BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
for
KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor 1.0.7
from
KoCo Connector AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 (*)
KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor
1.0.7
from KoCo Connector AG
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile)
Schutzprofil 1: Anforderungen an den Netzkonnektor
(NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016,
BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and
ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 22 March 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 2
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11. Security Target............................................................................................................21
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................21
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................28
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
6 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 component of this assurance family is relevant.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components. The evaluation contained the components AVA_VAN.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_CMC.3, ALC_CMS.3, ALC_DVS.1,
ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ATE_COV.2 and ATE_DPT.1 that are not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2014, for mutual recognition the EAL 2
components of these assurance families are relevant.
8 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, 1.0.7 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, 1.0.7 was conducted by
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 11.11.2016. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: KoCo Connector AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 22 March
2017 is valid until 21 March 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
9 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, 1.0.7 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
KoCo Connector AG
Marienstraße 12
10117 Berlin
10 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
1. Executive Summary
The target of evaluation (TOE) is KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, Version 1.0.7. The TOE
is the network connector (German: “Netzkonnektor”) and a small part of the application
connector (German “Anwendungskonnektor”) of the so-called “KoCoBox MED+” connector
(German: “Konnektor”). The TOE is part of a secure platform called KoCoBox MED+ which
is used as an “e-Health Konnektor” in the context of the German health care telematics
infrastructure.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1:
Anforderungen an den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016,
BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_TAT.1,
ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.VPN VPN Client
SF.DynamicPacketFilter Firewall with stateful packet inspection
SF.NetworkServices DHCP, DNS and NTP networking services
SF.SelfProtection Self-tests, attack counter mechanisms, deletion
of confidential data and non-emanation of data
SF.Audit Secure audit
SF.Administration Secure administration channels and update
mechanism
SF.CryptographicServices Cryptographic services required by other
functionality
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
12 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
KoCoBox MED+ Netzkonnektor, 1.0.7
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 FW Firmware Image 1.0.7 Either:
Initially included in the e-Health
Konnektor product KoCoBox
MED+
or as a software update package
via KSR process.
2 DOC KoCoBox MED+ Allgemeine
Gebrauchsanleitung
Purpose: Guide for the end
user
1.0.7, September
2016
Delivered with the delivery
package of the product
KoCoBox MED+.
3 DOC Administratorhandbuch
KoCoBox MED+ für die
Komponente Netzkonnektor
Purpose: Guide for the
Administrator
1.0.7 Delivered to the authorized
service technician, who installs
the TOE at the end user site.
The service technician performs
administration tasks.
4 DOC Guidance addendum
documentation
(„Ergänzungen zum
Administratorhandbuch
KoCoBox MED+ für die
Komponente
Netzkonnektor“)
1.0.1 See 3.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered to the end user as part of the product KoCoBox MED+. An
authorized service technician will deliver the product to the end user. The service
technician installs the product KoCoBox MED+ within the premises of the end user. Prior
to installation, the service technician must be identified via a photo ID by the end user. The
service technician is trained, instructs the end user and provides security advice.
The TOE can be identified within the KoCoBox MED+ as following:
● Display:
• OK to enter the Menu
• Select 4 for Version
Identification: Firmwareversion 1.0.7, Hardwareversion 1.0.0
13 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
● Web Administration Interface:
• Check the entry Firmware on the status page of the Web Administration Interface
Identification: Produktversion: 1.0.7:1.0.0
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit,
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management,
● Protection of the TSF,
● Trusted Path/Channels.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.NK.phys_Schutz: The TOE must be physically protected against unauthorized
access,
● OE.NK.Admin_EVG: The TOE must be configured by a trustworthy and well trained
administrator, who operates the TOE according to the guidance.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
A high level description of the IT product and its major components can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.7.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer testing effort
14 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
TOE test configurations:
The Security Target [6] has identified solely one configuration of the TOE under evaluation.
Nevertheless, the developer uses two “preparative” and four test configurations for his
simulative testing approach. Furthermore, two firmware versions for blackbox and for
whitebox testing are provided. Simulation is used for flexibility reasons: Properties of the
TOE can be changed, the “inner” behaviour can be analysed by whitebox approach.
TOE test environment configurations:
The assumptions and objectives for the operational environment stated in [6] are not
applicable for testing. Nevertheless, the developer uses five test environment
configurations which simulate a large amount of the real environment. Again, simulation is
used for flexibility reasons: All simulated components can be configured according to test
needs.
Testing approach:
● Coverage and depth tests are done together.
● The test specifications give mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s), subsystem(s), and
module(s).
● Different testing approaches are used:
• Code analysis
• Blackbox tests
• Manual
• Automatic
• Whitebox tests
• Manual
• Automatic
• The test descriptions comprise (inter alia)
• Pre conditions: preparative steps
• Test steps: Core test steps
• Post conditions: clearance steps to tidy up before the next test
● Testing results: The developer’s testing efforts have been proven sufficient to
demonstrate that the TSFIs and subsystems perform as expected.
All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all passed
according to their expected result.
Evaluator testing effort
TOE test configurations:
The evaluation body used the same test configurations and test environment as the
developer during functional testing.
Test subset chosen:
The evaluation body chose to repeat and inspect a broad set of developer tests. Effectively
more that 50% of the tests were covered.
15 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
Interface selection criteria:
The evaluation body chose to broadly cover the existing interfaces without specific
restrictions.
Interfaces tested:
Services at the LAN and the WAN ports were considered during testing.
Developer tests performed:
The evaluation body chose to perform a random sampling with the intent to broadly cover
the existing interfaces and the implemented security functionality.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing effort
The configuration defined in the ST was tested. Furthermore, different TOE variants were
used during penetration testing to verify different mechanisms.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful.
● Penetration testing approach:
The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern
derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. The areas were prioritized with
regard to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing
coverage, detectability of flaws during developer testing.
Medium and high areas were guaranteed to be penetration tested, with a stronger
emphasis on high priorities. Low priorities were also considered during penetration, but
could be less emphasized, if developer tests were found to be sufficient.
The penetration testing activities were performed as tests and as analytical tasks.
Whenever an analysis was estimated to yield better results, the evaluators chose the
analytical approach. Analytical activities were especially applied in the areas Update,
Random Number Generation and Hardening Mechanisms. Combined approaches were
also applied.
● TOE test configurations:
The TOE was delivered by the developer in two different configurations: A final
operational and a special ATE variant. The ATE configuration is an enhanced variant of
the software running on the same hardware and using the same smart cards (gSMC-K).
The ATE configuration is used to enable tests that are not possible due to security
mechanisms applied in the final operational configuration. The differences between final
operational configuration and the ATE variant are clearly defined. Therefore, two goals
can be achieved:
(1) Perform detailed testing using the target hardware and smart card,
(2) ensure that the tests results of the ATE variant are also valid for the final variant.
During the evaluation process, the TOE was updated several times. Penetration tests
were performed with versions 1.0.6 and 1.0.7. The developer provided a change
16 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
analysis which documents, the differences between the versions. The evaluation body
did not identify changes that would render the 1.0.6 test results invalid for 1.0.7. The
most important tests were conducted with the final version 1.0.7.
● Attack scenarios having been tested:
The evaluation body considered security analysis and penetration testing in the following
areas:
• VPN Connections
• Administration Connections
• Random Number Generation
• Update
• Hardening Mechanisms
• Filtering and Routing
• Self-Protection
• Network Services
• Audit
● Tested security functionality:
The evaluator ensured that all areas listed above are tested. Actually, the evaluation
body used a more detailed list during the analysis and testing. The penetration testing
was then conducted based on priorities as described above. Therefore, a complete
coverage of security functional testing based on technical areas of concern is performed.
● Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment provided that all measures required by
the developer are applied.
Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
The TOE testing did not reveal vulnerabilities exploitable by an attacker with high attack
potential.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluation results are only valid for the single configuration defined in the Security
Target [6].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
17 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_FSP.4, ALC_TAT.1,
ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1:
Anforderungen an den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2,
11.04.2016, BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by AVA_VAN.5, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3,
ADV_FSP.4, ALC_TAT.1, ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Comment
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification with encoding
RSASSA-PSS and
RSASSA-PKCS1-1.5
using SHA-256
[PKCS#1] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/TLS,
FCS_COP.1/Sign
2 Authentication RSA signature creation
with support of gSMC-K
and verification with
encoding
RSASSA-PKCS1-1.5
using SHA-256
(sha256withRSAEncrypti
on)
[PKCS#1] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 FCS_COP.1/NK.Auth,
FCS_COP.1/TLS
3 Key
Agreement
Diffie-Hellman (IKEv2)
with key derivation
function
PRF-HMAC-{SHA-1,
SHA-256}
[HaC] (DH)
[RFC3526]
(dh-group),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
2048
(dh-group
14) with DH
exponent
length ≥ 384
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE
18 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Comment
[RFC5996] (IKEv2) bits
4 Diffie-Hellman with TLS
key derivation function
[HaC] (DH)
[RFC3526]
(dh-group),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC1321] (MD5),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4346]
(TLSv1.1)
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2)
2048
(dh-group
14) with DH
exponent
length ≥ 384
bits
FCS_COP.1/TLS
5 Confidentiality AES in CBC [FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3602]
(AES-CBC)
256 FCS_COP.1/NK.ESP,
FCS_COP.1/NK.IPsec,
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE
6 AES in CBC [FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3602]
(AES-CBC)
128, 256 FCS_COP.1/TLS
7 Integrity HMAC with SHA-{1, 256}
(IKE, IPsec)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC2404],
[RFC4868],
[RFC5996] (IKEv2)
160, 256 FCS_COP.1/NK.HMA
C
8 HMAC with SHA-1 (TLS) [FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC2404],
[RFC4868],
[RFC5996] (IKEv2)
160 FCS_COP.1/TLS
9 Trusted
Channel
IKEv2, IPsec [RFC5996] (IKEv2)
[RFC4301] (IPsec),
[RFC4303] (ESP)
FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_T
I
10 IKEv2, IPsec [RFC5996] (IKEv2)
[RFC4301] (IPsec),
[RFC4303] (ESP)
FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_S
IS
11 TLS v1.1 and v1.2 [RFC4346]
(TLSv1.1),
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2)
FTP_TRP.1/NK.Admin
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to [gemSpec_Kon], [gemSpec_Krypt] and [TR03116-1] the algorithms are
suitable for the corresponding purpose.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
19 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level above
100 Bits
Comment
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification with
encoding
RSASSA-PKCS1-1.5
using SHA-1
[PKCS#1] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
2048,
4096
no FCS_COP.1/
Sign for
x.509
certificate
verification
2 RSA signature
verification with
encoding
RSASSA-PSS using
SHA-512
[PKCS#1] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
2048 yes FCS_COP.1/
Sign for
firmware
update
signatures
verification
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality (Update)
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
The administrator shall only configure the TOE by using the functionality of the web
administration interface as presented in the recommended web browser.
20 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
AK Application connector
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DH Diffie-Hellman
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eGK Elektronische Gesundheitskarte
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
gSMC-K Secure module for the connector
HBA Heilberufsausweis
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KSR Konfigurations- und Software-Repository
LAN Local Area Network
MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm 5
NK Network connector
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
21 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIS Secure Internet Service
SMC-B Secure Module Card – Type B: Praxisausweis / Institutionsausweis
ST Security Target
TI Telematikinfrastruktur
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
22 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017, Version 1.7.9, 09.11.2016, KoCoBox
MED+ Netzkonnektor Common Criteria Certification Security Target, KoCo
Konnektor AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 11.11.2016, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 1: Anforderungen an
den Netzkonnektor (NK-PP), Version 3.2.2, 11.04.2016, BSI-CC-PP-0047-2015
[9] Configuration list for the TOE
• Konfiguration Items N-Design (ALC_CMS.3 + ADV_IMP.1) - Release 1.0.7 –
v1_0.xlsx, n-design GmbH, Version 1.0, 12.9.2016
• Konfiguration_Items_os-cillation_(ALC_CMS.3_+_ADV_IMP.1)_-_v1.0.7.xls,
os-cillation GmbH, Version 1.0, 26.9.2016
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE
• KoCoBox MED+ Allgemeine Gebrauchsanleitung, KoCo Konnektor AG,
Version September 2016, 26.09.2016
• Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+ Version 1.0 für die Komponente
Netzkonnektor, KoCo Konnektor AG, Version 1.0.7, 26.9.2016
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
23 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
• Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+, Version 1.0 für
die Komponente Netzkonnektor, KoCo Konnektor AG, Version 1.0.1,
09.11.2016
[11] Implementation standards:
[Brainpool] ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation. Version 1.0,
October 19, 2005.
[HaC] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot und O. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRCPress, 1996.
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Signature Standard (SHS), NIST,
March 2012
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197:
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), NIST, November 2001
[PKCS#1] B. Kaliski: PKCS #1: RSA Encryption, Version 2.1, RFC 3447, Version
2.2, October 2012
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm ", April 1992.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, „HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", February 1997
[RFC2404] The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH, Network Working
Group, November 1998
[RFC3268] Chown, P., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), June 2002
[RFC3526] More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for
Internet Key Exchange (IKE), May 2003
[RFC3602] S .Frankel, R. Glenn, S. Kelly: The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and
Its Use with IPsec. September 2003
[RFC4301] Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (IPsec), S. Kent, K.
Seo, December 2005
[RFC4303] IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 4303 (ESP), S. Kent,
December 2005
[RFC4346] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1, T. Dierks,
E. Rescorla, April 2006
[RFC4868] Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with
IPsec, S. Kelly, S. Frankel, May 2007
[RFC5246] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, RFC 5246,
Network Working Group
[RFC5996] The Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), D. Harkins,
D. Carrel, September 2010
[SEC1] SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Certicom Research. Version 2.0,
21.05.2009, http://www.secg.org/download/aid-780/sec1-v2.pdf
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation – Methods
and Techniques, December 2001
24 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
[SP800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
[SP800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, November 2007
[SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators, NIST Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015.
[12] Application standards:
[gemSpec_Kon] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte: Konnektorspezifikation,
gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH,
Version 4.6.0, 26.08.2014
[gemSpec_Krypt] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte - Verwendung
kryptographischer Algorithmen in der Telematikinfrastruktur, gematik
Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH, Version
2.3.0, 17.06.2014
[TR03116-1] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-1, Kryptographische Vorgaben
für die eCard-Projekte für der Bundesregierung, Teil 1: Telematikinfrastruktur,
Technische Arbeitsgruppe TR-03116, 30.01.2014 (Version 3.18)
25 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
26 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
27 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition“
28 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
29 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
30 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
31 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
32 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary
33 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
34 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
35 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0950-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
36 / 36