Security Target -
ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE
Configuration
Document Information
Author: Thomas Aichinger Austria Card Ges.m.b.H.
Title: Security Target
Version: 1.02 public
Date: 2021-11-29
Company: AUSTRIA CARD-Plastikkarten und Ausweissysteme Gesellschaft m.b.H.,
Lamezanstraße 4-8, 1230 Vienna, Austria
Classification: Public
Document History
Version Date Author Changes
v1.02 2021-11-29 AC Public version
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
1 Contents
2 Security Target Introduction (ASE_INT)..........................................................................................8
2.1 ST Reference ...........................................................................................................................8
2.2 TOE Reference.........................................................................................................................8
2.3 TOE Overview..........................................................................................................................8
2.4 TOE Description.......................................................................................................................9
2.4.1 TOE Definition.................................................................................................................9
2.4.2 Scope.............................................................................................................................11
2.4.3 TOE Usage and Security Features for Operational Use ................................................11
2.4.4 TOE Life-Cycle................................................................................................................15
2.4.5 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware Required by the TOE....................................19
2.4.6 TOE Components ..........................................................................................................20
3 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)....................................................................................................20
3.1 CC Conformance Claim .........................................................................................................20
3.2 PP Claim ................................................................................................................................21
3.3 Package claim........................................................................................................................21
3.4 Conformance Claim Rationale ..............................................................................................21
4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD) ........................................................................................24
4.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................24
4.2 Assets ....................................................................................................................................24
4.3 Subjects.................................................................................................................................25
4.4 Assumptions..........................................................................................................................28
A.Insp_Sys .................................................................................................................................28
A.Auth_PKI ................................................................................................................................28
A.Passive_Auth..........................................................................................................................28
4.5 Threats ..................................................................................................................................29
T.Read_Sensitive_Data .............................................................................................................29
T.Counterfeit.............................................................................................................................29
T.Skimming................................................................................................................................30
T.Eavesdropping........................................................................................................................30
T.Tracing....................................................................................................................................30
T.Forgery ...................................................................................................................................31
T.Abuse-Func.............................................................................................................................31
T.Information_Leakage.............................................................................................................31
T.Phys-Tamper ..........................................................................................................................32
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
T.Malfunction............................................................................................................................32
4.6 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................33
P.Sensitive_Data .......................................................................................................................33
P.Personalization.......................................................................................................................33
P.Manufact................................................................................................................................34
P.Pre-Operational .....................................................................................................................34
P.Card_PKI.................................................................................................................................34
P.Trustworthy_PKI ....................................................................................................................35
P.Terminal.................................................................................................................................35
5 Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ) ......................................................................................................36
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................36
OT.Sens_Data_Conf ..................................................................................................................36
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.................................................................................................................36
OT.Data_Integrity......................................................................................................................37
OT.Data_Authenticity ...............................................................................................................37
OT.Data_Confidentiality............................................................................................................37
OT.Tracing.................................................................................................................................37
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func.................................................................................................................38
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak ......................................................................................................................38
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper...............................................................................................................38
OT.Prot_Malfunction ................................................................................................................38
OT.Identification .......................................................................................................................39
OT.AC_Pers ...............................................................................................................................39
OT.Active_Auth_Proof ..............................................................................................................39
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..........................................................39
OE.Legislative_Compliance.......................................................................................................39
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document ..............................................................................................40
OE.AA_Key_Travel_Document..................................................................................................40
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data............................................................................................................40
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign...............................................................................................................41
OE.Personalisation....................................................................................................................41
OE.Terminal...............................................................................................................................41
OE.Travel_Document_Holder...................................................................................................42
OE.Exam_Travel_Document .....................................................................................................42
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document..........................................................................................43
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems................................................................................................................43
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale ...............................................................................................43
6 Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD) ................................................................................46
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
6.1 Definition of the Family FIA_API...........................................................................................46
FIA_API.1...................................................................................................................................46
6.2 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS.........................................................................................46
FAU_SAS.1.................................................................................................................................47
6.3 Definition of the Family FCS_RND.........................................................................................47
FCS_RND.1 ................................................................................................................................47
6.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ........................................................................................48
FMT_LIM.1 ................................................................................................................................48
FMT_LIM.2 ................................................................................................................................48
6.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS.........................................................................................49
FPT_EMS.1 ................................................................................................................................49
7 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)................................................................................................51
7.1.1 Subjects.........................................................................................................................51
7.1.2 Objects ..........................................................................................................................51
7.1.3 Security Attributes ........................................................................................................51
7.1.4 Keys and Certificates.....................................................................................................52
7.2 SFR Class FAU........................................................................................................................55
7.2.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011.........................................................................55
FAU_SAS.1.................................................................................................................................55
7.3 SFR Class FCS.........................................................................................................................55
7.3.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011.........................................................................55
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ...............................................................................................................55
FCS_CKM.4................................................................................................................................56
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC ..............................................................................................................56
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.............................................................................................................57
FCS_RND.1 ................................................................................................................................57
7.3.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132.......................................................................58
FCS_CKM.1/CA..........................................................................................................................58
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC ..................................................................................................................59
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER..................................................................................................................59
FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC..........................................................................................................60
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC.................................................................................................................60
7.3.3 Additional SFRs (not from PPs) .....................................................................................61
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair......................................................................................................61
FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair......................................................................................................61
7.4 SFR Class FIA..........................................................................................................................62
7.4.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011.........................................................................62
FIA_AFL.1/PACE.........................................................................................................................62
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FIA_UAU.6/PACE.......................................................................................................................62
7.4.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132.......................................................................63
FIA_UID.1/PACE ........................................................................................................................63
FIA_UAU.1/PACE.......................................................................................................................64
FIA_UAU.4/PACE.......................................................................................................................64
FIA_UAU.5/PACE.......................................................................................................................65
FIA_UAU.6/EAC.........................................................................................................................66
FIA_API.1/CA.............................................................................................................................66
FIA_API.1/AA.............................................................................................................................66
7.5 SFR Class FDP ........................................................................................................................67
7.5.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011.........................................................................67
FDP_RIP.1..................................................................................................................................67
FDP_UCT.1/TRM .......................................................................................................................67
FDP_UIT.1/TRM.........................................................................................................................68
7.5.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132.......................................................................68
FDP_ACC.1/TRM........................................................................................................................68
FDP_ACF.1/TRM........................................................................................................................68
7.6 SFR Class FTP.........................................................................................................................70
7.6.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011.........................................................................70
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.........................................................................................................................70
7.7 SFR Class FMT........................................................................................................................71
7.7.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011.........................................................................71
FMT_SMF.1 ...............................................................................................................................71
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA................................................................................................................71
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS.................................................................................................................72
FMT_MTD.1/PA.........................................................................................................................72
7.7.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132.......................................................................72
FMT_SMR.1/PACE.....................................................................................................................72
FMT_LIM.1 ................................................................................................................................73
FMT_LIM.2 ................................................................................................................................73
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI..............................................................................................................74
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD...........................................................................................................74
FMT_MTD.1/DATE ....................................................................................................................75
FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK............................................................................................................75
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ............................................................................................................76
FMT_MTD.3 ..............................................................................................................................76
7.8 SFR Class FPT.........................................................................................................................77
7.8.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011.........................................................................77
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FPT_FLS.1 ..................................................................................................................................77
FPT_TST.1..................................................................................................................................77
FPT_PHP.3.................................................................................................................................78
7.8.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132.......................................................................78
FPT_EMS.1 ................................................................................................................................78
7.9 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE.....................................................................79
7.10 Security Requirements Rationale..........................................................................................79
7.10.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale................................................................79
7.10.2 Dependency Rationale..................................................................................................84
7.10.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale................................................................86
7.10.4 Security Requirements - Mutual Support and Internal Consistency ............................87
8 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)..........................................................................................89
8.1 TOE Security Services............................................................................................................89
8.1.1 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................89
Chip Authentication ..................................................................................................................89
Terminal Authentication...........................................................................................................90
Active Authentication ...............................................................................................................90
Passive Authentication..............................................................................................................90
PACE Protocol Authentication ..................................................................................................90
Symmetric Mutual Authentication ...........................................................................................90
8.1.2 Access Control...............................................................................................................90
Read Access...............................................................................................................................90
Write Access..............................................................................................................................91
8.1.3 Cryptographic Operations.............................................................................................91
8.1.4 Data Confidentiality ......................................................................................................91
Secure Messaging .....................................................................................................................91
8.1.5 Data Integrity ................................................................................................................91
Secure Messaging .....................................................................................................................91
Integrity Self Test ......................................................................................................................92
8.1.6 Protection......................................................................................................................92
Hardware and Software (IC Security Embedded Software)......................................................92
Software (IC embedded software)............................................................................................92
8.1.7 Application Data and Key Management .......................................................................92
8.2 Statement of Compatibility...................................................................................................93
8.2.1 Security Assurance Requirements ................................................................................93
8.2.2 Assumptions..................................................................................................................93
8.2.3 Security Objectives........................................................................................................94
8.2.4 Security Objectives Environment..................................................................................95
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
8.2.5 Organizational Security Policies....................................................................................95
8.2.6 Threats ..........................................................................................................................96
8.2.7 Security Functional Requirements................................................................................96
9 Glossary.........................................................................................................................................99
10 Acronyms ................................................................................................................................107
11 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................107
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
2 Security Target Introduction (ASE_INT)
2.1 ST Reference
Title Security Target - ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Version 1.02 public
Author Austria Card Ges.m.b.H.
Compliant to Common Criteria Protection Profiles:
 “Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application,
Extended Access Control with PACE” (EAC PP) [1] and
 “Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP) [2]
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5
Certification ID ANSSI ACOS-ID
Assurance Level EAL4+
Keywords ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Document, Extended Access Control,
PACE, Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
2.2 TOE Reference
TOE Name ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
TOE Developer Austria Card Plastikkarten und Ausweissysteme Gesellschaft m.b.H.,
Lamezanstraße 4-8, 1230 Wien, Austria
IC Developer Infineon Technologies AG
TOE Hardware Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000005h H13 and
IFX_CCI_000008h H13, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021
TOE Version v2.0 eMRTD (B)
2.3 TOE Overview
This ST defines the security objectives and requirements for the contact based / contactless chip of
electronic documents (i.a., machine readable travel documents – MRTD, driving license) based on
the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), EU
requirements for biometric European passport [3] and Biometric European Resident Permit [4]. It
addresses the advanced security methods Password Authenticated Connection Establishment,
Extended Access Control, and Chip Authentication and optionally Active Authentication according to
“ICAO Doc 9303” [5].
ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration is a chip operating system compliant to ISO 7816-3
[6], ISO 7816-4 [7], ISO 7816-8 [8], ISO 7816-9 [9], ISO 14443 [10] [11] [12] , BSI TR03110 [13] and EN
419212 [14] for secure chips used in electronic documents (MRTD). It provides multi-application
support (e.g. Signature-, Access Control-, Health-Applications). The operating system runs on
Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000005h H13 and IFX_CCI_000008h H13 including software
packages [15].
The secure chip and software packages (e.g. libraries) are certified according to CC EAL 6+ according
to the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [16] (see [17]).
The TOE is a composition of ACOS-IDv2.0 operating system and applications (software) and a secure
chip (hardware) including its associated software packages (software).
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
2.4 TOE Description
2.4.1 TOE Definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a secure chip including software for an electronic document to be
included in e.g. a machine readable travel document representing a contactless / contact passport or
smart card programmed according to ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control” /
“PACE” [18] / [5] (which means amongst others according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and
additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to the “ICAO Doc 9303” [5] and [13],
respectively. The communication between terminal and secure chip shall be protected by Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) according to Electronic Passport using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), [2]. For PACE the “generic mapping” and the “integrated
mapping” are supported. Additionally, Active Authentication according to “ICAO Doc 9303” [5] is
provided.
The TOE provides multi-application support, i.e., installation of additional multi-purpose applications
(MPA) is possible.
The TOE supports contact based T=1 (according ISO/IEC7816-3) and contactless T=CL Type A
(according to ISO/IEC14443) communication protocols.
The following “Figure 1: TOE Block Diagram” gives an overview of the TOE and its borders and the
scope of the evaluation.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Master
File
Application
Controller
ACOS-ID
OS & Application Code
Libraries
Chip Hardware (Sillicon), IC dedicated SW (Firmware)
Chip Module, Antenna,
Booklet / Card Body
Terminal
Application Content
Chip
Embedded
Software
(Code)
Composite TOE Certification
Hardware TOE
Certification
Application Header
eMRTD
Content Header
MPA-1
Content Header
MPA-n
Content Header
Filesystem
Data
Header
eMRTD
Files
Figure 1: TOE Block Diagram
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
2.4.2 Scope
“Figure 1: TOE Block Diagram” together with “Table 1: Components and Scope” define the scope of
the TOE. The latter gives more details and also divided the physical versus the logical scope.
Component In Scope of TOE (physical /
logical)
Covered by
Chip Hardware (Silicon) and IC
dedicated Software (Firmware)
Yes (physical) Chip hardware certification
Libraries (from secure chip
hardware vendor)
Yes (logical) Chip hardware certification
ACOS-ID Operation System and
Application Code (IC Embedded
Software) including Application
Controller
Yes (logical) Composite certification
Master File, application header
and eMRTD related files / keys
Yes (logical) Composite certification
eMRTD, MPA-1 … MPA-n
Application Header
Yes (logical) Composite certification
eMRTD Application Content,
including file/key headers
Yes (logical) Composite certification
Guidance Documentation Yes (physical) Composite certification
MPA-1 … MPA-n Application
Content
No n/a
Chip Module, Bonding Wires,
Antenna, Booklet / Card Body
(all optional)
No n/a
Terminal No n/a
Table 1: Components and Scope
From the communication (Operating System to Terminal) perspective the logical scope ends at the
input / output interface of the Operating System, which is the APDU-Interface (Application Protocol
Data Unit) consisting of all commands supported by the operating system. Any APDU command is
received by the input interface and any response APDU is sent via the output interface.
All commands and responses are physically transmitted over either the contact-based or the
contactless hardware interface, represented by connections on the Chip Hardware (pads on silicon).
2.4.3 TOE Usage and Security Features for Operational Use
A State or Organisation issues electronic documents incorporated into machine readable travel
documents to be used by the holder for international travel, as well as similar electronic documents
incorporated in documents such as driving license, electronic health card or other proprietary
applications. This Security Target covers the application where the traveller presents a machine
readable travel document or a driving license to the inspection system to prove his or her identity.
The machine readable travel document contains
(i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
(ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods
in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and
(iii) data elements on the travel document’s chip (electronic document) according to LDS in
case of contactless machine reading.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
The authentication of the traveller is based on
(i) the possession of a valid travel document personalised for a holder with the claimed
identity as given on the biographical data page and
(ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the travel document.
The issuing State or Organisation ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine travel documents.
The receiving State trusts a genuine travel document of an issuing State or Organisation.
The travel document is viewed as unit of
(i) the physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/or plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel
document holder
a. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document surface,
b. the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
c. the printed portrait.
(ii) the logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored according to
the Logical Data Structure as defined in [5] as specified by ICAO on the contact based or
contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based / contactless readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel document holder
a. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
b. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
c. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
d. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
e. the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organisation implements security features of the travel document to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the travel document and their data. The physical part of the travel
document and the travel document’s chip are identified by the Document Number.
The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the travel document’s chip) and organisational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation procedures) [5]. These security
measures can include the binding of the travel document’s chip to the travel document.
The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organisation and the security features of the
travel document’s chip
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active Authentication of the
travel document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics
as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [5], and Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment [5]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and
independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This ST addresses the protection of the logical travel document
(i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and
(ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
This ST addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [13] and the Active Authentication
stated in [5].
BAC is additionally supported by the composite product, but it is not in the scope of this ST due to
the fact that [19] only considers extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control
Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3). Therefore a separate evaluation and certification process using an ST
[20] conformant to [19] is carried out contemporaneous to the current process.
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a mandatory
security feature of the TOE. The travel document strictly conforms to the ‘Common Criteria
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with
PACE (PACE PP)’ [2]. Note that [2] considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [5], the following steps shall be performed:
(i) the travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from the
MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the domain
parameters to the terminal.
(ii) The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading the
MRZ resp. CAN data.
(iii) The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann key
agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared secret.
Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared secret.
(iv) Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies
the received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip provide private
communication (secure messaging) [13], [5].
The TOE implements the Extended Access Control as defined in [13]. The Extended Access Control
consists of two parts
(i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 and
(ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1).
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
(i) authenticates the travel document’s chip to the inspection system and
(ii) establishes secure messaging
which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system.
Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been
successfully executed.
The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of
(i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving State
or Organisation through the issuing State, and
(ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only
to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems.
The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the
authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.
The TOE supports both PACE mapping methods “generic mapping” and “integrated mapping” as
defined in [13] (but no “chip authentication mapping”).
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
The secure messaging established by the PACE protocol is preserved to protect the data
transmission from the TOE to the inspection system.
The TOE implements as an option Active Authentication (AA) according to [5] part 1 vol. 2
NORMATIVE APPENDIX 4 using ECDSA. AA may be used in addition to Chip Authentication followed
by Terminal Authentication. It can also be used instead of Chip Authentication to ensure the
authenticity of the Chip – but in this case Terminal Authentication cannot be performed. (see also
notes (1), (2), (3) and (4) below).
Notes:
1. PP56 [1] addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [13] as an
alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [5].
2. This ST refines PP56 [1] and addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described
in [13] and optionally the Active Authentication stated in [5].
3. Active Authentication is optional because the Active Authentication Public Key data
can be stored in DG15 (EF.DG15) as well as the private key can be installed or not. If
the Active Authentication Public Key data and the private key is not stored, Active
Authentication is not available and vice versa.
4. Chip Authentication Version 1 protocol and Active Authentication protocol both
authenticate the Travel document's Chip to the terminal.
The TOE can also be used as a driving license (IDL or eDL) compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 [21] or ISO/IEC
TR 19446 [22] (according Commission Regulation (EU) No 383/2012 [23]) supporting PACE, AA and
CA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL/eDL) share the same protocols and data structure
organization. Therefore, in the rest of the document, the word “MRTD” may be understood either as
a MRTD in the sense of ICAO, or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
depending on the targeted usage envisioned by the issuer.
When an Issuer is using the product as a driving licence, the following name mapping of roles,
definitions, data groups and protocol is applicable within the scope of this security target:
MRTD Driving License or eDL or IDL
ICAO ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303 ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
BAC BAP-1
DG3 DG7*
DG4 DG8*
DG15 DG13
MRZ MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier)
Traveller Holder
*Access rights of DG3 and DG4 (containing the biometric data) are also mapped to DG7 and DG8,
respectively.
Multi-Application support
Beside the travel document application the additional multi-purpose applications (MPA) may be
optionally installed. To ensure that the security objectives of the MRTD still hold, restrictions and
minimum requirements for the MPA applications (e.g. necessary access conditions for contained
files, keys) are defined and evaluated to prove their correctness as a part of the evaluation. The main
restriction for MPAs is that only a BIS-Authenticated Terminal (after successful performing the PACE
protocol) is able to select any MPA application. The application separation (access control / access
conditions) provided by the OS ensures that no inference with the ePassport application is possible.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
2.4.4 TOE Life-Cycle
The description of the TOE life-cycle includes the four life-cycle phases and 7 steps exactly as given in
the PP [1] and extends it by addition of a fifth life-cycle phase. Additional Notes are inserted into the
original text taken from the PP where necessary, e.g. to explain the two delivery options which are
introduced below.
The mapping of the roles is defined as follows:
 IC developer: Infineon Technology AG (as defined by the IC Certificate)
 IC Manufacturer: Production Sites in charge of Infineon (as defined by the IC Certificate)
 IC Embedded Software Developer: Austria Card Plastikkarten und Ausweissysteme
Gesellschaft m.b.H., Lamezanstraße 4-8, 1230 Wien, Austria (Development Site as covered
by Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0153)
 Travel Document Manufacturer: any entity authorized by Austria Card
The TOE makes use of a Flash-Technology IC product in combination with “Loader functionality”
(provided by the “secure flash loader package” of the IC / IC dedicated software), which is a
dedicated secure method, covered by the IC certification , see also “Package Loader, Package 1” and
“Package Loader, Package 2” acc. [24]) to load the IC Embedded Software. The IC Security Target
[24] addresses this topic in “P.Lim_Block_Loader” and “P.Ctrl_Loader”. See also [24] Annex 7,
especially Table 17 and Application Note 32.
Delivery Options:
IC Embedded Software (ACOS-ID Operation System and Application Code, Libraries) will only reside
in non-volatile programmable memory (Flash). Therefore the IC Embedded Software may either be
written by
 Option a) the IC Manufacturer or by
 Option b) the Travel Document Manufacturer making use of the “Loader functionality”
In both cases Austria Card delivers the Guidance Documentation of the TOE (including ePassport
application TSF data), initialization data as well as necessary keys to the Travel Document
Manufacturer. Additionally
in case of Option a)
 the IC including the IC embedded software is delivered to the Document Manufacturer
in Case of Option b)
 the IC Embedded Software is delivered from Austria Card to the Document Manufacturer.
 the IC without the IC embedded software is delivered to the Document Manufacturer
 For acceptance, processing of the IC and loading the Travel Document Manufacturer follows
the Guidance Documentation of the IC
 Directly after successfully loading the IC Embedded Software the TOE exists for the first time
and the Travel Document Manufacturer follows the guidance documentation of the TOE.
For both Options the IC is delivered from Production Sites via “Distribution Centers” – both in charge
of Infineon (as defined in the IC certification) - to the Document Manufacturer or from Production
Sites via “Distribution Centers” – both in charge of Infineon (as defined in the IC certification) - to
Austria Card and from Austria Card to the Document Manufacturer.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
The life-cycle description is taken from the underlying PP [1] (four life-cycle phases and 7 steps) and
complemented by a fifth life-cycle phase and additional notes explaining the delivery options.
The following picture gives an overview of the life-cycle of the TOE. Details are given below.
Phase 1 „Development“
(Step 1)
Step 2)
Phasae 2 „Manufacturing“
(Step 3)
(Step 4, optional)
Step 5)
IC production
Loading of IC Embedded SW (in case of Option a)
IC + IC dedicated SW
Development
IC Guidance
Development
IC Design
Data
IC Embedded SW
Development
SW
Option a)
IC Packaging
(e.g. interfacing)
Phase 3 „Personalization“
(Step 6)
Loading of IC Embedded SW (in case of Option b)
TOE Init & Pre-Perso incl. Application creation
IC with / without
embeded SW
SW
Option b)
TOE Guidance
Development
TOE Guidance
Development
TOE Personalization
IC
Phase 4 „Operational Use“
(Step 7)
TOE Personalization
TOE Use
IC
Guidance
Option b)
Phase 5 „Termination“ TOE Termination
IC
Guidance
Infineon
Austria Card
Infineon
Productionn sites
Infineon Distribution
Centers, Austria Card,
Any third Party
Travel Document
Manufactuter
Personalizer
Traveller /
Document Holder
Point of Delivery:
for Option a)
for Option b)
Guidance Delivery
Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Embedded Software (operating system), the ePassport application and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded
Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC
manufacturer.
Note: The term ”non-volatile non-programmable memories” typically refers to ROM, where the non-
programmable (ROM) part can only be “written” by the IC Manufacturer during Mask-processing.
The TOE does uses Flash technology instead, so the “Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-
programmable memories“ part does not exists. In case of
 Option a) the IC Embedded Software is securely delivered to the IC Manufacturer (via IC
Developer Infineon) or
 Option b) the IC Embedded Software is securely delivered to the travel document
manufacturer.
The ePassport application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the travel
document manufacturer.
Note: the term “ePassport application” above refers mainly to application data (TSF data, part of the
guidance documentation) but not to executable code. Whole executable code is part of the
Operating System and Application code or libraries.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts1
of the travel document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-
volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data
onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the
delivery process to the travel document manufacturer.
If necessary (Note: which means in case of Option a)), the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC
Embedded Software in the non- volatile programmable memories (Flash). Note: in Case of Option a)
the TOE exists after this action.
The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to the travel document manufacturer. Note:
The delivery can optionally be done via the IC Developer Infineon and Austria Card. In Case of
 Option a) this step is the TOE delivery, while in case of
 Option b) the IC is delivered without the IC Embedded Software and therefore the delivered
ICs does not represent the TOE (the IC Embedded Software is delivered to the Document
Manufacturer separately)
(Step 4 optional) The travel document manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact
based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card
only.
Note: Step 4 may be performed by any entity action on behalf of the travel document manufacturer.
(Step5) The travel document manufacturer
(i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it in the non-volatile programmable memories
(FLASH) if necessary (Note: this is necessary only in case of Option b) when this was not
done before by the IC manufacturer),
1
Note: for this TOE such parts don’t exist; no part of the IC Embedded Software is contained in ROM.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
(ii) creates the ePassport application (create the MF and ICAO.DF2
), and
(iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre- personalization Data.
(iv) Note: optionally the travel document manufacturer equips travel document’s chip with
personalization data such as
a. Initial CVCA Public Key
b. Initial CVCA Certificate
c. Initial Current Date
But this can instead also be done in phase 3 by the Personalization Agent.
The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
travel document manufacturer to the Personalisation Agent. The travel document manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalisation Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalisation of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalisation of the travel document includes
(i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized
portraits and the optional biometric reference data),
(iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel
document,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and
(v) configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalisation Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2),
(iii) the Document security object, and
(iv) personalization data such as
a. Initial CVCA Public Key
b. Initial CVCA Certificate
c. Initial Current Date
Note: the personalization with the initial CVCA Public Key, Certificate and Current Date
can instead also be done in phase 2 by the manufacturer.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [13] finalizes the
personalisation of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised
travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
travel document holder for operational use.
The TSF data3
(data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE) comprise
(but are not limited to) the Personalisation Agent Authentication Key(s), the Terminal Authentication
trust anchor, the effective date and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
This ST distinguishes4
between the Personalisation Agent as entity known to the TOE and the
Document Signer as entity in the TOE IT environment signing the Document security object as
described in [5]. This approach allows but does not enforce the separation of these roles.
2
See Application Note 1 of [1]
3
See also Application Note 2 from PP56v2
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in
the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the
issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but
they can never be modified.
Phase 5 “Terminated”
If the TOE’s security mechanisms observe an attack, critical operating environment conditions or a
malfunction it shuts itself down permanently. This state can be reached any time after the IC
Embedded Software (operating system) has been installed and started (from phase 2, 3 or phase 4
on) and is final. Encrypted log data can be read that allow tracing back to cause of the shut-down.
This ST considers the phases 1 and parts of phase 2 (Step1 to Step3) as part of the evaluation and
therefore to define the TOE delivery according to CC after Step 35
.
The production, generation and installation procedures (step 4, 5, 6 as applicable) after TOE delivery
up to the “Operational Use” (Phase 4) and “Terminated” (Phase 5) have been considered in the
product evaluation process under AGD assurance class.
2.4.5 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware Required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its
claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip (sillicon) and the complete
operating system and application code and ePassport application data. Note, the module (including
bonding wires) holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) or
card body are needed to represent a complete travel document, nevertheless these parts are
irrelevant for the secure operation of the TOE.
4
See also Application Note 3 from PP56v2
5
See also Application Note 4 from [1]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
2.4.6 TOE Components
The TOE consists of the following components:
Category Definition
Secure Chip Hardware Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000005h H13 and
IFX_CCI_000008h H13
Secure Chip Firmware 80.100.17.3, 80.100.17.2
Secure Chip Vendor Software
Libraries
Crypto Library (ACL): v2.08.007
Hardware Support Layer (HSL): 03.12.8812
Operating System ACOS-IDv2.0
Builds: 0x8C1D, 0x62D7 and 0x9486
Those builds differ in their support of different configurations of
the same TOE Hardware (RAM Size, User NVM Size, availability of
the Very High Bit Rate (VHBR) feature).
The builds and the underlying code are represented by the label
“REL_ACOS-IDv2.0_01” in the repository.
This chip embedded software version corresponds to the Version
Identifier “v2.0” of the TOE (part of the TOE name).
Guidance Documentation The Guidance consists of the following documents:
 “Preparation and Operational Manual - ACOS-IDv2.0
eMRTDv2.0, BAC and EAC/PACE Configuration”, Version
1.04, Date 2021-11-29, [25]
 “ACOS-ID User Manual”, Version 2.12, Date 19.05.2021
[26]
 “Internal Operation Manual - ACOS-IDv2.0”, Version 1.2,
2021-07-19, [27] (only used Austria Card internal)
Those documents are represented by the label “REL_ACOS-
IDv2.0_eMRTD_CC-DOC_02” in the repository.
This documentation version is reflected by the text “eMRTD (B)”
part of the TOE name, where “eMRTD” refers to documentation
for a specific type of certification and “(B)” to the specific version
of the documentation.
3 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
3.1 CC Conformance Claim
This ST claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 Revision 5, [28] [29] [30] as follows:
Part 2 extended due to the use of
 FAU_SAS.1
 FCS_RND.1
 FMT_LIM.1
 FMT_LIM.2
 FPT_EMS.1
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
from [2] and
 FIA_API.1. from [1],
Part 3 conformant.
For the evaluation the following methodology is used: [31]
3.2 PP Claim
This Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profiles
 Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with
PACE (EAC PP) [1]
 Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE
PP) [2]
3.3 Package claim
This Security Target is conforming to assurance package EAL4 augmented with:
 ALC_DVS.2
 ATE_DPT.2
 AVA_VAN.5
due to PP68 [2].
And additionally:
 ALC_FLR.1
 ALC_CMS.5
 ALC_TAT.2
as defined in CC part 3 [30].
3.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
This Security Target claims strict conformance to the following protection profiles as required:
 Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with
PACE (EAC PP) [1]
 Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE
PP) [2]
The chapter Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD) is taken over from the claimed PPs without
changes.
The chapter Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ) is taken over from the claimed PPs completely and
extended by
 Proof of the travel document's chip authenticity
With Proof of the travel document's chip authenticity the Active Authentication functionality is
introduced.
Active Authentication is a challenge-response protocol defined in [5]:
 the terminal sends a challenge (nonce) to the chip
 the chips sends a signature of this nonce to the terminal
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
 and the terminal verifies this signature.
Active Authentication allows cryptographic verification of the authenticity of the chip and is an
alternative to Chip Authentication which performs a public key exchange for the same purpose. The
keys used for Active Authentication are different from the keys used by Chip Authentication.
OE.AA_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key
With OE.AA_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key the issuing State or
Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure to make the Active
Authentication functionality possible.
Conclusion:
1. The OT added to content of the PPs in the ST do not change the statement of Security
Objectives of the PPs
2. The statement of Security Objectives in this ST remains consistent with the statement of
Security Objectives in the PPs.
The chapter Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD) is taken over from the claimed PPs without
changes.
The chapter Security Requirements (ASE_REQ) is taken over from the claimed PPs completely
without changes but the following security requirements are added:
- FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair
The SFR introduces functionality to this ST which
o adds the key generation functionality for Active Authentication to this TOE, which
 is an alternative mechanism to Chip Authentication
 works with its own key pair which is different from the CA key pair
Conclusion:
o The SFR added to content of the PPs in the ST do not change the statement of SFRs
in the PPs.
o The statement of SFRs in this ST remains consistent with the statement of SFRs in
the PPs.
- FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair
The SFR introduces functionality to this ST (according to [1] Application Note 44) which
o adds the key generation functionality for Chip Authentication to this TOE, which
 is an alternative mechanism to generating the key externally and loading it
onto the TOE
 works with its own key pair which is different from the AA key pair
Conclusion:
o The SFR added to content of the PPs in the ST do not change the statement of SFRs
in the PPs.
o The statement of SFRs in this ST remains consistent with the statement of SFRs in
the PPs.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
- FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC
The SFR introduces functionality to this ST which
o adds the signature generation functionality for Active Authentication to this TOE
which needs a private key which might either be created by
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair (see above) or loaded.
o is an alternative mechanism to Chip Authentication
Conclusion:
o The SFR added to content of the PPs in the ST do not change the statement of SFRs
in the PPs.
o The statement of SFRs in this ST remains consistent with the statement of SFRs in
the PPs.
- FIA_API.1/AA
The SFR introduces functionality to this ST which
o adds the Active Authentication functionality to this TOE
o works with its own key pair which is different from the CA key pair
Conclusion:
o The SFR added to content of the PPs in the ST do not change the statement of SFRs
in the PPs.
o The statement of SFRs in this ST remains consistent with the statement of SFRs in
the PPs.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
4.1 Introduction
This ST introduces optional functionality (Active Authentication) as an alternative to Chip
Authentication.
For the purpose of authentication of the chip to the terminal the Chip Authentication and Active
Authentication are equivalent mechanisms. Therefore and since those parts taken from [1] already
consider Chip Authentication there is no modification of the SPD needed.
4.2 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip, user
data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data from the
claimed PACE PP [7], chap 3.1.:
Primary Assets (User Data)
Asset Definition
User data stored on the TOE All data (being not authentication data) stored in the
context of the ePassport application of the travel
document as defined in [5] and being allowed to be
read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as
Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of
[5]). This asset covers ‘User Data on the MRTD’s chip’,
‘Logical MRTD Data’ and ‘Sensitive User Data’ in [19].
User data transferred between the TOE
and the terminal connected (i.e. an
authority represented by Basic
Inspection System with PACE)
All data (being not authentication data) being
transferred in the context of the ePassport application
of the travel document as defined in [5] between the
TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic
Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [5]). User
data can be received and sent (exchange ⇔ {receive,
send}).
Travel document tracing data Technical information about the current and previous
locations of the travel document gathered
unnoticeable by the travel document holder
recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password.
TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered.
Logical travel document sensitive User
Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
Authenticity of the travel document’s
chip
The authenticity of the travel document’s chip
personalised by the issuing State or Organisation for
the travel document holder is used by the traveller to
prove his possession of a genuine travel document.
Table 2: Primary Assets
Secondary Assets (TSF Data)
Accessibility to the TOE functions and
data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and
TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorised subjects only.
Genuineness of the TOE Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide
claimed security functionality in a proper way. This
asset also covers ‘Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip’ in
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
[19].
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys Permanently or temporarily stored secret
cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to
enforce its security functionality.
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic
material
Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret
cryptographic (public) keys and other non-secret
material (Document Security Object SOD containing
digital signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce
its security functionality.
Travel document communication
establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable authorisation information for a
human user being used for verification of the
authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE
password). These data are stored in the TOE and are
not to be send to it.
4.3 Subjects
This ST includes all subjects from [1] (which itself includes all these subjects from [2]).
Travel document holder A person for whom the travel document Issuer has
personalised the travel document. This entity is
commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [19]. Please note
that a travel document holder can also be an attacker
(s. below).
Travel document presenter (traveller) A person presenting the travel document to a terminal
22 and claiming the identity of the travel document
holder. This external entity is commensurate with
‘Traveller’ in [19]. Please note that a travel document
presenter can also be an attacker (s. below).
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with
the TOE through the contactless/contact interface. The
role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being
recognised by the TOE as not being PACE authenticated
(‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter).
This entity is commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [19].
Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-
PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting
authority and verifying the travel document presenter
as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by
comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel
document presenter with the stored biometric data
(DG2) of the travel document holder). BIS-PACE
implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol
and authenticates itself to the travel document using a
shared password (PACE password) and supports
Passive Authentication
Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and
signing the Document Security Object stored on the
travel document for passive authentication. A
Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA
issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS ), see [5].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation
Agent.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel
document Issuer with respect to confirming
correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel
document. The CSCA represents the country specific
root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the
Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA
also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA)
having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic
means, see. [5], 5.5.1.
Personalisation Agent An organisation acting on behalf of the travel
document Issuer to personalise the travel document
for the travel document holder by some or all of the
following activities:
(i) establishing the identity of the travel
document holder for the biographic data in
the travel document,
(ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of
the travel document holder,
(iii) writing a subset of these data on the
physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the
travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document
holder as defined in [5],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object
defined in [5] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may
be distributed among several institutions according to
the operational policy of the travel document Issuer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation
agent’ in [19].
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing
integrated circuit and the travel document
Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel
document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the
TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase. The TOE
itself does not distinguish between the IC
Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using
this role Manufacturer. This entity is commensurate
with ‘Manufacturer’ in [19].
Attacker A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his
behalf) trying to undermine the security policy defined
by the ST, especially to change properties of the assets
having to be maintained. The attacker is assumed to
possess an at most high attack potential. Please note
that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role
recognised by the TOE. This external entity is
commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in [19].
A threat agent trying
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
(i) to manipulate the logical travel document
without authorization,
(ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data
(i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4),
(iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or
(iv) to trace a travel document.
Country Verifying Certification
Authority (CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)
enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or
Organisation with respect to the protection of sensitive
biometric reference data stored in the travel
document. The CVCA represents the country specific
root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The
updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in
the form of Country Verifying CA Link- Certificates.
Document Verifier (DV) The Document Verifier enforces the privacy policy of
the receiving State with respect to the protection of
sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the
Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier
manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection
Systems for the sensitive data of the travel document
in the limits provided by the issuing States or
Organisations in the form of the Document Verifier
Certificates.
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of
the receiving State
(i) examining a travel document presented by
the traveller and verifying its authenticity
and
(ii) verifying the traveller as travel document
holder.
Extended Inspection System The Extended Inspection System performs the
Advanced Inspection Procedure (see [1], figure 1) and
therefore
(i) contains a terminal for the communication
with the travel document’s chip,
(ii) implements the terminals part of PACE
and/or BAC;
(iii) gets the authorization to read the logical
travel document either under PACE or BAC
by optical reading the travel document
providing this information.
(iv) implements the Terminal Authentication
and Chip Authentication Protocols both
Version 1 according to [5] and
(v) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation through the Document
Verifier of the receiving State to read the
sensitive biometric reference data.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Security attributes of the EIS are defined by means of
the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be
used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are
supported by the TOE and the BIS, PACE must be used.
4.4 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used. This ST includes all assumptions from [1] and [2].
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing
CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [4] and/or BAC [8]. BAC may only be
used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE
must be used. The EIS reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the
Chip Authentication v.1 to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging.
EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure access control and is
authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Justification:
The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security objectives of the [7] as it repeats the
requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for the Inspection Systems for handling
the EAC functionality of the TOE.
A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification
Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs
and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organisations are signing the certificates of the
Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended
Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations
distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel
document’s chip.
Justification:
This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use of card verifiable
certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the PACE part of the TOE nor
will the security objectives of the [7] be restricted by this assumption. For the EAC functionality of
the TOE the assumption is necessary because it covers the pre-requisite for performing the
Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1.
A.Passive_Auth PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The
issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret
and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States
maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii)
hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document
Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the
Document Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer
Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and
Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the Document Security
Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [6].
4.5 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its
IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment
and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through
the communication interface of the travel document's chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [19]) in
respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the
motivation (to get data stored on the travel document's chip) but
differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric
reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the
opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the
possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference
data are stored only on the travel document's chip as private sensitive
personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually
readable on the physical part of the travel document as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in
possession of a legitimate travel document.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data (i.e.
biometric reference).
T.Counterfeit Counterfeit of travel document chip data
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy
or reproduction of a genuine travel document's chip to be used as part
of a counterfeit travel document. This violates the authenticity of the
travel document's chip used for authentication of a traveller by
possession of a travel document. The attacker may generate a new
data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine
travel document's chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to
imitate this genuine travel document's chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
Asset: authenticity of user data stored on the TOE.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
T.Skimming Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the
user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting
authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data
Application Note This TOE does not support BAC.
Application Note A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the
security policy defined in this ST. (cf. application note 10 of [2]).
Application Note MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel document.
Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets,
but are restricted-revealable, cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder. (cf.
application note 11 of [2]).
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE
and the PACE terminal
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel
document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the
user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data
Application Note This TOE does not support BAC.
Application Note A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the
security policy defined in this ST (cf.
application note 12 of [2]).
T.Tracing Tracing travel document
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement
of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by
establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: privacy of the travel document holder
Application Note This threat completely covers and extends "T.Chip-ID" from BAC PP
[BSI-CC-PP-0055-110]. (cf. application note 13 of [2]).
Application Note A product using BAC (whatever the type of the inspection system is:
BIS-BAC) cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy
defined in this ST. (cf. application note 14 of [2])
Application Note Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any
unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip
(no Chip Authentication or Active Authentication), a threat like
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel document) cannot be averted
by the current TOE. (cf. application note 15 of of [2])
T.Forgery Forgery of Data
Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored
on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the
terminal connected in order to outsmart
(i) the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE or
(ii) the authenticated Extended Inspection System6
by means of changed travel document holder's related reference data
(like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way
that the terminal connected perceives these modified data
as authentic one.
Threat agent: having high attack potential.
Asset: integrity of the travel document.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality2
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
TOE operational phase in order
1. to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE,
2. to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or
3. to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded
security functionality of the TOE.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization
and personalization in the operational phase after delivery to the travel
document holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document.
Application Note Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the
capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test
Software being not specified here (cf. application note 16 of [2]).
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from travel document
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data
stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE
and the terminal connected. The information leakage may be inherent
in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Threat agent: having high attack potential.
Asset: confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application Note Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
6
T.Forgery is extended by (ii) due to PP [1] Application note 8.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in
processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a
covert channel transmission, but is more closely related to
measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either
from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct
measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a
contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation
being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
(DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker
may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g.
Differential Fault Analysis). (cf. application note 17 of [2]).
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in
order
1. to disclose the TSF-data, or
2. to disclose/reconstruct the TOE's Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter
1. its security functionality (hardware and software part,
as well),
2. the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel
document.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and
TSF-data of the travel document.
Application Note Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the
inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the travel
document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack
methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires a direct interaction with the travel document's internals.
Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security
mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of the user data
and the TSF data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or
data can be permanent or temporary. (cf. application note 18 of [2]).
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document's hardware
and Embedded Software by
applying environmental stress in order to
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
1. deactivate or modify security features or functionality
of the TOE's hardware or to
2. circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of
the TOE's Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside
the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel
document's Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions.
To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about
the functional operation. attacker needs information about the
functional operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional
operation.
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and
TSF-data of the travel document.
Application Note A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction
with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a
manipulation (refer to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed
knowledge about TOE's internals. (cf. application note 19 of [2]).
4.6 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE and/or its environment shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies
(OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operation.
The following OSP are taken directly from [1] which itself includes P.Pre-Operational, P.Card_PKI,
P.Trustworthy_PKI, P.Manufact and P.Terminal taken from [8].
P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used
only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the travel document is
presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or
Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the
authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate.
The travel document's chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private
personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip
Authentication Version 1.
P.Personalization Personalization of the travel document by issuing State or
Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical travel
document with respect to the travel document holder. The personalization of the travel document
for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the travel document's chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The travel
document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least the
Personalisation Agent Key.
Note OSP P.Manufact covers OSP "P.Process-TOE" of [32] which inherits OSP
"P.Process-TOE" from PP [24]
P.Pre-Operational Pre-operational handling of the travel document
1. The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2. The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst
other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data
permanently stored in the TOE, see Primary assets and Secondary assets.
3. The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE's technical components (IC) which
enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life
cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase, see TOE Life-Cycle
above.
4. If the travel document Issuer authorizes a Personalization Agent to personalize
the travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has
to ensure that the Personalization Agent acts in accordance with the travel
document Issuer's policy.
P.Card_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)
Note The description below states the responsibilities of involved
parties and represents the logical, but not the physical structure of
the PKI. Physical distribution ways shall be implemented by the
involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging to the
PKI are securely distributed / made available to their final
destination, e.g. by using directory services. (cf. application note
20 of [2]).
1. The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the
passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the
travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA ) .
2. The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall
keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA )
having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure
means, see [5], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for
the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS ) and make them available to the travel
document Issuer, see [5], 5.5.1.
3. A Document Signer shall
(i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair,
(ii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification,
(iii) keep the Document Signer Private Key secret and
(iv) securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document
Security Objects of travel documents.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
P.Trustworthy_PKI Trustworthiness of PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and
DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on the
travel document.
P.Terminal Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows:
1. The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by
terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [5].
2. They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [5], of the Passive
Authentication [5] and use them in this order7
. The PACE terminal shall use
randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for
generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3. The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4. They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the
travel document, [5]).
5. The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE
passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure
operation of the TOE according to the current ST.
REFINEMENT P.Terminal holds also for Extended Inspection System with PACE.
7
This order is commensurate with [5].
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
5 Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ)
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives
for the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational
environment.
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the TOE independent of
TOE environment.
The following Objectives are taken directly from [1] which itself includes OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Tracing, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func,
OT.Prof_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers and
OT.Prot_Malfunction taken from [8].
OT.Sens_Data_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization
of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful
authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier
Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State
or Organisation. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical travel document data during
their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric
reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of the travel document’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the travel
document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organisation by means of the Chip
Authentication Version 1 as defined in [13]. The authenticity proof provided by travel document’s
chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Note The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip to
have
I. a unique identity as given by the travel document’s
Document Number,
II. a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private
authentication key as TSF data.
The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The
terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication
attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip
Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication
Private Key of the travel document’s chip. This certificate is
provided by
I. the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS
defined in [5] and
II. the hash value of DG14 in the Document Security Object
signed by the Document Signer.
(cf. Application Note 9 from [1])
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
OT.Data_Integrity Integrity of Data
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data8
stored on it by protecting these
data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying). The
TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the
TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the
PACE Authentication.
Refinement OT.Data_Integrity holds also for Extended Inspection System
which has used an authenticated BIS-PACE for authentication.
OT.Data_Authenticity Authenticity of Data
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data9
stored on it by enabling
verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side10
. The TOE must ensure authenticity of the
User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected
(and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen
by enabling such a verification at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active
verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE)11
.
Refinement OT.Data_Authenticity holds also for Extended Inspection System
which has used an authenticated BIS-PACE for authentication.
OT.Data_Confidentiality Confidentiality of Data
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data12
by granting read access
only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the
User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected
(and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
Refinement OT.Data_Confidentiality holds also for Extended Inspection
System which has used an authenticated BIS-PACE for
authentication.
OT.Tracing Tracing travel document
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel
document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared
passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
Note (REFINED) Since this TOE supports Chip Authentication, a security objective
like OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (proof of travel document authenticity)
8
See Secondary Assets
9
See Secondary Assets
10
Verification of SOD
11
secure messaging after the PACE authentication, see also [5]
12
See Secondary Assets
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
can be achieved by the current TOE. (cf. application note 21 of
[2]).
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE operational
phase, can be abused in order
1. to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE,
2. to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE,
3. to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of
the TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-data
stored and/or processed by the travel document
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines,
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Note This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent
complex signal processing due to normal operation of
the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker (cf. application
note 2 of [2]).
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF-data
and the travel document's Embedded Software by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chip's
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and
current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction between
electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis),
 manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the
normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been proven or
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency or
temperature.
OT.Identification Identification of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialization13
and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-
volatile memory. The Initialization Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the
manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The storage of the
Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
Security Object according to LDS [5] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization
Agents only. The logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be
written only during and cannot be changed after personalization of the document.
Note The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written
during personalization for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1
and EF.DG2) cannot be changed using write access after
personalization. (cf. application note 23 of [2]).
The following threat has been included in addition to the threats in the protection profiles:
OT.Active_Auth_Proof Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the travel
document's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active
Authentication as defined in [5]. The authenticity proof provided by travel document's chip shall
be protected against attacks with high attack potential.14
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Travel document Issuer as the general responsible
The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global security policy related will
implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment:
OE.Legislative_Compliance Issuing of the travel document
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the terminals
complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
13
amongst other, IC Identification data
14
REFINEMENT
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to
(i) generate the travel document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair,
(ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and
(iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organizations to verify the
authenticity of the travel document's chip used for genuine travel document by
certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object.
Justification This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [2] in order to counter the Threat
T.Counterfeit as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 which is one of the additional
features of the TOE.
OE.AA_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to
(iv) generate the travel document’s Active Authentication Key Pair,
(v) sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and
(vi) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify the
authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by
certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document
Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document holders to authorized
receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State
or Organisation generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized
Document Verifier only.
Justification This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [2] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy
P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies
the pre- requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as
it concerns the need of an PKI for this protocol and the
responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 is one of the additional features of the TOE described
only in [1] and not in [2].
Travel document Issuer and CSCA: travel document’s PKI (issuing) branch
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following security objectives for
the TOE environment:
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Authentication of travel document by Signature
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the
CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer must
(i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair,
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a
secure operational environment, and
(iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA ).
Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained.
A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must
(i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair,
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key,
(iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification,
(iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational
environment only.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each data
group in use according to [5]. The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security
Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [5]. The CSCA must issue
its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct
Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document.
OE.Personalisation Personalisation of travel document
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf
(i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical
data for the travel document,
(ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
(iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical personalisation) and store
them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder
as defined in [5] (see also , [5], sec. 10)
(iv) write the document details data,
(v) write the initial TSF data,
(vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [6] (in the role of a DS).
Terminal operator: Terminal’s receiving branch
OE.Terminal Terminal operating
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators
and by travel document holders as defined in [5].
2.) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [5], of the
Passive Authentication [5] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security
Object) and use them in this order15
. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost)
uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for
Diffie-Hellmann).
15
This order is commensurate with [5].
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS ) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups
stored in the travel document, [5]).
5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of
respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of
PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to
the current PP.
Note OE.Terminal completely covers and extends “OE.Exam_MRTD”,
“OE.Passive_Auth_Verif“ and “OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD” from BAC
PP [19]. See note 24 from [2].
Travel document holder Obligations
OE.Travel_Document_Holder Travel document holder Obligations
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE
password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations
and are trustworthy.
Receiving State or Organisation
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document Examination of the physical part of the travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel document
presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and
to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document. The Basic Inspection System
for global interoperability
(i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each
issuing State or Organisation, and
(ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [5] and/or the Basic Access Control [5].
Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication Protocol
Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip.
Justification This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [2] in order to handle the Threat
T.Counterfeit and the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by demanding the
Inspection System to perform the Chip Authentication protocol
v.1. OE.Exam_Travel_Document also repeats partly the
requirements from OE.Terminal in [2] and therefore also counters
T.Forgery and A.Passive_Auth from [2]. This is done because a new
type of Inspection System is introduced in [1] as the Extended
Inspection System is needed to handle the additional features of a
travel document with Extended Access Control.
Refinement Inspection Systems not able to perform EAC perform additionally
to these points Active Authentication (if optionally available and
the terminal's ability allows to perform AA) to verify the
Authenticity of the presented travel document's chip.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document Protection of data from the logical travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality and integrity
of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping
to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
Justification This security objective for the operational environment is
needed additionally to those from [2] in order to handle the
Assumption A.Insp_Sys by requiring the Inspection System to
perform secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended Inspection
Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference
data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to
the travel document’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private
Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
Justification This security objective for the operational environment is needed
additionally to those from [2] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy
P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies
the pre- requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as
it concerns the responsibilities of the Document Verifier instance
and the Inspection Systems.
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.AA_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OE.Personalisation
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
OE.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Legislative_Compliance
T.Read_Sensitive_Data x x x
T.Counterfeit x x x x x
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
The Objectives, threats and assumptions marked in italic letters are included from PACE-PP [2].
The OSP P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or Organisation
only” addresses the
(i) the enrolment of the logical travel document by the Personalisation Agent as described in
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of
logical travel document”, and
(ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel document”.
Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers
limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent.
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and the threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by the
TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” requiring
that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only
granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these
data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates
issued by the issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for
use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to
authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
“Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the security
objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document additionally to the security objectives from PACE PP [2].
T.Skimming x x x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Tracing x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
T.Forgery x x x x x x x x x
P.Sensitive_Data x x x
P.Personalisation x x x
P.Manufact x
P.Pre-Operational x x x x
P.Terminal x x
P.Card_PKI x
P.Trustworthy_PKI x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.Auth_PKI x x
A.Passive_Auth x x
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
OE.Exam_Travel_Document enforces the terminals to perform the terminal part of the PACE
protocol.
The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” addresses the attack of
unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This attack is thwarted by
chip identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof or OT.Active_Auth_Proof
“Proof of travel document’s chip authentication” using an authentication key pair to be generated by
the issuing State or Organisation. The Active Authentication Public Key has to be written into
EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.AA_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key”. The Chip Authentication
Public Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as
demanded by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key”. According to
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” the General
Inspection system has to perform the Active Authentication Protocol or the Chip Authentication
Protocol 16
to verify the authenticity of the travel document’s chip.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial alteration of
the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between the TOE and the
terminal. Additionally to the security objectives from PACE PP [2] which counter this threat, the
examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_Travel_Document
“Examination of the physical part of the travel document” shall ensure its authenticity by means of
the physical security measures and detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel
document.
The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection
Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document” which
requires the inspection system to examine physically the travel document, the Basic Inspection
System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the Extended Inspection Systems to implement
and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the
presented travel document’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of data from the logical travel document” require
the Inspection System to protect the logical travel document data during the transmission and the
internal handling.
The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by
Signature” from PACE PP [2] covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair
and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is
covered by OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document”.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security objective for the
TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference
data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier
certificates for authorized receiving States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the
receiving State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”
to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
16
REFINEMENT Active Authentication Protocol
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
6 Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD)
6.1 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the
Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external
entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external
entity.
Note: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification of users’
identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove their
identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part
2 (cf. [3], chapter “Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an
external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of
authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication
mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment:
authorized user or role].
6.2 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of the class FAU
(Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of
audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require
the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content
of the audit records.
FIA_SAS Audit Storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling:
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to
store audit data.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencie
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the
audit records
6.3 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FCS_RND of the class FCS
(Cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for
random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND.1 is not
limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar
component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use. The family ‘Generation of random
numbers (FCS_RND)’ is specified as follows:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to be
used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that
random numbers meet a defined quality
metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
6.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE
show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing abuse of
functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts access to functions whereas the Limited
capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling:
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability 1 and 2
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built
to provide only the capabilities (perform action,
gather information) necessary for its genuine
purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict
the use of functions (refer to Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved,
for instance, by removing or by disabling
functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-
cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Application Note
The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume existence of two types of
mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection
in order to enforce the related policy. This also allows that
1. the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment, but its
capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
2. the TSF is designed with high functionality, but is removed or disabled in the product
in its user environment.
The combination of both the requirements shall enforce the related policy.
6.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS
The family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to
describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against
secret data stored in and used by the TOE where the attack is based on external observable physical
phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation,
simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family
describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations being not directly
addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [29].
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS TOE emanation 1
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible
emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface
emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in
excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to
use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to
gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
7 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 [28] of the CC.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in bold text
and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC requirement were
deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been made by the ST authors are denoted as underlined text and
the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the
length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the ST authors are denoted by showing
as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is
denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.
7.1.1 Subjects
The definition of the subjects
• Manufacturer,
• Personalisation Agent,
• Extended Inspection System,
• Country Verifying Certification Authority,
• Document Verifier
• Terminal
used in the following chapters is given in section Subjects.
7.1.2 Objects
All used objects are defined in section Glossary.
7.1.3 Security Attributes
Security Attribute Values Meaning
Terminal Authentication
Status
none (any
Terminal)
default role (i.e. without authorization after
start-up)
CVCA roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication (cf. [13]); Terminal is
authenticated as Country Verifying Certification
Authority after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (domestic) roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication (cf. [13]); Terminal is
authenticated as domestic Document Verifier
after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (foreign) roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication (cf. [13]); Terminal is
authenticated as foreign Document Verifier
after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
IS roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication (cf. [13]); Terminal is
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
authenticated as Extended Inspection System
after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
Terminal Authorization none
DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG4: (cf. [5])
DG3 (Fingerprint) Read access to DG3: (cf. [5])
DG3 (Fingerprint) /
DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf. [5])
Notes:
1. Security attribute Terminal Authentication Status is spelled differently in PP [1], e.g.
FDP_ACF.1/TRM spells it Terminal Authentication v.1.
2. Security attribute Terminal Authorization is spelled differently in PP [1], e.g. FDP_ACF.1/TRM
spells it Authorization of the Terminal.
3. These different spellings are corrected by refinements to read always Terminal
Authentication Status or Terminal Authorization.
7.1.4 Keys and Certificates
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used. Where PP [2] is more
specific than PP [1] name and data are taken from PP [2].
Keys and certificates taken from PP56 [1]
Key/Certificate Name Meaning
TOE intrinsic secret
cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material
by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
Country Verifying Certification
Authority Private Key
(SK.CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a
private key (SK.CVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier
Certificates.
Country Verifying Certification
Authority Public Key
(PK.CVCA)
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority
Public Key (PK.CVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the
Document Verifier Certificates. The PK.CVCA has the security
attribute Current Date as the most recent valid effective date of
the Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a
domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying Certification
Authority Certificate (C.CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be
a self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [13] and
Glossary). It contains
(i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public
Key (PK.CVCA) as authentication reference data,
(ii) the coded access control rights of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority,
(iii) the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate
Expiration Date as security attributes
Document Verifier Certificate
(C.DV)
The Document Verifier Certificate C.DV is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains
(i) the Document Verifier Public Key (PK.DV) as
authentication reference data
(ii) identification as domestic or foreign Document
Verifier, the coded access control rights of the
Document Verifier,
(iii) the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Expiration Date as security attributes.
Inspection System Certificate
(C.IS)
The Inspection System Certificate (C.IS) is issued by the
Document Verifier. It contains
(i) as authentication reference data the Inspection
System Public Key (PK.IS),
(ii) the coded access control rights of the Extended
Inspection System,
(iii) the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate
Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication Public Key
Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SK.ICC, PK.ICC) are used
for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to
RFC 2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO 11770-
3 [33].
Chip Authentication Public Key
(PK.ICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PK.ICC) is stored in the
EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE's logical
travel document and used by the inspection system for Chip
Authentication Version 1 of the travel document's chip. It is part
of the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
Chip Authentication Private
Key (SK.ICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SK.ICC) is used by the TOE
to authenticate itself as authentic travel document's chip. It is
part of the TSF data.
Chip Authentication Session
Keys (CA-K.MAC, CA-K.Enc)
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC computation key
agreed between the TOE and an Inspection System as result of
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
Keys and certificates taken from PP68 [2]
Country Signing Certification
Authority Key Pair and
Certificate
Country Signing Certification Authority of the travel document
Issuer signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (C.DS)
with the Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key
(SK.CSCA) and the signature will be verified by receiving terminal
with the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(PK.CSCA). The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA) to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means,
see [5], 5.5.1
Document Signer Key Pairs
and Certificates
The Document Signer Certificate C.DS is issued by the Country
Signing Certification Authority. It contains the Document Signer
Public Key (PK.DS) as authentication reference data. The
Document Signer acting under the policy of the CSCA signs the
Document Security Object (SO.D) of the travel document with
the Document Signer Private Key (SK.DS) and the signature will
be verified by a terminal as the Passive Authentication with the
Document Signer Public Key (PK.DS).
PACE Session Keys (PACE-
K.MAC, PACE-K.Enc)
Secure messaging AES keys for message authentication (CMAC-
mode) and for message encryption (CBC-mode) or 3DES Keys for
message authentication and message encryption (both CBC)
agreed between the TOE and a terminal as result of the PACE
Protocol, see [5].
PACE authentication
ephemeral key pair (ephem-
SK.PICC.PACE, ephem-
The ephemeral PACE Authentication Key Pair {ephem-
SK.PICC.PACE, ephem- PK.PICC-PACE } is used for Key Agreement
Protocol: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH; ECKA key
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
PK.PICC.PACE) agreement algorithm) according to TR-03111 [34], cf. [5].
Active Authentication Key Pair The Active Authentication Key Pair (KPr.AA, KPu.AA) are used for
Active Authentication Protocol according to [5] part 1 vol. 2
chapter "7.2.2 Inspection process flow" section "Active
Authentication (Optional)" using EC.
Active Authentication Public
Key (KPu.AA)
The Active Authentication Public Key (KPu.AA) is stored in the
EF.DG15 of the TOE's logical travel document and used by the
inspection system for Active Authentication of the travel
document's chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE
for the IT environment.
Active Authentication Private
Key (KPr.AA)
The Active Authentication Private Key (KPr.AA) is used by the
TOE to authenticate itself as authentic travel document's chip. It
is part of the TSF data.
Notes:
1. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as "domestic" in
the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State as the Country Verifying
Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document
Verifier as "foreign" in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the same
State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. From travel document's point of view
the domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing State or Organization.
2. With the optional Active Authentication a key pair is stored in the chip.
3. According to OE.AA_Key_Travel_Document the hash value of ACTIVE AUTHENTICATION
PUBLIC KEY INFO (cf. [5] part 1 vol.2 chapter NORMATIVE APPENDIX 4) is stored in the
Document Security Object (SO.D) for verifying the key using Passive Authentication.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
7.2 SFR Class FAU
7.2.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in the audit
records.
Application Note
The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the life cycle phase
‘manufacturing’. The IC manufacturer and the travel document manufacturer in the Manufacturer
role write the Initialisation and/or Pre-personalisation Data as TSF-data into the TOE. The audit
records are usually write-only-once data of the travel document (see FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS). Please note that there could also be such audit records which cannot be
read out, but directly used by the TOE.
7.3 SFR Class FCS
7.3.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for PACE
session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.2/DH fulfilled
by FCS_CKM.2/DH.
Justification: A Diffie-Hellman key agreement is used in order
to have no key distribution, therefore FCS_CKM.2 makes no
sense in this case.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH
compliant to [35]17
and specified cryptographic key sizes 256,
384, 512, 52118
that meet the following: [5]19
.
Application Note
The TOE generates a shared secret value K with the terminal during the PACE protocol, see [5] This
protocol may be based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic
based cryptographic algorithm, cf. [36]) or on the ECDH compliant to TR- 03111 [35] (i.e. the elliptic
curve cryptographic algorithm ECKA, cf. [5] and [35] for details). The shared secret value K is used
17
[selection: Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3, ECDH compliant to [35]]
18
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
19
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [5]]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
for deriving the AES or DES session keys for message encryption and message authentication (PACE-
K MAC, PACE-K Enc) according to [5] for the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.
Note: the PACE protocol defines three different “mapping” methods (see [5] chapt. 4.4: This SFR
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE covers “generic mapping” (see [5] chapt. 4.4.3.3.1) and “integrated mapping”
(see sect. 4.4.3.3.2) but not “chip authentication mapping” (see chapt. 4.4.3.3.3).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – Session keys, PACE and
CA session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method overwriting
with constant or random data20
that meets the following:
none21
Application Note
The TOE shall destroy the PACE session keys after detection of an error in a received command by
verification of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any session keys before starting
the communication with the terminal in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption AES /
TDES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES, TDES22
in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes
20
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
21
[assignment: list of standards]
22
[selection: AES, 3DES]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
112, 128, 192, 256 23
bit that meet the following: compliant to
[5].
Application Note
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive AES or 3DES for secure
messaging with encryption of transmitted data and encrypting the nonce in the first step of PACE.
The related session keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the PACE
protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KEnc).
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled
byFCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm CMAC (AES), Retail-MAC24
(TDES) and
cryptographic key sizes 112 (TDES), 128 (AES), 192 (AES), 256
(AES)25
bit that meet the following: compliant to [5].
Application Note
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with
message authentication code over transmitted data. The related session keys are agreed between
the TOE and the terminal as part of either the PACE protocol according to the
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KMAC). Note that in accordance with [5] the (two-key) Triple-DES
could be used in Retail mode for secure messaging.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meet PTG.3 according to AIS 31 [37]26
.
Application Note
This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers (random nonce) used for the
23
[selection: 112, 128, 192, 256]
24
[selection: CMAC, Retail-MAC]
25
[selection: 112, 128, 192, 256]
26
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
authentication protocol (PACE) as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE.
7.3.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for Chip
Authentication session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH27
and
specified cryptographic key sizes 256, 320, 384, 512, 52128
that
meet the following: ECDH protocol compliant to [35]29
.
Application Note
FCS_CKM.1/CA implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used for key
derivation by demanding compliance to [13].
Application Note The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1, see [13]. This protocol may be based on the Diffie- Hellman-
Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm, cf. [36]) or
on the ECDH compliant to TR-03111 (i.e. an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm) (cf. [35], for
details). The shared secret value is used to derive the Chip Authentication Session Keys used for
encryption and MAC computation for secure messaging (defined in Key Derivation Function [13]).
Application Note
The TOE shall implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive to derive the
keys for secure messaging from any shared secrets of the Authentication Mechanisms. The Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 may use SHA-1 (cf. [13]). The TOE may implement additional hash
functions SHA-224 and SHA-256 for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (cf. [13] for details).
Application Note
The TOE shall destroy any session keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4 from [2] after (i) detection
of an error in a received command by verification of the MAC and (ii) after successful run of the
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1. (iii) The TOE shall destroy the PACE Session Keys after
generation of a Chip Authentication Session Keys and changing the secure messaging to the Chip
Authentication Session Keys. (iv) The TOE shall clear the
memory area of any session keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a new
after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1. Concerning the Chip Authentication keys
FCS_CKM.4 is also fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA.
27
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
28
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
29
[selection: based on the Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to [36] and [13] , based on an
ECDH protocol compliant to [35] ]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption /
Decryption
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm TDES in CBC mode, AES in CBC mode30
and
cryptographic key sizes 112 (TDES), 128 (AES), 192 (AES), 256
(AES)31
that meet the following:
1. (CBC mode:) ISO/IEC 10116 [38].
2. (TDES:) ISO/IEC 18033-3 [39].
3. (AES:) FIPS PUB 197 [40]32
.
Application Note
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitives (e.g. Triple-DES and/or AES)
for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the
TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to the
FCS_CKM.1/CA.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by
travel document
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA33
and cryptographic key sizes 256, 384, 512,52134
that meet the
following: BSI TR-03111 [34]35
.
Application Note
The ST writer shall perform the missing operation of the assignments for the signature algorithms
key lengths and standards implemented by the TOE for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
(cf. [5]). The signature verification is used to verify the card verifiable certificates and the
authentication attempt of the terminal creating a digital signature for the TOE challenge
30
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
31
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
32
[assignment: list of standards]
33
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
34
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
35
[assignment: list of standards]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC Cryptographic operation – Signature generation for AA
with EC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_SGEN_EC The TSF shall perform digital signature generation36
in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA37
and cryptographic key sizes 256, 384, 512, 52138
that meet the
following: BSI TR-03111 [34]39
.
Application Note
1. SFR FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC is added to contents of PPs [1] and [2].
2. The signature generation is used to perform Active Authentication.
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm CMAC for AES, RETAIL-MAC TDES40
and cryptographic key sizes 112 (TDES), 128 (AES), 192 (AES),
256 (AES)41
that meet the following:
(AES): FIPS PUB 197 [40]42
(TDES): ISO/IEC 18033-3 [39].
(CMAC/RETAIL-MAC): ISO/IEC 9797-1 [41]
Application Note
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with
encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed
between the TSF by Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to the FCS_CKM.1/CA.
36
[assignment: list of standards]
37
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
38
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
39
[assignment: list of standards]
40
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
41
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
42
[assignment: list of standards]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication attempts of a terminal as Personalisation Agent by
means of the authentication mechanism.
7.3.3 Additional SFRs (not from PPs)
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair Cryptographic key generation – EC key pair for AA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/AA_EC_KeyPair
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm EC key
generation43
and specified cryptographic key sizes 256, 320,
384, 512, 52144
that meet the following: ANSI X9.62-2005 and
ISO/IEC 15946-1:200245
.
Application Note
1. FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair is added to contents of PPs [1] and [2].
2. With FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair the TOE is able to create an EC key pair for Active
Authentication.
FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair Cryptographic key generation – EC key pair for CA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_EC_KeyPair
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm EC key
generation46
and specified cryptographic key sizes 256, 320,
384, 512, 52147
that meet the following: ANSI X9.62-2005 and
ISO/IEC 15946-1:200248
.
Application Note
1. FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair is added to contents of PPs [1] and [2].
2. With FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair the TOE is able to create an EC key pair for Chip
Authentication.
43
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
44
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
45
[selection: based on the Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to [36] and [13] , based on an
ECDH protocol compliant to [35] ]
46
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
47
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
48
[selection: based on the Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to [36] and [13] , based on an
ECDH protocol compliant to [35] ]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
7.4 SFR Class FIA
7.4.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling – PACE authentication
using non-blocking authorisation data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled by
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when 1-1649
unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to authentication attempts using the
PACE password as shared password.
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met, the TSF shall
- activate authentication delay for following
authentication attempts50
, starting with a delay of 1
second and exponentially growing.
Application Note
The open assignment operation shall be performed according to a concrete implementation of
the TOE, whereby actions to be executed by the TOE may either be common for all data
concerned (PACE passwords, see [5]) or for an arbitrary subset of them or may also separately be
defined for each datum in question.
Since all non-blocking authorisation data (PACE passwords) being used as a shared secret within
the PACE protocol do not possess a sufficient entropy51
, the TOE shall not allow a quick
monitoring of its behaviour (e.g. due to a long reaction time) in order to make the first step of the
skimming attack52
requiring an attack potential beyond high, so that the threat T.Tracing can be
averted in the frame of the security policy of the current PP.
One of some opportunities for performing this operation might be ‘consecutively increase the
reaction time of the TOE to the next authentication attempt using PACE passwords’.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
49
[assignment: positive integer number]
50
[assignment: list of actions]
51
≥ 100 bits; a theoretical maximum of entropy which can be delivered by a character string is N*ld(C),
whereby N is the length of the string, C – the number of different characters which can be used within the
string.
52
guessing CAN or MRZ, see T.Skimming above
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the
PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE
terminal.
Application Note
The PACE protocol specified in [4] starts secure messaging used for all commands exchanged after
successful PACE authentication. The TOE checks each command by secure messaging in encrypt-
then-authenticate mode based on CMAC or Retail-MAC, whether it was sent by the successfully
authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute
any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore, the TOE re-authenticates
the terminal connected, if a secure messaging error occurred, and accepts only those commands
received from the initially authenticated terminal.
7.4.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [5],
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [13]
5. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [13]
6. to carry out the Active Authentication Protocol
according to [5]53
.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user
Application Note
User identified after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a terminal. Please note that
neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted revealable; i.e. it is either
the travel document holder itself or an authorised other person or device (Basic Inspection
System with PACE). Application Note PP56 In the life-cycle phase ‘Manufacturing’ the
Manufacturer is the only user role known to the TOE. The Manufacturer writes the Initialisation
Data and/or Pre- personalisation Data in the audit records of the IC. Please note that a
Personalisation Agent acts on behalf of the travel document Issuer under his and CSCA and DS
policies. Hence, they define authentication procedure(s) for Personalisation Agents. The TOE must
functionally support these authentication procedures being subject to evaluation within the
assurance components ALC_DEL.1 and AGD_PRE.1. The TOE assumes the user role
‘Personalisation Agent’, when a terminal proves the respective Terminal Authorisation Level as
defined by the related policy (policies).
53
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [5],
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to identify themselves by selection of the
authentication key
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [13]
6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [13]
7. to carry out the Active Authentication Protocol
according to [5]54
.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions
on behalf of that user.
Application Note
The user authenticated after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a terminal. Please note
that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted revealable; i.e. it is
either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other person or device (BIS-PACE). If
PACE was successfully performed, secure messaging is started using the derived session keys
(PACE-KMAC , PACE-KEnc ), cf. FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication of the Terminals by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. PACE Protocol according to [5]
2. Authentication Mechanism based on TDES and AES55
.
3. Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [13].
54
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
55
[selection: Triple-DES, AES or other approved algorithms ]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Application Note
The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly generated by
the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication
attempt. However, the authentication of Personalisation Agent may rely on other mechanisms
ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a diversifier.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide
1. PACE Protocol according to [5],
2. Passive Authentication according to [5],
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [5],
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES 56
5. Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [13],
6. Active Authentication according to [5]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity
according to the following rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE
accepts only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by
means of the PACE protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalisation Agent by the Authentication
Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key(s) 57
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1
the TOE accepts only received commands with correct
message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means
of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
4. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means
of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the
terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 and the secure messaging
established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1
5. none58
Application Note
The SFR FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE covers the definition in
PACE PP [2] and extends it by EAC aspects 4), 5), and 6). The SFR FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE in
56
[selection: Triple-DES, AES or other approved algorithms]
57
[selection: the Authentication Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key(s) ]
58
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [2] and extends it by EAC aspects 2), 3), 4)
and 5). These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the
TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being
sent by the Inspection System.
Application Note
The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip Authentication Protocol
specified in [5] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful
authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode
each command based on a corresponding MAC algorithm whether it was sent by the successfully
authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute
any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticates
the user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from the
previously authenticated user
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1
according to [13] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application Note: Due to the fact that there is a SFR added to this ST using AA for Authentication
Proof of Identity the SFR "FIA_API.1" of [1] is renamed to "FIA_API.1/CA".
Application Note This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1
specified in [13]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman
Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according
to [5]. The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging whether the travel document’s chip
was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private Key
corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Protocol
according to [5] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application Note: SFR FIA_API.1/AA is iterated from PP SFR FIA_API.1/CA ("FIA_API.1").
Application Note This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Active Authentication Mechanism
specified in [5]. The TOE computes a signature over a nonce received from the terminal, sends the
signature to the terminal and the terminal verifies the signature.
7.5 SFR Class FDP
7.5.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the
resource from59
the following objects:
1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related
communication session),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC-PACE (by
having generated a DH shared secret K according to
[5]),
3. none60
.
Application Note
The functional family FDP_RIP possesses such a general character, so that it is applicable not only
to user data (as assumed by the class FDP), but also to TSF-data; in this respect it is similar to the
functional family FPT_EMS. Applied to cryptographic keys, FDP_RIP.1 requires a certain quality
metric (‘ any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable’ ) for key’s
destruction in addition to FCS_CKM.4 that merely requires a fact of key destruction according to a
method/standard.
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to
59
[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]
60
[assignment: list of objects]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has
occurred.
7.5.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control – Terminal Access
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control: fulfilled
by FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of
the logical travel document.
Application Note
The SFR FIA_ACC.1.1 in this ST covers the definition in PACE PP [2] and extends it by data stored in
EF.SOD of the logical travel document. This extension does not conflict with the strict
conformance to PACE PP.
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control: fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation: not fulfilled, but
justified
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses
security attributes having been defined during the
personalisation and fixed over the whole life time of the TOE.
No management of these security attributes (i.e. SFR
FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Terminal,
b. BIS-PACE,
c. Extended Inspection System;
2. Objects:
a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16,
EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical travel document,
b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document,
c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document,
d. all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in
the travel document;
3. Security attributes:
a. PACE Authentication
b. Terminal Authentication v.1
c. Authorisation of the Terminal;
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
1. A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM according to [5] after a successful
PACE authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
1. based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules:
1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to
write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the
travel document.
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed
to read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on
the travel document.
3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System with the Read access to
DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate
holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read
the data objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System with the Read access to
DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data
objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not
allowed to read data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Application Note
The SFR FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM in this ST covers the definition in PACE PP [2] and extends it by
additional subjects and objects. The SFRs FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM and FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM in this ST
cover the definition in PACE PP [2]. The SFR FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM in this ST covers the definition in
PACE PP [2] and extends it by 3) to 6).These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance
to PACE PP.
Application Note
The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVC of the inspection system is
defined in [13]. The TOE verifies the certificate chain established by the Country Verifying
Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate (cf.
FMT_MTD.3). The Terminal Authorization is the intersection of the Certificate Holder
Authorization in the certificates of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the Document
Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain.
Application Note
Please note that the Document Security Object (SOD) stored in EF.SOD (see [6]) does not belong to
the user data, but to the TSF data. The Document Security Object can be read out by Inspection
Systems using PACE, see [5].
Application Note
FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the protection of the User Data transmitted from
the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message authentication codes
after successful Chip Authentication Version 1 to the Inspection System. The Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment, and the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 establish
different key sets to be used for secure messaging (each set of keys for the encryption and the
message authentication key).
7.6 SFR Class FTP
7.6.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted
channel for any data exchange between the TOE and the
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Terminal.
Application Note
The trusted IT product is the terminal. In FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE, the word “initiate” is changed to
‘enforce”, as the TOE is a passive device that can not initiate the communication. All the
communication are initiated by the Terminal, and the TOE enforce the trusted channel.
Application Note
The trusted channel is established after successful performing the PACE protocol
(FIA_UAU.1/PACE). If the PACE was successfully performed, secure messaging is immediately
started using the derived session keys (PACE-K MAC , PACE-K Enc ): this secure messaging enforces
preventing tracing while Passive Authentication and the required properties of operational
trusted channel; the cryptographic primitives being used for the secure messaging are as required
by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. The establishing phase of the PACE trusted
channel does not enable tracing due to the requirements FIA_AFL.1/PACE.
Application Note
Please note that the control on the user data stored in the TOE is addressed by FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
7.7 SFR Class FMT
7.7.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalisation,
3. Personalisation
4. Configuration.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing Initialisation and Pre-
personalisation Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data
and Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Reading and Using
Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialisation
Data and Pre-personalisation Data to the Personalisation
Agent.
Application Note
The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data and the Pre- personalisation Data
by (i) allowing writing these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of
the manufacturing phase. The Manufacturer may write the Initialisation Data (as required by
FAU_SAS.1) including, but being not limited to a unique identification of the IC being used to trace
the IC in the life cycle phases ‘manufacturing’ and ‘issuing’, but being not needed and may be
misused in the ‘operational use’. Therefore, read and use access to the Initialisation Data shall be
blocked in the ‘operational use’ by the Personalisation Agent, when he switches the TOE from the
life cycle phase ‘issuing’ to the life cycle phase ‘operational use’.
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data – Personalisation Agent
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled
by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Security
Object (SOD) to the Personalisation Agent.
Application Note
By writing SOD into the TOE, the Personalisation Agent confirms (on behalf of DS) the correctness
and genuineness of all the personalisation data related. This consists of user- and TSF- data
7.7.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalisation Agent,
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
3. Terminal,
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE.
5. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6. Document Verifier,
7. Domestic Extended Inspection System,
8. Foreign Extended Inspection System
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note
The SFR FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE in this ST covers the definition in PACE PP [2] and extends it by 5) to
8). This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
Application Note
The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF data to prevent
misuse of test features of the TOE over the life-cycle phases.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability: fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced:
Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks. and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities: fulfilled by FMT_LIM.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced:
Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow:
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed.
Application Note
The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit misleading
since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the respective
functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to
provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy.
Application Note
The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The
TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA
Certificate and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public
Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificate,
3. initial Current Date,
4. none
to Manufacturer, Personalization Agent61
.
Application Note
The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate and the initial Current Date is
needed for verification of the certificates and the calculation of the Terminal Authorization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
61
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
to Country Verifying Certification Authority
Application Note
The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates its asymmetric key pair and distributes the
public key by means of the Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf. [13]). The TOE updates its
internal trust-point if a valid Country Verifying CA Link- Certificates (cf. FMT_MTD.3) is provided
by the terminal (cf. [13]).
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
3. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
4. Document Verifier,
5. Domestic Extended Inspection System
Application Note
The authorized roles are identified in their certificate (cf. [13]) and authorized by validation of the
certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The authorized role of the terminal is part of the Certificate
Holder Authorization in the card verifiable certificate provided by the terminal for the
identification and the Terminal Authentication v.1 (cf. to [13]).
FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK Management of TSF data – CA and AA Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/ CA_AA_PK The TSF shall restrict the ability to create or load62
the Chip
Authentication Private Key and the Active Authentication
Private Key to Personalization Agent63
.
Application Note
Due to the fact that this SFR is refined with Active Authentication the SFR "FMT_MTD.1/CAPK" of
[1] is renamed to "FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK".
The verb "load" means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key and the Active
Authentication Private Key are generated securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE
memory.
The verb "create" means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key and Active Authentication
62
[selection: create, load ]
63
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Private Key is generated by the TOE itself.
This TOE is able to generate the Chip Authentication Private Key, see FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair.
This TOE is able to generate the Active Authentication Private Key, see
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. PACE passwords,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalisation Agent Keys
4. Active Authentication Private Key
to none
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 and the Access Control.
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the
Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the
expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not
before the Current Date of the TOE and the expiration date of the Document Verifier
Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Inspection System
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated
Extended Inspection System.
Application Note
The Terminal Authentication Version 1 is used for Extended Inspection
System as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Terminal
Authorization is used as TSF data for access control required by FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
7.8 SFR Class FPT
7.8.1 SFRs from PP BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur:
1. Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE
malfunction,
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1,
3. none.64
.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions:
 At reset / OS Startup: Integrity check of whole file
system
 On any use of TSF data and user data (e.g. use of a DG /
EF or key): Integrity check of used TSF and user data
 On any code execution: Integrity check of executed
code
65
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of the TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
64
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
65
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user,
at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Application Note
If the travel document’s chip uses state of the art smart card technology, it will run some self tests
at the request of an authorised user and some self tests automatically. E.g. a self test for the
verification of the integrity of stored TSF executable code required by FPT_TST.1.3 may be
executed during initial start-up by the ‘authorised user’ Manufacturer in the life cycle phase
‘Manufacturing’. Other self tests may automatically run to detect failures and to preserve the
secure state according to FPT_FLS.1 in the phase ‘operational use’, e.g. to check a calculation with
a private key by the reverse calculation with the corresponding public key as a countermeasure
against Differential Failure Analysis.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing
to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
Application Note
The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical manipulation and
physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can by no
means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these
attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, ‘automatic
response’ means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii)
countermeasures are provided at any time.
7.8.2 SFRs from PP BSI-PP-0056-V2-2012-132
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit variations in IC power consumption or
electromagnetic emissions or variations in command
execution time66
in excess of non-useful information67
enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE session keys (PACE-KMAC , PACE-KEnc ),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC-PACE,
4. Manufacturer Keys, PACE Chip Authentication Private
Keys and Modular Invert of Chip Authentication Key,
Active Authentication Private Key68
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
6. Chip Authentication Private Key and
66
[assignment: types of emissions]
67
[assignment: specified limits]
68
[assignment: list of types of user data]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
7. EF.DG3 and EF.DG4
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE session keys (PACE-KMAC , PACE-KEnc ),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC-PACE,
4. Manufacturer Keys, PACE Chip Authentication Private
Keys and Modular Invert of Chip Authentication Key,
Active Authentication Private Key69
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
6. Chip Authentication Private Key and
7. EF.DG3, EF.DG4
Application Note 56
The SFR FPT_EMS.1.1 in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [2] and extends it by EAC
aspects 1., 5. and 6. The SFR FPT_EMS.1.2 in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [2]
and extends it by EAC aspects 4) and 5). These extensions do not conflict with the strict
conformance to PACE PP.
7.9 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating
environment are those taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
augmented by taking the following components:
 ALC_DVS.2
 ATE_DPT.2
 AVA_VAN.5
 ALC_FLR.1
 ALC_CMS.5
 ALC_TAT.2
Application note: The TOE shall protect the assets against high attack potential. This includes
intermediate storage in the chip as well as secure channel communications established using the
PACE and / or Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (see also OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document).
7.10 Security Requirements Rationale
7.10.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
69
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
OT.Sens_Data_Conf.
OT.
Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.
AC_Pers
OT.
Data_Integrity
OT.
Data_Authenticity
OT.
Data_Confidentiality
OT.
Identification
OT.
Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.
Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Tracing
OT.
Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.
Prot_Malfunction
FAU_SAS.1 x x
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA x x x x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair x x x
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair x x x
FCS_CKM.4 x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC x x
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER x x
FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC x
FCS_RND.1 x x x x x
FIA_AFL.1/PACE x
FIA_UID.1/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.1/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.4/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.5/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.6/PACE x x x
FIA_UAU.6/EAC x x x x x
FIA_API.1/CA x
FIA_API.1/AA x
FDP_ACC.1/TRM x x x x
FDP_ACF.1/TRM x x x x
FDP_RIP.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1/TRM x x x
FDP_UIT.1/TRM x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x x x x
FMT_SMR.1/PACE x x x x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD x
FMT_MTD.1/DATE x
FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK x x x
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FMT_MTD.1/PA x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x x x x
FMT_MTD.3 x
FPT_EMS.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
FTP_ITC.1/PACE x x x x
The security objective OT.Identification "Identification of the TOE" addresses the storage of
Initialization and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby they also include the
IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE's chip. This will be ensured by TSF according to
FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization and
Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
requires the Personalization Agent to disable access to Initialization and Pre-personalization Data in
the life cycle phase 'operational use'. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the
functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical travel document"
addresses the access control of writing the logical travel document. The justification for the SFRs
FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises from the justification for
OT.Identification above with respect to the Pre-personalization Data. The write access to the logical
travel document data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM
and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document.
FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing S.OD and, in generally,
personalization data). The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and
the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization).
The SFRs FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to the Personalization Agent
Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to
SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE.
If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the Personalization Agent Keys the
TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA
(for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part
of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication).
If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the
authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the
integrity of the logical travel document stored on the travel document’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is addressed by FPT_PHP.3. Logical
manipulation of stored user data is addressed by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the
Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires
that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive
Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be
considered as trustworthy. The Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate themselves
according to FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data. FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management
functions.
Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a prerequisite for establishing this
trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted channel is established using PACE, Chip Authentication v.1 or Active
Authentication, and Terminal Authentication v.1. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session
keys (here: for KMAC ).
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical travel
document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires
the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure
messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the
generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed
according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The
SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims ensuring authenticity of the User- and TSF data
(after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminal-side and by an active
verification by the TOE itself. This objective is mainly achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or
Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here:
for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific
properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE
passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing
signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to
be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The SFR
FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1
and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims that the TOE always ensures confidentiality of
the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication resp. Chip Authentication , of
these data exchanged. This objective for the data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required
specific properties of the protocols used. This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by
FDP_UCT.1/TRM, FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip
and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for Kenc ). The SFR
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication
Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the
TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent
only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general support
for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the
functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” is
enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the
data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection
System being authorized by a valid certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER. The SFRs
FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and authentication of the inspection
systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before any
authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication
following the CA v.1 the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR
FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data
after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys),
and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The
session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or
read afterwards. To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public
key and certificate as well as the current date are written or updated by authorized identified role as
of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity” is
ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by FIA_API.1/CA proving the identity of
the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair is performed
using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 [13] requires additional TSF according
to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging). The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity” is
ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/AA proving the identity of the
TOE. The Active Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair is performed using a
TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The key pair is generated using FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair. The Active
Authentication Protocol requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC (for the
generation of the digital signatures).
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by
the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other
features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires
the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the travel document’s
chip against disclosure
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE tracing data by means
of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a
communication via the contactless interface of the TOE without a priori knowledge of the correct
values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ). This objective is achieved as follows:
i. while establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (non-blocking authorisation data)
– by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;
ii. for listening to PACE communication – FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is covered by
the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by
i. the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests
of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and
ii. the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating
conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
7.10.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual
support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All
dependencies between the chosen functional components are analysed, and non- dissolved
dependencies are appropriately explained.
The following Table shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/CA [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4 from
[2]
FCS_CKM.4 from [2] [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4 from
[2]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4 from
[2]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4 from
[2]
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4 from
[2]
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4 from
[2]
FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair,
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4 from
[2]
FIA_UID.1/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1/CA No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1/AA No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control,
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
justification 1 for non-satisfied
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
dependencies
FMT_SMR.1/PACE FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 from
[2]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 from
[2]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/DATE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 from
[2]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 from
[2]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/PA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 from
[2]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MTD.1 Fulfilled by
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI and
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies n.a.
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes which are
defined during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
No. 2: (i) Dependency "FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation" is not useful since all keys for
Terminal Authentication are generated outside of the TOE, see "A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection
Systems". (ii) Dependencies "FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes" and
"FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data with security attributes" are not necessary because all keys are
written using SFR FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI.
7.10.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not
require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable
in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently
assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security
specific engineering costs.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the travel
document’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the travel
document’s material.
The selection of the component ATE_DPT.2 provides a higher assurance than the pre-defined EAL4
package due to requiring the functional testing of SFR-enforcing modules.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil the security
objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The selection of the component ALC_FLR.1 provides basic handling of security flaws. This component
provides guidance procedures on how to handle security flaws (i.e.: tracking, documentation,
correction, status).
The selection of the component ALC_CMS.5 provides the highest available assurance level regarding
the management of configuration items. The configuration lists contains configuration items such as
the implementation representation, development tools and security flaws. This configuration items
play an important role in the production of a quality TOE version and are important to maintain in a
controlled manner.
The selection of the component ALC_TAT.2 provides a higher assurance than the pre-defined EAL4
package due to requiring to document the TOE development tools.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component ATE_DPT.2 has the following dependencies:
 ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
 ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
 ADV_FUN.1 Functional testing
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
• ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
• ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
• ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
• ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
• AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
• AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component ALC_FLR.1 has no dependencies.
The component ALC_CMS.5 has no dependencies.
The component ALC_TAT.2 has the following dependencies: ADV_IMP.1 which is met by the EAL4
assurance package.
7.10.4 Security Requirements - Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security
assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and internal
consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section Dependency Rationale Dependency Rationale for the security
functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between
all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional
components are analysed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
All subjects and objects addressed by more than one SFR are also treated in a consistent way: the
SFRs impacting them do not require any contradictory property and behaviour of these ‘shared’
items.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent
assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in section
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance requirements are mutually
supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency
appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not to
arise in sections Dependency Rationale and Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.
Furthermore, as also discussed in section Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen
assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements
and security functional requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between
the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
8 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
This TOE provides the following Security Services:
 Identification and Authentication
 Access Control
 Cryptographic OperationsData Confidentiality
 Data Integrity
 Protection
 Application Data and Key Management
8.1 TOE Security Services
8.1.1 Identification and Authentication
This service provides identification and authentication of the following user roles:
1. Manufacturer (IC or travel document),
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Terminal,
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE,
5. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6. Document Verifier,
7. Domestic Extended Inspection System
8. Foreign Extended Inspection System
according to FMT_SMR.1/PACE.
Note: a user acting in the role of Travel Document Manufacturer or Personalization Agent acts in the
role of the Administrator.
The TOE does not provide any security services or allows any actions by any subjects unless
identified and authenticated except (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE):
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [5],
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key,
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [13]
6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [13]
7. to carry out the Active Authentication Protocol according to [5]70
.
Chip Authentication
This service allows to prove identity (FIA_API.1/CA) and authenticate the TOE’s chip using the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 by using ECDH generated session keys (FCS_CKM.1/CA).
The TOE verifies that each command was sent by the Inspection System that was successfully
authenticated using the Chip Authentication Protocol by verifying the MAC (FIA_UAU.5/PACE
,FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC). In case an error occurs (FPT_FLS.1) or a MAC cannot be
verified the secure messaging session is aborted and the Inspection System must re-authenticate.
70
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Terminal Authentication
This service provides (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [13] (FIA_UAU.5/PACE).
This service allows the TOE to authenticate a Terminal by verifying a signature (FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER)
generated by the Terminal. On each new authentication attempt of the Terminal a new randomly
generated challenge (FCS_RND.1) by the TOE must be signed by the Terminal to prevent replay
attacks (FIA_UAU.4/PACE).
Active Authentication
This service allows to prove the TOE’s identity (FIA_API.1/AA) using the Active Authentication
Protocol according to [5] (FIA_UAU.5/PACE).
This services provides the ability to perform an authentication using the Active Authentication
Protocol with EC keys that
 are generated off-card by the Personalization Agent or Manufacturer
(FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK) during Life-Cycle phase 2 or 3 or
 are generated on the chip.
The TOE generates ECDSA based digital signatures (FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC) in the process of an
Active Authentication Protocol session.
Passive Authentication
This service provides the Passive Authentication according to [5] (FIA_UAU.5/PACE).
PACE Protocol Authentication
This service provides the PACE Protocol according to [5] (FIA_UAU.5/PACE).
On each new authentication attempt of the BIS-PACE a new randomly generated challenge
(FCS_RND.1) by the TOE must be signed by the BIS-PACE to prevent replay attacks
(FIA_UAU.4/PACE).
The TOE verifies that each command was sent by the Inspection System that was successfully
authenticated using the PACE Protocol by verifying the MAC (FIA_UAU.5/PACE ,FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC). In case an error occurs (FPT_FLS.1) or a MAC cannot be verified the secure
messaging session is aborted and the Inspection System must re-authenticate.
Symmetric Mutual Authentication
The TOE provides Device Authentication according to EN 419212-3 [42], Section 3.8 for
Authentication of the Personalization Agent (FIA_UAU.5/PACE).
8.1.2 Access Control
This service provides access control to protect data from unauthorized disclosure (FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM).
After life-cycle personalization only terminals that can be successfully authenticated and authorized
are allowed to read, write or modify data on the TOE (FDP_ACF.1/TRM).
Read Access
Only an Extended Inspection System that is authorized by the relative certificate holder und which
certificate and certificate chain can be successfully verified by the TOE can read iris or fingerprint
data (FDP_ACF.1/TRM).
Nobody can read intrinsic cryptographic keys that are stored on the TOE (FDP_ACF.1/TRM,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ).
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
This service only allows the Personalisation Agent to access the Initialisation Data and Pre-
personalisation Data for reading (FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
Write Access
The manufacturer in the role of the IC manufacturer writes the Initialisation Data (Keys to
authenticate and optionally to establish a secure channel) during Life-Cycle phase 2 to the audit
records (FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,)
The manufacturer in the role of the travel document manufacturer writes the Pre-Personalisation
Data during Life-Cycle phase 2. The Pre-Personalisation Data allows the Personalisation Agent to
authenticate to the TOE in Life Cycle phase 3 (FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA).
8.1.3 Cryptographic Operations
This service provides a true random number generator (FCS_RND.1) to allow secure authentication
using the PACE protocol according to [5].
This service provides signature verification (FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER) to allow terminal authentication
using Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (FIA_UID.1.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE):
8.1.4 Data Confidentiality
This service provides the Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [5] (FIA_UAU.5/PACE).
Secure Messaging
After successfully running the PACE protocol according to [5] this service provides an AES or TDES
encrypted (FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC) data stream between an authenticated entity and the TOE. The
PACE protocol uses sessions keys agreed upon by using ECDH (FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE).
After successfully running the Chip Authentication Protocol using EC keys
(FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair) or the Active Authentication Protocol using EC keys
(FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair) this service provides an AES or TDES encrypted (FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC)
data stream between an authenticated entity and the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol uses
sessions keys agreed upon by using ECDH (FCS_CKM.1/CA).
8.1.5 Data Integrity
Secure Messaging
This service provides protection from modification, deletion, insertion and replay of transmitted
data and detects such (FDP_UIT.1/TRM, FTP_ITC.1/PACE).
This service provides the Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [5] (FIA_UAU.5/PACE).
After successfully running the PACE protocol according to [5] this service provides an integrity
protected (FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC) data stream using CMAC or Retail-MAC between an
authenticated entity and the TOE. The PACE protocol uses sessions keys agreed upon by using ECDH
(FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE).
In case an error occurs during secure messaging communication, i.e. a command cannot be verified
(FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC) the session keys are destroyed (FCS_CKM.4).
After successfully running the Chip Authentication Protocol according to [13] this service provides an
integrity protected (FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC) data stream using CMAC or Retail-MAC between an
authenticated entity and the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol uses sessions keys agreed upon
by using ECDH (FCS_CKM.1/CA).
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
In case an error occurs during secure messaging communication, i.e. a command cannot be verified
(FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC) the session keys are destroyed (FCS_CKM.4).
After successfully running the Device Authentication protocol according to EN 419212-3 [42], Section
3.8 this service provides an integrity protected (FCS_COP.1/CA_MACFCS_COP.1/CA_MAC) data
stream using CMAC or Retail-MAC between the (pre-) personalisation agent and the TOE.
Integrity Self Test
This service runs file system integrity self-test after reset on OS start-up .
This service also ensures that sensitive data stored on the TOE, in particular TSF and user data or
keys used by the security functionality and any code are integrity protected. Data integrity is verified
on any data access (FPT_TST.1).
This service ensures furthermore that only executable code is stored on the TOE which integrity is
verified. The integrity of code is also verified during loading in life-cycle phase 1 and 2 (FPT_TST.1).
8.1.6 Protection
Hardware and Software (IC Security Embedded Software)
This service makes test features that are used in phases 1 – 3 unavailable in order to protect data to
be disclosed or manipulated by unauthorized users or to gain knowledge about the TOE to facilitate
attacks (FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2).
This service also ensures that the TOE always operates in a secure state (TOE reset or switching to
life-cycle TERMINATED) even if an attack or failure is detected or operating conditions are causing a
malfunction (FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3).
This service ensures that no variations in IC power consumption or electromagnetic emissions and
variations in command execution time are emitted by the TOE to allow an attacker to gain sensitive
data stored on the TOE that is used for identification, authentication and secure messaging purposes
or to corrupt the security functionality of the TOE (software: FPT_EMS.1, hardware: FDP_ITT.1 and
FPT_ITT.1).
Software (IC embedded software)
The service protects session key data and other ephemeral private keys by destroying it (FCS_CKM.4,
FDP_RIP.1)
 after closing a secure messaging session
 on detection of an error during command execution
If the TOE detects 3 consecutive unsuccessful authentication/verification attempts using the
 PACE protocol according to [5]
a delay of 1 second will be in place for following authentication attempts (FIA_AFL.1/PACE). The
delay increases exponentially with every further un-successful authentication attempt. Only after a
successful authentication the delay is re-set to its default value.
8.1.7 Application Data and Key Management
This service provides the ability to initialize, configure and to perform pre-personalisation and
personalisation of the TOE (FMT_SMF.1).
Only the manufacturer is allowed to write initialisation data and pre-personalisation data in life-cycle
phase 2 to the TOE (FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA).
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
This service restricts the ability to read initialisation data and pre-personalisation to the
personalisation agent (FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
This service allows the personalisation agent to write the document security object and restricts the
write access in consecutive life cycles (FMT_MTD.1/PA).
This service allows the Manufacturer in life-cycle phase 2 or the Personalisation Agent in life-cycle
phase 3 to write initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key, initial Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificate, initial Current Date to the TOE (FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI) and
restricts the write access in consecutive life cycles (FMT_MTD.1/PA).
This service allows the Personalisation Agent in life-cycle phase 3 to create or load the Chip
Authentication Private Key and Active Authentication Private Key to Personalization Agent
(FMT_MTD.1/CA_AA_PK) and restricts the write access in consecutive life cycles (FMT_MTD.1/PA).
This service restricts the ability to update the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate to the Country Verifying Certification Authority
(FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD).
This service restricts the ability to modify the Current date to Country Verifying Certification
Authority, Document Verifier and Domestic Extended Inspection System (FMT_MTD.1/DATE).
This service ensures that only secure values for the certificate chain are accepted (FMT_MTD.3).
8.2 Statement of Compatibility
This section shows the compatibility of this Composite ST and the Platform-ST as required by [43].
The Platform-ST is the security target of Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000005h H13 and
IFX_CCI_000008h H13 used by this TOE as platform.
8.2.1 Security Assurance Requirements
The Hardware-Platform Security Target provides
• EAL6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The Composite-ST requires:
• EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_CMS.5 and
ALC_TAT.2.
8.2.2 Assumptions
The following table list all assumptions of the hardware platform related to its operational
environment not relevant for this ST.
Assumptions of the HW
platform related to its
operational environment
inherited from [24]
Meaning Operational Environment of
this TOE
A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform n.a.
The following table list all relevant assumptions of the hardware platform related to its operational
environment which are fulfilled by the ST.
Assumptions of the HW
platform related to its
Meaning Operational Environment of
this TOE
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
operational environment
inherited from [24]
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging,
Finishing and Personalisation
OT.Identification
8.2.3 Security Objectives
The following table lists all security objectives of the hardware platform and mapped to the relevant
security objective of this ST.
Security
objectives of the
Platform-ST
OTs of the Composite-ST
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
O.Phys-
Manipulation
x
O.Phys-Probing x
O.Malfunction x x
O.Leak-Inherent x
O.Leak-Forced x x x x x
O.Abuse-Func x
O.Identification x
O.RND x x x x
O.Add-Functions x x x x x
The security objectives of the Platform-ST and the OTs of this Composite-ST are not contradictory
since they can be mapped.
The following security objective of platform cannot be mapped to OTs of this ST
• O.Mem-Access
since no OT of the Composite-ST needs the respective security functionality.
For the following OTs of the Composite-ST no security objectives of platform exists
• OT.Sens_Data_Conf
• OT.Tracing
• OT.AC_Pers
since no security objectives of the Platform-ST provides a functionality needed by this TOE.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
With the mapping of security objectives of platform and the security objectives of this ST all security
objectives are listed and therefore the security objectives of the Platform-ST are not contradictory to
those of this composite ST.
8.2.4 Security Objectives Environment
The Security Target of the Hardware Platform lists the following Security Objectives for the
operational environment:
 OE.Lim_Block_Loader
 OE.TOE_Auth
 OE.Loader_Usage secure
 OE.Process-Sec-IC
According to the “Note 8”, Page 53 of the Security Target these objectives only apply when the HW
platform comes with an activated Flash Loader.
This is especially the case for “Option b)” in Life Cycle Phase 1 (see Chapter 2.4.4), which means that
the Travel Document Manufacturer is enabled to download the Chip Embedded Software using the
Loader provided by the Chip Dedicated software.
In this situation the Travel Document Manufacturer still act’s as the “TOE Manufacturer” in the
sense of the Chip Hardware Certification and therefore the Objectives for the Operational
Environment as given in the Hardware Platform Security Target apply to him directly and therefore
don’t need to be re-stated in the Security Target at hand.
In the sense of ASE_COMP.1 these Objectives are rated as Ir.OE as they address the TOE
Manufacturer in the sense of the Chip Hardware Certification.
Note: The IC Embedded Software to be loaded does not provide Loader Functionality itself.
Objective for the
Operational Environment
in the HW platform ST
Meaning Classification Operational Environment of
this TOE
OE.Lim_Block_Loader Limitation of
capability and
blocking the Loader
Ir.OE n/a
OE.TOE_Auth Authentication to
external entities
Ir.OE n/a
OE.Loader_Usage secure communication
and usage of the
Loader
Ir.OE n/a
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during
composite product
manufacturing
Ir.OE n/a
8.2.5 Organizational Security Policies
The Platform-ST lists two organizational security policies:
• P.Process-TOE
• P.Add-Functions.
OSP P.Process-TOE of the platform is relevant since this organizational security policy is covered by
• OSP P.Manufact
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
of the Composite-ST.
OSP P.Add-Functions of the platform is relevant since this policy provides security functionality
needed by
• OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (ECDH)
• OT.Active_Auth_Proof (EC)
• OT.Data_Integrity (AES and TDES)
• OT.Data_Authenticity (AES and TDES)
The organizational security policies of the Platform-ST and the OTs of this Composite-ST are not
contradictory since they are not relevant or can be used directly by this TOE.
8.2.6 Threats
The following table provides a mapping of the threats of the Platform-ST to the threats of this ST.
Threats of the Platform-ST Threats of this ST
T.Phys-Tamper
T.Forgery
T.Malfunction
T.Information_Leak
age
T.Abuse-Func
T.Counterfeit
T.Skimming
T.Eavesdropping
T.Leak-Inherent x
T.Phys-Probing x x
T.Malfunction x x x
T.Phys-Manipulation x x
T.Leak-Forced x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.RND x x x
T.Mem-Access x x x
8.2.7 Security Functional Requirements
The relevant security requirements of the composite TOE can be mapped directly to the hardware’s
SFRs. None of them show any conflicts between each other. Platform SFRs that are not used by the
composite ST are not listed.
Platform SFR Meaning Category71
Supports TOE SFR
FRU_FLT.2 Limited Fault Tolerance RP_SFR-MECH FPT_TST.1
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of
Secure State
RP_SFR-MECH FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack RP_SFR-MECH FPT_PHP.3
FDP_ITT.1 Basic Internal Transfer
Protection
RP_SFR-MECH FPT_EMS.1
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow RP_SFR-MECH FPT_EMS.1
71
Either „IP_SFR“: irrelevant, „RP-SFR-SERV”: relevant in TSFI implementation, “RP_SFR-MECH”: relevant and
addressed in ARC
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Control
FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data
Transfer Protection
RP_SFR-MECH FPT_EMS.1
FCS_RNG.1 Quality Metric for Random
Numbers
RP-SFR-SERV FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair,
(EC Key
Pair generation for CA)
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair
(EC Key
Pair generation for AA)
FIA_UID.1/PACE for
- (2) PACE Protocol
- (5) Terminal
Authentication
Protocol v.1
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FPT_EMS.1 (blinding)
FCS_RND.1
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE Security Testing RP_SFR-MECH FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
FCS_CKM.1/EC Cryptographic key generation RP-SFR-SERV FCS_CKM.1/CA_EC_KeyPair,
FCS_CKM.1/AA_EC_KeyPair
FCS_COP.1/ECDH Cryptographic Support (ECDH) RP-SFR-SERV FCS_CKM.1/CA,
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA Cryptographic Support
(ECDSA)
RP-SFR-SERV FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_COP.1/AA_SGEN_EC
FCS_COP.1/DES Cryptographic Support (3DES) RP-SFR-SERV FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic Support (AES) RP-SFR-SERV FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FAU_SAS.1 Audit Storage RP-SFR-SERV FAU_SAS.1
FMT_LIM.1 Limited Capabilities RP_SFR-MECH FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2 Limited Availability RP_SFR-MECH FMT_LIM.2
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control RP_SFR-MECH FPT_FLS.1
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based
Access Control
RP_SFR-MECH FPT_FLS.1
FDP_SDI.1 Stored Data Integrity
Monitoring
RP_SFR-MECH FPT_PHP.3, not used by TSF
directly
FDP_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity
Monitoring and Action
RP_SFR-MECH FPT_PHP.3, not used by TSF
directly
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security
Attributes
RP_SFR-MECH FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_PHP.3
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization RP_SFR-MECH FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_PHP.3
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
RP_SFR-MECH FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
There is no conflict between the security problem definition, the security objectives and the security
requirements of the composite ST and the platform ST. All related details (operations on SFRs,
definition of security objectives, threats) can be found in both STs.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
9 Glossary
Term Definition
Accurate Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is
trusted by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal Certificates
with the correct certificate effective date, see [5].
Advanced Inspection
Procedure (with PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document and
a terminal as required by [4], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip Authentication
v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SO D and (iv) Terminal
Authentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-PACE.
Agreement This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [6] option by which means the travel
document’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity
and authenticity of the travel document’s chip as part of a genuine travel
document issued by a known State of Organisation.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document's chip
to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the
travel document’s chip were created by the issuing State or Organisation
Basic Access Control
(BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [6] by which means the travel
document’s chip proves and the inspection system protects their
communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic
Access Keys
Basic Inspection
System with PACE
protocol (BIS- PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and operated
by a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or Foreign
Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document presenter as the
travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric
data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric
data (DG2) of the travel document holder). The Basic Inspection System
with PACE is a PACE Terminal additionally supporting/applying the
Passive Authentication protocol and is authorised by the travel
document Issuer through the Document Verifier of receiving state to
read a subset of data stored on the travel document.
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the travel
document’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the
printed MRZ data for reading the logical travel document.
Biographic data
(biodata).
The personalised details of the travel document holder of the document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the
biographical data page of a travel document. [6]
Biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder
in the travel document’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional
biometric reference data.
Card Access Number
(CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the
data-page.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System
Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between,
and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the
highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means. [6]
Country Signing CA
Certificate (C CSCA )
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(KPuCSCA ) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the
inspection system
Country Signing
Certification Authority
(CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with
respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the
travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the
PKI for the travel documents and creates the Document Signer
Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA
Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic
means, see. [6], 5.5.1. The Country Signing Certification Authority
issuing certificates for Document Signers (cf. [6]) and the domestic CVCA
may be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification
Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used
for different roles, see [5]
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
(CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document
Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel
document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to these data). The
CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the terminals
using it and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI.
Updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in form of CVCA
Link-Certificates, see [5]. The Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA) issuing certificates for Document Signers (cf. [6]) and the
domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country
Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs
must be used for different roles, see [5].
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate
card verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate Card Verifiable Certificate according to [5].
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old
key.
Document Basic
Access Key Derivation
Algorithm
The [6] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm
on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the
second line of the printed MRZ data.
PACE passwords Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the
SHA-1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and
Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see [4],
Document Details
Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document
representing the document details like document type, issuing state,
document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The
document details data are less-sensitive data.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Document Security
Object (SOD )
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the
travel document’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (C
DS ). [6]
Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive
authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA
issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS ), see [5]and [6] This role is
usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Document Verifier
(DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service
Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority)
and managing terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by
a State’s border police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A
Document Verifier is therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by at
least the national CVCA to issue certificates for national terminals, see
[5]. There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting
under the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document
Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the respective foreign
CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate agreement between the
travel document Issuer und a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the travel
document Issuer’s privacy policy).
Eavesdropper A threat agent with high attack potential reading the communication
between the travel document’s chip and the inspection system to gain
the data on the travel document’s chip
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [6]
Travel document
(electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic
or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application:
ePassport.
ePassport application A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl.
biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this
application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a
machine readable travel document (MRTD). See [5].
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [6] by which means the travel
document’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems
authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls
the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data
during their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging.
Extended Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition
to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation to read the optional biometric reference data and supports
the terminals part of the Extended Access Control Authentication
Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes
to the biographical data or the portrait. [6]
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data
received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in
inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of
both eye-readable and machine readable data in all travel documents.
[6]
IC Dedicated Software Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the
IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery
procedures between different players. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life phases.
IC Dedicated Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to
test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Embedded Software Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer.
The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life phase and
embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the TOE.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control
the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the
delivery process to the travel document manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance
to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of
using that person’s document. [6]
Improperly
documented person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no
travel document or visa, if required. [6]
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (TOE life-
cycle, Phase 2, Step 3).
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification
as travel document’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an travel document presented to it by a
traveller (the travel document holder) and verifying its authenticity. [6]
Inspection system (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller and
verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel
document holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the
travel document’s chip have not been altered from that created by the
issuing State or Organisation
Issuing Organisation Organisation authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [6]
Issuing State The Country issuing the travel document. [6]
Logical Data Structure
(LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [6]. The capacity expansion technology
used is the travel document’s chip
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Logical travel
document
Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contact based/contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contact based/contactless readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel document
holder the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
EF.DG1), the digitized portraits (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of
finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and the other data
according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organisation which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read. [6]
Machine
readable zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document or
MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel
document, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading
using OCR methods. [6] The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable
secret that is derived from the machine readable zone and may be used
for PACE.
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [6]
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and
the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel
document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the
manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between
the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
Metadata of a CV
Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in
[5]. The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
Certificate Profile Identifier, Certificate Authority Reference, Certificate
Holder Reference, Certificate Holder Authorisation Template, Certificate
Effective Date, Certificate Expiration Date
ePassport application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system
on the IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes the file structure
implementing the LDS [6], the definition of the User Data, but does not
include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16,
EF.COM and EF.SOD) and the TSF Data including the definition the
authentication data but except the authentication data itself.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder
in the travel document’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or
(ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European
commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as
optional biometric reference data
Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object
and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment (PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [4],. The PACE
Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of the
communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected):
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether the communication partners
share the same value of a password π). Based on this authentication,
PACE also provides a secure communication, whereby confidentiality
and authenticity of data transferred within this communication channel
are maintained.
PACE Password A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Personalisation The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This
may also include the optional biometric data collected during the
“Enrolment” (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalisation Agent An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to
personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some
or all of the following activities: establishing the identity of the travel
document holder for the biographic data in the travel document,
enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [5], writing
the document details data, writing the initial TSF data, signing the
Document Security Object defined in [6] (in the role of DS). Please note
that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among several
institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document
Issuer. Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of
this role
Personalisation Data A set of data incl. individual-related data (biographic and biometric data)
of the travel document holder, dedicated document details data and
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-cycle phase
card issuing.
Personalisation Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalisation Agent.
Personalisation Agent
Key
Cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the Personalisation Agent
to prove his identity and to get access to the logical travel document and
(ii) by the travel document’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of
a terminal as Personalisation Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
Physical part of the
travel document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing
to present data including (but not limited to) biographical data, data of
the machine-readable zone, photographic image and other data
Pre-Personalisation Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the travel document Application (TOE life-cycle,
Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-personalisation
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
travel document Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalised travel document’s and/or to secure shipment within or
between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the
Personalisation Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalised
travel document’s chip
travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Receiving State The Country to which the traveller is applying for entry. [6]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip
according to ISO/IEC 14443 [15].
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [6]
Secure messaging in
encrypted/combined
mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [14]
Service Provider An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection
service which can be used by the travel document holder. Service
Provider uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical travel document or
parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and
a terminal as required by [4], namely (i) PACE or BAC and (ii) Passive
Authentication with SO D . SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and
BIS-BAC.
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either
through the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system
verifying correspondence between the password stored in the travel
document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel
document presenter. In this ST the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any
terminal being authenticated by the TOE. Terminal may implement the
terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and thus authenticate itself to the
travel document using a shared password (CAN or MRZ).
Terminal
Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the
Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and
Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the
Current Date.
Terminal
Authorisation Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the
Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current
Date.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the
travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document
holder) recognising the travel document.
Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read; see [6] (there
“Machine readable travel document”).
Travel Document
Holder
The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing State or
Organisation personalised the travel document
Travel document’s
Chip
A contact based/contactless integrated circuit chip complying with
ISO/IEC 14443 [15] and programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO, [6], sec III.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
Travel document’s
Chip Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a travel document’s chip and not being
developed by the IC Designer. The travel document’s chip Embedded
Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the travel
document’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Traveller Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and
claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the
TOE (CC part 1 [1]).
Unpersonalised travel
document
The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding only
Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to the
Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of
the TSF (CC part 1 [1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be
operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the
TSF places no special meaning (CC part 2 [2]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being
claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s template. [6]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
10 Acronyms
Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CA Chip Authentication
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
EAC Extended Access Control
EF Elementary File
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
MF Master File
MRZ Machine readable zone
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP Personalisation Terminal
RF Radio Frequency
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)
11 Bibliography
[1] BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012, Common Criteria Protection Profile / Machine
ReadableTravelDocumentwith ’ICAOApplication’, Extended Access Control with PACE, BSI,
Version 1.3.2, 2012-12-05..
[2] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01, Version 1.01, 22nd
July 2014.
[3] REGULATION (EC) No 444/2009 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL,
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and
biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, 28 May 2009..
[4] REGULATION (EU) 2017/1954 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL,
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence
permits for third-country nationals, 25 October 2017..
[5] International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents –
Part 11: Security Mechanisms for eMRTDs", seventh edition, 2015.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
[6] ISO/IEC 7816-3 Identification cards - Integrated circuit - Cards with contacts - Electrical interface
and transmission protocols, Third edition 2006-11-01.
[7] ISO/IEC 7816-4 "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 4: Organization, security and
commands for interchange", third edition 2013-04-15.
[8] ISO/IEC 7816-8 "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 8: Commands and
mechanisms for security operations", third edition 2016-11-01.
[9] ISO/IEC 7816-9 "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 9: Commands for card
management", 2017, third edition 2017-12.
[10] ISO/IEC 14443-1:2018 Cards and security devices for personal identification - Contactless
proximity objects - Part 1: Physical characteristics.
[11] ISO/IEC 14443-2:2016, Identification cards - Contactless integrated circuit, cards - Proximity
cards - Part 2: Radio frequency power and signal interface.
[12] ISO/IEC 14443-3:2018, Cards and security devices for personal identification - Contactless
proximity objects - Part 3: Initialization and anticollision.
[13] Technical Guideline TR-03110 Part 1-4, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents and eIDAS token.
[14] Anwendungsschnittstelle für sichere Elemente zur elektronischen Identifikation, Authentisierung
und für vertrauenswürdige Dienste.
[15] Infineon, Common Criteria Public Security Target, EAL6 augmented / EAL6+,
IFX_CCI_000003h,000005h, 000008h, 00000Ch, 000013h, 000014h,000015h, 00001Ch,
00001Dh, 000021h, 000022h H13.
[16] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0, BSI-CC-PP-
0084-2014..
[17] BSI, "Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021," 2021.
[18] International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents,
Version 1.00, November 2010.
[19] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009.
[20] Security Target - ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) BAC configuration.
[21] ISO/IEC 18013-1:2018 Information technology — Personal identification — ISO-compliant
driving licence — Part 1: Physical characteristics and basic data set.
[22] ISO/IEC TR 19446:2015 Differences between the driving licences based on the ISO/IEC 18013
series and the European Union specifications.
[23] COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 383/2012 aying down technical requirements with regard to
driving licences which include a storage medium, of 4 May 2012.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
[24] Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered under
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, dated 2014-01-13.
[25] Austria Card, Preparation and Operational Manual - ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD, BAC and PACE/EAC
configuration, Version 1.04, Date 2021-11-29.
[26] Austria Card, ACOS-ID User Manual, Version 2.12, Date 19.05.2021.
[27] Internal Operation Manual - ACOS-IDv2.0, Version 1.2, 2021-07-19.
[28] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[29] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Components; CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1, Revision 5, July 2017.
[30] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Components; CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1, Revision 5, July 2017.
[31] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[32] Common Criteria Public Security Target, IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ch, IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch,
IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h.
[33] ISO/IEC 11770-3: Information technology — Security techniques — Key management -- Part 3:
Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2008.
[34] Technical Guideline BSI TR-03111, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.10, 2018.
[35] BSI-TR-03111, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical Guideline TR-
03111, Version 1.11, 17.04.2009.
[36] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version
1.4, Revised, November 1, 1993.
[37] BSI, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und
Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 15.05.2013,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[38] ISO/IEC 10116:2006 – Information technology – Security techniques – Modes of operation for an
n-bit block cipher. 2006..
[39] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 – Information technology – Security techniques – Encryption
Algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers. 2010..
[40] FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), NIST 2001.
[41] ISO/IEC, Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs) -
Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 2011.
[42] EN 419212-3 Application Interface for Secure Elements for Electronic Identification,
Authentication and Trusted Services - Part-3.
Security Target ACOS-IDv2.0 eMRTD (B) EAC/PACE Configuration
Public
[43] BSI, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS36: Kompositionsevaluierung,
Version 4, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[44] N. S. G. G. S. Infineon Technologies AG, Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages, version 1.0, 2014.
[45] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods and Techniques, National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD
20899-8900, December 2001.
[46] S. T. -. A.-I. e. v. BAC.
[47] ISO/IEC 14443-4:2018, Cards and security devices for personal identification - Contactless
proximity objects - Part 4: Transmission protocol.