Security Target – lite
Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”,
Basic Access Control
MTCOS Pro 2.1 BAC/ST23YR80
MASKTECH INTERNATIONAL GMBH
Document number: BSI-DSZ-CC-0671, ST – lite, Version 1.3
Created by: Gudrun Schürer
Date: 2011-02-10
Signature:
Released by Management:
Date:
Signature:
Change history
Version Date Reason Remarks
1.0 2011-01-18 Public version based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0671/ST
1.1 2011-01-31 Final public version
1.2 2011-02-01 Minor correction
1.3 2011-02-10 Some final changes
1
Contents
1 ST Introduction (ASE INT.1) 4
1.1 ST Reference and TOE reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 TOE Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Conformance Claims (ASE CCL.1) 9
2.1 CC Conformance Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Package Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Conformance rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Security Problem Definition (ASE SPD.1) 11
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Organizational Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Security Objectives (ASE OBJ.2) 19
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 Security Objective Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Extended Components Definition (ASE ECD.1) 28
6 Security Requirements (ASE REQ.2) 29
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency . . . 55
7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE TSS.1) 57
7.1 TOE Security Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library . . . . 57
7.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operating
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.2 Assurance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.2.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.3 Statement of Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.3.1 Relevance of Hardware TSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.3.2 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8 Glossary and Acronyms 74
3
Chapter 1
ST Introduction (ASE INT.1)
1.1 ST Reference and TOE reference
Title Security Target – Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Appli-
cation, Basic Access Control (ST-MRTD BAC)
Version 1.3, 2011-02-10
Editors Gudrun Schürer
Compliant to Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Docu-
ment with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control, version 1.10, BSI-
CC-PP-0055
CC Version 3.1 (Revision 3)
Assurance Level The assurance level for this ST is EAL4 augmented
TOE name MTCOS Pro 2.1 BAC/ST23YR80, operation system for secure passports
TOE Hardware ST Microelectronics SB23YR80B, dual interface Smartcard IC
TOE version MTCOS Pro 2.1 BAC
Keywords ICAO, machine readable travel document, basic access control
1.2 TOE Overview
This security target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security
methods Basic Access Control in the ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [1].
MTCOS Pro is a fully interoperable multi-application smart card operating system com-
pliant to ISO/IEC 7816 [2]. It provides public and secret key cryptography and supports also
other applications like e-purses, health insurance cards and access control.
The operating system software is implemented on the ST Microelectronics SB23YR80B se-
cure dual-interface controller, which is directly derived from the dual smartcard IC ST23YR80B
by the addition of the public key cryptographic library NesLib SB. SB23YR80B is certified ac-
cording to CC EAL5 augmented (ANSSI-CC-2010/02 [3] compliant to the Protection Profile
4
BSI-PP-0035 [4]). This means, that the TOE consists of software and hardware.
TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine read-
able travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) [5] and providing Basic Access Control according to the ’ICAO 9303’ [1].
The TOE comprises of
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system)
• the MRTD application
• the associated guidance documentation [6, 7, 8, 9]
The TOE is based on ISO/IEC 7816 [2] commands and is intended to be used inside a
MRTD as storage of the digital data and supports Basic Access Control and Extended Access
Control.
The TOE provides following services for MRTDs:
• Storage of the MRTD data, e.g. data groups and signature
• Organization of the data in a file system as dedicated and elementary files
• Mutual Authenticate and Secure Messaging as specified in TrPKI [10] for Basic Access
Control
• Contactless communication according to ISO/IEC 14443 [11]
• Protection of the privacy of the passport holder with functions like random UID and Basic
Access Control
TOE Usage and Security Features for Operational Use
State or organization issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler
presents a MRTD to the Inspection System to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context
of this Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the
holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip
according to LDS [5] for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is
based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity
as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in
5
the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine
MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
For this Security Target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
1. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book
2. the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ)
3. the printed portrait
the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Struc-
ture [5] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
1. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1)
2. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2)
3. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both
4. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
5. the Document Security Object
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [1]. These security
measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of
the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication
of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive bio-
metrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [1]. The Passive Authentication
Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE
by the TOE environment.
This Security Target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access
Control Mechanism. This protection profile does not address the Active Authentication and the
Extended Access Control as optional security mechanisms.
6
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE.
The inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection sys-
tem by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspec-
tion system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private
communication (Secure Messaging) with this inspection system [1], normative appendix 5.
TOE Life Cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. With respect to [4], the
TOE life cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 step.
Phase 1: Development (Step 1) The TOE is developed in Phase 1. The IC developer devel-
ops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
(Step 2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated cir-
cuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and
develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and
the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is se-
curely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is se-
curely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2: Manufacturing (Step 3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced con-
taining the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embed-
ded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufac-
turer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material
during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The
IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the
non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
(Step 4) See Inlay production below
(Step 5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips
MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data. The Initialization and Pre-personalization
described in this step is performed by SmartTrac, Thailand (see [12]) and MASKTECH
INTERNATIONAL.
Note: For file based operating systems, the creation of the application implies the cre-
ation of MF and ICAO.DF.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from
the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
7
(Inlay production) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the
contactless interface in the passport book. The inlay production including the application
of the antenna is NOT part of the TOE and takes part after the delivery.
Phase 3: Personalization of the MRTD (Step 6) The personalization of the MRTD includes
(i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrollment of the MRTD
holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric
reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v)
configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization
Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [1] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
Phase 4: Operational Use (Step 7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the
Inspection Systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according
to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to
the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform
its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete op-
erating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and
the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless
these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
8
Chapter 2
Conformance Claims (ASE CCL.1)
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model; CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009 [13]
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Func-
tional Requirements; CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009 [14]
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security As-
surance Requirements; CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009 [15]
as follows
• Part 2 extended
• Part 3 conformant
The
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Method-
ology; CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009 [16]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Reference
The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control, version 1.10, BSI-CC-PP-
0055 [17] is claimed.
9
2.3 Package Claim
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4 augmented with ALC DVS.2 defined in CC part
3 [15].
2.4 Conformance rationale
Since this ST is not claiming conformance to any other protection profile, no rationale is nec-
essary here.
10
Chapter 3
Security Problem Definition (ASE SPD.1)
3.1 Introduction
Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
(with different security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [5].
These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with
the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD
holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the Inspection System for
the Chip Authentication and the Active Authentication Public Key (EF.DG15) for Active Au-
thentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the
logical MRTD.
Due to interoperability reasons the ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [1] specifies only the BAC mecha-
nisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to
• Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16)
• Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14
• Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15
• Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD
• Common data in EF.COM
11
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by
the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his
possession of a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
This Security Target considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and
the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the de-
fault user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between
the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. During pre-
personalization the MRTD manufacturer (so-called Pre-Personalization Agent) prepares the
TOE for the personalization, e.g. creation of data files.
Personalization Agent The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing
the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the
encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder
as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data
and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [5].
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the con-
tactless interface.
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiv-
ing State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains
a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the ter-
minals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the
logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts
of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a
Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) im-
plements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive bio-
metric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System
Certificates.
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MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the Inspection System and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
Attacker A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to
manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent
on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of
successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.MRTD Manufact (MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6) It is assumed that appropriate
functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used
during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the
MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification,
retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD Delivery (MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6) Procedures shall guarantee the
control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:
• Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and stor-
age.
• Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
• Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
A.Pers Agent (Personalization of the MRTD’s chip) The Personalization Agent ensures
the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Ba-
sic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14)if stored on the MRTD’s
chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The
Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears
the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric
cryptographic mechanisms.
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A.Insp Sys (Inspection Systems for global interoperability) The Inspection System is used
by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the
traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic
Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and
the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements
the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [10]. The Basic Inspection System reads the
logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify
the logical MRTD.
A.BAC-Keys (Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys) The Document Basic
Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have
to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [1],
the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual
printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand
any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access
Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Chip ID (Identification of MRTD’s chip)
Adverse action An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying
remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through
the contactless communication interface.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset Anonymity of user.
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T.Skimming (Skimming the logical MRTD)
Adverse action An attacker imitates an Inspection System trying to establish a commu-
nication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication
channel of the TOE.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset Confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Eavesdropping (Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and Inspection
System)
Adverse action An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the
MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The
inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker
does not know these data in advance.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset Confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Forgery (Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip)
Adverse action An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system
by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may
alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in
the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler.
The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the
visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentica-
tion mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference
data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection sys-
tem. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a
new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional bio-
metric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another
MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder
this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to
another contactless chip.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate MRTDs.
Asset Authenticity of logical MRTD data.
15
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality)
Adverse action An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
“Operational Use” phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate
(explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or
(iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the person-
alization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information Leakage (Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip)
Adverse action An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during
its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O char-
acteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This
leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely re-
lated to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from mea-
surements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact
to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the
specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker
may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential
Fault Analysis).
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
16
T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering)
Adverse action An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
(i) to disclose TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify
security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of
the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF
data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation
of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the Inspection System) or
TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation
of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g.
to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires
direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed
in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that,
the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data
may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a
security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress)
Adverse action An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Em-
bedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify se-
curity functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operat-
ing conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs informa-
tion about the functional operation.
Threat agent Having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset Confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
17
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see
CC part 1, sec. 3.2 [13]).
P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip) The Initialization Data are written by
the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-
personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization (Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only)
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the
holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal Data (Personal data protection policy) The biographical data and their sum-
mary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and
the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biomet-
ric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)1
and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13,
EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups
are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by Inspection Systems to
which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic
Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [1].
Note: The organizational security policy P.Personal Data is drawn from the ICAO ’ICAO
Doc 9303’ [1]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE environment
and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
1
Note, that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication not being covered by
BSI-CC-PP-0055 [17]
18
Chapter 4
Security Objectives (ASE OBJ.2)
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the
TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into secu-
rity objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD) The TOE must ensure
that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according
to LDS [5] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The
logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and
cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by
authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Note: The OT.AC Pers implies that
1. the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least
EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization
2. the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written
yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for
adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data Int (Integrity of personal data) The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical
MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing.
The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the trans-
mitted logical MRTD data.
19
OT.Data Conf (Confidentiality of personal data) The TOE must ensure the confidentiality
of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to
EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated
as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of
the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE
must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic
Inspection System.
Note: The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the Inspection System by presenting the MRTD. The MRTD’s chip
shall provide read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by means of the
Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys. This Security
Objective requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic Access Control
Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined by
the TOE environment and are loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Therefore the
sufficient quality of these keys has to result from the MRZ data’s entropy. Any attack based
on decision of the ’ICAO Doc 9303’ [1] that the Inspection System derives Document Basic
Access is ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the authorization for reading the biometric data
in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after successful Enhanced Access Control not covered
by this Security Target, but that of BSI-DSZ-CC-0664. Thus the read access must be prevented
even in case of a successful BAC Authentication.
OT.Identification (Identification and Authentication of the TOE) The TOE must provide
means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The
IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 Manufac-
turing and Phase 3 Personalization of the MRTD. The storage of the Pre-Personalization Data
includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated
Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
Note: The TOE Security Objective OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE
to support the Life Cycle security in the Manufacturing and Personalization Phases. The IC
Identification Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 and for traceability and/or to
secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 into the Phase 3. This Security Objective addresses
security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE manufacturing. In the Phase 4 the TOE
is identified by the Document Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. This Security
Objective forbids the output of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN)
or MRTD identifier through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic
Inspection System or as Personalization Agent.
The following TOE Security Objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent on the TOE environment.
OT.Prot Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality) After delivery of the
TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that
20
may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of
the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass,
deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot Inf Leak (Protection against Information Leakage) The TOE must provide pro-
tection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines and
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE
Note This Security Objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details
correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering) The TOE must provide
protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with basic-enhanced attack
potential by means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions) The TOE must ensure its correct
operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where
reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The
environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage
(on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with ele-
ments on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE’s internals.
21
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following Security Objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD Manufact (Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing) Appropriate functional-
ity testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing
and test data.
OE.MRTD Delivery (Protection of the MRTD delivery) Procedures shall ensure protec-
tion of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:
• Non-disclosure of any security relevant information
• Identification of the element under delivery
• Meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledg-
ment)
• Physical protection to prevent external damage
• Secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s)
• Traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
– Origin and shipment details
– Reception, reception acknowledgment
– Location material/information
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality con-
vention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to
meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expec-
tations.
22
OE.Personalization (Personalization of logical MRTD) The issuing State or Organization
must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organiza-
tion (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD,
(ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded fin-
ger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder
together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass Auth Sign (Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature) The issuing State or
Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure
the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a
secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA
Public Key to receiving States and organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The
issuing State or organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key
Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security
Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the
Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations. The
digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [5].
OE.BAC-Keys (Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys) The Document Ba-
sic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organiza-
tion have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ’ICAO Doc
9303’ [1] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the
individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to
withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document
Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Receiving State or organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam MRTD (Examination of the MRTD passport book) The Inspection System of
the receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authentic-
ity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical
MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Sign-
ing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and
(ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [10].
23
OE.Passive Auth Verif (Verification by Passive Authentication) The border control officer
of the receiving State uses the Inspection System to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The
Inspection Systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects
and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States
and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all Inspection Systems.
OE.Prot Logical MRTD (Protection of data of the logical MRTD) The Inspection System
of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read
from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic
Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic
Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of
the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).
24
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
Table 4.1 provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC
Pers
OT.Data
Int
OT.Data
Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
OE.MRTD
Manufact
OE.MRTD
Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass
Auth
Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam
MRTD
OE.Passive
Auth
Verif
OE.Prot
Logical
MRTD
T.Chip-ID x x
T.Skimming x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x x
T.Information Leakage x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal Data x x
A.MRTD Manufact x
A.MRTD Delivery x
A.Pers Agent X X X X X X X X x
A.Insp Sys X X X X X X X X x x
A.BAC-Keys X X X X X X X X x
Table 4.1: Security Objective Rationale
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification
of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as
being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organiza-
tion only” addresses the (i) the enrollment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent
as described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Person-
alization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as de-
scribed by the security objective OT.AC Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) ac-
cording to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security
objective OT.AC Pers limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the
Personalization Agent.
25
The OSP P.Personal Data “Personal data protection policy”requires the TOE (i) to support
the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic Access Control
and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing State or Organiza-
tion. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data Int “Integrity of personal
data” describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during trans-
mission. The security objective OT.Data Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the
protection of the confidentiality.
The threat T.Chip ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip”addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication
interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective OT.Identification by
Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective
for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait”and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection sys-
tem”address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or listening the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the secu-
rity objective OT.Data Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control
using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment
OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration
of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC Pers
“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write ac-
cess for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization).
The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objec-
tive OT.Data Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical
MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass Auth Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according OE.Passive Auth Verif
“Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s
functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot Abuse-
Func “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions which may
not be used in the “Operational Use” phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks intend-
ing to abuse functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect
the TOE in such a way that security features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated,
changed or explored shall be effectively countered. Additionally this objective is supported
by the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personal-
ization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD
holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
26
The threats T.Information Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmen-
tal Stress”are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high
attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the di-
rectly related security objectives OT.Prot Inf Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”,
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot Malfunction
“Protection against Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.MRTD Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD Manufact “Protection of the
MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD Delivery “Protection of the MRTD
delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical
MRTD” including the enrollment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the
MRTD holder personal data.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot Logical MRTD “Protection of data from the
logical MRTD” require the Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD data during the
transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”is di-
rectly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys “Crypto-
graphic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided
by the issuing State or Organization.
27
Chapter 5
Extended Components Definition
(ASE ECD.1)
This Security Target uses the components defined in chapter 5 of BSI-CC-PP-0055 [17]. No
other components are used.
28
Chapter 6
Security Requirements (ASE REQ.2)
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 of the CC [13]. Each
of these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts
a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in
bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC
requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating
a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as underlined text
and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections filled in by the ST
author are denoted as double-underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are
denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a
footnote. Assignments filled in by the ST author are denoted as double-underlined text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Extended Inspec-
tion System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier” and “Termi-
nal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all these subjects are
acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either in chapter 8 or in
the following table. The operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and “ disable read access” are
used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations “store”, “create”, “trans-
mit”, “receive”, “establish communication channel”, “authenticate” and “ re-authenticate” are
originally taken from [14]. The operation “load” is synonymous to “import” used in [14].
29
Definition of security attributes
Terminal authentication status
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without authorization after start-up)
Basic Inspection System terminal is authenticated as Basic Inspection System after suc-
cessful Authentication in accordance with the definition in rule 2 of FIA UAU.5.2.
Personalization Agent Terminal is authenticated as Personalization Agent after suc-
cessful Authentication in accordance with the definition in rule 1 of FIA UAU.5.2.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into subsections fol-
lowing the main security functionality.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU SAS.1)” as specified below (Com-
mon Criteria Part 2 [14] extended).
FAU SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Note: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the Manufacturer role
write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The
audit records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see FMT MTD.1/INI DIS).
30
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS CKM.1)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
key generation algorithms to be implemented and keys to be generated by the TOE.
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys
by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit that meet the following: ICAO DOC 9303 [1],
normative appendix 5.
Note: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and down-
loaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol de-
scribed in [1], normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-
DES key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the al-
gorithm in [1], Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC
generated by TSF as required by FCS RND.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS CKM.4)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the
cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion of key
value that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2 [18].
Note: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC message
authentication keys for secure messaging.
Cryptographic Operation (FCS COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS COP.1)” as specified be-
low (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algo-
rithms to be implemented by the TOE.
31
FCS COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none
that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 [19].
FCS COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging (BAC) - encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [20] and [1] normative appendix 5,
A5.3.
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure
messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and
the terminal as part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the
FCS CKM.1 and FIA UAU.4.
FCS COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication - encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [20].
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for authentica-
tion attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication
mechanism (cf. FIA UAU.4).
32
FCS COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging - message
authentication code in accordance with a specified crypto-
graphic algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112
bit that meet the following: ISO 9797 [21].
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure
messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key
is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according
to the FCS CKM.1 and FIA UAU.4.
Random Number Generation (FCS RND.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended [14]).
FCS RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet class P2 defined in AIS31 [22].
Note: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication
protocols as required by FIA UAU.4.
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Note: Table 6.1 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE Algorithms and key sizes
according to [10], Annex E,
and [23]
Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism
FIA AFL.1,
FIA UAU.4,
FIA UAU.6
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys;
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for Per-
sonalization Agents
FIA UAU.4 Triple-DES, 112 bit keys
Table 6.1: Overview on authentication SFR
33
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of
the MRTD”
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified be-
fore allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Note: The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the Initialization Data and/or
Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. The
audit records can be written only in the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE”. At this time the
Manufacturer is the only user role available for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer creates the
user role Personalization Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the
MRTD”. The users in role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting
the authentication key. After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and
the Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing
the Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as default user
after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to
authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.
Note: In the “Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read the
ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the user is authenti-
cated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip ID). Note that the terminal and the MRTD’s
chip use a randomly chosen identifier for the communication channel to allow the terminal to
communicate with more then one RFID. This identifier will not violate the OT.Identification.
34
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA UAU.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of
the MRTD”
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified be-
fore allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Note: The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent authenticate themselves.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Ter-
minal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
Note: The authentication mechanisms use a challenge freshly and randomly generated by
the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication
attempt.
Note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication mechanism
defined in [1]. In the first step the terminal authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip and the
MRTD’s chip authenticates to the terminal in the second step. In this second step the MRTD’s
chip provides the terminal with a challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identifica-
tion of the MRTD’s chip with some probability depending on the entropy of the Document
Basic Access Keys. Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is
35
not successfully authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfill the security objective
OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip ID.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on
Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanisms
(a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
with Personalization Agent Keys
(b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with
Personalization Agent Key
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic
Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document
Basic Access Keys
Note: Because the ’Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Doc-
ument with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control’ [24] should also be fulfilled the
Personalization Agent should not be authenticated by using the BAC or the symmetric authen-
tication mechanism as they base on the two-key Triple-DES, but using the Terminal Authenti-
cation Protocol using the Personalization Key (cf. [24] FIA UAU.5.2).
Note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the Secure Messaging for all com-
mands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The Basic Inspec-
tion System may use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document
Basic Access Keys.
36
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based
communication after successful authentication of the terminal
with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [1] includes the Secure Messaging
for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The
TOE checks by Secure Messaging in MAC ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC
whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS COP.1/MAC for further
details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code.
Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those
commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user.
Note: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfill [24] the BAC communication might
be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a new secure messaging that is
distinct from the BAC based communication. In this case the condition in FIA UAU.6 above
should not contradict to the option that commands are sent to the TOE that are no longer
meeting the BAC communication but are protected by a more secure communication channel
established after a more advanced authentication process.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA AFL.6)” as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FIA AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempt
occurs related to BAC authentication.
FIA AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication at-
tempts has been met, the TSF shall wait for an administrator
configurable time greater 10 seconds between the reception of the
authentication command and its processing.
Note: The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within
range of acceptable values 1 to 10 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur re-
lated to BAC authentication protocol. When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable time
between the receiving the terminal challenge eIFD and sending the TSF response eICC during
the BAC authentication attempts. The terminal challenge eIFD and the TSF response eICC
37
are described in [23], Appendix C. The refinement by inclusion of the word “consecutive” al-
lows the TSF to return to normal operation of the BAC authentication protocol (without time
out) after successful run of the BAC authentication protocol. The unsuccessful authentication
attempt shall be stored non-volatile in the TOE thus the “consecutive unsuccessful authentica-
tion attempts” are count independent on power-on sessions but reset to zero after successful
authentication only.
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FDP ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
38
FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
(a) Personalization Agent
(b) Basic Inspection System
(c) Terminal
2. Objects:
(a) data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
(b) data in EF.COM
(c) data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes:
(a) authentication status of terminals.
FDP ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an opera-
tion among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write and to read the data of the EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1,
EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
39
FDP ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following sensitive rules: none.
FDP ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rules:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data
in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Note: The inspection system needs special authentication and authorization for read access
to DG3 and DG4 defined in BSI-CC-PP-0056 [24].
Inter-TSF-Transfer
Note: FDP UCT.1 and FDP UIT.1 require the protection of the User Data transmitted from the
TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message authentication codes
after successful authentication of the terminal. The authentication mechanisms as part of Basic
Access Control Mechanism include the key agreement for the encryption and the message
authentication key to be used for secure messaging.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FDP UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from unautho-
rized disclosure.
40
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FDP UIT.1 Data exchange integrity – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able
to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
FDP UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
Note: The SFR FMT SMF.1 and FMT SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the management
of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FMT SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
41
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT SMR.1)” as specified below (Com-
mon Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
1. Manufacturer
2. Personalization Agent
3. Basic Inspection System
FMT SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles
Note: The SFR FMT LIM.1 and FMT LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF
data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT LIM.1” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14] extended).
FMT LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks
42
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14] extended).
FMT LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their ca-
pabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities
(FMT LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks
Note: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features ...” in FMT LIM.2.1 might be a little bit
misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing
the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT LIM.1 and FMT LIM.2
is introduced provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy. Note that the term
“software” in item 3 of FMT LIM.1.1and FMT LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated and IC
Embedded Software.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]). The iterations address different management functions
and different TSF data.
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
INI ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer
Note: The Pre-personalization Data include but are not limited to the authentication refer-
ence data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization
Agent Key.
43
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initializa-
tion Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
INI DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users
to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent
Note: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are the
default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufactur-
ing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role Manufac-
turer. The TOE restricts the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Prepersonalization
Data by (i) allowing to write these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at
the end of the Phase 2. The IC Manufacturer writes the Initialization Data which includes
but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU SAS.1. The Initialization Data
provides a unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3
“personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”.
Therefore the external read access will be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer will write the
Pre-personalization Data.
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
KEY WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys to the Personalization Agent
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT SMR.1 Security roles
FMT MTD.1.1/
KEY READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic
Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys to none
Note: The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the correctness of the Doc-
ument Basic Access Keys.
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With
respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security func-
tional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT FLS.1)” and “TSF test-
ing (FPT TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” on the
44
other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT RVM.1)” and “TSF domain separa-
tion (FPT SEP.1)” together with “Limited capabilities (FMT LIM.1)” , “Limited availability
(FMT LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactiva-
tion and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT EMSEC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 [14] extended).
FPT EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption
and command execution time in excess of non-useful information
enabling access to Personalization Agent Authentication Keys and
Manufacturer Authentication Keys and none.
FPT EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use
the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access
to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and Manufacturer
Authentication Key and none.
Note: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based
on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at
the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be
caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The
set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement
the smart card. The MRTD’s chip has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may
have also (not used by the terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to
ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to
variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation
due to internal operations or data transmissions.
45
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit in-
formation leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FPT FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where
therefore a malfunction could occur
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT TST.1
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT TST.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FPT TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and
at the condition “request of random numbers“ to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
FPT TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to ver-
ify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to ver-
ify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT PHP.3)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 [14]).
FPT PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing
to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
46
Note: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation)
the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection
against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence,
“automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii)
countermeasures are provided at any time.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those
taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by taking the following components:
• ALC DVS.2
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The table 6.2 provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
47
OT.AC
Pers
OT.Data
Int
OT.Data
Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
FAU SAS.1 x
FCS CKM.1 x x x
FCS CKM.4 x x
FCS COP.1/SHA x x x
FCS COP.1/ENC x x x
FCS COP.1/AUTH x x
FCS COP.1/MAC x x x
FCS RND.1 x x x
FIA AFL.1 x x
FIA UID.1 x x
FIA UAU.1 x x
FIA UAU.4 x x x
FIA UAU.5 x x x
FIA UAU.6 x x x
FDP ACC.1 x x x
FDP ACF.1 x x x
FDP UCT.1 x x x
FDP UIT.1 x x x
FMT SMF.1 x x x
FMT SMR.1 x x x
FMT LIM.1 x
FMT LIM.2 x
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA x
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS x
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE x x x
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ x x x
FPT EMSEC.1 x x
FPT FLS.1 x x x
FPT TST.1 x x
FPT PHP.3 x x x
Table 6.2: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR
OT.AC Pers The security objective OT.AC Pers “Access Control for Personalization of log-
ical MRTD”addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to
the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP ACC.1 and FDP ACF.1 as follows: only
the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF ac-
cording to SRF FIA UAU.4 and FIA UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated
48
either by using the BAC mechanism (FCS CKM.1, FCS COP.1/SHA, FCS RND.1 (for key
generation), and FCS COP.1/ENC as well as FCS COP.1/MAC) with the personalization key
or for reasons of interoperability with [24] by using the symmetric authentication mechanism
(FCS COP.1/AUTH).
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA UAU.6 describes the re-authentication
and FDP UCT.1 and FDP UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure mes-
saging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS CKM.1, FCS COP.1/SHA,
FCS RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS COP.1/ENC as well as FCS COP.1/MAC for the
ENC MAC Mode.
The SFR FMT SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT
SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the Document
Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE as authentication refer-
ence data. The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY READ prevents read access to the secret key of the
Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR FCS CKM.4, FPT EMSEC.1,
FPT FLS.1 and FPT PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
OT.Data Int The security objective OT.Data Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the
TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against phys-
ical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the SFR FDP ACC.1 and FDP ACF.1 in the same way: Only the Personalization
Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
(FDP ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT SMR.1 lists the roles (in-
cluding Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall
be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA UAU.4, FIA UAU.5 and FIA UAU.6 using either
FCS COP.1/ENC and FCS COP.1/MAC or FCS COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure
that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD
data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA UAU.6, FDP UCT.1 and FDP UIT.1
require the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by
the cryptographic functions according to FCS CKM.1, FCS COP.1/SHA, FCS RND.1 (for key
generation), and FCS COP.1/ENC and FCS COP.1/MAC for the ENC MAC Mode. The SFR
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document Ba-
sic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT MTD.1/
KEY READ.
OT.Data Conf The security objective OT.Data Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” re-
quires the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. The SFR FIA UID.1 and FIA UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification
respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data Conf. In case of failed authentication
attempts FIA AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time
for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the
FDP ACC.1 and FDP ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed
to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Ba-
49
sic Inspection System is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and
EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR FMT SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent
and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentica-
tion of the user. The SFR FIA UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication at-
tempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentica-
tion Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the SFR FIA UAU.6 re-
quests Secure Messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the protection of the transmitted data in
ENC MAC Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS COP.1/ENC
and FCS COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP UCT.1 and FDP UIT.1) (for key generation), and
FCS COP.1/ENC and FCS COP.1/MAC for the ENC MAC Mode. The SFR FCS CKM.1,
FCS CKM.4, FCS COP.1/SHA and FCS RND.1 establish the key management for the secure
messaging keys. The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE addresses the key management and
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data Conf nor the SFR FIA UAU.5 requires the
Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure
messaging.
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentica-
tion of the TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the
MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR
FAU SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspec-
tion System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Person-
alization Agent key). The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI DIS allows the Personalization Agent to
disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security
objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA UID.1 and FIA UAU.1 do not allow reading of any
data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the Basic In-
spection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt. In
case of failed authentication attempts FIA AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging
the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
OT.Prot Abuse-Func
The security objective OT.Prot Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by the SFR FMT LIM.1 and FMT LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality
of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
50
OT.Prot Inf Leak
The security objective OT.Prot Inf Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” re-
quires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
against disclosure
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT EMSEC.1
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT FLS.1 and
FPT TST.1, and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT PHP.3
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper
The security objective OT.Prot Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT PHP.3.
OT.Prot Malfunction
The security objective OT.Prot Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered
by (i) the SFR FPT TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and
tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code and (ii) the SFR
FPT FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions
possibly causing a malfunction.
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mu-
tual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied.
All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved
dependencies are appropriately explained.
51
Table 6.3 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FAU SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS CKM.1 [FCS CKM.2 Cryptogr. key distribu-
tion or
FCS COP.1 Cryptogr. operation],
Fulfilled by
FCS COP.1/ENC, and
FCS COP.1/MAC,
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
FCS CKM.4 [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion]
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.1
FCS COP.1/SHA [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
FCS COP.1/ENC [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
Fulfilled by
FCS CKM.1,
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
FCS COP.1/AUTH [FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
52
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS COP.1/
MAC
[FDP ITC.1 Import of user data with-
out security attributes,
FDP ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS CKM.1 Cryptogr. key genera-
tion],
Fulfilled by
FCS CKM.1,
FCS CKM.4 Cryptogr. key destruc-
tion
Fulfilled by FCS CKM.4
FCS RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA AFL.1 FIA UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilled by FIA UAU.1
FIA UAU.1 FIA UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA UID.1
FIA UAU.4 No dependencies n.a.
FIA UAU.5 No dependencies n.a.
FIA UAU.6 No dependencies n.a.
FDP ACC.1 FDP ACF.1 Security attribute based
access control
Fulfilled by FDP ACF.1
FDP ACF.1 FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, Fulfilled by FDP ACC.1,
FMT MSA.3 Static attribute initial-
ization
justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP UCT.1 [FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted chan-
nel, or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path],
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Fulfilled by FDP ACC.1
FDP UIT.1 [FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted chan-
nel, or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path],
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Fulfilled by FDP ACC.1
FMT SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT SMR.1 FIA UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled by FIA UID.1
FMT LIM.1 FMT LIM.2 Fulfilled by FMT LIM.2
FMT LIM.2 FMT LIM.1 Fulfilled by FMT LIM.1
53
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FMT MTD.1/
INI ENA
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
INI DIS
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
KEY WRITE
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by
FMT SMR.1
FMT MTD.1/
KEY READ
FMT SMF.1 Specification of manage-
ment functions,
Fulfilled by FMT SMF.1
FMT SMR.1 Security roles Fulfilled by FMT SMR.1
FPT EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
Table 6.3: Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE
No. 1 The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS COP.1/SHA does not need any key ma-
terial. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS CKM.1 nor an import (FDP ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
No. 2 The SFR FCS COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored
during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT MTD.1/INI ENA) by the manufacturer.
Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE
lifecycle by the means of FCS CKM.1 or FDP ITC. Since the key is permanently stored
within the TOE there is no need for FCS CKM.4, too.
No. 3 The access control TSF according to FDP ACF.1 uses security attributes which are de-
fined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT MSA.1 and FMT MSA.3) is nec-
essary here.
No. 4 The SFR FDP UCT.1 and FDP UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the
MRTD and the BIS respectively GIS. There is no need for the SFR FTP ITC.1, e.g. to
54
require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication
channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human
interface a trusted path as required by FTP TRP.1 is not applicable here.
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engi-
neering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate appli-
cation of specialist security engineering techniques. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is
likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable
in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of indepen-
dently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive
security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s
material.
The component ALC DVS.2 has no dependencies.
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security require-
ments for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security
assurance requirements (SARs) together forms a mutually supportive and internally consistent
whole.
The analysis of the TOE’s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale for the security functional
requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all de-
fined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional
components are analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally con-
sistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the additional assurance in sec-
tion 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale components shows that the assurance
requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (additional) dependencies
are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not
to arise in sections 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale and 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
55
Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So
the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there
are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
56
Chapter 7
TOE Summary Specification (ASE TSS.1)
This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures covering the
requirements of the previous chapter.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions composing
the TSF.
7.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
F.IC CL: Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
This Security Function covers the security functions of the hardware (IC) as well as of the
crypto library. The Security Target of the hardware [3] defines the following TSFs:
TSF INIT A Hardware initialization & TOE attribute initialization
TSF CONFIG A TOE configuration switching and control
TSF INT A TOE logical integrity
TSF TEST A Test of the TOE
TSF FWL A Memory Firewall
TSF PHT A Physical tampering protection
TSF ADMINIS A Security violation administrator
TSF OBS A Unobservability
TSF SKCS A Symmetric Key Cryptography Support
TSF AKCS A Asymmetric Key Cryptography Support
TSF ALEAS A Unpredictable Number Generation Support
57
7.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operat-
ing system
F.Access Control
This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are only
executed after this TSF allowed access. This function consists of following elements:
1. Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any file) and security attributes
2. No access control policy allows reading of any key
3. Any access not explicitly allowed is denied
4. Access Control in phase 2 – Initialization/Pre-personalization – enforces Initialization
and Pre-personalization policy: Configuration and initialization of the TOE, config-
uring of Access Control policy and doing key management only by the manufacturer
(Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent) or on behalf of him (see F.Management)
5. Access Control in phase 3 – Personalization – enforces Personalization policy: Writing
of user data, keys (Basic Access Control ) and reading of initialization data only by the
Personalization Agent identified with its authentication key (see F.Management)
6. Access Control in phase 4 – Operation – enforces operational use policy: Reading of user
data by BIS authenticated at least by Secure Messaging with BAC.
F.Identification Authentication
This function provides identification/authentication of the user roles
• Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent)
• Personalization Agent
• Basic Inspection System
by the methods:
• Symmetric BAC authentication method [1, 10] with following properties
– The authentication is as specified by ICAO
– It uses a challenge from the MRTD
– The method can be configured by the administrator to delay the processing of the
authentication command after a failed authentication. The delay amounts to 0.1 s,
3 s, 6 s and 10 s after the first, second, third and any further failed authentication.
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by F.Crypto
58
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by F.Crypto
– On error (wrong MAC, wrong challenge) the user role is not identified/authenticated
– On success the session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging
For the BAC method, only an Enhanced-Basic Attack Potential is taken into account (see
also the Note in section 6.2).
• Secure Messaging with following properties
– The Secure Messaging is as specified by ICAO
– The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by F.Crypto
– The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by F.Crypto
– In a Secure Messaging protected command the method for confidentiality and the
method for authenticity must be present
– The initialization vector is an encrypted Send Sequence Counter (SSC)
– In phases 3 - 4 a session key is used
– On any command that is not protected correctly with the session keys these are
overwritten according to FIPS 140-2 [18] (or better) and a new BAC authentication
is required
– Keys in transient memory are overwritten after usage
F.Management
In phase 2 the Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent) performs the initial-
ization and configures the file layout including security attributes. In any case the layout de-
termines that the parameters given in F.Access Control for phases 3 and 4 are enforced. The
agent can also do key management and other administrative tasks.
In phase 3 the Personalization Agent performs following steps:
• Formatting of all data to be stored in the TOE according to ICAO requirements which
are outside the scope of the TOE. The data to be formatted includes the index file, data
groups, Passive Authentication data, BAC key derived from the Machine Readable Zone
data and parameters
• Writing of all the required data to the appropriate files as specified in TrLDS [5]
• Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the initialization
data is prevented
59
F.Crypto
This function provides a high level interface to
• DES (supplied by F.IC CL)
• Triple-DES/CBC
• DES/Retail MAC
This function implements the hash algorithms according to FIPS 180-2 [19]
• SHA-1
F.Verification
TOE internal functions ensures correct operation.
60
7.2 Assurance Measures
The assurance measures fulfilling the requirements of EAL4 augmented with ALC DVS.2 is
given in table 7.2.
ADV ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV FSP.4 Complete functional specification 4
ADV IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF 4
ADV TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures, automation
ALC CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ATE COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE DPT.2 Testing: modular design
ATE FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
Table 7.1: Assurance Measures
61
7.2.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Table 7.2 shows the coverage of the SFRs by TSFs.
SFR TSFs
FAU SAS.1 F.IC CL
FCS CKM.1 F.IC CL
FCS CKM.4 F.Identification Authentication
FCS COP.1/SHA F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/ENC F.IC CL, F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/AUTH F.IC CL, F.Crypto
FCS COP.1/MAC F.IC CL, F.Crypto
FCS RND.1 F.IC CL
FIA UID.1 F.Access Control
FIA UAU.1 F.Access Control
FIA UAU.4 F.Identification Authentication
FIA UAU.5 F.Access Control, F.Identification Authentication
FIA UAU.6 F.Identification Authentication
FIA AFL.1 F.Identification Authentication
FDP ACC.1 F.Access Control
FDP ACF.1 F.Access Control
FDP UCT.1 F.Identification Authentication
FDP UIT.1 F.Identification Authentication
FMT SMF.1 F.Management
FMT SMR.1 F.Identification Authentication
FMT LIM.1 F.IC CL
FMT LIM.2 F.IC CL
FMT MTD.1/INI ENA F.IC CL, F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/INI DIS F.Access Control, F.Management
FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE F.Access Control
FMT MTD.1/KEY READ F.Access Control
FPT EMSEC.1 F.IC CL
FPT FLS.1 F.IC CL
FPT TST.1 F.IC CL, F.Verification
FPT PHP.3 F.IC CL
Table 7.2: Coverage of SFRs for the TOE by TSFs.
62
The SFR FAU SAS.1 requires the storage of the chip identification data which is addressed
in F.IC CL, TSF INT A, TSF TEST A.
The SFR FCS CKM.1 requires the BAC key derivation algorithm, which is supplied by
the BAC authentication mechanism of F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FCS CKM.4 requires the destroying of cryptographic keys. This is done in
F.Identification Authentication (“Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage”).
The SFR FCS COP.1/SHA requires SHA-1. F.Crypto provides these hash algorithms.
The SFR FCS COP.1/ENC requires Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key
size 112 bit to perform Secure Messaging - encryption and decryption. This is provided in
F.IC CL, TSF SKCS A (Triple-DES) and F.Crypto (provides DES/Retail MAC).
FCS COP.1/AUTH requires Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key size 112 bit
to perform symmetric authentication - encryption and decryption. This is provided in F.IC CL,
TSF SKCS A (Triple-DES) and F.Crypto (provides DES/Retail MAC).
The SFR FCS COP.1/MAC requires Triple-DES in Retail MAC mode and cryptographic
key size 112 bit to perform Secure Messaging - Message Authentication Code. This is provided
in F.IC CL, TSF SKCS A (Triple-DES) and F.Crypto (provides DES/Retail MAC).
The SFR FCS RND.1 requires the generation of random numbers which is provided by
F.IC CL, TSF ALEAS A. The provided random number generator produces cryptographi-
cally strong random numbers which are used at the appropriate places as written in the addition
there.
The SFR FIA UID.1 requires timing of identification. It is handled by F.Access Control
which enforces identification of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after this TSF
allowed access”). Also all policies prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without
user identification.
The SFR FIA UAU.1 requires timing of authentication. It is handled by F.Access Control
which enforces authentication of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after this TSF
allowed access”). Also all policies prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user
authentication.
The SFR FIA UAU.4 requires prevention of authentication data reuse. This is in particular
fulfilled by using changing initialization vectors in Secure Messaging. Secure Messaging is
provided by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FIA UAU.5 requires Basic Access Control authentication mechanism and sym-
metric authentication mechanism based on Triple-DES. In addition SFR FIA UAU.5 also re-
quires the authentication of any user’s claimed identity. F.Identification Authentication and
F.Access Control fulfill these requirements.
The SFR FIA UAU.6 requires re-authentication for each command after successful authen-
tication. This is done by F.Identification Authentication providing Secure Messaging.
The SFR FIA AFL.1 requires the detection of an unsuccessful authentication attempt and
the waiting for a specified time between the reception of an authentication command and its
processing. F.Identification Authentication detects unsuccessful authentication attempts and
can be used “to delay the processing of the authentication command after a failed authentication
command”.
63
The SFR FDP ACC.1 requires the enforcement of the access control policy on termi-
nals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1
to EF.DG16. This is done by F.Access Control (based on the objects: “a. data EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 ...”).
The SFR FDP ACF.1 requires the enforcement of the access control policy which is done
by F.Access Control ( “Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any files)
and security attributes”).
The SFR FDP UCT.1 requires the transmitting and receiving data protected from unautho-
rized disclosure after Basic Access Control. This is done by using an encrypted communica-
tion channel, which is based on Secure Messaging provided by F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FDP UIT.1 requires the transmitting and receiving data protected from modi-
fication, deletion, insertion and replay after Basic Access Control. This is done by using
an protected communication channel. This channel is based on Secure Messaging provided
by F.Identification Authentication. A send sequence counter makes each command unique
while the authenticity method makes it possible to detect modifications.
The SFR FMT SMF.1 requires security management functions for initialization, personal-
ization and configuration. This is done by F.Management: The Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-
personalization Agent) performs the Initialization and configures the file layout in phase 2, the
Personalization agent performs the personalization in phase 3.
The SFR FMT SMR.1 requires the maintenance of roles. The roles are managed by
F.Identification Authentication.
The SFR FMT LIM.1 requires limited capabilities of test functions which is provided by
F.IC CL, TSF CONFIG A, TSF TEST A which controls what commands can be executed
thereby preventing external usable test functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software
only is available in the Test Mode.
The SFR FMT LIM.2 requires limited availabilities of test functions which is provided by
F.IC CL, TSF CONFIG A, TSF TEST A which controls what commands can be executed
thereby preventing external usable test functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software
only is available in the Test Mode.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI ENA requires writing of Initialization data and Pre-personaliza-
tion data to the manufacturer. Writing of Pre-personalization and Installation data only by the
manufacturer is enforced by F.Access Control, which limits these operations to phase 2. In
addition F.IC CL, TSF FWL A stores this data in the User Read Only Area which cannot be
changed afterwards.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/INI DIS requires only the Personalization agent to be able to dis-
able reading of the Initialization data. This is provided by F.Management (Personalization
agent: “Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the Initial-
ization data is prevented”) and F.Access Control.
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY WRITE requires the Personalization agent to be able to
write the Document Basic Access Keys. This is provided by F.Access Control allowing the
personalization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
64
The SFR FMT MTD.1/KEY READ requires the Document Basic Access Keys and the
Personalization Agent Keys to never be readable. This is enforced by F.Access Control, which
does not allow reading of any key to any role.
The SFR FPT EMSEC.1 requires limiting of emanations. This is provided by F.IC CL,
TSF OBS A, TSF ADMINIS A.
The SFR FPT FLS.1 requires failure detection and preservation of a secure state. The Con-
trol of Operating Conditions of F.IC CL, TSF INIT A, TSF INT A, TSF FWL A, TSF PHT
A, TSF ADMINIS A is directly designed for this SFR. It audits continually and reacts to en-
vironmental and other problems by bringing it into a secure state.
The SFR FPT TST.1 requires testing for (a) correct operation, (b) integrity of data and
(c) integrity of executable code. F.Verification does this testing. F.IC CL, TSF INT A,
TSF TEST A controls all EEPROM and ROM content for integrity.
The SFR FPT PHP.3 requires resistance to physical manipulation and probing. This is
provided by F.IC CL, TSF INIT A, TSF PHT A which is provided by the hardware to resist
attacks.
65
7.3 Statement of Compatibility
This is a statement of compatibility between this Composite Security Target and the Security
Target of the ST Microelectronics Chip SB23YR80B [3].
7.3.1 Relevance of Hardware TSFs
Table 7.3 shows the relevance of the hardware security functions for the composite Security
Target.
Hardware TSFs Relevant Not relevant
TSF INIT A: Hardware init. & TOE attribute init. x
TSF CONFIG A: TOE configuration switching and control x
TSF INT A: TOE logical integrity x
TSF TEST A: Test of the TOE x
TSF FWL A: Memory Firewall x
TSF PHT A: Physical tampering protection x
TSF ADMINIS A: Security violation administrator x
TSF OBS A: Unobservability x
TSF SKCS A: Symmetric Key Cryptography Support x
TSF AKCS A: Asymmetric Key Cryptography Support x
TSF ALEAS A: Unpredictable Number Generation Support x
Table 7.3: Relevance of Hardware TSFs for Composite ST
7.3.2 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment
Assumptions
The following list shows that neither assumptions of the TOE nor of the hardware have any
conflicts between each other. They are either not relevant for this Security Target or are covered
by appropriate Security Objectives.
• Assumptions of the TOE
– A.MRTD Manufact (MRTD manufacturing): No conflict
– A.MRTD Delivery (MRTD delivery): No conflict
– A.Pers Agent (Personalization of the MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– A.Insp Sys (Systems for global interoperability): No conflict
66
– A.BAC-Keys (Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys): No conflict
• Assumptions of the hardware
– BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personaliza-
tion): No conflict
– BSI.A.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform): See BSI.OE.Plat-Appl; the correct
usage of the hardware platform becomes a Security Objective of the TOE and is
proven by the evaluation
– BSI.A.Resp-Appl (Treatment of User Data): Covered by Security Objective OT.Prot
Inf Leak
Threats
The Threats of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped (see Table 7.4) or are not relevant.
They show no conflicts between each other.
• Threats of the TOE
– T.Chip ID (Identification of MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– T.Skimming (Skimming the logical MRTD): No conflict
– T.Eavesdropping (Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and Inspec-
tion System): No conflict
– T.Forgery (Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip): No conflict
– T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the hardware
ST
– T.Information Leakage (Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip): Matches T.Leak-
Inherent and T.Leak-Forced of the hardware ST
– T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering): Matches T.Phys-Probing and T.Phys-Manipulation
of the hardware ST
– T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress): Matches T.Malfunction
of the hardware ST
• Threats of the hardware
– BSI.T.Leak-Inherent (Inherent Information Leakage): Matches T.Information Leakage
of the TOE ST
– BSI.T.Phys-Probing (Physical Probing): Matches T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
– BSI.T.Malfunction (Malfunction due to Environmental Stress): Matches T.Malfunction
of the TOE ST
– BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation (Physical Manipulation): Matches T.Phys-Tamper of the
TOE ST
67
– BSI.T.Leak-Forced (Forced Information Leakage): Matches T.Information Leakage
of the TOE ST
– BSI.T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality): Matches T.Abuse-Func of the TOE
ST
– BSI.T.RND (Deficiency of Random Numbers): Basic threat concerning especially
the BAC functionality of the TOE; no conflict
– AUG4.T.Mem-Access (Memory Access Violation): Matches T.Malfunction, T.Abuse-
Func and T.Phys-Tamper of the TOE
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information
Leakage
T.Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent x
BSI.T.Phys-Probing x
BSI.T.Malfunction x
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation x
BSI.T.Leak-Forced x
BSI.T.Abuse-Func x
AUG4.T.Mem-Access x x x
Table 7.4: Mapping of hardware to TOE Threats (only threats that can be mapped directly are
shown)
Organizational Security Policies
The Organizational Security Policies of the TOE and the hardware have no conflicts be-
tween each other. They are shown in the following list.
• Organizational Security Policies of the TOE
– P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip): Covers P.Process-TOE of the
hardware ST
– P.Personalization (Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only): Not applicable
– P.Personal Data (Personal data protection policy): Covers AUG1.P.Add Functions
of the hardware ST
68
• Organizational Security Policies of the hardware
– BSI.P.Process-TOE (Protection during TOE Development and Production): Cov-
ered by P.Manufact of the TOE ST
– AUG1.P.Add Functions (Additional Specific Security Functionality): Covered by
P.Personal Data of the TOE ST
Security Objectives
Some of the Security Objectives of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped directly (see
Table 7.5). None of them show any conflicts between each other.
• Security Objectives for the TOE
– OT.AC Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD): No conflicts
– OT.Data Int (Integrity of personal data): No conflicts
– OT.Data Conf (Confidentiality of personal data): Matches AUG1.O.Add-Functions
of the hardware ST
– OT.Identification (Identification and Authentication of the TOE - BAC): Matches
BSI.O.Identification of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality): Matches BSI.O.Abuse-
Func of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Inf Leak (Protection against Information Leakage): Matches BSI.O.Leak-
Inherent and BSI.O.Leak-Forced of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering – BAC): Matches
BSI.O.Phys-Probing and BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation of the hardware ST
– OT.Prot Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions): Matches BSI.O.Malfunction
of the hardware ST
• Security Objectives for the hardware
– BSI.O.Leak-Inherent (Protection against Inherent Information Leakage): Covered
by OT.Prot Inf Leak of the TOE ST
– BSI.O.Phys-Probing (Protection against Physical Probing): Covered by OT.Prot Phys-
Tamper of the TOE ST
– BSI.O.Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions): Covered by OT.Prot Malfunction
of the TOE ST
– BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation (Protection against Physical Manipulation): Covered by
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper of the TOE ST
– BSI.O.Leak-Forced (Protection against Forced Information Leakage): Covered by
OT.Prot Inf Leak of the TOE ST
– BSI.O.Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality): Covered by OT.Prot
Abuse-Func of the TOE ST
69
– BSI.O.Identification (TOE Identification): Covered by OT.Identification of the TOE
ST
– BSI.O.RND (Random Numbers): Basic objective for the security of the TOE; no
conflicts with any Security Objective of the TOE
– AUG1.O.Add-Functions (Additional specific security functionality): Covered by
OT.Data Conf of the TOE ST
– AUG4.O.Mem-Access (Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control): Covered
by OT.Prot Malfunction, OT.Prot Abuse-Func and OT.Prot Phys-Tamper of the TOE
ST
– BSI.OE.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform): The correct usage of the hard-
ware platform becomes a Security Objective of the TOE and is proven by the eval-
uation
– BSI.OE.Resp-Appl (Treatment of User Data): No conflicts
– BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personaliza-
tion): No conflicts
OT.Data
Conf
OT.Identification/
OT.Prot
Abuse-Func
OT.Prot
Inf
Leak
OT.Prot
Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot
Malfunction
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent x
BSI.O.Phys-Probing x
BSI.O.Malfunction x
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation x
BSI.O.Leak-Forced x
BSI.O.Abuse-Func x
BSI.O.Identification x
AUG1.O.Add-Functions x
AUG4.O.Mem-Access x x x
Table 7.5: Mapping of hardware to TOE Security Objectives including those of the environment
(only those that can be mapped directly are shown)
70
Security Requirements
The relevant Security Requirements of the TOE and the hardware can be mapped directly
(see Table 7.6). None of them show any conflicts between each other.
• Relevant Security Requirements of the TOE
– FAU SAS.1 (Audit storage) Matches FAU SAS.1 of the hardware ST
– FCS CKM.1 (Cryptographic key generation - Generation of Document Basic Ac-
cess Keys by the TOE): No conflicts
– FCS CKM.4 (Cryptographic key destruction): No conflicts
– FCS COP.1/SHA (Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD):
Matches FCS COP.1/SHA-[1, 224, 256 ] operation of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/ENC (Cryptographic operation - Encryption / Decryption Triple DES):
Matches FCS COP.1/DES/3DES operation of the hardware ST
– FCS COP.1/AUTH (Cryptographic operation - Authentication): No conflicts
– FCS COP.1/MAC (Cryptographic operation - Retail MAC): Matches FCS COP.1/DES/
3DES operation of the hardware ST
– FCS RND.1 (Quality metric for random numbers): Matches FCS RNG.1 of the
hardware ST
– Class FIA (Identification and Authentication): No conflicts
– FDP ACC.1 (User Data Protection - Subset access control): Matches FDP ACC.2
of the hardware ST
– FDP ACF.1 (User Data Protection - Security attribute based access control): Matches
FDP ACF.1 of the hardware ST
– Other Class FDP (User Data Protection): No conflicts
– FMT SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions): No conflicts
– FMT SMR.1 (Security roles): No conflicts
– FMT LIM.1 (Limited capabilities): Matches FMT LIM.1 of the hardware ST
– FMT LIM.2 (Limited availability): Matches FMT LIM.2 of the hardware ST
– Other Class FMT (Management of TSF data): No conflicts
– FPT EMSEC.1 (TOE Emanation): Matches FDP ITT.1, FPT ITT.1 and FDP IFC.1
of the hardware ST
– FPT FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state): Matches FPT FLS.1, FRU FLT.2
and FPT PHP.3 of the hardware ST
– FPT TST.1 (TSF testing): Matches FRU FLT.2 of the hardware ST
– FPT PHP.3 (Resistance to physical attack): Matches FRU FLT.2 and FPT PHP.3 of
the hardware ST
71
• Security Requirements of the hardware
– FAU SAS.1 (Audit storage) Matches FAU SAS.1 of the TOE ST
– FRU FLT.2 (Limited fault tolerance): Covered by FPT FLS.1, FPT TST.1 and
FPT PHP.3 of the TOE ST
– FPT FLS.1 (Failure with preservation of secure state): Covered by FPT FLS.1 and
FPT PHP.3 of the TOE ST
– FMT LIM.1 (Limited capabilities): Covered by FMT LIM.1 of the TOE ST
– FMT LIM.2 (Limited availability): Covered by FMT LIM.2 of the TOE ST
– FPT PHP.3 (Resistance to physical attack): Covered by FPT PHP.3 of the TOE ST
– FDP ITT.1 (Basic internal transfer protection): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1 of the
TOE ST
– FPT ITT.1 (Basic internal TSF data transfer protection): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1
of the TOE ST
– FDP IFC.1 (Subset information flow control): Covered by FPT EMSEC.1 of the
TOE ST
– FCS RNG.1 (Random number generation): Covered by FCS RND.1 of the TOE
ST
– FDP ACC.2 (Complete access control) Covered by FDP ACC.1 of the TOE ST
– FDP ACF.1 (Security attribute based access control) Covered by FDP ACF.1 of the
TOE ST
– FMT MSA.3 (Static attribute initialization): Used implicitly, no conflicts to the
TOE SFRs
– FMT MSA.1 (Management of security attributes): Used implicitly, no conflicts to
the TOE SFRs
– FCS COP.1 (Cryptographic operation): Covered by FCS COP.1/SHA, FCS COP.1/ENC
and FCS COP.1/MAC of the TOE ST
– FCS CKM.1 (Cryptographic key generation): No conflicts
72
FAU
SAS.1
FCS
COP.1/SHA
FCS
COP.1/ENC
FCS
COP.1/MAC
FCS
RND.1
FDP
ACC.1
FDP
ACF.1
FMT
LIM.1
FMT
LIM.2
FPT
EMSEC.1/
FPT
FLS.1
FPT
TST.1
FPT
PHP.3
FAU SAS.1 x
FRU FLT.2 x x x
FPT FLS.1 x x
FMT LIM.1 x
FMT LIM.2 x
FPT PHP.3 x
FDP ITT.1 x
FPT ITT.1 x
FDP IFC.1 x
FCS RNG.1 x
FDP ACC.2 x
FDP ACF.1 x
FCS COP.1 x x x
Table 7.6: Mapping of of hardware to TOE Security SFRs (only SFRs that can be mapped
directly are shown)
Assurance Requirements
The level of assurance of the
• TOE is EAL4 augmented with ALC DVS.2
• Hardware is EAL5 augmented with ALC DVS.2 and AVA VAN.5
This shows that the Assurance Requirements of the TOE matches the Assurance Require-
ments of the hardware.
7.3.3 Conclusion
Overall no contradictions between the Security Targets of the TOE and the hardware can be
found.
73
Chapter 8
Glossary and Acronyms
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [10] option by which means the MRTD’s
chip proves and the Inspection System verifies the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
Application note / Note Optional informative part of the ST containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use
of the TOE (cf. CC part 1 [25], section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTD’s chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access Control Security mechanism defined in [10] by which means the MRTD’s chip
proves and the Inspection System protects their communication by means of Secure Mes-
saging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection System (BIS) An Inspection System which implements the terminals part of
the Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip
using the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the
logical MRTD.
Biographical data (biodata) The personalized details of the bearer of the document appear-
ing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a
passport book or on a travel card or visa. [1]
Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Certificate chain Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level), Docu-
ment Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates (high-
est level), where the certificate of a lower lever is signed with the private key correspond-
ing to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level. The Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the private key corresponding to the
public key it contains (self-signed certificate).
74
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means. [1]
Country Signing CA Certificate (CCSCA) Certificate of the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority
stored in the Inspection System.
Country Verifying Certification Authority The country specific root of the PKI of Inspec-
tion Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces
the Privacy policy of the issuing Country or Organization in respect to the protection of
sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. It is Current date The maximum
of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates
known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certifi-
cation Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate
expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm The [10], Annex E.1 describes the Doc-
ument Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Docu-
ment Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document Basic Access Keys Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for Secure Messaging
with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data trans-
mitted between the MRTD’s chip and the Inspection System [10]. It is drawn from the
printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ
of the passport book.
Document Security Object (SOD) A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the
Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in
the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [10]
Document Verifier Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and man-
aging the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the
MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations.
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and the Inspection System to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrollment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person’s iden-
tity. [26]
Extended Access Control Security mechanism identified in [10] by which means the MRTD’s
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the Inspection Systems authorized to read the op-
tional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference
data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference
75
data during their transmission to the Inspection System by Secure Messaging. The Per-
sonalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Per-
sonalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the
logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection System A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and
(iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of
the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Extended Inspection System (EIS) A role of a terminal as part of an Inspection System which
is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization
to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Ex-
tended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the bio-
graphical data or the portrait. [1]
General Inspection System A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Global Interoperability The capability of Inspection Systems (either manual or automated)
in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective
States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for
placement of both eye readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [26]
IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and
identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or
herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s document. [1]
Improperly documented person A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an ex-
pired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel doc-
ument or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or
visa, if required. [26]
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC identifi-
cation data).
76
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD
holder) and verifying its authenticity. [26]
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or mem-
ory functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have not
been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization.
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [5]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [5]
Logical Data Structure (LDS) The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the
optional capacity expansion technology [5]. The capacity expansion technology used is
the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [5]
as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable
data including (but not limited to)
1. personal data of the MRTD holder
2. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1)
3. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2)
4. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both
5. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
Logical travel document Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
1. data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory)
2. digitized photographic image (mandatory)
3. fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional)
Machine readable travel document (MRTD) Official document issued by a State or Orga-
nization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a sep-
arate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements
capable of being machine read. [5]
77
Machine readable visa (MRV) A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein, for-
mulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder. Contains manda-
tory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being
machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a pass-
port. [5]
Machine readable zone (MRZ) Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or
MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory
and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [5]
Machine-verifiable biometrics feature A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g.
an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form
that can be read and verified by machine. [1]
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on
the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
• the file structure implementing the LDS [5]
• the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content
of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16)
• the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the authen-
tication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access Control Mutual authentication protocol followed by Secure Messaging
between the Inspection System and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key
seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 [11] and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO, [27] p. 14.
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being de-
veloped by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase
1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD
holder in the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European commission decided to use only
fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication (i) Verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Ob-
ject and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
to the document. [1]
78
Personalization Agent The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD
holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and
(iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent Authentication Information TSF data used for authentication proof
and verification of the Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent Authentication Key Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Per-
sonalization Agent to prove their identity and get access to the logical MRTD accord-
ing to the SFR FIA UAU.4/BT, FIA UAU.6/BT and FIA API.1/SYM PT and (ii) by the
MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent
according to the SFR FIA UAU.4/MRTD, FIA UAU.5/MRTD and FIA UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel document Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
1. biographical data,
2. data of the machine-readable zone,
3. photographic image and
4. other data
Pre-personalization Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE
by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or
to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not
limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized MRTD’s chip MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [5]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the veri-
fication data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the docu-
ment by whatever means. [1]
Secure messaging in encrypted mode Secure messaging using encryption and message au-
thentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [28].
Skimming Imitation of the Inspection System to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ
data.
Terminal Authorization Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the
Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier
Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
79
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or orga-
nization which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel. [26]
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the Inspection System and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part
1 [25]).
Unpersonalized MRTD MRTD material prepared to produce a personalized MRTD contain-
ing an initialized and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User data Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC
part 1 [25]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine
whether it matches the enrollee’s template. [26]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their iden-
tity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference
data known for the claimed identity.
Acronyms
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
EIS Extended Inspection System
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organizational security policy
PT Personalization Terminal
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functions
80
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