JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 1 | 83
STMicroelectronics
JSAFE3_EPASS
BAC Security Target
Public Version
Common Criteria for IT security
evaluation
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite Rev. A
13 March 2019
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BLANK
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J JSAFE3_EPASS BAC
Security Target Public Version
Common Criteria for IT Evaluation
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Document Reference
Document identification: JSAFE3_EPASS BAC Security Target - Public Version
Revision: A
Registration: JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite
1.2 Security Target Reference
Document identification: JSAFE3_EPASS BAC Security Target
Revision: M
Registration: JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget
1.3 TOE Reference
TOE Name and Version: JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC V1.0.0
2. PURPOSE
This document presents the Security Target lite of JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC V1.0.0 a
contact/contactless chip implementing the machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based
on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) [ICAO_9303] and implementing the advanced security methods Basic Access
Control (BAC) and the Active Authentication (AA) [ICAO_9303].
This document is a sanitized version of the Security Target used for the evaluation. It is
classified as public information.
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INDEX
Page
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................3
1.1 Document Reference ................................................................................................................................3
1.2 Security Target Reference ........................................................................................................................3
1.3 TOE Reference .........................................................................................................................................3
2. Purpose ............................................................................................................................................................3
3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS...........................................................................................................................7
4. DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................................................................10
5. ST Introduction ...............................................................................................................................................16
5.1 ST Reference..........................................................................................................................................16
5.2 TOE Overview.........................................................................................................................................16
5.3 TOE Description......................................................................................................................................16
5.3.1 TOE Reference .....................................................................................................................................16
5.3.2 TOE Definition.......................................................................................................................................16
5.3.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use...........................................................................18
5.3.4 Life Cycle Phases..................................................................................................................................20
5.3.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE................................................................22
6. Conformance Claim........................................................................................................................................23
6.1 CC Conformance Claims ........................................................................................................................23
6.2 PP Claims ...............................................................................................................................................23
6.3 Package Claims ......................................................................................................................................23
6.4 Conformance Rationale ..........................................................................................................................23
7. Security Problem Definition............................................................................................................................24
7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................24
7.2 Subjects and external entities .................................................................................................................24
7.3 Assumptions............................................................................................................................................25
7.4 Threats ....................................................................................................................................................27
7.5 Organizational Security Policies .............................................................................................................29
8. Security Objectives.........................................................................................................................................31
8.1 Security Objectives for the TOE..............................................................................................................31
8.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .............................................................................33
8.3 Security Objective Rationale...................................................................................................................36
9. Extended Components Definition...................................................................................................................39
9.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS Audit Data Storage ..........................................................................39
9.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND Generation of random numbers ......................................................40
9.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability...................................................41
9.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS TOE Emanation ...............................................................................43
10. Security Requirements ...............................................................................................................................43
10.1 Overview..............................................................................................................................................44
10.2 Class FAU Security Audit ....................................................................................................................45
10.3 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)....................................................................................................46
10.3.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) ..............................................................................................47
10.3.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1) ......................................................................................49
10.4 Class FIA Identification and Authentication.........................................................................................49
10.5 Class FDP User Data Protection.........................................................................................................53
10.5.1.1. Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)...........................................................................................53
10.5.1.2. Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) ................................................................53
10.5.1.3. Inter-TSF-Transfer........................................................................................................................54
10.6 Class FMT Security Management.......................................................................................................55
10.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions..................................................................................58
10.8 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ..................................................................................61
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10.9 Security Requirements Rationale........................................................................................................61
10.9.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale......................................................................................61
10.9.2 Rationale for the Fulfilment of the Security Objectives for the TOE ...................................................62
10.9.3 SFR Dependency Rationale................................................................................................................65
10.9.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale .....................................................................................68
10.9.5 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency ..................................................68
11. TOE Summary Specification.......................................................................................................................70
11.1 SF_BAC – Basic Access Control Authentication ................................................................................70
11.2 SF_AA – Active Authentication ...........................................................................................................70
11.3 SF_AUTH – Personalization Agent Authentication.............................................................................70
11.4 SF_SM - Secure Messaging ...............................................................................................................71
11.5 SF_AC - Access Control .....................................................................................................................71
11.6 SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support .......................................................................................................71
11.7 SF_PRO – Data Protection .................................................................................................................72
11.8 Statement of Compatibility ..................................................................................................................74
11.8.1 Relevance of javacard Platform-ST JSAFE3 TSF ..............................................................................74
11.8.2 Security Requirements........................................................................................................................74
11.8.3 Security Objectives..............................................................................................................................76
11.8.4 Security Objectives for the Environment.............................................................................................77
11.8.5 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment...........................................................................................78
11.8.5.1. Assumptions.................................................................................................................................78
11.8.5.2. Threats .........................................................................................................................................78
11.8.5.3. Organizational Security Policies...................................................................................................79
11.8.6 Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................80
12. ANNEX A – Crypto Disclaimer ...................................................................................................................81
13. QUALITY REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................................83
13.1 Revision History...................................................................................................................................83
14. ENVIRONMENTAL/ECOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................83
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List of tables
Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale .................................................................................................................36
Table 2: Definition of security attributes ................................................................................................................44
Table 3: SFR Overview .........................................................................................................................................45
Table 4: FCS_COP.1/AA.......................................................................................................................................49
Table 5: Overview on the authentication mechanisms..........................................................................................50
Table 6: Assurance Requirements - EAL 4 extended with ALD_DVS.2 ...............................................................61
Table 7: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR ............................................................................62
Table 8: Dependencies between the SFRs...........................................................................................................67
Table 9: SFR vs TSF rationale ..............................................................................................................................73
Table 16 - Revision History ...................................................................................................................................83
List of figures
Figure 1 - TOE Overview.......................................................................................................................................17
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3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
CC documents
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
1: Introduction and general model. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
2: Security functional requirements. Version 3.1 Revision 5. April 2017
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3: Security assurance requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April
2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April
2017. CCMB-2017-04-004.
[AIS31/20] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS
31, A proposal for Functionality classes for random number
generators Version 2.0 vom 18.09.2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[AIS36] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS
36, Version 2 vom 12.11.2007, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
Protection Profiles and Technical Guidelines
[PP-0084]
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 – Eurosmart – Security IC Platform Protection
Profile with Augmentation Packages
[PP-0056]
CC Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE
Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012
[PP-0055]
CC Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic
Access Control
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009
[PP-0068]
CC Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE(PACE PP). BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
Version 1.0, November 2011
[ICAO_9303]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 –
Machine Readable Passports,
Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[ICAO_TR]
TECHNICAL REPORT
Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Version - 1.1– April 15, 2014
[TR-03110-1] Technical Guideline TR-03110-1: Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 1 – eMRTDs with
BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.10, 20. March 2012
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[TR-03110-2] Technical Guideline TR-03110-2: Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents Part 2, Version 2.10,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 2012-03-
20
[TR-03110-3] Technical Guideline TR-03110-3: Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 3 – Common
Specifications, Version 2.11, 12. July 2013
[TR-03111] Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version
1.11, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI),
2009-04-17
Specifications
[FIPS_PUB_46-3]
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD
(DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[FIPS_PUB_197]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
November 26, 2001
[FIPS186] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-
3, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 2009-06
[FIPS_180-2] FIPS Publication 180-2: SECURE HASH STANDARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002
August 1
[SP800-38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005.
[SP800-38A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques,
Special Publication 800-38A 2001 Edition
[SP800-90A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for
Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators Special Publication 800-90A Rev.1 April 2014
[SP800-22]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, A Statistical Test
Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for
Cryptographic Applications Special Publication 800-22 Rev.1a April
2010
[ISO7816] ISO 7816-4, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts, Part 4: Organization, security and commands for
interchange, ISO/IEC, IS 2013
[ISO7810] ISO/IEC 7810:2003, Identification cards -- Physical characteristics,
ISO, 2010-05-03
[ISO 10116] ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology - Security Techniques --
Modes of operation of an n-bit block cipher, ISO, 2006.
[ISO_9797-1]
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999: Information technology - Security techniques –
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a
block cipher
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[ISO_9796-2]
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Information technology — Security techniques
Digital signature schemes giving message recovery — Part 2: Integer
factorization based mechanisms
Platform documents
[PP_JC_Closed] Java Card System – Closed Configuration Protection Profile, Version
3.0, December 2012 [ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/07-M01]
[JSAFE3_ST]
JSAFE3 on ST31G480 Security Target
[STLite_ST31G480] ST31G480 A04 including optional cryptographic library NESLIB, and
optional technologies MIFARE DESFire EV1 and MIFARE Plus X –
Security Target for composition, Rev A04.1 April 2017
[MntRep_ST31G480] ST31G480 A04 including optional cryptographic library NESLIB, and
optional technologies MIFARE DESFire EV1 and MIFARE Plus X –
Rapport de manteinance ANSSI-CC-2016/58-M02, June 2017
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4. DEFINITIONS
Acronyms
Term Definition
ATR Answer To Reset
ATS Answer To Select
AUTH External Authentication
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DF Dedicated File
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EF Elementary File
Enc Encryption
ENC Content Data Encryption
GIS General Inspection System
HW Hardware
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
ID Identifier
IT Information Technology
MF Master File
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
n.a. Not applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OSP Organizational security policy
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PTRNG Physical True Random Number Generator
PT Personalization Terminal
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SEMA Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SIG Content Data Signature
Sign Signature
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Glossary
Term Description
Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] option by which means
the MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the
identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine
MRTD issued by a known State or Organization.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
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Term Description
evaluation, or use of the TOE
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to
store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip were created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access
Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means the
MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system protects their
communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic
Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the
MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from
the printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder of the document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the
biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa.
[ICAO_9303]
biometric
reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference
data. Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine
security document made by whatever means [ICAO_9303]
Country Signing
CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure
messaging with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication
(key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the
inspection system [ICAO_9303]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of
the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed
MRZ of the passport book.
Document
Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document
Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS). [ICAO_9303]
Eavesdropper A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system
to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference
templates representing that person's identity. [ICAO_9303]
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means the
MRTD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems
authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls
the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects
the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference
data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same
mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent
Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD
and TSF data.
Extended
Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in
addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State
or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
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Term Description
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [ICAO_9303]
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process
data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in
inspection operations in their respective States. Global
interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications
for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all
MRTDs. [ICAO_9303]
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used
to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Identification
Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to
control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the
delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a
false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the
purpose of using that person’s document. [ICAO_9303]
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d)
no travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO_9303]
Initialization Process of writing Initialization Data (see below) to the TOE (TOE life
cycle, Phase 2, Step 3).
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler
(the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO_9303]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying
its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or
Organization
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
[ICAO_9303]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity
expansion technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but
not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
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Term Description
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
(6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being
machine read. [ICAO_9303]
Machine readable
visa (MRV):
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications
contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance
security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of
being machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached
to a visa page in a passport. [ICAO_9303]
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP
Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD,
containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using
OCR methods. [ICAO_9303]
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO_9303]
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating
system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG14, EF.DG 16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but
except the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic
Access
Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging
between the inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ
information as key seed and access condition to data stored on
MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443
and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by, [ICAO_TR], p. 14.
MRTD’s chip
Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by
the IC
Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in
Phase 1 and
embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded
iris image(s)
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Term Description
(EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided
to use only finger print and not to use iris images as optional
biometric reference data.
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security
Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data
are applied to the document. This may also include the optional
biometric data collected during the “Enrolment” (cf. TOE life cycle,
Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity
the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the
biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the
encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii)
writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the
Personalization Agent to prove their identity and get access to the
logical MRTD and (ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication
attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-
Personalization
Process of writing Pre-Personalization Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the MRTD Application (cf. TOE life cycle,
Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-
personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between
life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active
Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier and an unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip
Primary Inspection
System (PIS)
An inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
random identifier Random identifier used to establish a communication to the TOE in
Phase 3 and 4 preventing the unique identification of the MRTD and
thus participates in the prevention of traceability.
Receiving State The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [ICAO_9303]
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check
the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
secure messaging
in
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication
code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
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Term Description
encrypted mode
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts
of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or
Organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for
international travel. [ICAO_9303]
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming
the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of
the TOE ([CC_P1]).
Unpersonalized
MRTD
The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the
Personalization Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation
of the TSF ([CC_P1]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template.
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification
data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
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5. ST INTRODUCTION
This section provides information about the TOE, which enables a potential user of the
TOE to determine, whether the TOE implements the functionality required by the user.
5.1 ST Reference
Title: JSAFE3_EPASS BAC Security Target Lite
Developer: STMicroelectronics Z.I. Marcianise SUD I-81025 Marcianise (CE) ITALY
Status: Final
Version: Rev.A
Date: 13.March.2019
5.2 TOE Overview
1 The Security Target refers to the TOE JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC V1.0.0 a contact/contactless
chip implementing the machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the
requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
[ICAO_9303] and implementing the advanced security methods Basic Access Control
(BAC) and the Active Authentication (AA) [ICAO_9303].
5.3 TOE Description
5.3.1 TOE Reference
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC V1.0.0
5.3.2 TOE Definition
2 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a composite TOE comprising hardware and software
The TOE is a contact/contactless chip and comprises the following elements:
 the STM IC ST31G480 Security Integrated Circuit with dedicated software and
embedded cryptographic library. Rapport de manteinance ANSSI-CC-2016/58-M02,
June 2017 [MntRep_ST31G480]
 the Java Card ™ Operating System JSAFE3 [JSAFE3_ST]
 the TOE javacard applet JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 implementing the machine readable
travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) programmed according to the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) and implementing the advanced security methods Basic Access
Control (BAC) and the Active Authentication (AA) as described in the ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [ICAO_9303].
 the associated guidance documentation in printed copy delivered by courier and in .pdf
format delivered crypted by e-mail:
 JSAFE3-EPASS Operational User Guidance Rev. E 10 January 2019
 JSAFE3-EPASS Preparative Procedure Rev. F 15 January 2019
3 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is delivered at the end of Phase 2 Step 3 (see chap. 5.3.4)
in wafer or micromodule D70, D76, CB6 format. The TOE is delivered by trusted courier.
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4 The Figure 1 shows the composition of the TOE parts, including their location in the
memory areas of the TOE. The TOE is a Java Card Flash memory based product.
Figure 1 - TOE Overview
5 The ROM code holds the IC Dedicated Firmware belonging to the IC ST31G480
6 The Operating System JSAFE3 Java Card Platform and the applet JSAFE3_EPASS
V.3.0.4 are located in the NVM.
7 During the Manufacturing phase the Java Card Package, including the applet
JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 are loaded on the TOE.
8 The applet JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 is instantiated from this package during the
initialisation of the TOE into the NVM memory area.
9 The applet JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 utilises the IC ST31G480 RAM and the NVM area for
storage of operational and permanent data, in order to provide security functionality.
10 During operational use phase the applet JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 interacts with other
external entities.
11 The Security Target of the underlying Operating System JSAFE3 Java Card Platform
claims conformance to Java Card System – Closed Configuration Protection Profile,
Version 3.0, December 2012 ([PP_JC_Closed])
12 This composite ST is based on the ST of the underlying Operating System JSAFE3 Java
Card Platform [JSAFE3_ST].
13 Important note: The TOE is closed Java Card implementation with the applet
JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 and the applet IAS V.2.0.3 are installed and initialized as a single
instances. The applet JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 is default selected after TOE reset. No
post-issuance of further applets is possible to install on the TOE. The applets are installed
and initialized in Phase 2, step 3. of TOE life cycle (see chap. 5.3.4).
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5.3.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use
14 A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel.
The traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The
MRTD in context of this ST contains
 visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
 a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and
 data elements on the TOE according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The
authentication of the traveller is based on
i. the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed
identity as given on the biographical data page and
ii. optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
15 The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s.
The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
16 For this ST the MRTD is viewed as unit of:
 the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip (TOE). It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
i. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the MRTD,
ii. the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
iii. the printed portrait.
 the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact based or contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contact based / contactless readable data including
(but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
i. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
ii. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
iii. the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) 1
or both
iv. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
v. the Document security object (SOD).
17 The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book
and the MRTD’s chip (TOE) is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
18 The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the TOE) and organizational security
measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO_9303]. These
security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip (TOE) to the passport book.
19 The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by
the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features
of the TOE.
1
These biometric reference data are optional according to [ICAO_9303]. It is assumed that the issuing State or Organization
uses this option and protects these data by means of EAC
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20 The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active
Authentication of the travel document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the [ICAO_9303], and
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment [ICAO_TR]. The Passive
Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE by the
TOE environment
21 The TOE protects the integrity of logical MRTD by write only-once access control and by
physical means, and the confidentiality of logical MRTD by the Basic Access Control
Mechanism and by Extended Access Control Mechanism.
22 The Basic Access Control is a security feature supported by the TOE. The inspection
system
 (i) reads optically the MRTD,
 (ii) authenticates itself as inspection system by means of Document Basic Access
Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection system TOE provides read
access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging)
with this inspection system [ICAO_9303] normative appendix 5.
Note: For what concern the Basic Access Control Mechanism and according to the
assurance level EAL4 and augmentations stated in [PP-0055] this mechanism shall be
evaluated considering only enhanced basic attack potential (i.e. AVA_VAN.3)
23 The TOE implements the Active Authentication as defined in[ICAO_9303]. Keys for Active
Authentication can be loaded into the TOE. These operations take place at personalization
time
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5.3.4 Life Cycle Phases
24 The life cycle of a MRTD is described in [PP-0055] and it is split in four phases.
Phase 1: “TOE Development”
Phase 2: “TOE Manufacturing”
Phase 3: “Personalization of the TOE MRTD application”
Phase 4: “TOE Operational Use”
In the beneath discussion, the following entities and roles are identified:
MRTD Embedded Software Developer: STMicroelectronics srl, Marcianise (CE) Italy
IC Developer: STMicroelectronics SAS, Rousset France
MRTD IC Manufacturer: STMicroelectronics srl, Marcianise (CE) Italy
MRTD Manufacturer: National accredited MRTD Manufacturing center (IPZS for Italy)
MRTD Personalization Agent: Public administration or National accredited MRTD
personalization center enabled to issue personalized MRTD booklet (IPZS for Italy).
Life cycle phase 1: “TOE Development ”.
25 In this phase the TOE is developed.
26 This phase includes the following Step 1:
 Development of TOE Embedded Software performed by MRTD Embedded Software
Developer:
o Operating System JSAFE3 Java Card Platform
o TOE MRTD application as Java card Applet
 TOE IC Development performed by IC Developer:
o IC ST31G480 with its Dedicated Software and embedded cryptographic
library
 TOE MRTD application guidance documentation
27 In the Step 1 the MRTD Embedded Software Developer delivers the Embedded Software
to the IC Developer. The Embedded Software is delivered in one of two possible
configuration:
 Embedded Software not Pre-Personalized. No OS or JSAFE3 Java Card
Platform or application code is delivered to IC Developer. Only pre-perso info to be
used in “Pre-Personalization” process at MRTD IC Manufacturer premises are
delivered. Pre-Perso info includes reference to keys for securing the download of
flash code (OS, JSAFE3 Java Card platform and application) on the IC ST31G480.
 Golden sample as full TOE image, as output of phase 2 step 3 anticipated here.
28 Step 2: IC Developer loads on IC ST31G480 programmable memory the Embedded
Software and alternatively do following :
 Embedded Software not Pre-Personalized. IC are securely delivered to the
MRTD IC Manufacturer. The TOE life cycle restart from phase 2 step 3.
 Golden sample as full TOE image. The IC and the respective guidance documents
are securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
The TOE life cycle restart from phase 2 step 4.
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Life cycle phase 2: “TOE Manufacturing ”
29 This phase is split in the following steps:
 Step 3: The MRTD IC manufacturer receives IC loaded with Dedicated Software
and with the Embedded Software not pre-personalized with the IC ST31G480 flash
code loader secured with the key established as pre-perso info is Phase 1 step 1
and step2. MRTD IC manufacturer integrates applets JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 and
IAS V.2.0.3 with JSAFE3 platform performing following steps:
i. loading JSAFE3 Java Card Platform into IC ST31G480 programmable
memory,
ii. loading and instantiation of all applets
iii. switch the JSAFE3 Java Card Platform in a secured closed state.
iv. Dump the binary image of full components of TOE
The IC with full TOE image is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
The MRTD IC manufacturer delivers the guidance documentation to MRTD
manufacturer.
 Step 4: The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless
interface in the passport booklet, equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization
Data and eventually create the LDS structures as defined in [ICAO_9303].
 Step 5: The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely
delivered from the MRTD manufacturer to the MRTD Personalization Agent. The
MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation
to the MRTD Personalization Agent.
Life cycle phase 3: “Personalization of the TOE MRTD application”
30 The personalization of the MRTD includes the following actions in the Step 6 performed
by the MRTD Personalization Agent.:
 the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
 the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized
portraits and the optional biometric reference data),
 the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
 the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD. This step is
performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to creation of:
i. the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
ii. the digitized portrait (EF.DG2) and
iii. the Document security object
 Configuration of the TSF if necessary.
 The signing of the Document security object by the Document Signer [ICAO_9303]
finalizes the personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder.
 The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if
necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use
31 The TSF data (data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE) comprise (but are not limited to) the Personalization Agent Authentication Key(s)
and the Basic Authentication Control Key
Life cycle phase 4: “TOE Operational Use ”
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32 Step 7: The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“TOE Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy
of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the
issuing State but they can never be modified.
33 Application note: The authorized Personalization Agents might be allowed to add (not to
modify) data in the other data groups of the MRTD application (e.g. person(s) to notify
EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 “TOE Operational Use”. This will imply an update of the
Document Security Object including the re-signing by the Document Signer.
34 Application note: The phases 1 and parts of phase 2 (Step 1, Step 2 and Step 3) are part
of the TOE evaluation. The TOE delivery is after phase 2 Step 3. Since specific production
steps of phase 2 are of minor security relevance (e. g. booklet manufacturing and antenna
integration) these are not part of the CC evaluation under ALC. The issuing State or
Organization is responsible for these specific production steps.
5.3.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
35 The antenna and the applet IAS V.2.0.3 are not in the scope of the TOE.
36 There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to
perform its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the
complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the
antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete
MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
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6. CONFORMANCE CLAIM
6.1 CC Conformance Claims
37 This Security Target claims conformance to:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 5. April 2017 ,
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components; Version 3.1, Revision 5. April 2017,
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 5. April 2017
as follows:
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
38 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 5. April 2017 [CEM].
6.2 PP Claims
39 This ST claims strict conformance to the PP:
 Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application",
Basic Access Control Version 1.10, 25 March 2009 [PP-0055].
6.3 Package Claims
40 The evaluation of the TOE is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC
evaluation provided by [JSAFE3_ST], [STLite_ST31G480] and [MntRep_ST31G480]. The
TOE uses a certified J-SAFE3 Java Card Platform and IC ST31G480 by
STMicroelectronics. J-SAFE3 Java Card Platform certified at assurance level EAL5+ its
associated Security Target is [JSAFE3_ST]. The IC ST31G480 Secure Microcontroller
with Cryptographic Library has been certified by ANSSI (ANSSI-CC-2017/61) with
assurance level EAL5+: its associated Security Target Lite is [STLite_ST31G480] and the
applicable Maintenance Report is [MntRep_ST31G480].
41 The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, as
defined in [CC_P3] .
6.4 Conformance Rationale
42 This Security Target claims strict conformance to the protection profiles [PP-0055] .
43 All sections of this Security Target regarding the Security Problem Definition, Security
Objectives Statement and Security Requirements Statement for the TOE are taken
over from the [PP-0055] .
44 This ST adds the following TOE Security Objective “OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof”, the
Security Objective for the Operational Environment “OE.Active_Auth_Sign”,
“OE.Active_Auth_Verif”, the Organizational Security Policies “P.Active_Auth”
45 The operations done for the SFRs taken from the [PP-0055] are clearly indicated.
46 This ST adds the following Security Functional Requirement “FCS_COP.1/AA
Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication”
47 The Security Assurance Requirements statement for the TOE in this Security Target
includes all the requirements for the TOE from the [PP-0055] .
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7. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
7.1 Introduction
48 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data stored in the TOE, user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal and MRTD tracing data
49 Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different
security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS
[ICAO_9303]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing
elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain
personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is
used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the
inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
For interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303] requires that Basic
Inspection Systems may have access to logical MRTD data:
 Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),
 Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
 Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
 Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
 Common data in EF.COM.
The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using BAC [ICAO_9303].
As the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential [PP-0055] the
PACE is recommended to be used instead of BAC. If nevertheless BAC has to be used, it
is recommended to perform Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 before getting access to data
(except EF.DG14), as this mechanism is resistant to high potential attacks
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
 Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
50 Authenticity of the travel document’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
This Security Target includes the following primary assets:
 user data stored on the TOE
 user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected
7.2 Subjects and external entities
51 This ST considers the following subjects:
52 Manufacturer: The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit
and the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is
the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not
distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer
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53 Personalization Agent: The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization
to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities
i. establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD
ii. enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the
encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s)
iii. writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for
global, international and national interoperability
iv. writing the initial TSF data
v. signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303].
54 Terminal: A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through
the contact interface or through the contactless interface.
55 Inspection system (IS): A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System
(BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii)
implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the
authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading
the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General
Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the
Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to
the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii)
is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of
the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
56 Application note: This ST does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because
the Extended Access Control is outside the scope.
57 MRTD Holder: The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
58 Traveller: Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity
of the MRTD holder.
59 Attacker: A threat agent trying
i. to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without
knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data)
ii. to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization
iii. to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
iv. to forge a genuine MRTD
60 Application note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment
independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may
use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for
the TOE.
7.3 Assumptions
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61 The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used
62 A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that
security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent
any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
63 A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
 Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
 Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
 Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
64 A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public
Key(EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document
Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent
Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
65 A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD.
Application note: According to [ICAO_9303] the support of the Passive Authentication
mechanism is mandatory whereas the the Basic Access Control is optional. This ST does
not address Primary Inspection Systems therefore the BAC is mandatory.
66 A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence
of the [ICAO_9303], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined
subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide
sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system
has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic
attack potential.
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67 Application note: When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy potential
dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to be
considered and taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency between the
Document Number when chosen consecutively and the issuing date.
7.4 Threats
68 This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in
the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
69 T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
 Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by
identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to
communications through the contactless communication interface.
 Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
 Asset: Anonymity of user
70 T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
 Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a
communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE.
 Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
 Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
71 T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
 Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the
MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The
inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the
attacker does not know these data in advance.
 Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
 Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
72 T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
 Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD
or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an
inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric
reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery.
The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the
passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity
of the traveller. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait
to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated
biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter
the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication
mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of
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different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the
digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical
MRTD of a traveller into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged
to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the
complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
 Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one
or more legitimate MRTDs
 Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
73 T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
 Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be
used in the phase “Operational Use” in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to
manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions
of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the
misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
 Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
 Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF
74 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
 Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE
during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage
may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may
occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics,
clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may
be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to
measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from
measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements
(by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be
related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover, the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault
injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
 Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
 Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
75 T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
 Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in
order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order
to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to
modify TSF data. The physical tampering may be focused directly on the
disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for
the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or
indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of
security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis).
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Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals.
Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering
efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout
characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The
modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of
circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
 Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
 Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF
76 T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
 Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent,
deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal
operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or
misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs
information about the functional operation.
 Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
 Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness
of TSF
7.5 Organizational Security Policies
77 The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its
operations (see [CC_P1]).
78 P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
79 P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the
holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
80 P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
(EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
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MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be
used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD
is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to
allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on
knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [ICAO_9303]
81 Application note: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the
‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by
the TOE environment and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
82 P.Active_Auth Active Authentication
The TOE implements the Active Authentication according to [ICAO_9303]
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8. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
83 This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into
security objectives for the development and production environment and security
objectives for the operational environment.
8.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
84 This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
85 OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be written by
authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its
personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that (1) the data of the LDS groups written
during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be
changed by write access after personalization, (2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add
(fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document
Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is
optional.
86 OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
87 OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System.
The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access
Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key.
Application note: The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in
EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the
MRTD. The MRTD’s chip shall provide read access to these data for terminals
successfully authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of
the Document Basic Access Keys. The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality requires
the TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic Access Control
Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined
by the TOE environment and are loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
Therefore the sufficient quality of these keys has to result from the MRZ data’s entropy.
Any attack based on decision of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303] that the inspection
system derives Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the
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authorization for reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after
successful Enhanced Access Control. Thus the read access must be prevented even in
case of a successful BAC Authentication.
88 OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the
IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent
Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
Application note: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security
features of the TOE to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and
personalization phases. The IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in Phase
2 “Manufacturing” and for traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2
“Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The OT.Identification
addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE manufacturing. In the
Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the Document Number as part of the
printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g.
integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier through the contactless
interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System or as
Personalization Agent.
89 The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent of the TOE environment.
90 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC
Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the
capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not
specified here.
91 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip:
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex
signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an
attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
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92 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of:
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
93 OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction
with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the
objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s
internals.
94 OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active
Authentication
The TOE shall support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Active Authentication as defined in ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303].
8.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
95 The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
96 OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
97 Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its
manufacturing and test data.
98 OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
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Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
 non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
 identification of the element under delivery,
 meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
 physical protection to prevent external damage,
 secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
 traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
o origin and shipment details,
o reception, reception acknowledgement,
o location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process. Procedures shall ensure
that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the
procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the
procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
99 OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
100 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a
secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document
Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in
the LDS according to [ICAO_9303].
101 OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence
of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are
derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that
these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that
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the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ
data with enhanced basic attack potential.
102 OE.Active_Auth_Sign Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the MRTD’s Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication
Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support
inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
103 OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements
the terminal part of the Basic Access Control.
104 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the
traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the
signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical
MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the
Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their
authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
105 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which
implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems)
106 OE.Active_Auth_Verif Verification by Active Authentication
The inspection systems to check the MRTD authenticity may use the active authentication
verification, this is a stronger mechanism to guaranty the authenticity of the MRTD.
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8.3 Security Objective Rationale
107 The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Active_Auth_Sign
OE.Active_Auth_Verif
T.Chip_ID x x
T.Skimming x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal_Data x x
P.Active_Auth x x x
A.MRTD_Manufact x
A.MRTD_Delivery x
A.Pers_Agent x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.BAC-Keys x
Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale
108 The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification
of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data
as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
109 The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the
user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with
the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of
TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
110 The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to
support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic
Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing
State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the
stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Confidentality
“Confidentiality of personal data” describes the protection of the confidentiality.
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111 The OSP P.Active_Auth “Active Authentication” addresses the active authentication
protocol as described in [ICAO_9303]. The TOE environment will detect partly forged
logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to
OE.Active_Auth_Sign “Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified
by the inspection system according to OE.Active_Auth_Verif “Verification by Active
Authentication”. This is possible only because genuine TOE enforce Active Authentication
as specified in OT.Active_Auth_Proof.
112 The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as
required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
113 The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection
system” address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or
listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is
countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the
security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys
114 The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to
limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive
contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE
environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature
which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD
by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
“Verification by Passive Authentication”.
115 The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s
chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization
in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the
logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against
Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for
the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” ensuring
that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled
and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are
enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
116 The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-
Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental
Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high
attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the
directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and
OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
117 OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active
Authentication” using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization. The Public Active Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 The
TOE environment will also detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Active_Auth_Sign “Active Authentication
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of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Active_Auth_Verif “Verification by Active Authentication”.
118 The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the
MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing
steps.
119 The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD
delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
120 The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical
MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the
MRTD holder personal data.
121 The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The
security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data
from the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic
Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the
internal handling.
122 The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is
directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys
“Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to
be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
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9. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
123 This Security Target uses components defined as extensions in [CC_P2]. All these
extended components are drawn from [PP-0055]. The extended components FAU_SAS,
FCS_RND, FMT_LIM and FPT_EMS are defined below.
9.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS Audit Data Storage
124 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of
the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than
FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE
itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
125 The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
FAU_SAS Audit Data Storage 1
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9.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
126 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2
is intended for non-cryptographic use.
127 The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour:
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are
intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that the random number generator
implements defined security capabilities and that the random numbers meet
a defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
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9.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
128 The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
129 The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited
capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific
manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities require that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) which are necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
130 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM)
of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional
requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by
limiting their availability.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
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131 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
132 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Application Note:
The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of
mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide
protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
1. the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its
capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced,
or conversely,
2. the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or
disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
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9.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
133 The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF)
is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE
shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on
external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are
evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential
power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional
requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed
by any other component of [CC_P2].
134 The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access
to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access
to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types
of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of
user data].
10.SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FPT_EMS TOE emanation 1
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10.1 Overview
135 This part of the PP defines the detailed security requirements that shall be satisfied by the
TOE. The statement of TOE security requirements shall define the functional and
assurance security requirements that the TOE needs to satisfy in order to meet the
security objectives for the TOE.
136 The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in section 8.1 of Part 1 of the Common
Criteria [CC_P1]Each of these operations is used in this ST.
137 The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts
a requirement. Refinements of security requirements are denoted in such a way that
added words are in bold text and removed are crossed out.
138 The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in
stating a requirement. Selections having been made by the PP author are denoted as
underlined text. Selections made by the ST author appear slanted and underlined.
139 The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments having been made by the PP author are
denoted by showing as underlined text. Assignments made by the ST author appear
slanted and underlined.
140 The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
141 This part defines the detailed security requirements that are satisfied by the TOE. These
requirements comprise functional components from [CC_P2]
142 Extended components as defined in Chapter 9, and the assurance components as defined
for the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 from [CC_P3] augmented by ALC_DVS.2
143 The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Basic Inspection
System” and “Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 7. Note, that all
these subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. The operations “write”, “read”,
“modify”, and “disable read access” are used in accordance with the general linguistic
usage. The operations “transmit”, “receive” and “authenticate” are originally taken from
[CC_P2].
144 Definition of security attributes:
security attribute values meaning
terminal authentication
status
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without authorization after
start-up)
Basic Inspection
System
Terminal is authenticated as Basic Inspection System
after successful Authentication in accordance with the
definition in rule 2 of FIA_UAU.5.2.
Personalization
Agent
Terminal is authenticated as Personalization Agent after
successful Authentication in accordance with the
definition in rule 1 of FIA_UAU.5.2.
Table 2: Definition of security attributes
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145 The following table summarizes all TOE security functional requirements of this ST:
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit Storage
Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation - Generation of Document Basic Access
Keys by the TOE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key Derivation
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication
FCS_RND.1 Random number generation
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4
Single-use authentication mechanism – Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control - Basic Access Control
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
Management of TSF data – Writing of initialization data and personalization
data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Table 3: SFR Overview
146 This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is split into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
10.2 Class FAU Security Audit
147 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer2
with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data3
in the audit records.
148 Application note: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE
in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the
Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF
Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
10.3 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
149 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by
the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys
by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm4
and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit5
that meet the following: [ICAO_9303], normative
appendix 56
.
150 Application note: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated
and downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication
Protocol described in [ICAO_9303], normative appendix A5.2, produces agreed
parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the Retail-MAC message authentication
keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [ICAO_9303], Normative appendix A5.1.
The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as required by
FCS_RND.1.
151 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as
specified below ([CC_P2]).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components
2
[assignment: authorized users]
3
[assignment: list of audit information]
4
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
5
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
6
[assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion by
overwriting the memory data with zeros7
that meets the following:
none8
.
152 Application Note: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-
MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging.
10.3.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
153 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be
implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing9
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm : SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-51210
and cryptographic key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits11
that
meet the following: [FIPS_180-2]12
.
154 Application Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1 for
the cryptographic primitive of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (see
also FIA_UAU.4) according to [ICAO_9303].
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption and
decryption13
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
7
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
8
[assignment: list of standards]
9
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
10
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
11
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
12
[assignment: list of standards]
13
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
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Triple-DES in CBC mode14
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit15
that
meet the following: [FIPS_PUB_46-3] and [ICAO_9303] normative
appendix 5, A5.316
.
155 Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for
secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between
the TOE and the terminal as part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and
decryption17
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
AES18
and cryptographic key sizes: 128 bit19
that meet the following:
[FIPS_PUB_197]20
.
156 Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for
authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric
authentication mechanism (cf. FIA_UAU.4).
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code21
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC22
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit23
that meet the following:
ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message
Counter, padding mode 2)24
.
157 Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for
secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted
data. The key is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
14
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
15
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
16
[assignment: list of standards]
17
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
18
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
19
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
20
[assignment: list of standards]
21
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
22
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
23
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
24
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]:fulfilled by FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform Table 4 column 125
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm Table 4 column 226
and
cryptographic key sizes Table 4 column 327
that meet the following
standards Table 4 column 428
.
list of cryptographic
operations
cryptographic
algorithm
cryptographic key sizes list of standards
digital signature creation RSA CRT 1024 and 2048 bits [ISO_9796-2]
digital signature creation ECDSA 192,224,256,320,384,512
and 521 bits
[TR-03111]
Table 4: FCS_COP.1/AA
10.3.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
158 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)”
as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet DRG.3 capabilities defined in [AIS31/20] standard29
.
159 Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the
authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
10.4 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
160 Application note: The Table 5 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms
used.
25
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
26
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
27
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
28
[assignment: list of standards]
29
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
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Name SFR for the TOE Algorithms and key sizes according to [ICAO_9303],
normative appendix 5, and [TR-03110-1]
Basic Access Control
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.6
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf.FCS_COP.1/ENC) and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys (cf.FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
FIA_UAU.4 AES with 128 bit keys
(cf. FCS_COP.1/AUTH)
Table 5: Overview on the authentication mechanisms
161 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”30
on behalf of
the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
162 Application note: The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the
Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during the
Phase 2 “TOE Manufacturing”. The audit records can be written only in the Phase 2
Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the Manufacturer is the only user role available for
the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user role Personalization Agent for
transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in role
Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key.
After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the Document Basic
Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing the Document
Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as default user after power
up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to
authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.
163 Application note: In the “TOE Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody
to read the ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the user
is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal and the
MRTD’s chip use a (randomly chosen) identifier for the communication channel to allow
the terminal to communicate with more then one RFID. If this identifier is randomly
selected it will not violate the OT.Identification. If this identifier is fixed the ST writer should
consider the possibility to misuse this identifier to perform attacks addressed by
T.Chip_ID.
164 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
30
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”31
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
165 Application note: The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent
authenticate themselves.
166 The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on AES32
.
167 Application note: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and
randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in
a successful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalisation Agent
may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use
of an internal counter as a diversifier.
168 Application note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device
authentication mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303]. In the first step the terminal
authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip and the MRTD’s chip authenticates to the terminal
in the second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip provides the terminal with a
challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’s chip with
some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not successfully
authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfill the security objective OT.Identification
and to prevent T.Chip_ID.
169 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)”
as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
31
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
32
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 52 | 83
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES33
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by
one of the following mechanism(s) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism
with the Personalization Agent Key34
,
2. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System
only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Document Basic Access Keys35
.
170 Application note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging
for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The
Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure
messaging mechanism as well if the personalization environment prevents eavesdropping
to the communication between TOE and personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection
System may use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document
Basic Access Keys.
171 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after
successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism36
.
172 Application note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [ICAO_9303]
includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful
authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in
MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the
successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE
does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore
the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those
commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user.
173 Application note: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfill [PP-0056] the BAC
communication might be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a new
secure messaging that is distinct from the BAC based communication. In this case the
condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not contradict to the option that commands are sent
33
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
34
[selection: the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Keys,
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key, [assignment other]]
35
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide
authentication]
36
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 53 | 83
to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC communication but are protected by a
more secure communication channel established after a more advanced authentication
process.
174 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)” as
specified below ([CC_P2]).
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an positive integer equal to 1 37
of
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to the
Personalization Agent authentication and the Basic Inspection
System authentication38
.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been met39
, the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable
time between the receiving the terminal challenge and sending the
TSF response during the BAC authentication attempts40
.
175 Application note: In this ST the open operations in the SFR FIA_AFL.1.1 and
FIA_AFL.1.2 have been assigned to ensure the strength of authentication function as
terminal part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol to resist enhanced basic
attack potential.
10.5 Class FDP User Data Protection
10.5.1.1. Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
176 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP41
on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD42
.
10.5.1.2. Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
177 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below ([CC_P2]).
37
[assignment: range of acceptable value]
38
[assignment: list of authentication event]
39
[assignment: met or surpassed]
40
[assignment: list of actions]
41
[assignment: access control SFP]
42
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the
SFP]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 54 | 83
FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP
43
to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of terminals
44
.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to
read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the
data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD
45
.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none
46
.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rule:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4
47
.
178 Application note: The inspection system needs special authentication and authorization
for read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are not defined in this ST.
10.5.1.3. Inter-TSF-Transfer
179 187 Application note: FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the protection of the User
Data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and
message authentication codes after successful authentication of the terminal. The
authentication mechanisms as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism include the key
agreement for the encryption and the message authentication key to be used for secure
messaging.
43
[assignment: access control SFP]
44
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
45
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects]
46
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to
objects]
47
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 55 | 83
180 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)”
as specified below ([CC_P2])
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP
48
to be able to transmit
and receive
49
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
181 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP
50
to be able to transmit
and receive
51
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay
52
errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay
53
has occurred.
182 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
10.6 Class FMT Security Management
183 Application note: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to
the management of the TSF data.
184 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
48
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
49
[selection: transmit, receive]
50
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
51
[selection: transmit, receive]
52
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
53
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 56 | 83
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization
54
.
185 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Basic Inspection System
55
.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
186 Application note: The following SFRs FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the
management of the TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over
the life cycle phases.
187 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below ([CC_P2]).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
188 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
54
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
55
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 57 | 83
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks.
189 Application note: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might
be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by
disabling or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of
FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced provide an optional approach to enforce the
same policy. Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1
refers to both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
190 Application note: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of
TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified
below.
191 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below ([CC_P2]). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write
56
the Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
57
to the TOE Manufacturer
58
.
192 Application note: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the
authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric
cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to
59
the Initialization Data
60
to the Personalization Agent
61
.
193 Application note: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD
Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during
the Phase 2 “TOE Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish between
these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE may restrict the ability to write the
Initialization Data and the Prepersonalization Data by (i) allowing to write these data only
56
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
57
[assignment: list of TSF data]
58
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
59
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
60
[assignment: list of TSF data]
61
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 58 | 83
once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2. The IC
Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited to the IC
Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a unique
identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3 “personalization”
but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. Therefore the
external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-
personalization Data.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write
62
the Document Basic
Access Keys and the Active Authentication key
63
to the
Personalization Agent
64
.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read
65
the Document Basic
Access Keys the Personalization Agent Keys and the Active
Authentication key
66
to none
67
.
194 Application note: The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the
correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys.
10.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
195 The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and
TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent
leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination
with the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”,
“Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)”
together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent
bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE
functions.
196 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
62
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
63
[assignment: list of TSF data]
64
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
65
[selection: change, default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
66
[assignment: list of TSF data]
67
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 59 | 83
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution68
in excess of non-useful information69
enabling access to Personalization Agent Key(s)70
the Document
Basic Access Keys and the Active Authentication key.71
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users72
are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts and contactless73
to
gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s)74
the Document Basic
Access Keys and the Active Authentication key 75
.
197 Application note: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the
attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks
may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal
operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical
environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena
is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The MRTD’s chip
has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not used by the
terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to ISO/IEC 7816-2 as
well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the
power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal
operations or data transmissions.
198 The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation.
199 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below ([CC_P2]).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1
76
.
200 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
([CC_P2]).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
68
[assignment: types of emissions]
69
[assignment: specified limits]
70
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
71
[assignment: list of types of user data]
72
[assignment: type of users]
73
[assignment: type of connection]
74
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
75
[assignment: list of types of user data]
76
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 60 | 83
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and before
calling a security sensitive module
77
to demonstrate the correct operation of
the TSF
78
.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data
79
.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
201 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below ([CC_P2]).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing
80
to the
TSF
81
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
202 Application note: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter
physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be
violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there
might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.
77
[selection: during initial start-up.. [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]
78
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
79
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data]
80
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
81
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 61 | 83
10.8 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
203 The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE, its development and operating
environment are to choose as the predefined assurance package EAL4 augmented by the
following component:
▪ ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures)
The following table lists the assurance components which are applicable
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENTS
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample.
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
Table 6: Assurance Requirements - EAL 4 extended with ALD_DVS.2
10.9 Security Requirements Rationale
10.9.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
204 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 62 | 83
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1 x x x
FCS_CKM.4 x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA x x x
FCS_COP.1/ENC x x x
FCS_COP.1/AUTH x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC x x x
FCS_COP.1/AA x
FCS_RND.1 x x x
FIA_UID.1 x x
FIA_AFL.1 x x
FIA_UAU.1 x x
FIA_UAU.4 x x x
FIA_UAU.5 x x x
FIA_UAU.6 x x x
FDP_ACC.1 x x x
FDP_ACF.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1 x x x
FDP_UIT.1 x x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x x
FPT_EMS.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
Table 7: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR
10.9.2 Rationale for the Fulfilment of the Security Objectives for the TOE
205 In the following, a detailed justification as required to show the suitability and sufficiency of
the security functional requirements to achieve the security objectives defined for the TOE
is given.
OT.AC_Pers
206 The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”
addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 63 | 83
logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only
the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the
groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be
authenticated either by using the BAC mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC)
with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [PP-0056] by using
the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication
and FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of
secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA,FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the
Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as
authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to
the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these
keys.
OT.Data_Int
207 The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect
the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation
and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the
SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is
allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
(FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists
the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF
management functions (including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or
FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure
that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and
FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the
ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent
to establish the Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by
anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Confidentiality
208 The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of personal data” requires
the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before
identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Confidentiality. In
case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read
access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the
successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 64 | 83
MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and
Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the
SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the
protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1
and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for
the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA
andFCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5
requires the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism or secure messaging.
OT.Identification
209 The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”
address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its
non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows
only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including
the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization
Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates
the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow
reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication
of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful
authentication attempt. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces
additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute
force attack.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
210 The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test
functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
211 The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s
chip against disclosure
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the
time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field,
power consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_EMSEC.1,
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 65 | 83
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
212 The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
213 235 The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is
covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct
operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code,
and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or
operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof
214 The security objective OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity
by Active Authentication” “is covered by the SFRs FCS_COP.1.1/AA_RSA,
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
10.9.3 SFR Dependency Rationale
215 The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for
mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is
satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and
non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained. The table below shows the
dependencies between the SFR of the TOE
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic
key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction,
Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/ENC
and FCS_COP.1/MAC,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 66 | 83
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1,
justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP_UCT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control or
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control]
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control or
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control]
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
Table 8: Dependencies between the SFRs
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
216 No. 1: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
217 No. 2: The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently
stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 68 | 83
manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the
addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is
permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
218 No. 3: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are
defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is
necessary here.
219 No. 4: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between
the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this
communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since
there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a
trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
10.9.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
220 The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4
is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
221 The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security
of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
222 The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security
requirements
Dependencies ALC_DVS.2:
no dependencies.
10.9.5 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
223 The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and
the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and
internally consistent whole.
224 The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 10.9.3 SFR Dependency Rationale for the security
functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency
between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the
chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are
appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally
consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance
components in section 10.9.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the
assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive)
dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
225 Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown
not to arise in sections 10.9.3 SFR Dependency Rationale and 10.9.4 Security Assurance
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 69 | 83
Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 10.9.4 Security
Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for
the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional
requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of
these two groups of security requirements.
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 70 | 83
11.TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
226 The TOE provides the following TOE security functionality, which comply to the [PP-0055]:
 BAC
 Active Authentication
 Personalization Agent Authentication
 Secure Messaging
 Access Control
 Cryptographic Support
 Data Protection
227 These Security Functions are implemented by the realisation of the Security Functional
requirements, according to chap. 10. The details of the implementation of this TOE
security functionality is provided in the following sections.
11.1 SF_BAC – Basic Access Control Authentication
228 The TOE implements the Basic Access Control (BAC) mechanism to protect the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) according to SFRs FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.
229 The TOE implements the Basic Access Control (BAC) mechanism to enstablish secure
messaging key to protect data during the comunication with Basic Inspection system (BIS)
(FMT_SMR.1). The TOE implements the BAC according to [ICAO_9303]. The Basic
Inspection System uses the Basic Access Control with the Document Basic Access Keys.
230 The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication mechanism
defined in [ICAO_9303] and includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged
after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure
messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent
by the successfully authenticated terminal (FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5,
FIA_UAU.6)
231 The authentication mechanisms as part of BAC Mechanism include the key agreement
(FCS_CKM.1) for the encryption (FCS_COP.1/ENC) and the message authentication
(FCS_COP.1/MAC) key to be used for secure messaging (FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1)
11.2 SF_AA – Active Authentication
232 The TOE implements the Active Authentication (AA) mechanism to proof the MRTD chip
authenticity according to [ICAO_9303].
233 The Active Authentication cryptographic algorihtm, key length an standards are defined by
SFR FCS_COP.1/AA. Algorithm RSA CRT with key length 1024 and 2018 bits. Algorithm
ECDSA with key length 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, and 521 bits. For both the
algorithms the following hashing algorithms are supported: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512.
234 The Active Authentication cryptographic key is imported in the TOE by the personalization
agent according to the SFR FMT_MTD-1/KEY_WRITE
11.3 SF_AUTH – Personalization Agent Authentication
235 The TOE implements security mechanism to authenticate external user and assign roles
and right. The auhentication mechanism is based on AES algorithm and key length of 128
bits as selected for the SFRs FCS_COP.1/AUTH and FCS_RND.1. The purpose of the
TSF SF_AUTH is to authenticate the roles of “Personalization Agent” when the TOE is in
the life cycle phase 3 “TOE Personalization” (FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1). The Personalization Agent Authentication Key(s)
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 71 | 83
are pre-loaded in the TOE at the end of phase 2 “TOE Manufacturing”. After a succesful
authentication the “Personalization Agent” take control of the TOE and execute the steps
and operations as described in the life cycle phase 3 “TOE Personalization” and initliaze
the Logical Data Structure (LDS) (FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1).
11.4 SF_SM - Secure Messaging
236 The TOE implements a trusted channel providing confidentiality and integrity of transferred
data according to the FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requirements. The trusted channel is
using TripleDES cipher for encryption in CBC mode as selected and defined in the SFR
FCS_COP.1/ENC and message authentication code generation in Retail-MAC mode as
selected and defined in the SFR FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR SF_SM uses new fresh
random (FCS_RND.1) at each set up of the trusted channel between TOE and Basic
Inspection System (BIS).
11.5 SF_AC - Access Control
237 The TOE operates in accordance to the access policies according to FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1 and considers the management functions and user roles as defined in
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 respectively.
238 This TSF checks that for each operation initiated by a subject on data (EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD) and keys (Personalization agent key, Document
Basic Access Keys), the security attributes for that roles authorization are satisfied. The
function covers the management, write and read of stored keys and data as defined in
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
239 The TSF SF_AC access control allows, the user in the role “TOE Manufacturer” during the
Phase 2 “TOE Manufacturing” to write the “Initialization Data”, which includes but are not
limited to the “IC Identification data” as required by FAU_SAS.1, to write these data only
once.
11.6 SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support
240 This Security Function is responsible for providing cryptographic support to all the other
Security Functions including secure key generation and operations on data such as
encrypt, decryption and MAC generation:
 The TSF provides the secure generation of symmetric Key for secure messaging
(FCS_CKM.1). The TSF produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES key
and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the algorithm
in [ICAO_9303], Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm uses the random number
generated by TSF as required by FCS_RND.1
 The TSF provides high quality Random Number Generator (FCS_RND.1) compliant with
the [AIS31/20]. This generator is a deterministic RNG of level DRG.3 according to
supporting enhanced backward and forward secrecy.
 The TSF provides Hashing Cryptographic operation for key derivation
(FCS_COP.1/SHA)
 The TSF provides TripleDES cipher for encryption/decryption in CBC mode and
cryptographic key size 112 bits (FCS_COP.1/ENC).
 The TSF provides AES cipher for encryption/decryption in CBC mode and cryptographic
key size 128 bits (FCS_COP.1/AUTH)
 The TSF provides message authentication based on Retail-MAC and cryptographic key
size 112 bits (FCS_COP.1/MAC).
 Secure destruction of cryptographic key secret or private material (FCS_CKM.4).
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 72 | 83
241 This TSF enforces protection of Key material during cryptographic functions processing
and Key Generation, against state-of-the-art attacks, including IC power consumption
analysis (FPT_EMS.1).
11.7 SF_PRO – Data Protection
242 This Security Function is responsible for protection of the TSF data, user data, and TSF
functionality. The TSF SF_RPO Data Protection is composed of software implementations
of test and security functions including:
 Performing self-tests of the TOE at each power-up including a set of tests to verify that
the underlying cryptographic algorithms are operating correctly (FPT_TST.1)
 Initializing memory after reset
 Initializing memory of de-allocated data
 Preserving the TOE lifecycle state integrity to ensure that the testing/debugging features
used during development remain irreversibly deactivated for deployment in order to
ensure User and TSF Data confidentiality (FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2).
 Protecting the integrity of all stored cryptographic keys before use and preventing use of
corrupted data by stopping the operation involved and setting an error.
 Preventing electromagnetic and power emissions or associated information like timing
behaviour, in order to preserve the confidentiality of stored keys or residual key material
information (FPT_EMS.1).
 Preserving secure state after sensitive processing failure (RNG, power loss, memory or
functional failure) or potential physical tampering or intrusion detection (FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_PHP.3)
243 This TSF prevents re-activation of de-activated or disabled or terminated mechanisms: the
code area and data area are protected (FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2).
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 73 | 83
SFR vs TSF
SF_BAC
–
Basic
Access
Control
SF_AUTH
-
Authentication
SF_AA
Active
Authentication
SF_SM
–
Secure
Messaging
SF_AC
–
Access
Control
SF_CRY
–
Cryptographic
Support
SF_PRO
–
Data
Protection
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1 x x
FCS_CKM.4 x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA x
FCS_COP.1/ENC x x
FCS_COP.1/AUTH x
FCS_COP.1/MAC x x
FCS_COP.1/AA x
FCS_RND.1 x
FIA_UID.1 x x
FIA_UAU.1 x x
FIA_UAU.4 x x
FIA_UAU.5 x x
FIA_UAU.6 x
FIA_AFL.1 x x x
FDP_ACC.1 x x x
FDP_ACF.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1 x
FDP_UIT.1 x
FMT_SMF.1 x x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x
FPT_EMS.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x
FPT_TST.1 x
FPT_PHP.3 x
Table 9: SFR vs TSF rationale
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11.8 Statement of Compatibility
244 This is the statement of compatibility between this Composite Security Target and the
Security Target of the underlying javacard platform JSAFE3 [JSAFE3_ST].
11.8.1 Relevance of javacard Platform-ST JSAFE3 TSF
245 Relation of TOE security Function of the Composite-TOE and the javacard Platform-ST
JSAFE3:
Javacard
Platform
JSAFE3 SF
Composite
TOE SF
SF.CryptoKey SF.CryptoOp SF.ObjectDeletion SF.SecureManagement
SF.Transaction
SF.SmartCardPlatform
apply indirectly to all
Composite-TOE security
functions
SF_BAC X X X
SF_AUTH X X X
SF_AA X X X
SF_SM X X
SF_AC X
SF_CRY X X X X
SF_PRO X
246 The SF SF.PIN and SF.Firewall are considered not relevant to the composite TOE
because these functionalities available in javacard platform JSAFE3 are not used by the
composite TOE.
11.8.2 Security Requirements
247 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the SFRs of the
Composite-TOE and the platform JSAFE3. The table below shows the mapping between
the javacard platform JSAFE3 SFRs and the Composite ST SFRs. Only the relevant
platform JSAFE3 SFRs are listed
Relation of Security Requirements of the Composite-TOE to javacard
Platform-ST JSAFE3:
SFR-components of the Composite-
TOE
Platform JSAFE3 SFRs
FAU_SAS.1
Audit Storage
-
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation -
Generation of Document Basic Access
Keys by the TOE
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher
fcs_cop.1/SHA - Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
fcs_ckm.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/SHA
Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key
Derivation
fcs_cop.1/SHA - Cryptographic operation
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 75 | 83
SFR-components of the Composite-
TOE
Platform JSAFE3 SFRs
FCS_COP.1/ENC
Cryptographic operation – Encryption /
Decryption Triple DES
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
Cryptographic operation –
Authentication
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher - Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_MAC - Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/MAC
Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC
FCS_COP.1/AA
Active Authentication
fcs_cop.1/RSA_Signature
fcs_cop.1/EC_Signature
FCS_RND.1
Random number generation
fcs_rng.1/DRBG - Generation of random numbers
FIA_UID.1
Timing of identification
-
FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
-
FIA_UAU.4
Single-use authentication mechanism –
Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
-
FIA_UAU.5
Multiple authentication mechanisms
-
FIA_UAU.6
Re-authenticating of Terminal by the
TOE
-
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure handling
-
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control – Basic Access
Control
-
FDP_ACF.1
Basic Security attribute based access
control - Basic Access Control
-
FDP_UCT.1
Basic data exchange confidentiality -
MRTD
fcs_cop.1/DES-TDES_Cipher
FDP_UIT.1
Data exchange integrity - MRTD
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions
-
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
-
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
fmt_lim.1/Test - Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
fmt_lim.2/Test - Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
Management of TSF data – Writing of
initialization data and personalization
data
-
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Management of TSF data – Disabling of
Read Access to Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
-
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
Management of TSF data – Key Write
-
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Management of TSF data – Key Read
-
FPT_EMS.1
TOE emanation
fpt_emsec.1 TOE Emanation
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 76 | 83
SFR-components of the Composite-
TOE
Platform JSAFE3 SFRs
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
fpt_fls.1/Operate - Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
fpt_tst.1 TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
fpt_php.3 - Resistance to physical attack
Platform-SFRs classification
IP_SFR : Irrelevant Platform-SFRs:
fcs_ckm.1/RSA fcs_ckm.1/EC fcs_ckm.1/DSA fcs_ckm.2/DES
fcs_ckm.2/AES fcs_ckm.2/RSA_STD fcs_ckm.2/RSA_CRT fcs_ckm.2/EC
fcs_ckm.2/DSA fcs_ckm.3/DES fcs_ckm.3/AES fcs_ckm.3/RSA_STD
fcs_ckm.3/RSA_CRT fcs_ckm.3/EC fcs_ckm.3/DSA fcs_cop.1/AES_CMAC
fcs_cop.1/RSA_Cipher fcs_cop.1/ECDH_KeyExchange fcs_cop.1/DH_KeyExchange fcs_cop.1/ECDHGMap
fcs_cop.1/DHGMap fcs_rng.1/ICAll.
RP_SFR-SERV: Relevant Platform-SFRs being used by the Composite-ST to implement a security service
with associated TSFI.
fcs_cop.1/SHA -
Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/DES-
TDES_Cipher
fcs_cop.1/AES_Cipher -
Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/AES_MAC -
Cryptographic operation
fcs_cop.1/DES_MAC fcs_cop.1/RSA_Signature fcs_cop.1/EC_Signature fcs_rng.1/DRBG -
Generation of random
numbers
fcs_ckm.4 fpt_fls.1/Operate fpt_php.3 fpt_tst.1
fpt_emsec.1
RP_SFR-MECH: Relevant Platform-SFRs being used by the Composite-ST because of its security properties
providing protection against attacks to the TOE as a whole. These required security properties are a result of
the security mechanisms and services that are implemented in the Platform TOE.
fdp_acc.2/FIREWALL fdp_acf.1/FIREWALL fdp_ifc.1/JCVM fdp_iff.1/JCVM
fdp_rip.1/OBJECTS fmt_msa.1/JCRE fmt_msa.1/JCVM fmt_msa.2/FIREWALL_JCVM
fmt_msa.3/FIREWALL fmt_msa.3/JCVM fmt_smf.1 fmt_smr.1
fdp_rip.1/ABORT fdp_rip.1/APDU fdp_rip.1/bArray fdp_rip.1/KEYS
fdp_rip.1/TRANSIENT fdp_rol.1/FIREWALL fau_arp.1/JCS fdp_sdi.2
fpr_uno.1/PIN fpr_uno.1/KEY fpt_fls.1 fpt_tdc.1
fia_atd.1/AID fia_uid.2/AID fia_usb.1/AID fmt_mtd.1/JCRE
fmt_mtd.3/JCRE fdp_rip.1/ODEL fpt_fls.1/ODEL fdp_acc.1/GP_API
fdp_acf.1/GP_API fmt_msa.1/GP_API fmt_msa.3/GP_API fmt_smr.1/GP_API
fia_uid.1/GP_API fdp_acc.1/Atomicity fdp_rol.1/Atomicity fru_flt.2
fpt_fls.1/SCP fmt_lim.1/Test fmt_lim.2/Test fdp_sdc.1
fdp_sdi.2 fdp_itt.1 fpt_itt.1 fdp_ifc.1
Security Assurance Requirements
248 The chosen level of assurance of the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3 is EAL5 augmented
by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
249 The Assurance Requirement levels of Composite-TOE and the underlying platform are
compliant to each other.
11.8.3 Security Objectives
250 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the Security
Objectives of the Composite-TOE and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 77 | 83
Relation of the Security Objectives of the Composite-ST and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3:
Javacard platform-ST
JSAFE3 Security Objectives
Composite-ST
Security
Objectives
O.OPERATE
O.REALLOCATION
O.SCP.RECOVERY
O.SCP.IC
O.SCP.SUPPORT
O.CIPHER
O.KEY-MNGT
O.TRANSACTION
O.OBJ-DELETION
O.SIDE_CHANNEL
O.GLOBAL_ARRAY_CONFID
OT.AC_Pers x x
OT.Data_Int x x x x
OT.Data_Conf x x x x x
OT.Identification x
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func x x x x x
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak x x
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper x x
OT.Prot_Malfunction x x x x
OT.Active_Auth_MRTD_Proof x x
Security Objectives for the javacard platform JSAFE3 not relevant for the Composite-TOE:
251 O.ALARM, O.SID, O.ROLES, O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG,
O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID, O.NATIVE, O.LIFE_CYCLE, O.RESOURCES ,
O.FIREWALL, O.PIN-MNGT
11.8.4 Security Objectives for the Environment
252 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the Security
Objectives for the envornment for the Composite-TOE and for the javacard platform-ST
JSAFE3.
IrOE: The objectives for the environment being not relevant for the Composite-ST are the
following: none
CfPOE: The objectives for the environment being fulfilled by the Composite-ST
automatically are the following: none
SgOE: The objectives for the environment significant for the Composite-ST are the
following:
 OE.CARD_MANAGEMENT, OE.NO-DELETION, OE.NO-INSTALL,
OE.VERIFICATION, OE.CODE-EVIDENCE. All these objectives are relevant to
the composite TOE because a correct verification and management of the TOE
applet code (JSAFE3_EPASS V.3.0.4 and IAS V.2.0.3) before and after
installation is crucial and necessary for the TOE security.
Note: The status of the platform Card Manager (also called Issuer Security Domain,
ISD) is locked in post-issuance i.e. applet loading, installation and deletion is no
more possible.
 OE.MANAGEMENT_OF_SECRETS. User secret or TSF data managed outside
the TOE shall be protected against unauthorised disclosure and modification.
This objective is enforced by OE.MRTD_Manufact and OE.Personalization
stated for the composite TOE.
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 78 | 83
11.8.5 Compatibility: TOE Security Environment
11.8.5.1. Assumptions
253 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the Assumptions of
the Composite-ST and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3
Assumptions for the Composite-TOE referring to the MRTD operational capabilities only:
 A.MRTD_Manufact - MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
 A.MRTD_Delivery - MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
 A.Pers_Agent - Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
 A.Insp_Sys - Inspection Systems for global interoperability
 A.BAC-Keys - Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
Assumptions of the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3 are not referring to Composite-TOE
assumptions:
 A.VERIFICATION: All the bytecodes are verified at least once, before the loading,
before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in
order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.
 A.NO-DELETION: No deletion of installed applets (or packages) is possible.
 A.NO-INSTALL: There is no post-issuance installation of applets. Installation of
applets is secure and occurs only in a controlled environment in the pre-issuance
phase.
11.8.5.2. Threats
254 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the Threats of the
Composite-TOE and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
Threats for the Composite-TOE:
 T.Chip_ID - Identification of MRTD’s chip
 T.Skimming - Skimming the logical MRTD
 T.Eavesdropping - Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
 T.Forgery - Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
 T.Abuse-Func - Abuse of Functionality
 T.Information_Leakage - Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
 T.Phys-Tamper - Physical Tampering
 T.Malfunction - Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Threats of the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3:
 T.OBJ-DELETION: The attacker keeps a reference to a garbage collected object in
order to force the TOE to execute an unavailable method, to make it to crash, or to
gain access to a memory containing data that is now being used by another
application.
 T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA: The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) another
application’s data.
 T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA: The attacker executes an application to disclose data
belonging to another application.
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 79 | 83
 T.CONFID-JCS-DATA: The attacker executes an application to disclose data
belonging to the Java Card System.
 T.INTEG-JCS-DATA: The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) Java Card
System or API data or the SCP data.
 T.SID.1: An fake applet impersonates another application, or even the Java Card RE, in order
to gain illegal access to some resources of the TOE or with respect to the end user or the
terminal.
 T.SID.2: The attacker modifies the TOE’s attribution of a privileged role (e.g. default
applet and currently selected applet), which allows illegal impersonation of this role.
 T.RESOURCES: An attacker prevents correct operation of the Java Card System
through consumption of some resources of the card: RAM or NVRAM.
 T.PHYSICAL: The attacker discloses or modifies the design of the TOE, its sensitive
data or application code by physical (opposed to logical) tampering means. This
threat includes IC failure analysis, electrical probing, unexpected tearing, and DPA.
That also includes the modification of the runtime execution of Java Card System or
SCP software through alteration of the intended execution order of (set of) instructions
through physical tampering techniques. This threatens all the identified assets.
Refinement:
This threat also addresses leakage of information that may occur during TOE usage
through:
o Emanations,
o Variations in power consumption,
o I/O characteristics,
o Clock frequency,
o Changes in processing time
 T.LIFE_CYCLE: An attacker accesses to product functionalities outside of their
expected availability range thus violating irreversible life cycle phases of the product
(for instance, an attacker downloads, install, or delete applications available on the
product at post-issuance).
255 There are no contradictions between the threats of the composite TOE and the threats of
the underlying javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
11.8.5.3. Organizational Security Policies
256 The following section verifies that there is no contradiction between the OSPs of the
Composite-TOE and the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
Organizational Security Policies of the Composite-TOE:
 P.Manufact - Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
 P.Personalization - Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
 P.Personal_Data - Personal data protection policy
 P.Active_Auth – Active Authentication
Organizational Security Policies of the javacard platform-ST JSAFE3:
 OSP.VERIFICATION: This policy shall ensure the consistency between the export files
used in the verification and those used for installing the verified file. The policy must
also ensure that no modification of the file is performed in between its verification and
the signing by the verification authority.
 OSP.MANAGEMENT_OF_SECRETS: Management of secret data (e.g. generation,
storage, distribution, destruction, loading into the product of cryptographic private
JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 80 | 83
keys, symmetric keys and user authentication data) performed outside the product on
behalf of the TOE or Product Manufacturer shall comply with security organisational
policies that enforce integrity and confidentiality of these data. Secret data shared with
the user of the product shall be exchanged through trusted channels that protect the
data against unauthorised disclosure and modification and allow detecting potential
security violations.
 OSP.ROLES: The TOE shall recognize the following roles associated with:
o Applications
 OSP.CARD_ADMINISTRATION_DISABLED: Card Content Management Functions
(CCMFs) shall not be available after TOE delivery.
257 No organizational security policies of underlying javacard platform-ST JSAFE3 is mapped
to platform relevent objectives.
258 There are no contradictions between the organizational security policies of the composite
TOE and the organizational security policies of the underlying javacard platform-ST
JSAFE3.
11.8.6 Conclusion
259 There are no contradictions between the ST of the composite TOE and the ST of the
underlying javacard platform-ST JSAFE3.
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12. ANNEX A – CRYPTO DISCLAIMER
260 The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits
Authentication AES in CBC mode [FIPS_PUB_197]
(AES),
[ISO 10116] (CBC)
Key sizes: 128 bits
RSA in CRT [ISO_9796-2] 1024, 2048 bits
ECDSA [TR-03111] 192,224,256,320,3
84,512 and 521
Key
Agreement
Session key established
with BAC
[ICAO_9303] Key sizes: 112 bits
Confidentiality TripleDES in CBC mode [FIPS_PUB_46-3]
and [ICAO_9303]
normative appendix
5, A5.3
Key sizes: 112 bits
Integrity Retail-MAC [ISO_9797-1] (MAC
algorithm 3, block
cipher DES,
Sequence Message
Counter, padding
mode 2)
Key sizes: 112 bits
Trusted
Channel
Secure messaging in
ENC_MAC mode and key
established with BAC
[ICAO_9303] Key sizes: 112 bits
RNG True Random Generator
(TRNG) class PTG.2
Deterministic Random
Generator (DRBG) class
RNG DRG.3
[AIS31/20] N.A.
Hashing SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512
[[FIPS_180-2] N.A.
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JSAFE3_EPASS_BAC_SecurtyTarget_Lite - P a g e 83 | 83
13.QUALITY REQUIREMENTS
13.1 Revision History
Version Subject
A Initial Release – 13-March-2019
Table 10 - Revision History
14.ENVIRONMENTAL/ECOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS
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consumption.