XPORTALNET HS
SECURITY TARGET
VERSION 1.0
10-FEB-18
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Document management
Document identification
Document ID MicroEngine_EAL2_ST
Document title xPortalNet HS Security Target
Document Version/Date Version 1.0, 10-FEB-18
Document history
Version Date Description
0.1 12-JUL-17 Released for internal review.
0.2 10-AUG-17 Draft Release to certification Body
0.3 10-FEB-18 Revised Section 1, Section 4, Section 5 and Section 7
1.0 10-FEB-18 Final Released
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Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction (ASE_INT.1)................................................................................5
1.1 ST Reference ............................................................................................................................5
1.2 TOE Reference .........................................................................................................................5
1.3 Document Organization...........................................................................................................5
1.4 TOE Overview ..........................................................................................................................6
1.5 TOE Description .....................................................................................................................11
2 Conformance Claim (ASE_CCL.1) ..........................................................................................14
3 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)..............................................................................15
3.1 Overview................................................................................................................................15
3.2 Threats ...................................................................................................................................15
3.3 Organisational Security Policies.............................................................................................15
3.4 Assumptions ..........................................................................................................................16
4 Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)...........................................................................................17
4.1 Overview................................................................................................................................17
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE.............................................................................................17
4.3 Security Objectives for the Environment ..............................................................................17
4.4 TOE Security Objectives Rationale.........................................................................................18
4.5 Environment Security Objectives Rationale ..........................................................................20
5 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2).....................................................................................21
5.1 Overview................................................................................................................................21
5.2 Security Functional Requirements.........................................................................................22
5.3 Security Requirements Rationale ..........................................................................................31
6 TOE Security Assurance Requirements (ASE_REQ.2) .............................................................34
6.1 Overview................................................................................................................................34
6.2 Justification for SAR selection................................................................................................35
7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)...............................................................................36
7.1 Overview................................................................................................................................36
7.2 Security Audit.........................................................................................................................36
7.3 Identification and Authentication .........................................................................................37
7.4 Security Management............................................................................................................37
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7.5 Secure Communication..........................................................................................................38
7.6 Tamper Protection.................................................................................................................39
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1 Security Target Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
1.1 ST Reference
ST Title xPortalNet HS Security Target
ST Identifier MicroEngine_EAL2_ST
ST Version/Date Version 1.0
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Title TOE consists of:
• xPortalNet HS Server
• xPortalNet HS Client
• Xp-GLS5100 Controller
TOE Version • xPortalNet HS Server v2.0.0.2
• xPortalNet HS Client v2.0.0.2
• Xp-GLS5100 Controller
1.3 Document Organization
This document is organized into the following major sections:
• Section 1 provides the introductory material for the ST as well as the TOE description
(ASE_INT.1).
• Section 2 provides the conformance claims for the evaluation (ASE_CCL.1).
• Section 3 provides the definition of the security problem that the TOE has been designed to
address (ASE_SPD.1).
• Section 4 defines the security objectives for the TOE and the environment (ASE_OBJ.2).
• Section 5 contains the security functional and assurance requirements derived from the
Common Criteria Part 2 and 3 respectively, which are in turn satisfied by the TOE and the
development lifecycle (ASE_REQ.2).
• Section 6 contains the security assurance requirements derived from the Common Criteria,
Part 3 (ASE_REQ.2).
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1.4 TOE Overview
1.4.1 TOE Usage and Major Security Functions
The Target of Evaluation is xPortalNet HS System which consists of xPortalNet HS Server, xPortalNet
HS Client and Xp-GLS5100 Controller. The TOE provides a centralise management system to manage
MicroEngine controller(s) and supporting device from unauthorized user access and/or physical
temper on controllers or device such as access control system, alarm system, parking payment system,
lift access control system and other. The TOE provides access control and manage users, controllers
and card access control, where they can modify or change the Card ID and Card Serial Number. It also
increased accountability by always knowing which assets are accessed when and by whom.
The TOE consists of three (3) parts:
1. xPortalNet HS Server – the TOE is a software that runs on Windows operating System and act
as an centralise management system to manage xPortalNet HS client, controller, user and
supporting device. Each user able to manage multiple controller and devices registered with
the controller. TOE allow users to authenticate using the same user credential for xPortalNet
HS Server and xPortalNet Client. Below are the features:
▪ 20 Digits (Full DesFire 64-bit CSN and Card ID)
Higher Security by recording both DesFire Card Serial Number (CSN) and the Card ID
(CID), with 20 digits each. This captures the Full 64-bit number. The system will track the
CID with the CSN to ensure that the the card matches the full record.
▪ DesFire Security Profile Configuration
Full support of DesFire Security Profile Configuration in the software. This allows the
user to have maximum control of the security key setting and change it whenever they
want to. Programming of the cards can be done through the desktop card programming
unit. Easy to operate with no local configurations required.
▪ Alarm Monitoring & Lift Controller
Supports up to 512 inputs / 256 outputs / 256 LED Mimic outputs with event
programming. User notification can be achieved through client applications, email and
SMS for maximum flexibility. Control of up to 96 floors per lift. Support multiple lobby
implementations for large scale projects.
▪ CCTV Integration
Tightly integrated to MicroEngine’s line of DVDs for viewing and capturing purposes.
DVDs and CCTVs will be shown on the floor plan to ease identification and management.
▪ Floor Plan
Comprehensive floor plan control to enable easy viewing and control device of status.
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2. xPortalNet HS Client - TOE is a software running on Windows operating System that can be
deployed under xPortalNet HS servers. It enables the user to manage the registered
controller(s) and supporting devices. It also provides monitoring activities, report generation
as well as change tracking. Below are the features:
▪ Flexible scheduling to control who can access which device or door when and for how
long.
▪ Full event and audit trail records with data export functions.
▪ Use for a big scale deployment to manage and configure all device and users.
3. Xp-GLS5100 Controller – The TOE Controller is equipped with LAN connectivity at 10/100
Base-T using TCP/IP protocol. It supports push based communication to computer for faster
speed. The communication between controller and card reader is encrypted for secure
communication. The controller capable to centralised and distributed architecture flexible in
one box. Below are the features:
▪ Centralised Connection
▪ Support DesFire Card System with advanced messaging security with 20 digit Card
Serial Number (CSN and Card ID (CID). This provide a much reliable and secure
identification.
▪ Configurable to Distributed Architecture
▪ The Controller uses the 32-bit ARM RISC dual-core processor at 72MHz.
▪ Supports Door, Lift, Alarm Monitoring
▪ Onboard IP with Encryption
▪ Live Remote Firmware Download
The following table highlights the range of security functions implemented by the TOE.
Security functions Descriptions
Security Audit The TOE generates audit records for security events. The super user and
authorised user have the ability to view/export the audit and transaction logs
Identification and
Authentication
xPortalNet HS Server and xPortalNet HS users (super user and authorised user)
are required to identify or authenticate with the TOE prior to any user action
or information flow being permitted.
Note: super user and authorised user have the ability to authenticate using
same credential on server and/or client.
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Security functions Descriptions
Security Management The TOE (xPortalNet HS Server) provides a wide range of security management
functions. The super user able to configure the TOE via a software. Super user
can configure the TOE, manage device, manage user account and view/export
the transaction logs
Secure
Communication
The TOE can protect the user data from disclosure and modification by using a
secure communication
Tamper Protection The TOE (Xp-GLS5100 Controller) includes tamper detection mechanisms that
generate a log to alert the users
1.4.2 TOE Type
The TOE is consists of the following components; xPortalNet HS Server, xPortalNet HS Client and xP-
GLS5100 Controller. The TOE provides security functionality such as Security Audit, Identification and
Authentication, Security Management, Secure Communication and Tamper Protection. The TOE can
be categorised as Access Control Devices and Systems in accordance with the categories identified on
the Common Criteria Portal (www.commoncriteriaportal.org) that lists all the certified products.
1.4.3 Supporting hardware, software and/or firmware
Minimum System Requirements
xPortalNet HS Server
CPU Xeon E5506 2.15 Ghz
RAM 16GB
Operating System Microsoft Windows Server 2008 (64-bit)
Microsoft windows Server 2012 (64-bit)
Microsoft .NET Framework Version 2.0 & 3.5
Ethernet & Serial Port Yes
USB Port Required for software license key
Hard Disk (Free Space) 500GB
Database Microsoft SQL Server 2008
xPortalNet HS Client
CPU Intel Core 2 Duo E8400 3.0Ghz
RAM 4GB
Operating System Microsoft Windows 7
Microsoft Windows 10
Microsoft .NET Framework Version 2.0
Ethernet & Serial Port Yes
USB Port Optional for USB Desktop reader
Hard Disk (Free Space) 50GB
Database Microsoft SQL Server 2008
XP-GLS5100
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Max Door 5
Relay Output 8(5 for Door Relay + 3 General Purpose) Relay rating: 1A
Sensor Input 16 Supervised (as door Status or General Purpose)
IP Support Yes. LAN 100 Base T
Reader Support MicroEngine Plato Readers: Max 10 (5 Entry + 5 Exit)
Wiegand / ABA Readers : Max 5
Comm Port Yes.
RS485 to Remote Interface Module
RS485 to Extension Boards
Up to 16 Digits Up to 16 Digits
Max Card DB 25,000 / 50,000 / 100,000*
Max Transaction DB 100,000 / 100,000 / 200,000*
Access Mode 1. Card + Pin
2. Card Only
3. Pin Only
4. Facility Code
5. Fingerprint Only
6. Card + Fingerprint
7. Pin + Fingerprint
8. Automatic Lock Release
9. Inhibit Access
Processor ARM RISC Processor at 72MHz
Power Requirement 12V @ 500mA (Base Board Only)
Remote Firmware Update
Yes. Can be done through application software at site.
Controller Package PSU
12VDC @ 5A with 12AH Battery
1.5 TOE Description
1.5.1 Physical scope of the TOE
Legend: TOE Boundary
Figure 1 – TOE Deployment Architecture
Below are the descriptions of the components stated in Figure 1 above.
Component Descriptions
xPortalNet HS Server The TOE is a software that runs on Windows operating System and act
as a centralise management system to manage xPortalNet HS client,
system user, controller and supporting system or device. Each user able
to manage multiple controller and devices registered with the
controller. The TOE allows users to authenticate using the same user
account for xPortalNet HS client.
xPortalNet HS Client TOE is a software running on Windows operating System that can be
deployed under xPortalNet HS Server. It enables the user to manage the
registered controller(s) and supporting devices. It also provides
monitoring activities, report generation as well as change tracking.
XP-GLS5100
Controller
The TOE Controller is equipped with LAN connectivity at 10/100 Base-T
using TCP/IP protocol. It supports push based communication to
computer for faster speed. The communication between controller and
card reader is encrypted for secure communication. The controller
capable to centralised and distributed architecture flexible in one box.
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Component Descriptions
Car park management Support Vehicle Count control and Car park payment management
system
CCTV Tightly integrated to MicroEngine’s line of DVDs for viewing and
capturing purposes. DVDs and CCTVs will be shown on the floor plan
to ease identification and management.
Alarm Monitoring and
Lift Access Control
Supports up to 512 inputs / 256 outputs / 256 LED Mimic outputs with
event programming. User notification can be achieved through client
applications, email and SMS for maximum flexibility.
Control of up to 96 floors per lift. Support multiple lobby
implementations for large scale projects.
Door Access Control TOE can be integrated with door access control. Door access control is
an electronic access control system grants access based on the
credential presented. When access is granted, the door is unlocked for
a predetermined time and the transaction is recorded.
1.5.2 Logical scope of the TOE
The logical boundary consists of the security functionality of TOE is summarized below.
• Security Audit: The TOE (xPortalNet HS Server and xPortalNet HS Client) generates audit
records for security events. Only the super user and authorised user have the ability to
view/export the audit logs. There are two types of audit event log:
o xPortalNet HS Server – The Activity audit event is catered for the user’s activities
(Super user/authorised User) audit log. It captures events such as event date,
Connection, Unit No, RdrNo, Controller, Door/Panel, ID No, Card CSN, Card Type,
Name and Transaction.
o xPortalNet HS Client – The Activity audit event list is catered for the client user’s
activities (authorised user) audit log. It captures events such as event date,
Connection, Unit No, RdrNo, Controller, Door/Panel, ID No, Card CSN, Card Type,
Name and Transaction.
The exported audit logs can be either in CSV file format.
• Identification and Authentication: All users are required to perform identification and
authentication with the TOE before any information flows are permitted.
o xPortalNet HS Server – super user and authorised user must be authenticated to the
server prior to performing any TOE functions by entering a username and password.
o xPortalNet HS client – Authorised user must be authenticated to the client by entering
the username and password before performing any TOE functions. Each user utilizes
one device policy to prevent sharing of user IDs and passwords.
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• Security Management: The TOE provides a wide range of security management functions. For
xPortalNet HS Server, the super user and/or authorised user able to configure the TOE via
software. Super user can manage the TOE controller (Xp-GLS5100), manage user account and
view/export the audit logs.
• Secure Communication: The TOE can protect the user data from disclosure and modification
using a secure communication between:
o xPortalNet HS Server,
o xPortalNet HS Client, and
o Xp-GLS5100 Controller
• Tamper Protection: The TOE (Xp-GLS5100 Controller) includes tamper detection mechanisms
that generate a log records to alert users
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2 Conformance Claim (ASE_CCL.1)
The ST and TOE are conformant to version 3.1 (REV 4) of the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation.
The following conformance claims are made for the TOE and ST:
• Part 2 conformant. Conformant with Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation Part 2: Security functional requirements, version 3.1 (REV 4), September 2012
• Part 3 conformant, EAL2. Conformant with Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance requirements, version 3.1 (REV 4). Evaluation
is EAL2, September 2012.
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3 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
3.1 Overview
This section describes the nature of the security problem that the TOE is designed to address. The
security problem is described through:
a) a series of threats that the TOE has been designed to mitigate,
b) specific assumptions about the security aspects of the environment (both IT related and
non-IT related elements) in which the TOE will operate, and
c) any relevant organisational security policies are any statements made in terms of rules or
guidelines that must be followed by the TOE and/or the operational environment.
3.2 Threats
Identifier Threat statement
T.MANAGEMENT An unauthorized user modifies configuration data that they are not
authorised to access resulting in a loss of integrity of the data that the TOE
uses to enforce the security functions.
T.UNAUTHORISED_A
CCESS
A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE and residing data by
sending impermissible information through the TOE (such as Brute Force
Attacks) resulting the exploitation of protected resources
T.CONFIG An unauthorized person may read, modify, or destroy TOE configuration
data.
T.TOECOM An unauthorized person or unauthorized external IT entity may be able to
view, modify, and/or delete security related information or information
properties sent between distributed components of the TOE.
3.3 Organisational Security Policies
No organisational security policies have been defined regarding the use of the TOE.
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3.4 Assumptions
Identifier Assumption statement
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy platform and local network from which it
provides administrative capabilities. The TOE relies on this platform to provide
logon services via a local or network directory service, and to provide basic
audit log management functions. The platform is expected to be configured
specifically to provide TOE services, employing features such as a host-based
firewall which limits its network role to providing TOE functionality.
A.SUPERUSER One or more competent, trusted personnel who are not careless, wilfully
negligent, or hostile, are assigned and authorized as the TOE super user, and do
so using and abiding by guidance documentation.
A.USER Users are not wilfully negligent or hostile, and use the device within compliance
of a reasonable enterprise security policy.
A.TIMESTAMP The platforms on which the TOE operate shall be able to provide reliable time
stamps.
A.PHYSICAL It is assumed that the appliance hosting the operating system and database are
in a secure operating facility with restricted physical access and non-shared
hardware.
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4 Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
4.1 Overview
The security objectives are a concise statement of the intended response to the security problem
defined in Section 3. There are security objectives for the TOE to address and additional objectives
that provide specific direction for the intended in environment in which the TOE is to operate.
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE
Identifier Objective statements
O.ACCESS The TOE must ensure that only authorised users are able to access
protected resources or functions and to explicitly deny access to specific
users when appropriate
O.CONFIG TOE shall prevent unauthorized person to access TOE functions and
configuration data. Only authorized TOE Super user shall have access to
TOE management interface.
O.MANAGE The TOE must allow super user to effectively manage the TOE, while
ensuring that appropriate controls are maintained over those functions.
O.USER The TOE must ensure that all users are identified and authenticated
before accessing protected resources or functions.
O.NOAUTH The TOE shall protect itself against attempts by unauthorized users to
bypass, deactivate, or tamper with TOE security functionality.
O.TOECOM The TOE must protect the confidentiality of its dialogue between
distributed components.
4.3 Security Objectives for the Environment
Identifier Objective statements
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon the trustworthy platform and hardware
to provide policy enforcement as well as cryptographic
services and data protection.
OE.SUPERUSER The owners of the TOE must ensure that the super user who
manages the TOE is not hostile, competent and apply all
super user guidance in a trusted manner.
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Identifier Objective statements
OE.USER Users of the TOE are trained to securely use the system,
controller and device and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
OE.TIMESTAMP Reliable timestamp is provided by the operational
environment for the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the
appliance hosting the operating system and database are in a
secure operating facility with restricted physical access and
non-shared hardware.
4.4 TOE Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides the summary that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the
addressed assumptions, threats and OSPs.
THREATS/
ASSUMPTIONS/OSPs
OBJECTIVES
T.MANAGEMENT
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS
T.CONFIG
T.TOECOM
A.PLATFORM
A.SUPERUSER
A.USER
A.TIMESTAMP
A.PHYSICAL
O.ACCESS D D
O.CONFIG D
O.MANAGE D
O.USER D D
O.TOECOM D
O.NOAUTH D
OE.PLATFORM D
OE.SUPERUSER D
OE.USER D
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THREATS/
ASSUMPTIONS/OSPs
OBJECTIVES
T.MANAGEMENT
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS
T.CONFIG
T.TOECOM
A.PLATFORM
A.SUPERUSER
A.USER
A.TIMESTAMP
A.PHYSICAL
OE. TIMESTAMP D
OE. PHYSICAL D
The following table demonstrates that all security objectives for the TOE trace back to the threats
and OSPs in the security problem definition.
Threats/OSPs Objectives Rationale
T.CONFIG O.CONFIG The objective ensures that the TOE only allowed
authorized person such as TOE Super user to
access TOE functions and configuration data.
T.MANAGEMENT O.USER The objective ensures that the TOE identifies and
authenticates all users before they access a
protected resources or functions.
O.MANAGE This objective ensures that the TOE provides the
tools necessary for the authorized system admin
to manage the security-related functions and that
those tools are usable only by users with
appropriate authorizations.
O.ACCESS The objective ensures that the TOE restricts access
to the TOE objects to the authorized users and
deny access to specific users when appropriate
T.UNAUTHORISED_AC
CESS
O.ACCESS The objective ensures that the TOE restricts access
to the TOE objects to the authorized users and
deny access to specific users when appropriate
O.USER The objective ensures that the TOE identifies and
authenticates all users before they access a
protected resources or functions.
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Threats/OSPs Objectives Rationale
O.NOAUTH The objective ensures that the TOE protect itself
against attempts by unauthorized users to bypass,
deactivate, or tamper with TOE security
functionality.
T.TOECOM O.TOECOM The objective ensures that the TOE protect the
confidentiality of its dialogue between distributed
components.
4.5 Environment Security Objectives Rationale
The following table demonstrates that all security objectives for the operational environment all
trace back to assumptions or OSPs in the security problem definition.
Assumptions Objective Rationale
A.PLATFORM OE.PLATFORM This objective ensures that the underlying
platforms are trustworthy and hardened to
protect against known vulnerabilities and security
configuration issues.
A.SUPERUSER OE.SUPERUSER This objective ensures that those responsible for
the TOE are competent and trustworthy
individuals, capable of managing the TOE and the
security of the information it contains.
A.USER OE.USER This objective ensures that those responsible for
the TOE are competent and trustworthy
individuals, capable of operating the TOE and the
security of the information it contains in a secure
manner.
A.TIMESTAMP OE.TIMESTAMP This objective ensures that reliable timestamps
are provided by the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL OE.PHYSICAL This objective ensures that the appliance that
hosts the operating system and database are
hosted in a secure operating facility with
restricted physical access with non-shared
hardware.
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5 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
5.1 Overview
This section defines the security requirements satisfied by the TOE. Each requirement has been
extracted from version 3.1 (REV 4) of the Common Criteria, part 2 providing functional requirements
and part 3 providing assurance requirements.
Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines an approved set of operations that may be applied to security
functional requirements. Following are the approved operations and the document conventions
that are used within this ST to depict their application:
• Assignment. The assignment operation provides the ability to specify an identified
parameter within a requirement. Assignments are depicted using bolded text and are
surrounded by square brackets as follows [assignment].
• Selection. The selection operation allows the specification of one or more items from a list.
Selections are depicted using bold italics text and are surrounded by square brackets as
follows [selection].
• Refinement. The refinement operation allows the addition of extra detail to a requirement.
Refinements are indicated using bolded text, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions.
• Iteration. The iteration operation allows a component to be used more than once with
varying operations. Iterations are depicted by placing a letter at the end of the component
identifier as follows FDP_IFF.1a and FDP_IFF.1b.
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5.2 Security Functional Requirements
5.2.1 Overview
The security functional requirements are expressed using the notation stated in Section 5.1 above
and itemised in the table below.
Identifier Title
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FIA_ATD.1a User attribute definition (Server)
FIA_ATD.1b User attribute definition (Client)
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action (Server & Client)
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action (Server & Client)
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1a Management of TSF data (Server)
FMT_MTD.1b Management of TSF data (Client)
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour (Server)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (Server)
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack (Controller)
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5.2.2 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit report of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [Specifically defined auditable events listed in the Notes section below].
FAU_GEN1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
• For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [none].
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Notes: Auditable events within the TOE:
xPortalNet HS Server
a) Log In,
b) Shut Down,
c) System Device Setting,
d) Software Setting,
e) Staff Profile
f) Software User
g) Manage User connection
xPortalNet HS Client
a) Screen Alarm
b) System Device Setting
c) Device Operation Settings
d) Software Setting
e) Time Setting
f) Staff Profile
g) Staff Attendance Schedule
h) Staff Security Setting
i) Staff Records
j) Floor Plan
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k) Download/Upload Settings
l) Transaction Report
m) Software User
n) Manage User connection
5.2.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [Super user and authorised user] with the capability to read
[all audit information] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Notes: None.
5.2.4 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] on [objects listed in the table
below].
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Notes: xPortalNet HS Server
Subject Object Operation
Super user Manage user
connection
Execute
Software User Add/Delete/Change/View
Staff Profile Add/Delete/Change/View
Software Testing Change/View
System Device
Settings
Add/Delete/Change/View
Shut Down Execute
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Log IN Execute
Authorised User
(based on assigned
privilege)
Software User Add/Delete/Change/View
Staff Profile Add/Delete/Change/View
Software Testing Change/View
System Device
Settings
Add/Delete/Change/View
Shut Down Execute
Log IN Execute
xPortalNet HS Client
Subject Object Operation
Authorised user Card personalization Execute
Personalization
Settings
Add/Delete/Change/Print/View
Key Management for
Personalization
Add/Delete/Change/Print/View
Guard Tour Report 1 Print/View
Guard Tour Add/Delete/Change/Print/View
CCTV Camera View Execute
Download/Upload
Visitor Card Settings
Execute
Visitor Sign IN/Out Execute
5.2.5 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to objects based on the following:
[as listed in the Notes section of FDP_ACC.1].
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
a) First Time login to xPortalNet Server, super user and authorised user
must set their password before performing any action for the first time
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b) Super user and authorised user must enter their username and
password before performing any action on the xPortalNet Server
c) Super user and authorised user can change their password once they
have authenticated with the TOE
]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Notes: None.
5.2.6 FIA_ATD.1a User attribute definition (Server)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_ATD.1a.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: [Username, Password]
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Notes: None.
5.2.7 FIA_ATD.1b User attribute definition (Client)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_ATD.1b.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: [Username, Password]
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Notes: None.
5.2.8 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Notes: None.
5.2.9 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Notes: None.
5.2.10 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to restrict the ability to
[change_default, modify, delete] the security attributes [Super user Account,
Authorised user Account] to [Super user].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Notes: None.
5.2.11 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to provide [permissive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Notes: None.
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5.2.12 FMT_MTD.1a Management of TSF data (Server)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1a.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [manage] the [Access Control Lists, assign
users to roles, User ID] to [Super user]
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Notes: None.
5.2.13 FMT_MTD.1b Management of TSF data (Client)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1b.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [password] to [Super User,
Authorised user].
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Notes: None.
5.2.14 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour (Server)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour of, modify the
behaviour of] the functions [xPortalNet HS Alarm Trigger Pattern] to [Super user
and Authorised user].
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Notes: None.
5.2.15 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (Server)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
xPortalNet HS Server
a) Log In,
b) Manage user connection
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c) Software User
d) Staff Profile
e) Software Testing
f) System Device Settings
g) Shut Down
].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Notes: None.
5.2.16 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Super user, Authorised user].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Notes: None.
5.2.17 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [remote] users
that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
[modification or disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [initial user authentication,
[and all further communication after authentication]].
Dependencies: No dependencies
Notes: None
5.2.18 FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack (Controller)
Hierarchical to: FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
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FPT_PHP.2.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might
compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.2.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with
the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
FPT_PHP.2.3 For [the xp-GLS5100 controller casing], the TSF shall monitor the devices and
elements and notify [authorised user] when physical tampering with the TSF's
devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
Dependencies: FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Notes: The TSF shall detect physical tampering performed by opening the cover or
forcedly removing the device
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5.3 Security Requirements Rationale
5.3.1 Dependency rationale
Below demonstrates the mutual supportiveness of the SFR’s for the TOE by demonstrating how the
SFR dependencies are fulfilled by the TOE, and by justifying those dependencies that are not fulfilled.
The SARs relevant to the TOE constitute an evaluation assurance level EAL2 as defined in Common
Criteria and include no extensions or augmentations. Therefore, as a complete evaluation assurance
level, they are a mutually supportive set and require no further justification.
SFR Dependency Inclusion
FAU_GEN.1 FPT.STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1 has not been
included as the TOE obtains
all audit timestamps from the
underlying platform. This has
been addressed in Section
3.4 by A.TIMESTAMP.
FAU.SAR.1 FAU.GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU.GEN.1
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FIA_ATD.1a No dependencies NA
FIA_ATD.1b No dependencies NA
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies N/A
FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
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SFR Dependency Inclusion
FMT_MTD.1a FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1b FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies N/A
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2
FTP_TRP.1 No dependencies N/A
FPT_PHP.2 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_MOF.1
5.3.2 Mapping of SFRs to security objectives for the TOE
Security objective Mapped SFRs Rationale
O.USER FIA_UAU.2 The requirement helps meet the objective by
authenticating user before any TSF mediated actions.
FIA_UID.2 The requirement helps meet the objective by identifying
user before any TSF mediated actions
O.ACCESS FAU_GEN.1 The TOE allows set of rules to be applied to indicate
authorised and unauthorised access of every user.
FAU_SAR.1 The TOE maintains a profile of system usage and
suspicion rating to each profile along with threshold
condition to indicate possible security violation.
FIA_ATD.1a/b The requirement helps meet the objective by ensuring
user security attributes are maintained.
FMT_SMF.1 The requirement helps meet the objective by providing
management functions of the TOE for authenticated user.
FMT_SMR.1 The requirement helps meet the objective by providing
user timing of identification.
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Security objective Mapped SFRs Rationale
O.MANAGE FMT_MTD.1a The requirement helps meet the objective by restricting
the ability to modify the user password.
FMT_MSA.1 The requirement helps to meet the objective by
restricting the ability to modify the security attributes for
the super user.
O.CONFIG FMT_MTD.1a The requirement helps meet the objective by restricting
user access to management functions.
FMT_MTD.1b The requirement helps meet the objective by restricting
user access to management functions.
FMT_MSA.1 The requirement helps meet the objective by restricting
user access to security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3
The requirement helps meet the objective by restricting
access to provide default values for security attributes
that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_SMR.1 The requirement helps meet the objective by defining the
security roles used within the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1 The requirement provides access control functionality to
ensure that access to security functionality is controlled.
FDP_ACF.1 The requirement provides access control functionality to
ensure that access to security functionality is controlled.
FMT_MOF.1 This requirement helps meet the objective by restricting
the modification of the TOE behaviour to Super User
O.TOECOM FTP_TRP.1 The requirement ensures that data sent by users is
protected from modification or disclosure.
O.NOAUTH FPT_PHP.2 The requirement ensures that the TOE provide
notification of physical attack to Super User.
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6 TOE Security Assurance Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
6.1 Overview
EAL2 requires evidence relating to the design information and test results, but does not demand more
effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice.
EAL2 provides assurance by a full security target and an analysis of the SFRs in that ST, using a
functional and interface specification, guidance documentation and a basic description of the
architecture of the TOE, to understand the security behaviour.
The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer testing based on
the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, and a
vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional specification, TOE design, security architecture
description and guidance evidence provided) demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with
a basic attack potential.
EAL2 also provides assurance through use of a configuration management system and evidence of
secure delivery procedures.
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
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Assurance class Assurance components
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
6.2 Justification for SAR selection
The assurance package for the evaluation of the TOE is Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2).
TOE has a low to moderate level of assurance in enforcing its security functions when instantiated in
its intended environment, which imposes no restrictions on assumed activity on applicable
networks. EAL2 is sufficient to demonstrate that the TOE is resistant to attackers with a Basic attack
potential.
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7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
7.1 Overview
This section provides the TOE summary specification, a high-level description of how the TOE
implements the claimed security functional requirements. The TOE provides the following security
functions:
• Security Audit;
• Identification and Authentication;
• Security Management;
• Secure Communication; and
• Tamper Protection
7.2 Security Audit
The TOE (xPortalNet HS Server) will create audit records (which contain the data and time of the event,
type of event, subject identity and outcome of the transaction event) for the following auditable
events (FAU_GEN.1):
xPortalNet HS Server
h) Log In,
i) Shut Down,
j) System Device Setting,
k) Software Setting,
l) Staff Profile
m) Software User
n) Manage User connection
xPortalNet HS Client
o) Screen Alarm
p) System Device Setting
q) Device Operation Settings
r) Software Setting
s) Time Setting
t) Staff Profile
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u) Staff Attendance Schedule
v) Staff Security Setting
w) Staff Records
x) Floor Plan
y) Download/Upload Settings
z) Transaction Report
aa) Software User
bb) Manage User connection
The TOE’s (xPortalNet HS Server) Super user have the capability to review these audit records via the
software interface (FAU_SAR.1). Timestamps for the server and client are generated for audit logs by
utilising the underlying operating system. The TOE does not generate its own timestamps for use in
audit records; these are supplied by the underlying operating system.
7.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE implement access control and authentication measures to ensure that TOE data and
functionality is not misused by unauthorised parties (FDP_ACC.1). All TOE users must provide
authentication data to the TOE to affirm their identity and role prior to being granted access to any
TOE functions or interfaces.
• xPortalNet HS Server maintains two types of users which are Super user and Authorised user
(FMT_SMR.1). These users may access the Server via the web interface that the platform
provides. Super user and Authorised user must be authenticated to the server prior
performing any TOE functions by entering a username and password (FIA_ATD.1a, FIA_UAU.2,
FIA_UID.2, FDP_ACF.1). Upon first time login to the server, Super user and Authorised user
must set their new password before performing any action (FDP_ACF.1).
• xPortalNet HS Client maintains one type of user which is Authorised user (FMT_SMR.1). These
users must be authenticated to the software application by entering username and password
before performing any TOE functions (FIA_ATD.1b, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FDP_ACF.1).
7.4 Security Management
The TOE provides a suite of management functions only to Super user and Authorised user. These
functions allow for the configuration of Server and client to suit the environment in which it is
deployed. Additionally, management roles may perform the following tasks (FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_MTD.1a, FMT_MTD.1b, FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3):
xPortalNet HS Server
• Manage user connection,
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• Software User,
• Staff Profile
• Software Testing
• System Device Settings
• Shut down
• Log In
xPortalNet HS Client
• Card personalization
• Personalization Settings
• Key Management for Personalization
• Guard Tour Report 1
• Guard Tour
• CCTV Camera View
• Download/Upload Visitor Card Settings
• Visitor Sign IN/OUT
Both xPortalNet Server and Client implement access control and authentication measures to ensure
that TOE data and functionality is not misused by unauthorised parties (FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1).
7.5 Secure Communication
The TOE establishes a trusted path (FPT_TRP.1) using the proprietary encryption method as a secure
communication between:
• Remote Super user/ system user and xPortal HS Server
• xPortal HS Server and xPortal HS Client
The TOE also able to protect the user data from disclosure and modification using controller
encryption as a secure communication between the controller and card reader.
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7.6 Tamper Protection
The TOE (Xp-GLS5100 Controller) includes motion tamper detection mechanisms that trigger an alarm
response mechanisms to alert the users (FPT_PHP.2). There is one sensors used in the Controller to
perform tamper detection.
• Motion Sensor is used to detect the changes on orientation and position of the Device.
A dedicated output signal line is allocated to connect to external alarm/reporting system. This signal
will be triggered upon tampering is detected. The super user has the ability to manage the behaviour
of the TOE alarm trigger pattern (FMT_MOF.1) via the xPortalNet HS server.