Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
for
IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager,
Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.32
Common Criteria Arrangement
BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager,
Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1
from
IBM Corporation
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 - Basic Flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 14th
February 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager, Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager,
Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH.
The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
IBM Corporation
Via Sciangai, 53
Roma 00144, Italia
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 14th
February 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-22.
The product IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager, Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1
has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
7
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
Via Sciangai, 53
Roma 00144, Italia
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 10
3 Security Policy 11
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 17
9 Results of the Evaluation 18
10 Comments/Recommendations 19
11 Annexes 19
12 Security Target 19
13 Definitions 20
14 Bibliography 22
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager, version 2.2, Fix Pack 1 (named TLCM
in short) is a software only product that provides software inventory, use
metering, and license allocation services. Information about installed software
and software use (software usage records) is collected from monitored
computers and stored in a central DB2 database that is part of the TOE
environment. The software usage records can be accessed by an authorized
administrator to produce reports for billing and tracking of software license use
within a defined organization.
Tivoli License Compliance Manager is based on a three-tier architecture
composed of multiple servers with associated databases, agents, and related
components supporting the product’s functionality. The Administration Server,
the Runtime Server(s) and Agents are considered to be the TOE. The
databases and other supporting components are located in the TOE
environment. For more details about the architectural description of the product,
please refer to chapter 5 of this report.
Tivoli License Compliance Manager is an internally-deployed system,
accessible only by a trusted and competent group of administrators in a
controlled environment. There are no typical “end users” interacting with the
product.
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
• Identification and authentication with password policy enforcement
• Session timeout
• Security Roles
• Management of Roles and Security Functions
• Secure data transfer between components
• Guaranteed data delivery
The product is available in two forms:
• A full commercial form that enables enterprise-wide monitoring and
management of both IBM and non-IBM software products, including
software products defined by an authorized administrator.
• A subset form that tracks installation and use of specific IBM software
products to enable reporting requirements associated with the sub-capacity
pricing model.
The security functions are the same for both forms of the product.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
The IT product IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager, Version 2.2,
Fix Pack 1 was evaluated by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 25 January 2007. The atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
IBM Corporation
Via Sciangai, 53
Roma 00144, Italia
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL2 (Evaluation Assurance Level 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1). The following
table shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL2 TOE evaluation: structurally tested
+: ALC_FLR.1 Life-cycle – Basic flaw remediation
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based control
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security management roles
FTA TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1a Management of security attributes (Super
Administrator)
FMT_MSA.1b Management of security attributes (user)
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.3.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.IA Identification and Authentication
SF.IA.1 User to Administration Server identification and authentication
SF.IA.2 Password policy enforcement
SF.IA.3 Agent to Runtime Server identification and authentication
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.IA.4 Runtime Server to Administration
authentication
Server identification and
SF.IA.5 Inactivity timeout
SF.ACCESS Access Control
SF.DATA Data Protection During Transfer
SF.DATA.1 Agent to Runtime Server secure channel
SF.DATA.2 Data availability protection
SF.MGMT Management of Security Functions
SF.MGMT.1 Create and manage organizations
SF.MGMT.2 Create and manage users
SF.MGMT.3 Change own user passwords
SF.MGMT.4 Change Runtime Server communication password
SF.MGMT.6 Change the Runtime Server Database password
SF.MGMT.7 Change the password used to open the truststore file
SF.MGMT.8 Re-encrypt all passwords
SF.MGMT.9 Change the Administration Server Database password
SF.MGMT.10 Re-encrypt all passwords
SF.MGMT.11 Define and manage runtime server security attributes
Table 5: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed basic (SOF-basic) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 8.3.3.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The Security Target [6] describes the threats to be countered by the TOE and
its environment in terms of human threat agents and assets potentially subject
to attacks.
The only asset described is the following:
• Software Usage Records: Software installation and use data collected by
the Agents deployed on monitored computers, transmitted through the
Runtime Server and the Administration Server, and stored in an external
Administration Server DB2 database.
The threat agents, their attack potential, resources, and level of expertise are
described below:
• User: This threat agent is a legitimate human user in the TOE environment.
Non-administrator TOE users have no authorized access at all to the TOE
resources, but may attempt to access assets protected by the system. This
threat agent is considered to have a low motivation to attack, limited
resources, and limited opportunity, but might have a high level of expertise
and competence.
• Non authorized administrator: This threat agent is a legitimate human
administrator of the TOE with access to specific data or function of TOE, but
without authorized access to other data or function functions of TOE. An
administrator with limited access might attempt to access assets he or she is
not authorized to access. This threat agent is considered to have a low
motivation to attack and limited resources, but has a high level of expertise,
competence, and opportunity.
It is assumed that both sets of potential attackers come from a well-managed
user community in a non-hostile working environment. The TOE is not intended
to be used in an environment in which protection against determined or
sophisticated attacks is required.
The following threats must be countered by security functions implemented by
the TOE:
• T.BYPASS: A user or a non-authorized administrator might bypass TSP
enforcement functions to access data or resources protected by the TOE by
penetrating or manipulating portions of the TOE.
• T.ACCESS: An administrator might see software usage records for an
organization in which he or she does not play a role.
• T.DATA_INT: A user or a non-authorized administrator might compromise
the integrity or confidentiality of data being transferred from the Agent to the
Runtime Server.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
• T.DATA_PERSIST: A legitimate user (because of user error), an attacker
(maliciously), or a system error might cause loss of data by interfering with
successful completion of the transfer of data from one TOE component to
another component (successful completion means successful write to the
target database).
Please note that no organizational security policies for the TOE are described.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The evaluated configuration of the IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager,
Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1 servers, can be used on the following range of
operating system platforms:
• Windows Server 2003 Standard or Enterprise Edition,
Windows 2000 Advanced Server or Windows 2000 Server
• IBM AIX 5.3 and 5.2
• HP/UX 11i
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.0 and 3.0
• SUSE LINUX Enterprise Server 9 and 8
• Sun Solaris 10 and 9
The evaluated configuration of Tivoli License Compliance Manager Agents are
allowed to be used on the following operating system platforms:
• Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition
• IBM AIX 5.3
• Sun Solaris 9
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.0
Please consider the platforms on which the TOE testing has been carried out
(refer to chapter 7).
The Agents include IBM Global Security Kit (GSKit) as part of the TOE. It is a
library package that implements SSL. The following GSKit versions are used:
Supported Agent Operating System GSKit Version
AIX 7.0.3.15
Linux 7.0.3.15
Sun Solaris 7.0.3.17
Windows 7.0.3.20
Table 6: Supported GSKit versions
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The TOE can be purchased through established IBM product distribution
channels. It may be acquired either by secure electronic download or by
requesting and installing from physical media (CD-ROM or DVD).
In the evaluated configuration, the fix pack component of the TOE (Fix Pack 1)
must be acquired and is only available on CD-ROM through an established IBM
Tivoli support channel.
The following installation requirements are described in the ST [6]:
• The TOE must be configured to use the database authentication
mechanism.
• The TOE must be configured to use SSL with client authentication to
protect data flow between the Agents and the Runtime Server.
• The Runtime Server Agent Self Update feature must be disabled.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the environment of the TOE are made:
• A.PHYSICAL: It is assumed that all machines housing components of the
TOE and components in the TOE environment on which the TOE relies are
protected against unauthorized physical access and modification.
• A.TIME: It is assumed that a reliable time function is provided by the TOE
environment to support the inactivity timeout function.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager, Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW IBM Tivoli License Manager Version 2.2: PID
number 5724-
D33
CD-ROM or Download
2 SW Fix Pack 1 part number
2.2.0-TIV-TLCM-
FP0001
CD-ROM
3 DOC ADMINGUIDE SC32-1430-02 PDF
4 DOC CATMGMT SC32-1434-01 PDF
5 DOC CCGUIDE First Ed. PDF
6 DOC COMMANDREF SC32-1501-00 PDF
7 DOC DATADICT SC32-1432-02 PDF
8 DOC FPREADME First Ed. PDF
9 DOC INSTALL SC32-1431-02 PDF
10 DOC OVERVIEW SC32-1503-00 PDF
11 DOC PROBDETER SC32-9102-01 PDF
12 DOC RELNOTES SC32-1429-02 PDF
13 DOC SECMGMT SC32-1502-00 PDF
Table 7: Deliverables of the TOE
The following licensed program packages that delivered together with the TOE.
They have to be installed as prerequisites for the TOE as part of the TOE
environment:
• IBM WebSphere Application Server (WAS) version 6.0
• IBM WebSphere Application Server plug-in, version 6.0
• IBM HTTP Web server, version 6.0
• IBM DB2 Universal Database, Enterprise Edition, version 8.2
Please note that the TOE component GSKit in the versions as listed in chapter
1.5 of this report is also delivered with the TOE.
No hardware is delivered as part of the product.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager, version 2.2, Fix Pack 1 provides
software inventory, use metering and license allocation services.
Therefore its main purpose is to provide mechanisms for Authentication and to
control the access to protected ressources. As the TOE consists of more than
one component, protection of data transfer between the components is
implemented. Management functionality is provided to support these
functionalities.
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined by the following TOE security
functional requirements:
• SFR components of the class FIA define the mechanisms for identification
and authentication
• SFR components of the class FDP define the access control for protected
ressources and the protection of data transfer between the components of
the TOE
• SFR components of the class FMT define the management functions that
the TOE provides
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1 by the definition of the TOE Security
Functional Requirements.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is expected to be
used are described in terms of assumptions. The assumptions for the
environment are divided into assumptions about the intended usage of the TOE
and assumptions about the environment the TOE is going to be used in.
4.1 Usage assumptions
• A.CRYPTO: It is assumed that cryptographic keys and certificates used in
authentication between components of the TOE are generated, managed,
and stored in a secure way to ensure their confidentiality and integrity.
• A.ENV_CONFIG: It is assumed that the TOE environment is configured and
well managed in accordance with the administrator documentation to protect
the TOE and its data, including when data is transferring from the Runtime
Server to the Administration Server and when data is transferring between
each server and its associated database.
• A.TOE_CONFIG: It is assumed that the TOE is configured and operated in
accordance with the administrator documentation and that the Agent
software is installed using a secure deployment method for the intended
environment as documented in the administrator documentation.
• A. DATA_INT: It is assumed that administrators will ensure the integrity and
confidentiality of data transferred between the Runtime Server and the
Administration Server.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
• A.PHYSICAL: It is assumed that all machines housing components of the
TOE and components in the TOE environment on which the TOE relies are
protected against unauthorized physical access and modification.
• A.TIME: It is assumed that a reliable time function is provided by the TOE
environment to support the inactivity timeout function.
• A.TOE_ADMIN: It is assumed that TOE Administrators are competent and
trustworthy to perform their tasks, and that organizational procedures and
policies are sufficient to ensure that they are held accountable for their
security-relevant actions.
• A. ENV_ADMIN: It is assumed that TOE Environment Administrators (e.g.,
individuals who have administrator privileges on the administration and
runtime databases) are competent and trustworthy to perform their tasks.
• A.COOP: It is assumed that all non-administrator users in the environment
are part of a well-managed and cooperative user community.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats described below must be countered by security means
implemented by the TOE environment.
• TE.PASS: A user or a non-authorized administrator might bypass the TOE
to access data or resources protected by the TOE by attacking the
underlying operating system or database.
• TE.SPOOF: A user or a non-authorized administrator might record or modify
user data on an inter-TOE communication link or on a communication link
between TOE and non-TOE components in order to obtain unauthorized
access to user data or to manipulate user data to be recorded.
5 Architectural Information
Tivoli License Compliance Manager is based on a three-tier architecture
composed of multiple servers with associated databases, Agents, and related
components supporting the product’s functionality. Figure 1 shows a simple
deployment.
Figure 1: Three-tier architecture of the TOE
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These are the main components of Tivoli License Compliance Manager, as
illustrated in Figure 1:
• A single Administration Server through which various administrative,
monitoring, and reporting capabilities are provided and which with its
associated DB2 database, provides a repository for product, license
agreement, license use, installed software, and organization information. (In
the context of this evaluation, the DB2 database is part of the environment,
not part of the TOE.)
• One or more Runtime Servers, which act as a proxy between Agents and
the Administration Server and supply information required by the Agents to
support software monitoring tasks. Each Runtime Server has an associated
DB2 database. Scalability of the monitored organization is addressed by
adding more Runtime Servers as needed in order to balance performance
requirements. (In the context of this evaluation, the DB2 database is part of
the environment, not part of the TOE.)
• A license management Agent deployed on each computer that is to be
monitored. The Agent performs an inventory of the software installed on the
computer and monitors use of installed software products, and forwards this
information (software usage records) to the Runtime Server, which in turn
forwards the software usage records to the Administration Server.
As shown in Figure 1, the software usage records managed by the TOE flow
from the Agents to the Runtime Servers, then from the Runtime Servers to the
Administration Server.
The hierarchical structure of Tivoli License Compliance Manager allows for
flexible deployment. For example, the Administration Server and Runtime
Server components can be deployed on the same machine, or Runtime Servers
may be deployed within the same physical network as the Administration
Server, or Runtime Servers may be deployed at remote locations. Agents may
be deployed on machines physically within or outside the secure network.
Administrators are trusted to make appropriate decisions to ensure secure
communication if components are not deployed within a secure network.
6 Documentation
For a listing of the documentation delivered with the TOE please refer to
chapter 2 or chapter 14 (documents [8] to [18]) of this report.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
Testing approach
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0388-2007 Certification Report
A test plan is used by the testing personnel to set-up the test environment. The
tests have been performed in the IBM test lab at the Rome facility. The test
cases are performed manually using the GUI interface and the command-line.
They are fully described in the test plan.
Tests that have been performed for the evaluated version are recorded in a test
tracking tool based on a Lotus Notes database. The test records the number of
times a test has been performed and the results (pass or fail) for each run.
Testing configuration
Testing of the server components is performed on a Solaris System which is
used for both the runtime and the admin server. The test environment was set
up in the IBM Rome test lab according to the instructions in the test plan which
is compliant with the evaluated configuration. As the server components of the
TOE rely on an underlying Java layer as the abstract machine (which is part of
the environment and is provided with the IBM WebSphere Application
Server 6.0) there is no dependency on the real hardware.
The server software used for testing was installed from CDs or a central
repository where the contents of the CDs have been copied to. The server
software used for testing was IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager,
Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1.
The clients (systems the TLCM Agent is running on) used for testing used the
following operating systems as listed in the Security Target:
• Sun Solaris 9
• Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition
• IBM AIX 5.3
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.0
The GSKit Versions used were:
• AIX: GSKit Version 7.0.3.15
• Linux: GSKit Version 7.0.3.15
• Solaris: GSKit Version 7.0.3.17
• Windows: GSKit Version 7.0.3.20
The underlying/supporting software of the TOE environment for the test was:
• IBM WebSphere Application Server 6.0
• IBM WebSphere Application Server plug-in 6.0
• IBM HTTP Web Server 6.0
• IBM DB2 Universal Database, Enterprise Edition 8.2
Test results
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Test results are recoded as pass / fail counters in a test tracking tool (a Notes
database). All tests where recorded as pass for each iteration performed.
Test coverage and depth
The developer provided a test coverage analysis where test cases are mapped
to FSP/TSFI and SF. It shows a full coverage of all TSF and TSFI.
Conclusion
Developer testing was performed in an ST conformant TOE environment with a
TOE in a version and configuration also in line with the ST.
The developers test coverage and the depth of the testing was analysed by
reviewing all test cases in the test plan. The evaluator found the testing of the
TSF to be sufficient and covering the TSF as identified in the functional
specification.
Test results provided by the developer have been found to be consistent with
the test plan (i.e. all actual test results were as expected).
7.2 Evaluator Testing
TOE test configuration
The evaluator used the developers test environment in the lab in Rome. The
systems (Server and Agents) were installed from install programs on a central
file server. The install programs were verified against the shipped CD via MD5
checksums. The installation was performed in accordance with the “Common
Criteria Secure Implementation and Configuration Guide” following the setup
instructions in the developers test plan.
The same test set up and configuration as for the developer testing was used.
Chosen subset size
The evaluator chose to perform all of the CC specific tests of the developer.
Evaluator tests performed
In addition to the repetition of the developer tests the evaluator devised a set of
own tests. These evaluator tests were not functional tests but penetration
testing to augment the functional developer testing. The evaluator performed
tests e.g. in the following areas:
• Vulnerability Scanning
• URL based penetration testing
Summary of Evaluator tests
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The evaluator could perform the developer tests successfully with the provided
test documentation. The evaluator tests confirmed the developer tests and
extended the testing of the developer.
All tests have been successfully executed and produced the expected results.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE is IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager,
Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1 as described in the ST. This includes the following
GSKit version for the different platforms the TOE can run on:
• AIX: GSKit Version 7.0.3.15
• Linux: GSKit Version 7.0.3.15
• Solaris: GSKit Version 7.0.3.17
• Windows: GSKit Version 7.0.3.20
The TOE has to be set-up in accordance to the guidance documentation [8] to
[18] and the Security Target [6]
Both the developer and the evaluator have tested the server parts of the TOE
on a Solaris System. The client part was tested on four different platforms:
• Sun Solaris 9
• Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition
• IBM AIX 5.3
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.0
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL2.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL2
augmented by SLC_FLR.1 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Configuration items ACM_CAP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Descriptive high-level design ADV_HLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 8: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
• SF.IA.2 Password policy enforcement
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the “IBM Tivoli License
Compliance Manager,Version 2.2, Fix Pack 1” as described in chapter 2 of this
report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The guidance documents [8] to [18] and the Security Target [6] contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein
have to be considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0388-2007, Version 2.2, 18 December 2006 ,
Security Target for IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager version 2.2,
Fix Pack 1, IBM Italia s.p.a., Tivoli
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4, atsec information security
GmbH, 24 January 2007, confidential document
User Guidance Documentation
[8] ITLM version 2.2 Administration, tlmadmst.pdf, SC32-1430-02, Feb 2006
[9] ITLM version 2.2 Catalog Management, tlmcmmst.pdf, SC32-1434-01,
Feb 2006
[10] IBM Tivoli License Compliance Manager Version 2.2 Fix Pack 1
Common Criteria Secure Implementation and Configuration Guide,
ITLCM 2.2 FP1 - CCGuide.pdf, First Ed., Sep 2006
[11] ITLM version 2.2 Commands, tlmcmdmst.pdf, SC32-1501-00, Feb 2006
[12] ITLM version 2.2 Data Dictionary, tlmddmst.pdf, SC32-1432-02, Feb
2006
[13] Readme File for Fix Pack 2.2.0 2013TIVTLCM-FP0001,
FixPack1_readme.pdf, First Ed., 2006-06-01
[14] ITLM version 2.2 Planning, Installation, and Configuration, tlminmst.pdf,
SC32-1431-02, Feb 2006
[15] ITLM version 2.2 Overview, tlmovmst.pdf, SC32-1503-00, Feb 2006
[16] ITLM version 2.2 Problem Determination, tlmpdmst.pdf, SC32-9102-01,
Feb 2006
[17] ITLM version 2.2 Release Notes, tlmrnmst.pdf, SC32-1429-02, Feb 2006
[18] ITLM version 2.2 Security Management, tlmsmmst.pdf, SC32-1502-00,
Feb 2006
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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