluation. Nevertheless the co-processor is part of the Smartcard IC and
therefore a security relevant component of the TOE that must resist to the
attacks mentioned in this Security Target and that must operate correctly as
specified in the Data Sheet. The same scope for the evaluation is applied to the
CRC module.
The TOE can be delivered in different configurations. This influences the
availability of the contact-less interface (including the functions provided by the
MIFARE Operating System) and other not security relevant features. The
results of this evaluation are also valid for the product variants called
P5CC080V0B and P5CN080V0B. The following table provides an overview
about the differences between the P5CD080V0B and the variants:
TOE contact-less interface I/O Pads for ISO 7816
P5CD080V0B enabled, configured for ISO 14443A 3
P5CN080V0B enabled, configured for NFC (S²C) 2
P5CC080V0B disabled 3
Table 1: Major configuration options overview
The differences are called major configuration options by the developer. For the
detailed description of the differences refer to [7], section 2.2.
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
The IT products NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software
were evaluated by T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The
evaluation was completed on 08. June 2007. The T-Systems GEI GmbH,
Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
Stresemannallee 101
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 5 augmented (Evaluation Assurance Level augmented). The following
table shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL5 TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier Source from
PP or added
in ST
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 [DES] Cryptographic operation ST
FCS_COP.1 [AES] Cryptographic operation ST
FDP User data protection
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier Source from
PP or added
in ST
FDP_ACC.1 [MEM] Subset access control ST
9
FDP_ACC.1 [SFR] Subset access control ST
FDP_ACF.1 [MEM] Security Attribute based access control ST
FDP_ACF.1 [SFR] Security Attribute based access control ST
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control PP
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection PP
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 [MEM] Management of security attributes ST
FMT_MSA.1 [SFR] Management of security attributes ST
FMT_MSA.3 [MEM] Static attribute initialisation ST
FMT_MSA.3 [SFR] Static attribute initialisation ST
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions (see also [4,
AIS 32, Int065])
ST
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state PP
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack PP
FPT_SEP.1 [PP] TSF domain separation PP
FPT_SEP.1 [CONF] TSF domain separation ST
FRU Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Source from
PP or added
in ST
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FAU Security audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers PP
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP
9 [SFR] here means Special Function Register
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier Source from
PP or added
in ST
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP
Table 4: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7], chapter 5.1.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key generation
FDP_ITC.1 Import of
attributes
user data without security
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Table 5: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.2.1.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.RNG Random Number Generator
F.HW_DES Triple-DES Co-Processor
F.HW_AES AES Co-Processor
F.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
F.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.LOG Logical Protection
F.COMP Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
Table 6: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
B-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed high (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [7, chapter 6.1].
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target and can be summarised as follows.
So called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[9] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
• manipulation of user data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories),
• disclosure of user data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
• deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [9] and
used by the Security Target by defining threats on a more technical level for
• Inherent Information Leakage,
• Physical Probing,
• Physical Manipulation,
• Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
• Forced Information Leakage,
• Abuse of Functionality and
• Deficiency of Random Numbers.
The development and production environment starting with phase 2 up to TOE
delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
developer / manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
B-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
Because there is a specific security component which is not derived from
threats the developer must apply the policy P.Add-Components (Additional
Specific Security Components) for Triple-DES encryption and decryption, AES
encryption and decryption, Area based Memory Access Control, Memory
separation for different software parts (including IC Dedicated Software and
Smart Card Embedded Software), Special Function Register Access Control
and Protection of configuration data.
Security objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones
related to the additional policy(see [7], section 3.4).
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and
P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software distinguish between
five different CPU modes: Boot Mode, Test Mode, Mifare Mode, System Mode
and User Mode.
The three modes Boot Mode, Test Mode and Mifare Mode are sub-modes of
the so-called Super System Mode. These three modes are not available for the
Smartcard Embedded Software developer, they are reserved for the three
software components that belong to the TOE (refer to [7], section 2.1). The
mapping of modes and software components is one-to-one: In Boot Mode the
TOE executes the Boot ROM Software, in Test Mode the TOE executes the
Test ROM Software and in Mifare Mode the TOE executes the MIFARE
Operating System. Note that the Super System Mode is not a mode on its own:
When the TOE is in Super System Mode, it is always either in Boot Mode, Test
Mode or Mifare Mode, depending on the settings of an internal register not
available for the Smartcard Embedded Software.
There are three major configuration options, denoted by different product
names. The products differ in the available interfaces: The P5CD080V0B is
equipped with the ISO 7816 interface and the ISO 14443 contact-less interface.
The P5CN080V0B differs in the configuration of the contact-less interface for
Near Field Communication. The P5CC080V0B does have only the ISO 7816
interface enabled, the contact-less interface is disabled. Details are described in
the subsections 2.2 of [7]. The derivates of the TOE as outlined in table 1 have
identical hardware and IC Dedicated Software. These configurations are done
before TOE delivery. Common minor configuration options of all configurations
are described in [7], section 2.2.4.
The application software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test
Mode. The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip
manufacturing process. At this point in time the operating system software is
already stored in the non-volatile memories of the chip and the Test Mode is
disabled.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the integration into a smart card, personalisation and the
B-9
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE. There are no
special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the requirement
that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating conditions
and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as described in
the user documentation [11] and chapter 10 of this report.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile BSI-PP-
0002-2001 [9], the assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile
are valid for the Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle
defined in the Security Target, phase 1 and the phases from TOE Delivery up to
the end of phase 6 are covered by these assumptions from the PP.
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (phase 1) must ensure:
• the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that the
software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In particular the
assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop software that fulfils
the assumptions.
• the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the TOE
(especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that the
Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of the
environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only
appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE
have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during packaging, finishing and personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
• Key-dependent functions shall be implemented (if applicable) in the Smart
Card Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
• The Smart Card Embedded Software must provide a function to check
initialisation data. The data is defined by the customer and injected by the
TOE manufacturer into the non-volatile memory to provide the possibility for
TOE identification and for traceability (A.Check-Init).
B-10
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and
P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 HW NXP P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and
P5CC080V0B Secure
Smart Card Controller
V0B GDS 2 File:
T035B_20060
904.gds2
Sawn Wafer or
embedded into
specific module
package (see
ST)
2 SW Test ROM Software (the
IC dedicated test
software)
63 29 November
2006
Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_63.lst)
3 SW Boot ROM Software (part
of the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
63 29 November
2006
Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_63.lst)
4 SW Mifare Operating System
(part of the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
2.0 24
2006
August Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_63.lst)
5 DOC Data Sheet,
P5Cx02x/040/073/080/14
4 family, Secure Dual
Interface PKI Smart Card
Controller
3.1 7 March 2007 Electronic
document [12]
6 DOC Instruction Set, SmartMX-
Family
1.1 4 July 2006 Electronic
document [15]
7 DOC Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual for the
P5Cx02x/040/080/144
family
1.5 24 May 2007 Electronic
document [11]
Table 7: Deliverables of the TOE
B-11
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific
IC Dedicated Software and its specific GDS-file. A so-called nameplate (on-chip
identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the chip during production and can be
checked by the customer, too. The nameplate T035B is specific for the SSMC
(Singapore) production site as outlined in the guidance documentation [11]. This
nameplate identifies Version V0B of the hardware, but does not identify
specifically the TOE configurations. For identification of a specific configuration,
the Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used (see [12], chapter
11.7):
• The value 28 hex as Device Coding Byte identifies the chip P5CD080V0B.
• The value 27 hex as Device Coding Byte identifies the chip P5CN080V0B .
• The value 26 hex as Device Coding Byte identifies the chip P5CC080V0B.
Items 2, 3 and 4 in table 7 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the
Test ROM part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the
life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the
different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either
• the customer picks up the TOE himself at the NXP site NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification, Stresemannallee 101, 22529
Hamburg – Germany (see part D, annex A of this report) as a wafer or
specific packages
• the customer picks up the TOE himself at the NXP site, NXP
Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok 10210,
Thailand (see part D, annex A of this report) as a module or in a specific
package or
• the TOE is sent by NXP to the customer protected by special ordering,
secured transport and tracking measures. Additionally, a FabKey according
to the defined FabKey-procedures has to be used to support the secure
delivery and the identification of the TOE
as described in [11].
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures.
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery
procedures described in [11] have to be followed.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the Test ROM Software, Boot ROM Software and Mifare
Operating System are implemented into a specific ROM mask for a TOE IC.
B-12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the Smart Card Operating System and the smart card application thus
providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will
implement symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES, AES)
to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support
secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generation
of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), protection against physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, against access to code and data memory and against abuse of
functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of
the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Smart Card Operating System and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the manufacturer of the
smart card to check the functionality of the chips before TOE Delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
ROM part of the operating system software is already stored in the ROM of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition, the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by
environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user
documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE, several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
B-13
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Line
Identification is the TOE developer and manufacturer and responsible for
specific aspects of handling the embedded smart card application software in its
development and production environment. For those aspects refer to chapter 9
of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from the IC fabrication SSMC
in Singapore indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T035B.
5 Architectural Information
The NXP P5CD080V0B secure smart card controller is an integrated circuit (IC)
providing a hardware platform to a Smart Card Operating System and
Smartcard Embedded Software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the “Security Target”,
[7]. The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the
NXP P5CD080V0B smartcard controller can be found in the “Data Sheet,
P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144 family”, [12] and “Instruction Set”, [15].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
8-bit CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, AES co-
processor, FameXE Co- Processor, Random Number Generator (RNG), Power
Module with Security Sensors and Filters are used. The CPU is equipped with a
Memory Management Unit and provides different CPU Modes in order to
separate different applications running on the TOE. Security measures for
Physical Protection are realized within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the security functions of
the TOE when they can be configured or used by the smartcard operating
system and the Smartcard Embedded Software. The P5CD080V0B provides
different levels of access control to the SFR with the different CPU Modes and
additional – configurable – access control to Special Function Registers in the
least-privileged CPU Mode, the User Mode.
The FameXE does not provide a cryptographic algorithm itself. The modular
arithmeticfunctions are suitable to implement different asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms.
The TOE executes the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Software) during
the start up to configure and initialise the hardware. This software is executed in
the Boot Mode that is not accessible after the start up is finished.
The Mifare Operating System supports the functions to exchange data in the
contact-less mode with other Mifare components. The Mifare Operating System
is executed in the Mifare Mode to ensure a strict separation between IC
Dedicated Support Software and Smartcard Embedded Software. Based on the
partitioning of the memories the Mifare Operating System is not able to access
the Smartcard Embedded Software and the data stored in the EEPROM area
that is not reserved for the Mifare Operating System. In the same way the
access to the program and the data of the Mifare Operating System is denied
B-14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
for the Smartcard Embedded Software. A limited memory area for the data
exchange (between Smartcard Embedded Software and Mifare Operating
System) and the access to components of the hardware (by the Mifare
Operating System) must be configured by the Smartcard Embedded Software.
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target:
For all, NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and
P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software
• The Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual [11],
• Instruction set [15] and
• The Data Sheet [12] for the P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B
Additional guidance as outlined in chapter 10 of this report has to be followed.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hard-
ware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
To support a composite evaluation as defined in AIS 36 [4], the document ETR
for Compositionlite [10] is provided for the composite evaluator.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following
categories:
1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology
against the specification and to get the technology parameters used in
simulations of the circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security
Functions);
2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for
the analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on
special software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software
and for the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE
and within a software simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
B-15
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
• used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different
operating conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred
to as characterisation tests)
• special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and
which include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in
order to verify statements concerning the layout;
6. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification, and in the high and low level
designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the
library of programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator
or at the developers site. They performed independent tests to supplement,
augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. The tests of the
developer are repeated by sampling, by repetition of complete regression tests
and by software routines developed by the evaluators and computed on
samples with evaluation operating system. For the developer tests repeated by
the evaluators other test parameters are used and the test equipment was
varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in
design data and on the final product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE (refer to
chapter 2 and section 3.2 for details on the TOE configuration) provides the
Security Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the
correct implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into
consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis
results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions
using bespoke equipment and expert know how. The penetration tests
considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not
modify the TOE physically.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software with
the nameplate T035B and specific EEPROM coding as outlined above.
All TSF are active and usable. Information on how to use the TOE and its
security functions by the software is provided within the user documentation.
The NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and
P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software distinguishes between
B-16
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
five different CPU modes: Boot Mode, Test Mode, Mifare Mode, System Mode
and User Mode.
As the TOE operates after delivery in System Mode or User Mode and the
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test Mode, the
evaluation was mainly performed in the System Mode and User Mode. For all
evaluation activities performed in Test Mode, there was a rationale why the
results are valid for the System Mode and User Mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL 4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34].
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii) ETR for Composition and
(iv) ETR for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
B-17
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.3 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.3 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Modularity ADV_INT.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.2 PASS
Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.3 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.2 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA.1 PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 8: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
B-18
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
• the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-PP-
0002-2001 [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
F.RNG (random number generator), according to AIS 31 Functionality class
P2 High, F.LOG (Logical Protection) contributing to the leakage attacks
especially for F.HW_DES (Triple-DES Co-processor) and F.HW_AES (AES
Co-processor) by SPA/DPA countermeasures. The scheme interpretations
AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the TOE Security Function F.HW_DES (Triple-DES Co-
processor) used for Triple-DES encryption and decryption and F.HW_AES
(AES Co- processor) used for AES encryption and decryption.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable for chips from the IC fabrication
SSMC in Singapore (see part D, Annex A) indicated by the nameplate (on-chip
identifier) T035B and the firmware and software versions as indicated above.
The evaluation results cannot be extended to further versions/derivates of the
TOE and/or another production sites without any extra investigations.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific smart
card embedded software additional evaluator actions were performed during the
TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the ETR for Composition [10]
according to [4, AIS 36]. Therefore, the interface between the smart card
embedded software developer and the developer of the TOE was examined in
detail. The ETR for Composition is intended to be provided to a composite
product evaluator.
B-19
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
10 Comments/Recommendations
The guidance documentation [11], [12] and [15], contains all necessary
information about the usage of the TOE. NXP will also provide either the
Security Target to customers or a “light” version of the Security Target [7], which
omits some technical details within the rational but contains the relevant
information about the TOE itself. This includes the assumptions about the
environment and usage of the TOE and the security functions provided by the
TOE.
Note that this ST is conformant to [4, AIS 35].
Besides the further requirements
• to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents and
• to ensure fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target.
For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or using the
TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems or complete
smart cards), the ETR for composition [10] resulting from this evaluation is of
importance and shall be given to the succeeding evaluation according to AIS
36. In addition, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH is able to provide a
customer product related configuration list based on the general configuration
list provided for the evaluation [14].
The operational documents [11], [12] and [15] contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
B-20
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, Act setting up the Federal Office for
Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
DEA Data Encryption Algorithm
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
IC Integrated Circuit
I/O Input/Output
IT Information Technology
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU Memory Management Unit
NFC Near Field Communication
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
S²C Smart card interface standard, complying with ISO-IEC-18092.
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
B-21
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
USB Universal Serial Bus
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
B-22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version
2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target, Evaluation of the P5CD080V0B, P5CC080V0B,
P5CN080V0B Secure Smart Card Controllers, NXP Semiconductors,
Business Line Identification, Version 1.2, March 7th, 2007 (confidential
document)
[7] Security Target Lite, Evaluation of the P5CD080V0B, P5CC080V0B,
P5CN080V0B Secure Smart Card Controllers, NXP Semiconductors,
Business Line Identification, Version 1.0, March 21th
, 2007 (sanitized
public document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410 NXP P5CD080V0B
Secure Smart Card Controller, version 1.0, Date from June 08th, 2007,
(confidential document)
[9] Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
registered at the German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-0002-
2001
[10] ETR for composition, NXP P5CD080V0B Secure 8-bit Smart Card
Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.0,
06.06.2007
B-23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
[11] Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5Cx02x/040/080/144
family, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.5, Document Number: 129915,
May 24th, 2007
[12] Data Sheet, P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144 family, Secure Dual Interface PKI
Smart Card Controller, Objective Data Sheet, NXP Semiconductors,
Revision 3.1, Document Number: 126531, March 7th, 2007
[13] FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed 25
Oct. 1999
[14] Configuration List for the NXP P5Cx02x/040/080/144 family of Secure
Smart Card Controllers, BSI-DSZ-CC-0404/0410/0411, Version 1.0, NXP
Semiconductors, April 10th, 2007
[15] Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller,
Philips Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July
04, 2006
[16] FIPS PUB 197 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES),
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001 November 26
B-24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
C-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
C-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
C-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
C-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
C-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
C-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
C-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
C-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
D-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
This page is intentionally left blank.
D-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 Certification Report
Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005), extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific
guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
version 2.3 (ISO/IEC15408: 2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 5. July 2007, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.3),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification (BL
ID), Georg-Heyken-Strasse 1, 21147 Hamburg, Germany, (development
center)
b) NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations -
Test Center Hamburg (IMO TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, 22529
Hamburg, Germany (assembly, test, delivery)
c) NXP Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi
Bangkok 10210, Thailand (assembly, delivery)
d) NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Document
Control Office, Mikron-Weg 1, 8101 Gratkorn, Austria (delivery)
e) Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. 8 (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris
Drive 1, Singapore 519527, Singapore (semiconductor factory)
f) Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd., 6 Loyang Way 2, Loyang Industrial Park,
Singapore 507099, Singapore (mask shop)
D-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007
g) Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC), 1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd.,
Science-Based Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City Taiwan R.O.C. (mask
shop)
h) Chipbond Technology Corporation, No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V, Science Based
Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C. (wafer bumping)
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore indicated by
the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T035B.
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for
each site and in accordance with the Security Target, Evaluation of the NXP
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller,
NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification, Version 1.2, March 7th,
2007 [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats are countered and the security
objectives for the life cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phase
3 or 4 as stated in the TOE Security Target are fulfilled by the procedures of
these sites.
D-4