BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
for
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1
from
Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by
Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 (*)
Smart card with a Java Card operating system
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1
from Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by
Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei
PP Conformance: Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration,
December 2017, Version 3.0.5, BSI-CC-PP-0099-
2017
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 May 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................22
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................23
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................24
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................25
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................25
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................25
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................27
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................30
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................31
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
6 / 37
BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+, C1 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+, C1 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25 May 2020. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Veridos GmbH - Identity
Solutions by Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei.
The product was developed by: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 29 May 2020
is valid until 28 May 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+, C1 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei
Prinzregentenstraße 159,
81677 München
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1 is a dual-
interface, contact based or a pure contactless smart card with a Java Card operating
system (OS). The TOE is a multi-purpose Java Card platform where applets of different
kind can be installed. Since a post-issuance installation of applets is possible, the TOE
corresponds to an open configuration, as defined in [8]. Depending on the installed
applets, the entire product (consisting of the TOE plus applets) can be used as a
government card (like an ID card or a passport), a payment card, a signature card and for
other purposes.
The TOE is based on the Integrated Circuit (IC) M5073 G11 [14] (Certification ID BSI-DSZ-
CC-0951-V4-2019). The TOE comprises the underlying hardware IC, the operating system
including the G+D crypto library and according TOE guidance documents.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, December 2017,
Version 3.0.5, BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.TRANSACTION This security function provides atomic
transactions according to the Java Card
Transaction and Atomicity mechanism with
commit and rollback capability ([JCRE304],
Section 7) for updating persistent data in flash
memory.
SF.ACCESS_CONTROL This security function provides control for the
TOE. It is in charge of the FIREWALL access
control SFP and the JCVM information flow
control SFP.
SF.CRYPTO This security function controls all the operations
related to the cryptographic key management and
cryptographic operations.
SF.INTEGRITY This security function provides a means to check
the integrity of check-summed data stored in
flash memory.
SF.SECURITY This security function ensures a secure state of
information, the non-observability of operations
on it and the unavailability of previous information
content upon deallocation.
SF.APPLET This security function ensures the secure loading
of a package or installing of an applet by S.CAD
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
and the secure deletion of applets and/or
packages by S.ADEL.
SF.CARRIER This security function ensures secure
downloading of applications on the card.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 5. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+, C1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
HW+
SW
ICC including the software
part of the TOE
Sm@rtCafé®
Expert 7.0 EAL
6+ C1
Sealed boxes by courier to
Composite Product Integrator.
The delivery is covered by the
certification of the site
certifications.
DOC Preparative Guidance
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0
EAL 6+ C1 [12]
2.1 Via email PGP RSA 2048 bit to
Composite Product Integrator.
DOC Operative
GuidanceSm@rtCafé®
Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1 [13]
3.6 Via email PGP RSA 2048 bit to
Composite Product Integrator.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE delivery takes place after lC Packaging so that the evaluation process is limited
to Phases 1 to 4 as defined in [8]. The TOE is delivered to the Composite Product
Integrator (CPI), which is responsible for sending the SCP03 authentication keys to be
integrated into the TOE previous to the TOE production. I.e. the CPI delivers the (Card
Manager) Master Key to the TOE embedded SW development G+D site from which the
card individual keys are derived before the TOE is delivered.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
The Composite Product Integrator has to verify that he has received the correct versions of
the TOE documentation.
The TOE can be used in two different configurations:
● Config 1: TOE is fully compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card Common Implementation
Configuration [17], and
● Config 2: TOE is fully compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration [18].
The TOE itself and the different TOE configurations can be identified through the GET
DATA and the GET STATUS APDU command responses (listed in the tables below):
TOE Configuration GET DATA Response (80 CA 00 C8 06)
Config 1 C8 04 7A 7D 36 C7
Config 2 C8 04 22 BF 6D BC
Table 3: TOE configuration identification by GET DATA response
TOE Configuration GET STATUS Response (80 F2 80 00 02 4F 00)
Config 1 08 A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 0F 9E
Config 2 08 A0 00 00 01 51 00 00 00 0F 9E
Table 4: TOE configuration identification by GET STATUS response
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit,
● Communication,
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management,
● Privacy,
● Protection of the TSF, and
● Trusted Path / Channels.
The security policy of the TOE, a smart card with a Java Card operating system (OS), is to
provide basic security functionalities to be used by smart card applications, thus providing
overall smart card system security.
The TOE implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user
data stored and operated on the smartcard when used in a hostile environment. Hence the
TOE maintains integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories and the
different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access
and for integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality
provided by the TOE. Therefore, the TOEs policy is to protect against malfunction,
leakage, physical manipulation and probing. Besides, the TOE's life-cycle is supported as
well as the user Identification whereas the abuse of functionality is prevented.
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Furthermore, random numbers generation as well as specific cryptographic services are
being provided to be securely used by the applications.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Section
8 of the Security Target [6] and [9]).
In the context of ADV_SPM.1, the security policies of the TOE were formally modelled. The
security policies that were modelled comprise the Java Card firewall, the on-card package
management and the secure package loading. The complete list of SFRs which are
included in the SPM can be found in [6, 8.2]. SFRs which are not covered comprise only
cryptographic functionality, unobservability, data exchange formats (FPT_TDC.1) and parts
of self-testing.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Details can be found in
the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.4 as well as [12, 5.1] and [13, 3.1 / 5.1 / 5.2].
5. Architectural Information
The TOE design reflects the abstract structure of the TOE as a Java Card OS based on a
certified HW IC. It follows this approach by defining subsystems and modules according to
the realized functionalities of a Java Card OS composite product. The subsystems again
are logically grouped together and compose four subsystems of the TOE:
● APDU,
● Application Programmers Interface,
● Virtual Machine, and
● Hardware Platform (composite evaluation).
For each subsystem, the TOE design breaks its structure further down into modules. How-
ever, this does not include the Hardware subsystem, since it is already covered by the
underlying hardware certification. The following table shows the modules and subsystems,
which are all classified as SFR-enforcing, defined by the TOE design:
Subsystem Module Description
APDU Applet The module Applet contains Issuer Security Domain
applet and Security Domain applet according
GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2.1 [16].
Dispatcher The module Dispatcher implements Transport
Management including protocols T=0, T=1 [ISO7816]
and T=CL [ISO14443]. Thus, it receives all APDU
commands provided by CAD via APDU interface.
Application
Programmers
Interface
Javacard Module Javacard implements all functions required by
[JCAPI].
Global Platform Module Global Platform implements content
management functions according [GP] and Chapter 11
of [JCRE304] to:
 Load packages,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
Subsystem Module Description
 Install applets,
 Delete applets and packages.
Content on card and additional information is managed
in Registry as defined in [GP]. Additionally it defines
interfaces which enable applets to provide and use the
further services.
Virtual
Machine
Bytecode Interpreter Module Bytecode Interpreter implements Javacard
Virtual Machine according [JCVM304]. This includes:
 Bytecodes as defined in Chapter 7 of [JCVM304],
 Exception Handling as defined in Chapter 7 of
[JCVM304],
 Firewall checks as defined in Chapter 6 of
[JCRE304].
Memory Management Module Memory Management implements provides
interface to copy data in memory providing tear
save writing according [JCRE304].
HW - Assessed by evaluator as SFR-enforcing.
Table 5: Subsystems of the TOE
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. TOE test configurations:
● Tests were performed with different TOE configurations, i.e. with different TOE interfaces
(contact based and contactless) as well as with the TOE simulator (software based TOE
simulation).
● The TOE has been tested in the configurations Configuration 1 and Configuration 2
representing the final TOE.
● Tests were done in different life-cycle phase (e.g. Global Platform life cycle states
SECURED, OP_READY, etc.).
● Tests were additionally performed with samples that had the re-flash and reset life-cycle
ability for prevention of increased amount of broken samples during testing.
● Penetration tests were performed with special samples reduced/modified to the
functionality which is tested.
The evaluator determined that the used samples deviating from the final TOE
configuration, including the simulated TOEs, represent exactly the TOE functionality
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
tested. I.e. this means that the test results done with modified TOE samples are valid and
can be taken over as results for the final TOE.
7.2. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Test approach:
According to the description of the TSFI in the functional specification, the following kinds
of APIs and TSFI were tested (not all parts of the packages or interfaces are implemented,
details in [7]): GlobalPlatform API, JavaCard API, G&D Proprietary API, Visa Openplatform
API, Java Card Virtual Machine TSFI (a subset of the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
Interface, i.e. all SFR relevant bytecodes), APDU Interface, and Electrical Interface.
Therefrom the following TSFI are defined: API, JCVM Interface, APDU Interface and
Electrical Interface.
Test environment:
Generally, two kinds of tests are differentiated, Systemtests and Simulatortests (so-called
Moduletests).
TOE configurations tested:
According to the security target the TOE can be used in two different configurations (see
Chapter 8): All configurations can either be installed on a dual-interface, contact based
chip or on a pure contactless smart card platform. All configurations have been tested
whereby the Configuration 1 is the configuration where all requirements can be applied.
Due to some restrictions in Configuration 2, several tests were skipped during the testing
activity of Configuration 2.
Test results:
The tests mainly run automatically and perform all test steps including installation of test
applets, test scripting, result checking and clean-up procedures. Test documentation
including test case description, tests steps, expected and actual results are partially
generated automatically. Actual results and details from test execution from Module testing
can be gained from prepared logs. ATE_COV and ATE_DPT were taken into account and
all mappings to interfaces and modules of the TOE are covered by the tests.
7.3. Evaluator Tests
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Approach for independent testing:
● Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps.
● Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests.
● Independent testing was performed at the Evaluation Body with the TOE developer test
environment and additional Evaluation Body test equipment using tests applets, test
scripts and simulation tools.
TOE test configurations:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
● Tests were performed with different TOE configurations, i.e. with different TOE interfaces
(contactless, contact based) as well as with the TOE simulator.
● The TOE has been tested in the following configurations:
1. Configuration 1, the configuration where all requirements can be applied.
2. Configuration 2 with several restrictions
● Tests were done in different life-cycle phase (e.g. Global Platform life cycle states
SECURED, OP_READY, etc.).
The test samples provided by the developer for repeating developer’s tests and for setting
up evaluator created tests are not identical to final delivered TOE cards. These samples
were brought in the state and configuration as desired.
Subset size chosen:
During sample testing the evaluator chose to repeat the developer functional tests. During
independent testing the evaluator used test applets and test scripts to invoke and test
functionality given by the API and APDU interfaces.
Interfaces tested:
The selection criteria for the interfaces of the composed subset consider simply the
security functionality that is available from these interfaces. Focus was laid upon interfaces
that are in particular security sensitive for JavaCard platform, such as firewall
mechanisms, atomic transactions, PIN mechanisms or key handling. The tested subset
comprises the APDU and the API interfaces available to users. While the physical IC
interface relies on the platform certification, the independent testing focused on the APDU
interface (based on the Global Platform specification [16]) and the API interface (which
provides packages from JavaCard API, GlobalPlatform API and proprietary API).
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE was operated as specified. No
unexpected behaviour was observed, particularly related to different TOE configurations.
7.4. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Penetration testing approach:
Based on a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment the evaluators devised the attack scenarios for penetration tests. The aspects
of the security architecture described in ADV_ARC were considered for penetration testing
as well as all other evaluation evidence. Source code reviews of the provided
implementation representation accompanied the development of test cases and were used
to find input for testing. The code inspection also supported the testing activities because
they enabled the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly be covered
by test cases.
In addition the evaluator applied tests and performed code reviews during the evaluation
activity of composition tests to verify the implementation of the requirements imposed by
the ETR for Composition and the guidance of the underlying platform. This ensured
confidence in the security of the TOE as a whole.
TOE test configurations:
The evaluators used TOE samples for testing that were configured according to the ST.
The tests were performed in different test scenarios:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
• TOE smart cards tested using specialized test tools for smart cards, Java cards and
for LFI testing.
• A simulator was used for test cases, which were not possible to perform with a real
smart card TOE, e.g. memory manipulation.
• Different life-cycles and life-cycle management were tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] an [9] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE, the composite smartcard product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1 was
tested in both possible configurations in scope of the certification:
● Config 1: TOE is fully compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card Common Implementation
Configuration [17], and
● Config 2: TOE is fully compliant to the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration [18].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(see [4], AIS 25),
(ii) The application of CC to integrated circuits (see [4], AIS 25),
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (see [4], AIS 26),
(iv) Certification of “open” smart card products (see [4], AIS 36),
(v) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e.
on hardware [14, 15] have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(vi) Cryptographic Algorithms and Random Number Generators (see [4], AIS 46)
(vii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (see [4], AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The component ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the following areas:
● The assurance level for evaluation was increased to EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1.
● Improvements and strengthening of countermeasures for ECC, RSA and the secure
SHA-2 were applied.
● A few smaller EC key lengths were removed from the TOE scope (160 and 192 bit
curves).
● Some bugfixes and improvements were applied, such as an RSA signature creation
bugfix and a corrected check for limitation on fields in a class instance.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, December
2017, Version 3.0.5, BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The implementation of the ECC scalar multiplication shows a reduced remaining rest
entropy for the secret scalar that lies below the general security level given for the
respective elliptic curve. This should be taken into account for applets that are set up and
running on the TOE.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
The tables in annex C of part D of this report give an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of table 8 with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than
100 Bits (in general context) only. An explicit validity period is not given.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AID Application identifier
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAP Converted Applet
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DES Data Encryption Standard
DLC Giesecke & Devrient Dienstleistungscenter
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GD SDM Giesecke & Devrient Secure DataManagement
GDC Giesecke & Devrient Development Center
GDSK Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia
GP Global Platform
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JCB proprietary script language to send APDU sequences to the card
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCS Java Card System
JCTS Java Card Test Suite
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
OS Operating System
PIN Personal Identification Number
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PP Protection Profile
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RAM Random Access memory
ROM Read-Only Memory
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRex TTCN-3 Refactoring and Metrics Tool
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Java Card System - The Java Card System consists of the JCRE (JCVM +API).
GlobalPlatform defines the Card Manager, which includes the Installer and the Applet
Deletion Manager, which are also part of the TOE.
JCRE - The Java Card runtime environment consists of the Java Card virtual machine, the
Java Card API, and its associated native methods. This notion concerns all those dynamic
features that are specific to the execution of a Java program in a smart card, like applet
lifetime, applet isolation and object sharing, transient objects, the transaction mechanism,
and so on.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020, Version 4.6, 15.04.2020, Security Target
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
(confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zu Site Certification
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL
6+ C1, Version 6, 25.05.2020, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[8] Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, December 2017, Version 3.0.5,
BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017, Oracle Corporation
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020, Version 4.7, 18.05.2020, Security Target
Lite Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
(sanitised public document)
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation according to AIS 36 for
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1, Version 6, 25.05.2020, BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-
2020, TÜViT GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.5, 18.05.2020, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile
Security GmbH (confidential document)
[12] Preparative Procedures Sm@rtCafé® Expert Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1 Version 2.1 ,
15.04.2020, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[13] Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+ C1, Version 3.6,
01.04.2020, Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
[14] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-V4-2019 for Infineon Security Controller
M5073 G11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v2.03.008 or v2.07.003, EC v2.03.008 or
v2.07.003, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v2.03.008 or v2.07.003 libraries, symmetric
crypto library v2.02.010, as well as with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the
Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE) from Infineon
Technologies AG, 18.12.2019, BSI
[15] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
0951-V4-2019, Version 2, 2019-12-10, “Evaluation Technical Report for Composite
Evaluation (ETR Comp)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[16] GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.2.1, January 2011
[17] GlobalPlatform Card Common Implementation Configuration, Version 1.0, February
2014.
[18] GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration, Version 1.0 Member Release, December
2011, Document Reference: GPC_GUI_039
[19] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0127-2019 for BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0127-2019 for
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security Development Center Germany of
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH, 13.12.2019, BSI
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 EAL 6+, C1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29 May 2020, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site Date of last
audit
New audit / reused
audit / n.r.
Giesecke+Devrient
Mobile Security
Development Center
Germany(DCG)
Prinzregenten-
str. 159, 81677
Munich, Germany
SW Development
(including
documentation) /
Testing
2019-07-23/24 Covered by site
certification:
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0127-
2019
Table 6: Relevant development sites
Related to the composite TOE the HW Infineon sites are also in scope of this TOE
certification. Those sites are covered by the underlying HW IC certification BSI-DSZ-CC-
0951-V4-2019 [14] and also comprise the delivery.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
Table 7 gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the
security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic
Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table
with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
1 Cryptographic
Primitives
ECDH The implemented
ECDH key
agreement is
reduced to scalar
multiplication,
checking for the
resulting point
whether it lies on
the curve and
differs from the
base point.
The Elliptic curve
parameters, the
secret scalar and
the public key of
the other party are
provided from
outside and not
under control of
the TOE. It is in
responsibility of
the user to
implement the full
ECDH key
agreement
procedure
compliant to the
referenced
standard
[ISO11770-3].
ECDH provides
an elliptic curve
Generic Mapping
according to [TR-
03111] Chapter
4.4.1.
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
secp{224,
256, 384,
521}r1
[SEC2],
brainpoolP{22
4, 256, 320,
384, 512}r1
and
brainpoolP{22
4, 256, 320,
384,
512}r1[RFC
5639].
Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/ECDH
2 Cryptographic
Primitives
SHA-1 [FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
None No FCS_COP.1.
1/HASH
3 Cryptographic
Primitives
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512}
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
None Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/HASH
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
4 Cryptographic
Primitives
3-DES in ECB
mode: encryption
and decryption
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[SP800-38A]
Chapter 6.1
(ECB),
[ISO9797-1]
padding method
M1 Chapter 6.3.1
and M2 Chapter
6.3.2 and
[PKCS5] Appendix
B.2.5
|k|=112, 168 No FCS_COP.1.
1/3DES
5 Cryptographic
Primitives
3-DES in CBC
mode: encryption
and decryption
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[SP800-38A]
chapter 6.2
(CBC),
[ISO9797-1]
padding method
M1 Chapter 6.3.1
and M2 Chapter
6.3.2 and
[PKCS5] Appendix
B.2.5
|k|=112 No FCS_COP.1.
1/3DES
6 Cryptographic
Primitives
3-DES in CBC
mode: encryption
and decryption
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[SP800-38A]
Chapter 6.2
(CBC),
[ISO9797-1]
padding method
M1 Chapter 6.3.1
and M2 Chapter
6.3.2 and
[PKCS5] Appendix
B.2.5
|k|=168 Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/3DES
7 Cryptographic
Primitives
3DES in CBC-
MAC and Retail-
MAC mode:
generation and
verification
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
Chapter 7.2 and
7.4 (CBC-MAC,
Retail-MAC)
|k|=112 No FCS_COP.1.
1/MAC-DES
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
8 Cryptographic
Primitives
3DES in CBC-
MAC: generation
and verification
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
Chapter 7.2
(CBC-MAC)
|k|=168 No FCS_COP.1.
1/MAC-DES
9 Cryptographic
Primitives
3DES in Retail-
MAC mode:
generation and
verification
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
Chapter 7.4
(Retail-MAC)
|k|=168 Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/MAC-DES
10 Cryptographic
Primitives
AES in ECB
mode: encryption
and decryption
[FIPS 197] (AES),
[SP800-38A]
Chapter 6.1
(ECB),
[ISO9797-1]
padding method
M1 Chapter 6.3.1
and M2 Chapter
6.3.2 and
[PKCS5] Appendix
B.2.5
|k|=128, 192,
256
No FCS_COP.1.
1/AES
11 Cryptographic
Primitives
AES in CBC
mode: encryption
and decryption in
CBC mode
[FIPS 197] (AES),
[SP800-38A]
Chapter 6.2
(CBC),
[ISO9797-1]
padding method
M1 Chapter 6.3.1
and M2 Chapter
6.3.2 and
[PKCS5] Appendix
B.2.5
|k|=128, 192,
256
Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/AES
12 Cryptographic
Primitives
AES in CMAC
mode: generation
and verification
[FIPS 197] (AES),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/CMAC-AES
13 Cryptographic
Primitives
AES in CBC-MAC
mode: generation
and verification
[FIPS 197] (AES),
[ISO9797-1]
Chapter 7.2
(CBC-MAC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
No FCS_COP.1.
1/MAC-AES
14 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA encryption
and decryption
with encoding
(RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5) and without
encoding
(RSADP, RSAEP)
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 7.2 (RSA)
with encoding and
without encoding
Chapter 5.1.1 for
RSAEP, Chapter
5.1.2 for RSADP
512, 736, 768,
896, 1024,
1280, 1536
No FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-ENC,
FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-DEC
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
15 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA encryption
and decryption
with encoding
(RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5) and without
encoding
(RSADP, RSAEP)
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 7.2 (RSA)
with encoding and
without encoding
Chapter 5.1.1 for
RSAEP, Chapter
5.1.2 for RSADP
1984, 2048 Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-ENC,
FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-DEC
16 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA-CRT
decryption with
encoding
(RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5) and without
encoding
(RSADP)
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 7.2 (RSA)
with encoding and
without encoding
Chapter 5.1.2 for
RSADP
512, 736, 768,
896, 1024,
1280, 1536
No FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-CRT-
DEC
17 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA-CRT
decryption with
encoding
(RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5) and without
encoding
(RSADP)
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 7.2 (RSA)
with encoding and
without encoding
Chapter 5.1.2 for
RSADP
1984, 2048,
4096
Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-CRT-
DEC
18 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA signature
generation
according scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-{1}
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 8.2 (RSA)
[ISO9796-2]
Scheme 1
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
512, 736, 768,
896, 1024,
1280, 1536,
1984, 2048
No FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-SIGN
19 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA signature
generation
according scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512}
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 8.2 (RSA)
[ISO9796-2]
Scheme 1
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
512, 736, 768,
896, 1024,
1280, 1536
No FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-SIGN
31 / 37
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
20 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA signature
generation
according scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512}
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 8.2 (RSA)
[ISO9796-2]
Scheme 1
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
1984, 2048 Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-SIGN
21 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA-CRT
signature
generation with
encoding scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-1
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 8.2 (RSA)
[ISO9796-2]
Scheme 1
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
512, 736, 768,
896, 1024,
1280, 1536,
1984, 2048,
4096
No FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-CRT-
SIGN
22 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA-CRT
signature
generation
according scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512}
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 8.2 (RSA)
[ISO9796-2]
Scheme 1
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
512, 736, 768,
896, 1024,
1280, 1536
No FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-CRT-
SIGN
23 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA-CRT
signature
generation
according scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512}
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 8.2 (RSA)
[ISO9796-2]
Scheme 1
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
1984, 2048,
4096
Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-CRT-
SIGN
32 / 37
BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
24 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA signature
verification
according scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-{1, 224, 256,
384, 512}
Scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8, [PKCS
#1] Chapter 8.2
(RSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
512, 736, 768,
896, 1024,
1280, 1536
No FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-VERI
25 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA signature
verification
according scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-1
Scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8, [PKCS
#1] Chapter 8.2
(RSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
1984, 2048 No FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-VERI
26 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA signature
verification
according scheme
1 of [ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8 and
[PKCS #1]
(RSASSA-
PKCS1-v15)
Chapter 8 using
SHA-{224, 256,
384, 512}
Scheme 1 of
[ISO9796-2]
Chapter 8, [PKCS
#1] Chapter 8.2
(RSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
1984, 2048 Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/RSA-VERI
27 Cryptographic
Primitives
ECDSA-FP
signature
generation and
verification
[TR-03111]
Chapter 4.2.1
(ECDSA)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curves
secp{224,256,
384, 521}r1
[SEC2] and
brainpoolP{22
4,256,320,384
,512}r1 and
brainpoolP{22
4,256,320,384
,512}t1 [RFC
5639]
Yes FCS_COP.1.
1/ECDSA-
SIGN,
FCS_COP.1.
1/ECDSA-
VERI
28 Cryptographic
Primitives
Determ. RNG
DRG.4
[AIS20], [AIS31],
CTR_DRBG as
specified in
[ISO18031, C.3.2]
N/A Yes FCS_RNG.1.
1,
FCS_RNG.1.
2,
[TR-02102]
33 / 37
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
29 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA Key
generation
[FIPS186-4],
Section B.3.3,
Deviations of the
above stated
standard as
described in [SPA/
DPA/DFA –RSA].
512, 736, 768,
896, 1024,
1280, 1536
No FCS_CKM.1.
1/RSA
30 Cryptographic
Primitives
RSA Key
generation
[FIPS186-4],
Section B.3.3,
Deviations of the
above stated
standard as
described in [SPA/
DPA/DFA-RSA].
1984, 2048,
4096
Yes FCS_CKM.1.
1/RSA
31 Cryptographic
Primitives
ECC Key
generation
[SEC2],
[RFC 5639]
Section 3,
[FIPS186-4],
Section B.4.1,
Deviations of the
above stated
standard as
described in
[ECC_key]
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curves
secp{224,256,
384, 521}r1
and
brainpoolP{22
4,256,320,384
,512}r1 and
brainpoolP{22
4,256,320,384
,512}t1
Yes FCS_CKM.1.
1/ECC
32 Cryptographic
Primitives
AES Key
generation
[FIPS 197]
Chapter 3.1 and 5
|k|=128, 192,
256
Yes FCS_CKM.1.
1/AES
33 Cryptographic
Primitives
3DES Key
generation
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2
|k|=112, 168 No, for key
lengths of 112
bit;
Yes, for key
lengths of 168
bit.
FCS_CKM.1.
1/3DES
Table 7: TOE cryptographic functionality (with Security Level)
The following table 8 gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE
to enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated. An explicit validity period is not given.
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification using
SHA-1 (RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5)
[PKCS #1]
Chapter 8.2,
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
1024, 1280,
1536, 1984,
2048
(DAP-
Verification,
[GP221], App.
C.2, C.3, and
C.6)
FCO_NRO.2.
1/CM, and
FCS_COP.1.1
/RSA-VERI.
34 / 37
BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
2 Authenticity 3DES in Retail-
MAC mode using
SHA-1
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
Chapter 7.4
(Retail-MAC),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
|k|=112 (DAP-
Verification
[GP221], App.
C.2, C.3, and
C.6)
FCO_NRO.2.
1/CM, and
FCS_COP.1.1
/MAC-DES.
3 Authentication 3-DES in CBC
mode
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[SP800-38A]
Chapter 6.2.1
(CBC)
|k|=112,
|host-
challenge|
=64,
|card-
challenge|=48
[GP221], App.
E.4.2
FCS_COP.1.1
/3DES.
4 Authentication KDF in counter
mode with CMAC
as PRF
[SP 800-108]
Chapter 5.1
(KDF),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC),
[FIPS 197] (AES)
|k|=128,
|host-
challenge|=
|card-
challenge|=64
[GP_AM_D],
Section
6.2.2.2,
6.2.2.3, and
4.1.5
FCS_COP.1.1
/CMAC-AES.
5 Key
Agreement
3-DES in CBC
mode with ICV=0
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[SP800-38A]
Chapter 6.2
(CBC)
|k|=112 [GP221], App.
E.4.1
FCS_COP.1.1
/3DES.
6 Key
Agreement
KDF in counter
mode with CMAC
as PRF
[SP 800-108]
Chapter 5.1
(KDF),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC),
[FIPS 197] (AES)
|k|=128 [GP_AM_D],
Section 6.2.1
FCS_COP.1.1
/CMAC-AES.
7 Confidentiality 3-DES in CBC
mode
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[SP800-38A]
Chapter 6.2
(CBC)
|k|=112 [GP221], App.
E.3.4, and
E.4.2
FCS_COP.1.1
/3DES.
8 Confidentiality AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS 197]
Chapter 3.1 and 5
(AES),
[SP800-38A]
Chapter 6.2.1
(CBC)
|k|=128 [GP_AM_D],
Section 4.1.2,
6.2.6, and
6.2.7
FCS_COP.1.1
/AES.
35 / 37
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
9 Integrity 3DES in Retail-
MAC mode
[SP800-67]
Chapter 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 (3DES),
[ISO9797-1]
Chapter 7.4
(Retail-MAC)
|k|=112 [GP221], App.
E.4.4 (on
unmodified and
modified
APDU), and
E.4.5
FCS_COP.1.1
/MAC-DES.
10 Integrity AES in CBC-MAC
and CMAC mode
truncated to 64
bits
[FIPS 197] (AES),
[ISO9797-1])
Chapter 7.2
(MAC),
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC)
|k|=128 [GP_AM_D],
Section 6.2.4,
and 6.2.5
FCS_COP.1.1
/MAC-AES,
and
FCS_COP.1.1
/CMAC-AES.
11 Trusted
Channel
SCP02 [GP221], App. E
additionally cf.
lines 3, 5, 7, 9
- [GP221], App.
E, supported
parameter 'i':
15,1A,55
FCS_COP.1.1
/3DES,
FIA_UID.1/C
M,
FTP_ITC.1/C
MGR, and
FCS_COP.1.1
/MAC-DES.
12 Trusted
Channel
SCP03 [GP_AM_D]
additionally cf.
lines 4, 6, 8, 10
- [GP_AM_D],
supported
parameter 'i':
b1 – b8
FCS_COP.1.1
/AES,
FIA_UID.1/C
M,
FTP_ITC.1/C
MGR,
FCS_COP.1.1
/MAC-AES,
and
FCS_COP.1.1
/CMAC-AES.
Table 8: TOE cryptographic functionality (with Standard of Application)
Technical references related to Table 7 and 8:
[TR-03111] Technical Guideline TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, version
2.0, 28.06.2012, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[FIPS46-3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3: Data Encryption
Standard (DES), U.S. Department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and
Technology, reaffirmed October 25th, 1999
[FIPS180-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 180-4,
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, Information Technology Laboratory National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of Commerce / National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
36 / 37
BSI-DSZ-CC-1092-2020 Certification Report
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26,
2001, Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), National Institute of
Standards and Technology
[ISO9796-2] ISO/IEC9796-2 Information technology — Security techniques —
[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011: Information technology – Security techniques –
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher.
[ISO11770-3]ISO/IEC 11770-3, Information technology — Security techniques — Key
management — Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2015-07-15.
[ISO18031] ISO/IEC 18031:2011, Information technology – Security techniques –
Random bit generation, 2011-11
[PKCS #1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 27, 2012, RSA
Laboratories.
[PKCS5] PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard, Version 2.1.
[SEC2] Standards for efficient cryptography, SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve
Domain Parameters, Certicom Research, January 27, 2010, Version 2.0.
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, NIST Special
Publication 800-38A, December 2001.
[SP800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005.
[SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for the
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised November 2017,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
[SP 800-108]NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation
Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), Lily Chen; Computer Security Division
Information Technology Laboratory, October 2009.
[RFC5639] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves
and Curve Generation, BSI and secunet, March 2010, ISSN 2070-1721.
[GP_AM_D] GlobalPlatform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol 03, Card
Specification v 2.2 – Amendment D, Version 1.1, September 2009.
[GP221] GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.2.1, January 2011.
Note: End of report
37 / 37