KECS-CR-21-69
XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-1139-2021
2021. 12. 23.
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2021.12.23 -
Certification report for XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC
with PACE on M7892
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for XSmart e-Passport V1.5
EAC with PACE on M7892 of LG CNS.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Testing Certification (KTC)
Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents
Certification Report ....................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................6
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................8
5. Architectural Information ....................................................................................9
6. Documentation...................................................................................................10
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................10
8. Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................... 11
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................12
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................12
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................13
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................14
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................14
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................16
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................16
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................18
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................19
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................19
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................22
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL5+ evaluation of XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892
with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and
conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified integrated circuit chip (IC chip) provided by Infineon Technologies AG and the
embedded software (IC chip operating system (COS), the application of machine
readable travel documents(MRTD application)) including Logical Data Structure(LDS)
in accordance with the ICAO Documents [5]. The TOE provides Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) and Extended Access Control (EAC)
defined in the ICAO’s Doc9303 Machine Readable Travel Documents [5] and the BSI’s
TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms Machine Readable Travel Documents [6].
Basic Access Control (BAC) and Active Authentication (AA) are also supported by the
product, but BAC and AA are not included in the scope of this TOE and separately
evaluated at the same time in consideration of different level of assurance which is
required by different PPs which are claimed conformance by each TOE.
The TOE XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892 is composed of the
following components:
 IC chip : Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003
libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware), see BSI-DSZ-CC-
0782-V5-2020, and
 Embedded software : e-Passport_V15 provided by LG CNS.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Testing Certification (KTC)
and completed on 10 December 2021. This report grounds on the evaluation technical
report (ETR) KTC had submitted [9] and the Security Target (ST) [10][11].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)
Version 1.3.2 (“EAC PP” hereinafter) [7] and Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE Version 1.01 (“PACE PP” hereinafter) [8]. All
Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance
component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance
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Level EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. Therefore, the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)
are based upon both functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined
component in the Extended Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE
satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2
extended.
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Type Identifier Release TOE Format
/Delivery Method
Composite
TOE
XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC
with PACE on M7892
V1.5 IC chip (module
type)
/By manual
(Note: The IC
Dedicated SW is
contained in ROM
and IC optional SW,
COS and Application
is contained in
FLASH memory of
the IC Chip.)
TOE
component:
IC + IC
Dedicated
SW
Infineon Security Controller
M7892 B11
- SLE78CLFX2400P
- SLE78CLFX3000P
- SLE78CLFX4000P
B11 IC+SW
Certification Report Page 7
Type Identifier Release TOE Format
/Delivery Method
Firmware V78.015.14.1
TOE
component:
IC Optional
SW
EC v2.07.003 Library (SW)
SHA-2 V1.01
Base v2.07.003
Toolbox v2.07.003
TOE
Component:
COS +
Application
e-Passport_V15
- e-Passport_V15_CLFX2400P.hex
- e-Passport_V15_CLFX3000P.hex
- e-Passport_V15_CLFX4000P.hex
V1.5
Hexa code image
(SW)
Guidance
Document
XSMART e-Passport
V1.5_AGD(EAC with
PACE)_V1.2.docx
V1.2
Softcopy
/PGP email
[Table 1] TOE identification
TOE is Composite product that should be considered in the Composite Product life
cycle. Composite product integrator performs Composite product integration (FLASH
code downloads into IC chip), preparation and shipping to the personalization for the
Composite product (Composite Product Integration). Then the TOE is issued by Card
Issuer with applications and associated personalization data after the initialization step.
For details on the chips, the IC dedicated software and the crypto libraries, see the
documentation under BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 [12].
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(14 August 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(17 May 2021)
TOE XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
EAL EAL5+
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(augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5)
Developer LG CNS
Sponsor LG CNS
Evaluation Facility Korea Testing Certification (KTC)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
10 December 2021
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [10][11] for the TOE claims strict conformance to the EAC PP [7] and the PACE
PP [8] by security objectives and security requirements based on the ICAO documents
[5] and BSI’s TR-03110-1 [6]. Thus, the TOE provides security features defined in the
EAC PP [7] and PACE PP [8].
Additionally, the TOE provides security features as follows:
 Personalization Agent authentication, ensures only authorized entity can
access to the TOE during pre-personalization and personalization phase,
 Secure messaging, ensures transmitted data to be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and modification during pre-personalization and
personalization phase.
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chip, the TOE
utilizes and therefore provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as security sensors, protection against physical proving, malfunctions,
physical manipulations and abuse of functionality, against leakage of information of
AES, 3DES, ECC and TRNG. Therefore, the TOE maintains the integrity and the
confidentiality of data stored in the memory or of security functionalities provided by the
TOE. For more details refer to the Security Target Lite for the IC chip [13].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions are described in the ST [10][11] in terms of the security aspects of
the operational environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used
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(for the detailed and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [10][11],
chapter 3.2).
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 1] show the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified IC chip and the embedded software.
[Figure 1] Architecture of the TOE
 MRTD application includes LDS (PACE and EAC) and application data which
is consisting of User Data and TSF Data of e-Passport.
 AML (Application Middle Layer) supports functions of MRTD application such
as cryptographic key management and logics for transactions and
cryptographic operations linked to HAL (Hardware Abstraction Layer).
 HAL (Hardware Abstraction Layer) implements hardware-dependent parts and
provides IC chip initialization, hardware resource management, cryptographic
algorithm implementation based on the cryptographic libraries, and security
settings on the chip.
 IC chip provides security features such as security sensors/detectors, and
supports cryptography.
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For the detailed description is referred to the ST [10][11].
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
XSMART e-Passport V1.5_AGD(EAC with
PACE)_V1.2.docx
V1.2 29 September 2021
[Table 3] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the component of the TOE and the
respective specification of each component. The developer conducted test cases
related to the TSFIs and module interfaces, and cryptographic functions as described
below:
 The automated tools for testing, whether the smartcard specifications (ISO/IEC
7816, ISO/IEC 14443, ICAO EAC, and PACE) are satisfied, are used to
conduct the security function tests and module interface tests through the
scenario-based scripts.
 The developer used an in-house testing tool for some special tests including
crypto test, tear test, card initializations test and security audit test.
 The developer conducted additional special tests including memory range
checking test, cryptographic key deletion test, and forcing card reset test.
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE and demonstrated that the TSFI behaves as
described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and modules
(including their interfaces) and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_DPT.3.
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The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests listed in this report chapter 7 and had
conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The
TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests. The tests cover
preparative procedures in accordance with the guidance. Some tests were performed
by design and source code analysis to verify fulfillment of the requirements of the
underlying platform to the COS and Application. The implementation of the
requirements of the platform’s ETR and guidance was verified by the evaluators.
Also, the evaluator had conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based
upon test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent, methodical
search for potential vulnerabilities. These test cases cover testing APDU commands,
perturbation attacks, observation attacks such as SEMA, fault injection attacks and so
on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing high attack potential were
found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [9].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892 composed of the
following components:
 IC chips: Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL
v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003
libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) (BSI-DSZ-CC-
0782-V5-2020)
 Embedded software: e-Passport_V15
The TOE is identified by the name, version and release number:
 IC fabricator: 0x8100 (Infineon)
 IC type: 0x0001 (SLE78CLFX4000P)
 OS release date: 0x1285 (YDDD, 2021.10.12)
 OS release level: 0x0150 (V1.5)
And the guidance document is listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 3] were evaluated
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with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [9] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2], and CCRA supporting
documents for the Smartcard and similar device [14][15][16][17][18][19].
As result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance components
of EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
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ST of the IC chip in accordance with the CCRA supporting document Composite
Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools that yield consistent and
predictable results, and implementation standards have been applied. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_TAT.2.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, development tools and related
information, and the evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in
accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.5.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Additionally,
sufficiency of the measures as applied is intended be justified. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator in accordance with the
CCRA supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
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maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems’ sufficiency
to determine the TSF boundary and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
modules and enough information about the SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.4.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.5.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
Certification Report Page 15
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1. Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements
in accordance with the CCRA supporting document ADV_ARC Evaluation [18][19].
The implementation representation is sufficient to satisfy the functional requirements of
the ST and is a correct realisation of the low-level design. Therefore, the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_IMP.1.
The TSF internal is well-structured such that the likelihood of flaws is reduced and that
maintenance can be more readily performed without the introduction of flaws.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_INT.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product in accordance with the
CCRA supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description), and TSF internals description (which describes evidence of the structure
of the design and implementation of the TSF). In addition, there is a security
architecture description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to
explain how its security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design
and the security architecture description. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
Certification Report Page 16
behaves as specified in the design documentation and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing High attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.5.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [14].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don’t allow attackers possessing High attack potential to violate the
SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 17
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2 ALC_TAT.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2.2E PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.5 ALC_CMS.5.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.4 ADV_TDS.4.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.4.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_FSP.5.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2 ADV_INT.2.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2.2E PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.3 ATE_DPT.3.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
Certification Report Page 18
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
AVA AVA_VAN.5 AVA_VAN.5.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.5.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.4E PASS
[Table 4] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE is a product used only for ePassport purposes, and the ePassport
application program initializes with the HAL_INS_INITIALIZE_CARD command
after successful authentication with the
HAL_INS_EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command. Initialization is performed
only once for the first time.
 Since the TOE is classified into SLE78CLFX4000P, SLE78CLFX3000P, and
SLE78CLFX2400P according to the size of the underlying platform (IC chip)
flash memory, it is recommended to check the identification information of the
product by referring to the guidance document provided with the product
before initializing the ePassport application program.
 After initialization of the ePassport application program, it is recommended to
verify the checksum value of the hexa code image by referring to the user
operational guidance document provided with the product.
 The Personalization Agent should pay attention to the management of the
initial product key, and it is recommended to inject a secure personalization
agent authentication key by referring to the guidance document during the
product initialization process so that secure communication can be performed
afterwards.
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 It is recommended that the Personalization agent create a secure channel by
following the command usage sequence and issue ePassport user data.
 The Personalization Agent shall distribute the ePassport whose status is
changed to PERSONALIZED to the user after the ePassport issuance is
completed.
 The Personalization Agent shall consider the operating environment specified
in the ST when operating the product.
 The Personalization Agent may deactivate the EAC function according to the
ePassport issuance policy, and when deactivated, biometric information of the
ePassport user shall not be issued.
11. Security Target
The XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892 Security Target V1.4, 9
December 2021 [10] is included in this report by reference. For the purpose of
publication, it is provided as sanitized version [11] according to the CCRA supporting
document ST sanitising for publication [20].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
AA Active Authentication
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
CC Common Criteria
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
LDS Logical Data Structure
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
Certification Report Page 20
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
ePassport application A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related
user data (incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for
authentication (incl. MRZ); this application is intended to be
used by authorities, amongst other as a machine readable
travel document (MRTD). See [EAC].
Extended Access
Control (EAC)
Security mechanism identified in ICAO Doc 9303 by which
means the travel document’s chip (i) verifies the
authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read
the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the
access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii)
protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional
biometric reference data during their transmission to the
inspection system by secure messaging.
IC Dedicated Software Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by
the IC manufacturer. Such software might support special
functionality of the IC hardware and be used, amongst
other, for implementing delivery procedures between
different players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain life phases.
Initialization Process of writing Initialization Data to the TOE.
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into
the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits
manufacturer. These data are for instance used for
traceability and for IC identification as travel document’s
material (IC identification data).
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing
and/or memory functions. The travel document’s chip is an
integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements
on the travel document’s chip have not been altered from
that created by the issuing State or Organisation
Logical Data Structure The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the
Certification Report Page 21
(LDS) optional capacity expansion technology. The capacity
expansion technology used is the travel document’s chip.
Machine readable travel
document (MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organisation which is
used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport,
visa, official document of identity) and which contains
mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read.
Password Authenticated
Connection
Establishment (PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in ICAO
Doc 9303,. The PACE Protocol is a password authenticated
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol providing implicit
password-based authentication of the communication
partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e.
PACE provides a verification, whether the communication
partners share the same value of a password). Based on
this authentication, PACE also provides a secure
communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of
data transferred within this communication channel are
maintained.
Personalisation The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in
and unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel
document. This may also include the optional biometric data
collected during the “Enrolment”.
Personalisation Agent An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document
Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel
document holder by some or all of the following activities:
(i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for
the biographic data in the travel document,
(ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel
document holder,
(iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel
document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the
travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel
document holder as defined in EAC PP,
(iv)writing the document details data,
(v)writing the initial TSF data,
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(vi)signing the Document Security Object defined in ICAO
Doc 9303.
Personalisation Data A set of data including followings:
(i)individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of
the travel document holder,
(ii)dedicated document details data and
(iii)dedicated initial TSF data (including the Document
Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the
non-volatile memory of the TOE by the Personalisation
Agent in the life-cycle phase card issuing.
Pre-Personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data to the TOE
including the creation of the travel document application.
Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is
used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport,
visa, official document of identity) and which contains
mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the
operation of the TOE.
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (24 August 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (17 May 2021)
Certification Report Page 23
[5] Doc9303 Machine Readable Travel Documents Seventh Edition, International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2015
[6] Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents -Part 1 - eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1,
Version 2.20, 26. February 2015
[7] Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access
Control with PACE (EAC PP) BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 (Version 1.3.2, 05th
December 2012)
[8] Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with
PACE (PACE PP) BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01 (Version 1.01, 22th July
2014)
[9] CC2019-00016 XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892 Evaluation
Technical Report V3.0, 10 December 2021
[10] XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892 Security Target V1.4, 9
December 2021 (Confidential Version)
[11] XSmart e-Passport V1.5 EAC with PACE on M7892 Security Target Lite V1.0,
29 September 2021 (Sanitized Version)
[12] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V5-2020 - Infineon Security Controller
M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, EC v1.02.013
or v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01, SCL v2.02.012, Base v1.02.013 or v2.07.003, and
Toolbox v1.02.013 or v2.07.003 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software
(firmware), 26 November 2020
[13] Security Target Lite M7892 B11 Version 4.1, 21 October 2020
[14] Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices v1.5.1, May
2018
[15] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards Version 3.1, JIL, June 2020
[16] The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 3.0, JIL, February 2009
[17] Minimum ITSEF Requirements for Security Evaluation of Smart cards and
similar devices Version 2.0, JIL, January 2017
[18] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices, Version 2.0, JIL, January 2012
[19] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices - Appendix 1, Version 2.0, JIL, January 2012
[20] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006