BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021
for
CASA 1.0
Software Version: 30100000__X026e
Hardware Version: 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 / 10 304
from
EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021 (*)
Smart Meter Gateway
CASA 1.0
Software Version: 30100000__X026e
Hardware Version: 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 / 10 304
from EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart
Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-
CC-PP-0073-2014
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 30 March 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................25
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................26
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021 Certification Report
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product CASA 1.0 (Software Version: 30100000__X026e, Hardware Version: 10 301 /
10 302 / 10 303 / 10 304) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-2019. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product CASA 1.0 (Software Version: 30100000__X026e, Hardware
Version: 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 / 10 304) was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 22 March 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG.
The product was developed by: EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 30 March
2021 is valid until 29 March 2029. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
4. to monitor the resistance of the certified product against new attack methods and to
provide a qualified confirmation by applying for a re-certification or re-assessment
process on a regular basis every two years starting from the issuance of the
certificate,
5. to make sure that over the complete lifetime of the certificate a security module with
a valid CC certificate is used.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product CASA 1.0 (Software Version: 30100000__X026e, Hardware Version: 10 301 /
10 302 / 10 303 / 10 304) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
Neu-Galliner Weg 1
19258 Gallin
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the CASA 1.0 (Software Version: 30100000__X026e,
Hardware Version: 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 / 10 3047
) is a communication unit used within
an intelligent metering system represented by the product CASA except for the integrated
Security Module (product name “TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release
2/P60C144PVE”, BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016) and external communication interfaces.
Besides the data processing, the Smart Meter Gateway offers the possibility to generate
tariff rates, in order to enable network operators and consumers to control energy
consumption in an intelligent way. As personal consumption data will be recorded,
processed and transmitted in the Gateway, high demands are made on data protection
and data security. The main functionality of the Gateway is the reception, the verification
and the storage of measured values and status of the connected meters as well as the
processing and the transfer of these measurements and status values. The transmission is
done via the remote connection to authorized external entities, as for example, the
metering point operators.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31 March
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 .
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.AU
Audit
The TOE maintains three kinds of logs:
• System Log
• Consumer Log
• Calibration Log
All audit messages/entries contain information about the accountable user
or event and further contain the following information: domain (log name),
date, time, event type, level, subject identity, operation result, causing
component and description. Furthermore, the consumer log contains all
entries that are required for a billing verification, the system log includes all
system relevant events and the calibration log persists of all information
that is relevant for calibration purposes.
SF.CR
Cryptography
The TOE implements the cryptographic functionality as required by [14],
[TR 3109]. As defined by [8], this functionality covers the symmetric parts
of the required cryptographic primitives. Furthermore, all ephemeral
cryptographic keys used for TLS or symmetric AES encryption are
destroyed using the method “zeroization” in accordance to [14], [FIPS 140-
7
Please note that this is a set of four alternative TOE Hardware Versions, denoted by the forward slash
separator ’/’; each variant describes the application of specific equivalent hardware components.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
2] and the TOE will use the Security Module ([13]) to generate all
necessary random numbers.
SF.UD
User Data Protection
The TOE provides functionality to logically remove unused information by
zeroization. All objects within the used databases are integrity protected.
Furthermore, access control and multiple policies (gateway, firewall and
meter) protect the corresponding data by fixed defined rule-sets.
SF.IA
Identification & Authentication
The TOE authenticates every user and external entity before allowing any
other action on behalf of that user. User identities have the following
security attributes: identity, status of identity, connecting network, role
membership. The Gateway administrator can configure consumers with a
username/password combination based identification & authentication or
with a certificate based identification & authentication. The Gateway
administrator can configure service technicians only with a certificate
based identification & authentication. The identification & authentication of
the Gateway administrator is implemented as certification-based,
bidirectional mechanisms according to [14], [TR 3109-1].
SF.SM
Security Management
The TOE includes functionality that allows its administration and
configuration as well as updating the TOE’s software. This functionality is
only provided for the authenticated Gateway administrator.
The following operations can be performed by the successfully
authenticated Gateway administrator:
• Management of devices in LMN and HAN,
• Client management,
• Maintenance of Processing Profiles,
• Key- and Certificate-Management
• Firmware Update,
• Wake-up configuration,
• Monitoring,
• Resetting of the TOE and
• Audit Log configuration.
SF.PR
Privacy
The TOE provides mechanisms for communication concealing. A
pseudonymization would only be used for processed Meter Data. The
communication to external entities is performed over packet oriented
networks. To conceal the communication, the packet size is mutable, also
the transmitted content is padded to random size.
SF.SP
Self-protection
The TOE provides a set of self-protection mechanisms that, in particular,
comprise the self-test of the TOE, detection of replay attacks and the
failure with preservation of a secure state.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3 – 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021 Certification Report
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
CASA 1.0
Software Version: 30100000__X026e
Hardware Version: 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 / 10 3048
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW CASA 1.0 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 /
10 304
Secure Delivery Procedure via
transport service and installation
by a service technician or
personal hand over
2 SW SMGW Software 30100000__X026e Pre-Installed on the HW
3 DOC CASA 1.0 –
Benutzerhandbuch für
Letztverbraucher
Version: 1.24
SHA-256-Prüfsumme:
25f244a5a78950eeab32df
48dce26a913ba50474e71
2b0c5392b2b5838790adf
Download from https secured
website
4 DOC CASA 1.0 – Installations- und
Konfigurationshandbuch für
Service-Techniker und
Gateway-Administratoren
Version: 1.24
SHA-256-Prüfsumme:
ffd944d191236bf481a6e81
4b315f937b630c7ecaae19
1b7c8e608c7dbeac248
Download from https secured
website
5 DOC CASA 1.0 – SMGW-
Schnittstellenbeschreibung
(CASA API)
Version: 1.30
SHA-256-Prüfsumme:
d555771712e48ba458697
19e9a73ec62a86dd4ecee
dae5e9be35119bfffa426c
Download from https secured
website
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE itself consists of the hardware, firmware and software parts of the Smart Meter
Gateway accompanied by the different guidance documents. For the physical parts
(Hardware parts) two different delivery ways exist. In the first delivery variant the TOE is
delivered within a special and secure safebag by a standard transportation service. A
8
Please note that this is a set of four alternative TOE Hardware Versions, denoted by the forward slash
separator ’/’; each variant describes the application of specific equivalent hardware components.
13 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021
certified NFC-Tag (Cert.-ID: CC-19-175197) is welded in the right side foil of the safebag.
The safebag possesses also security features to prevent manipulations with cutting,
welding and chemical solvents. Furthermore, the freight hold needs to be sealed. Each
seal possesses a unique seal number, which belongs to the tracking information of the
delivery. The TOE is packed into the safebag at the end of the production chain in the
secure production environment. Tracking information for the secure delivery is stored into
the NFC-Tag. Before the receiver opens the safebag, they have to verify the integrity of the
safebag and the integrity and authenticity of the tracking information stored within the
NFC-Tag. After a successful verification, the TOE can be installed at the consumer site by
a service technician.
In the second variant the TOE can be directly delivered by two employees of the developer
without safebag. In this case, only a maximum of 10 TOEs can be transported and the
transport time is limited to 24 hours. Continual monitoring of the TOE by the carrier during
the transport is necessary.
Parallel to the delivery procedures, all places where the TOE will be stored during the
delivery need to provide a basic protection against possible attackers (e.g. concrete walls,
doors need to be locked, and a physical inventory needs to be performed). Thereby it is
ensured that no manipulation of the TOE can take place on the complete track of delivery
(starting with the manufacturer, through the different stages of storages to the final place of
installation).
The firmware and software are pre-installed on the hardware and therefore part of the
physical delivery. All users can uniquely identify it by connecting to the TOE and using the
commands described in the relevant guidance document.
The guidance documents can be requested from the developer (standard delivery). After
the standard delivery, they can be uniquely identified by checking the hash value which is
also included in the Security Target and the Certification Report (which both will be
published on the website of the BSI).
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Security Audit, Communication, Cryptographic Support, User Data Protection,
Identification and Authentication, Security Management, Privacy, Protection of the TSF and
Trusted Path/Channels.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.ExternalPrivacy: Authorised and authenticated external entities receiving any kind of
private or billing-relevant data shall be trustworthy and shall not perform unauthorised
analyses of these data with respect to the corresponding consumer(s).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021 Certification Report
● OE.TrustedAdmins: The Gateway Administrator and the Service Technician shall be
trustworthy and well-trained.
● OE.PhysicalProtection: The TOE shall be installed in a non-public environment within
the premises of the consumer that provides a basic level of physical protection. This
protection shall cover the TOE, the Meters that the TOE communicates with and the
communication channel between the TOE and its Security Module. Only authorised
individuals may physically access the TOE.
● OE.Profile: The Processing Profiles that are used when handling data shall be obtained
from a trustworthy and reliable source only.
● OE.SM: The environment shall provide the services of a certified Security Module for
• verification of digital signatures,
• generation of digital signatures,
• key agreement,
• key transport,
• key storage,
• Random Number Generation.
The Security Module used shall be certified according to [13] and shall be used in
accordance with its relevant guidance documentation.
● OE.Update: The firmware updates for the Gateway that can be provided by an
authorised external entity shall undergo a certification process according to the Security
Target [6] before they are issued to show that the update is implemented correctly. The
external entity that is authorised to provide the update shall be trustworthy and ensure
that no malware is introduced via a firmware update.
● OE.Network: It shall be ensured that
• a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the individual
situation is available,
• one or more trustworthy sources for an update of the system time are available in the
WAN,
• the Gateway is the only communication gateway for Meters in the LMN,
• if devices in the HAN have a separate connection to parties in the WAN (beside the
Gateway) this connection is appropriately protected.
● OE.Keygen: It shall be ensured that the ECC key pair for a Meter (TLS) is generated
securely according to [TR 03109-3]. It shall also be ensured that the keys are brought
into the Gateway in a secure way by the Gateway Administrator.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The evaluator has determined that the following subsystems of the TOE are identified as
follows:
● Cryptography: Contains all functionalities to realize security functionalities with the
Hardware Security Module (SM).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021
● System Audit: Logs all important activities of the TOE. For potential discrepancies the
GWA will be informed.
● Networking: Implements the TSFIs IF_GW_WAN, IF_GW_CLS and IF_GW_SRV.
● Metering: Responsible for the collection, storage and transport of the meter data.
● System Time: Manages the system time and time synchronization.
● Boot: Responsible for the secure boot of the TOE.
● Operating System: Provides the basis for running applications. It manages the system
resources of main memory, non-volatile memory and connected interface blocks.
● Hardware: Includes the SMGW hardware: circuit boards, active and passive
components including enclosures.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test configuration
The final test procedure with all developer, independent ITSEF and penetration tests was
applied on the final TOE HW version and on SW version 30100000_X026d instead of the
final SW version 30100000_X026e. But, since both SW versions only differ in an additional
firewall rule (confirmed by the ITSEF in a source code analysis), this approach was
regarded appropriate.
7.2. Developer Tests
The developer’s testing approach was to systematically test the TOE separated into four
different subsets. One for each major interface group (WAN, HAN and LMN) and one for
manual testing of meters or LEDs.
Based on this subdivision, the full behaviour of the TSF was tested by developing
corresponding test cases during the development of the TOE. The corresponding
coverage and depth in testing for all SFRs, TSFIs as well as the TOE behaviour on the
level of subsystems were also summarized by the developer and evaluated by the
evaluation body without relevant deviations. The overall test amount is about 650 test
cases.
The evaluator checked the actual test results of the developer’s test for inconsistencies
with the expected test results. No inconsistencies have been found.
The developer’s testing effort has been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the security
functionality / TSFI perform as specified and has therefore passed the evaluator’s
examination.
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7.3. Independent Tests
The evaluation body chose to broadly cover all existing interfaces without specific
restrictions. The evaluation body chose to repeat a defined subset of the developer tests
with the intent to cover the existing interfaces and the implemented security functionality.
Independent and penetration tests of the evaluation body are mainly performed on a
stand-alone test-solution, containing approx. 3000 automated tests developed by TÜViT,
partitioned according to the SF established in [6], chapter 7. Using this environment, every
necessary role with corresponding rights (GWA, service technician, meters and
consumers, might be emulated at the appropriate interface. In particular, for testing
IF_GW_MTR, it contains a “meter simulator”, which allows to emulate and connect
multiple meters, controlling their behaviour (e.g. for inducing errors). Using the dedicated
crypto proxy, it is further possible to extract the nested CMS data, supported by the
enhanced Wireshark, which was enriched by the implementation of various dissectors.
Those test cases were supplemented by additional manual tests using the developer
resources and further manual penetration tests on the HAN interface.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.4. Penetration Tests
Beside the operational TOE variant, a special ATE variant with extended test possibilities
and SSH interface to directly access the TOE and view/modify data such as time-stamps,
and a TOE case without interior for case and sealing tests have been delivered. These
variants enable tests that would not be possible on the release TOE due to applied
security mechanisms. The differences between release TOE and test variants are clearly
defined.
The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern
derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. These areas were prioritized with
regard to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing
coverage, detectability of flaws during developer testing. Medium and high areas were
guaranteed to be penetration tested, with a stronger emphasis on high priorities. Low
priorities were also considered during penetration, but could be less emphasized if
developer tests were found to be sufficient. The penetration testing activities were
performed as tests and as analytical tasks. Whenever an analysis was estimated to yield
better results, the evaluators chose the analytical approach. Analytical activities were
especially applied in the areas secure boot, self-protection, domain separation, kernel and
system hardening as well as non-bypassability. Combined approaches were also applied.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment provided that all measures required by
the developer are applied.
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8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
TOE reference TOE configuration
TOE Identification CASA 1.0
Software Version Number 30100000__X026e
Hardware Version Number 10 301 / 10 302 / 10 303 / 10 3049
Table 3: TOE configuration
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 [4] (AIS 34)
and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 46, AIS 48).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-2019, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the implementation of new tariff
use cases (TAF), bugfixing and the a new function to yield a 2nd root-certificate during the
pre-personalization.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System,
Version 1.3, 31 March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9
Please note that this is a set of four alternative TOE Hardware Versions, denoted by the forward slash
separator ’/’; each variant describes the application of specific equivalent hardware components.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Validity
Period
TLS cipher
suite (key
establishment,
record layer
encryption and
integrity, peer
authentication)
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
ECDHE: [RFC5289]
ECDSA: [TR 03111]
AES: [FIPS 197]
HMAC: [RFC 2104]
brainpoolPxxxr1:
[RFC 5639]
secpxxxr1:
[SECG-SEC2]
CBC:
[NIST SP800-38A]
GCM:
[NIST SP800-38D]
SHA: [FIPS 180-4]
AES:
128bit
256bit
EC:
secp256r1
secp384r1
brainpoolP
256r1
brainpoolP
384r1
brainpoolP
512r1
[TR03109] 2026+
Key generation
for CMS
containers
key generation algorithms:
ecka-eg-X963KDF-SHA256
ecka-eg-X963KDF-SHA384
ecka-eg-X963KDF-SHA512
combined with key wrap
algorithms:
id-aes128-wrap
id-aes192-wrap
id-aes256-wrap
key generation:
[TR 03111]
key wrap: [RFC 3394]
128bit
192bit
256bit
[TR03109] 2026+
Encryption /
decryption
/integrity of
CMS container
id-aes128-GCM
id-aes192-GCM
id-aes256-GCM
id-aes-CBC-CMAC-128
id-aes-CBC-CMAC-192
id-aes-CBC-CMAC-256
id-aesxxx-gcm:
[RFC 5084]
id-aes-CBC-CMAC-
xxx: [TR 03109-1-I]
AES: [FIPS 197]
GCM:
[NIST SP800-38D]
CBC:
[NIST SP800-38A]
CMAC:
[NIST SP800-38B]
128bit
192bit
256bit
[TR03109] 2026+
Key generation
for meter data
AES-CMAC AES-CMAC:
[RFC 4493]
AES: [FIPS 197]
128bit [TR03109] 2026+
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Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Validity
Period
CMAC:
[NIST SP800-38B]
Encryption/
decryption,
integrity of
meter data
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
AES: [FIPS 197]
CBC:
[NIST SP800-38A]
AES-CMAC:
[RFC 4493]
CMAC:
[NIST SP800-38B]
128bit [TR03109] 2026+
Basic support
of integrity,
authenticity
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
[FIPS180-4] - [TR03109] 2026+
Encryption /
decryption,
integrity of
TSFI
XTS-AES [IEEE P1619] 128bit [TR03109] 2026+
Remarks Integrity of firmware updates and stored binaries of TSFI are not defined in SFRs per ST
[6], but they are implemented as ARC mechanisms.
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FLR Flaw Remediation
GWA Gateway Administrator
HAN Home Area Network
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HW Hardware
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LAN Local Area Network
LMN Local Metrological Network
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMGW Smart Meter Gateway
ST Security Target
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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TSFI TSF Interfaces
WAN Wide Area Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021 Certification Report
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0919-V2-2021, Version 2.13, 2021-02-25, CASA 1.0
Security Target, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2021-03-15, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, Version 1.3, 31
March 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0073-2014, Federal Office for Information Security,
Germany
[9] Configuration list for the TOE
CASA-Konfigurationsliste, Version 12, 2021-02-26, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
(confidential document)
[10] CASA (CASA-AGD) Benutzerhandbuch für Letztverbraucher (LV), Version 1.24,
2021-02-24, EMH metering GmbH & Co. KG
[11] CASA (CASA-AGD) Installations- und Konfigurationshandbuch für Service-
Techniker und Gateway-Administratoren, Version 1.24, 2021-02-24, EMH metering
GmbH & Co. KG
[12] CASA 1.0 SMGW-Schnittstellenbeschreibung, Version 1.30, 2020-06-11, EMH
metering GmbH & Co. KG
[13] Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway, Version 1.03,
11.12.2014, BSI-CC-PP-0077-V2, Federal Office for Information Security, Germany
[14] Standard of Application
[TR 03109] BSI TR-03109. Version 1.0.1, 11.11.2015
[TR 03109-1] BSI TR-03109-1, Anforderungen an die Interoperabilität der
Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems, Version 1.0.1, 2019-01-16
[TR 03109-3] BSI TR-03109-3, Kryptographische Vorgaben für die Infrastruktur von
intelligenten Messsystemen, BSI, Version 1.1, 2014
[TR 03111] BSI TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Version 2.10. BSI,
01.06.2018
[TR 03116] BSI TR-03116-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der
Bundesregierung. Teil 3: Intelligente Messsysteme, 2020-02-27
10
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 48, Version 1.0, Anforderungen an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten
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[FIPS 140-2] NIST FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, Part 2. NIST, 2001
[FIPS 180-4] NIST FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). NIST, 2015.
[FIPS 197] NIST FIPS PUB 197: Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES). NIST, 2001.
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods and Techniques. NIST, 2001.
[NIST SP800-38B] NIST SP800-38B: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication. NIST, 2005.
[NIST SP800-38D] NIST SP800-38D: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC. NIST, 2007.
[RFC 2104] Network Working Group RFC 2104, H. Krawczyk et al.: HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication. Network Working Group, Feb. 1997.
[RFC 3394] IETF RFC 3394, J. Schaad, R. Housley: Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. IETF, 2002.
[RFC 4493] IETF RFC 4493, J. H. Song, J. Lee, T. Iwata: The AES-CMAC
Algorithm. IETF, 2006.
[RFC 5084] IETF RFC 5084, R. Housley: Using AES-CCM amd AES-GCM
Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). IETF, 2007.
[RFC 5289] IETF RFC 5289, E. Rescorla: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM). IETF, 2008.
[RFC 5639] IETF RFC 5639, M. Lochter, J. Merkle: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation. IETF, 2010.
[IEEE P1619] IEEE P1619™/D16 Standard for Cryptographic Protection of Data on
Block-Oriented Storage Devices. IEEE, May 2007.
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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