KECS-CR-19-29
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC and AA on
S3D350A Family
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-0936-2019
2019. 6. 18.
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2019.06.18 -
Certification report for KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 -
BAC and AA on S3D350A Family
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for KCOS e-Passport Version
5.0 – BAC and AA on S3D350A Family of KOMSCO.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................9
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 11
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................13
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................13
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................14
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................15
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................16
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................16
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................18
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................18
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................20
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................20
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................21
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................24
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL4+ evaluation of KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC and AA on
S3D350A Family with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its
soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (IC
chip) and embedded software (IC chip operating system(COS) and the application of
machine readable travel documents(MRTD application)) including Logical Data
Structure (LDS) in accordance with the ICAO documents [5]. The TOE provides Basic
Access Control (BAC) and Active Authentication (AA) defined in the ICAO’s Doc9303
Machine Readable Travel Documents [5] and the BSI’s TR-03110 Advanced Security
Mechanisms Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token [6].
Supplemental Access Control (SAC) and Extended Access Control (EAC) are also
supported by the product, but SAC and EAC are not included in the scope of this TOE
and separately evaluated and certified at the same time in consideration of different
level of assurance which is required by different PPs which are claimed conformance
by each TOE.
The TOE is composed of the following components:
 IC chip: S3D350A/S3D300A/S3D264A/S3D232A revision 2 provided by
Samsung Electronics, see ANSSI-CC-2019/01, and
 Embedded software: KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC and AA provided by
KOMSCO.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on June 12, 2019. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [7] and the Security Target (ST)
[8][9].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application Basic Access Control Version 1.10 (“BAC PP”
hereinafter) [10]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only
upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented by ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
Certification Report Page 6
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3. Therefore the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)
are based upon both functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined
component in the Extended Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE
satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2
extended.
The TOE implements the following TOE Security Features. For more details refer to the
ST [8][9].
TOE Security Features Brief Summary
SF.PAC_AUTH Personalization Agent Authentication
SF.BAC_AUTH BAC Authentication
SF.ACTIVE_AUTH AA
SF.SEC_MESSAGE Secure Messaging
SF.ACC_CONTROL Access Control for Personalization Agent and IS,
Personalization and Management
SF.RELIABILITY TSF testing, protection against tempering and observation,
preservation of secure state, residual information protection
SF.IC IC chip security functionality
[Table 1] TOE Security Functionalities
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report Page 7
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Identifier Release Delivery Form /
Method
TOE KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC
and AA on S3D350A Family
- K5.0.01.SS.D35A.02(S3D350A)
- K5.0.01.SS.D30A.02(S3D300A)
- K5.0.01.SS.D26A.02(S3D264A)
- K5.0.01.SS.D23A.02(S3D232A)
Rev 1 IC Chip Module
(Note: The
Secure Boot
loader & System
API Code is
contained in
ROM and other
SW is contained
in FLASH
memory of the IC
chip.) /
By a person
(HW), and PGP
mail (SW)
IC Chip
(HW)
S3D350A/S3D300A/S3D264A/S3D232A Revision 2
IC
Dedicated
SW
Secure RSA/ECC/SHA Library V2.01
DTRNG FRO Library V2.0
Secure Boot loader & System API Code V0.7
COS and
MRTD
Application
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC
and AA
- KCOS50_350A.hex-1.3
- KCOS50_300A.hex-1.3
- KCOS50_264A.hex-1.3
- KCOS50_232A.hex-1.3
Rev 1
Document Operational User Guidance: EPS-05-
QT-OPE-BAC-1.0
V1.0 Softcopy or
Hardcopy /
By PGP mail or a
person
Preparative Procedures Guidance: EPS-
05-QT-PRE-BAC-1.0
V1.0
[Table 2] TOE identification
The TOE is finalized at step 3 of the Phase 2 (Manufacturing) in accordance with the
PPs [10]. TOE is Composite product that should be considered in the Composite
Product life cycle. Composite product integrator performs Composite product
integration (FLASH code download into IC chip), preparation and shipping to the
personalization for the Composite product (Composite Product Integration). After
Composite Product Integration, the ePassport manufacturer (i.e., inlay and e-Cover
Certification Report Page 8
manufacturer) embeds the TOE into the passport booklet. Then, the Personalization
Agency performs personalization and testing stage where the User Data/TSF Data is
loaded into the IC’s memory.
The Personalization Agency can only access the TOE using the securely delivered
personalization key set (through PGP mail or directly from the SW developer to the
Personalization Agency).
The certified IC chip which is a component of the TOE provides Contact interfaces and
Contactless interfaces, the Contact interfaces are not used by the TOE. Thus, the Type
A Contactless interface is used by the TOE. For details on the IC chips, the IC
dedicated software and the crypto libraries, see the documentation under ANSSI-CC-
2019/01 [11].
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(24 August 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(12 September 2017)
TOE KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 – BAC and AA on S3D350A
Family
- K5.0.01.SS.D35A.02(S3D350A)
- K5.0.01.SS.D30A.02(S3D300A)
- K5.0.01.SS.D26A.02(S3D264A)
- K5.0.01.SS.D23A.02(S3D232A)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Common Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004,
April 2017
EAL EAL4+
(augmented by ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3)
Developer KOMSCO
Sponsor KOMSCO
Certification Report Page 9
Evaluation Facility Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
June 12, 2019
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [8][9] for the TOE claims strict conformance to the BAC PP [10], and the TOE
complies security policies defined in the PP [10] by security objectives and security
requirements based on the ICAO document [5] and BSI specification [6]. Thus the TOE
provides security features BAC and AA.
Additionally, the TOE provides security features for Personalization Agent to protect
initialization data and application data (during pre-personalization and personalization
phase):
 Personalization Agent authentication, ensures only authorized entity can
access to the TOE during pre-personalization and personalization phase,
 Secure messaging, ensures transmitted data to be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and modification during pre-personalization and
personalization phase.
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chip, thus the
TOE utilizes and therefore provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as security sensors/detectors, life time detector, dedicated hardware
mechanisms against side-channel attacks, secure DES and AES symmetric
cryptography support, secure TORNADO-T coprocessor for the support of RSA and
ECC cryptographic operations, and a hardware Digital True Random Number
Generator (DTRNG FRO) that meets PTG.2 class of BSI-AIS31 (German scheme) and
some of ANSSI RGS requirements (French Scheme). For more details refer to the
Security Target Lite for the IC chip [12].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions related to the security aspects of the operational environment in
which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used are described in the ST [8][9] (for
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the detailed and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [8][9], chapter 3.1):
Furthermore, some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not
covered by the TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment:
Examination of the physical part of the MRTD, MRTD holder Obligations, Issuing of the
MRTD, Terminal operating, etc. Details can be found in the ST [8][9], chapter 3.2, 3.3
and 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 1] show the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified contactless IC chip and the embedded software (i.e.,
COS and MRTD application).
[Figure 1] Scope of the TOE
 IC chip provides security features such as security sensors/detectors, MPU
(Memory Protection Unit), secure DES and AES symmetric cryptography
support, secure coprocessor TONADO-T for RSA and ECC cryptographic
support, and a Digital True Random Number Generator (DTRNG).
 COS, which processes commands and manages files in accordance with
ISO/IEC 7816-4, 8, and 9 [20], executes MRTD application and provides
functions for management of application data. The COS is contained in FLASH.
 Application provides MRTD application (BAC and AA in accordance with the
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ICAO document [5]). It also provides additional security mechanisms for
Personalization Agent such as authentication and personalization of MRTD.
The Application is contained in FLASH.
 Application Data is consisting of User Data and TSF Data. The Application
Data is contained in FLASH.
For the detailed description is referred to the ST [8][9].
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC and AA on
S3D350A Family Operational User Guidance
V1.0(EPS-05-QT-OPE-BAC-1.0) Inspection
V1.0 May 27, 2019
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC and AA on
S3D350A Family Preparative Procedures Guidance
V1.0(EPS-05-QT-PRE-BAC-1.0)
V1.0 May 27, 2019
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The TOE is composite product and the developer took a testing approach based on the
components of the TOE including the platform, COS, and the MRTD application.
Tests for the TOE are:
 Standard and Security Mechanisms Test: Layer 6~7 MRTD Application
Protocol & Data Test (Security and Command Test, Logical Data Structure
Tests, etc.), which tests MRTD application according to Standard Test
Specifications (the ICAO Technical Report RF Protocol and Application Test
Standard, BSI TR-03105, etc.),
 Operational Mode Test: Additional features test which are not defined in the
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ICAO document [5], BSI specification [6] such as pre-personalization,
personalization and inspection, Positive and Negative Test for APDUs in each
TOE life cycle(5 phases), life cycle state change, residual information removal,
etc., and
 Other Test: Layer 3~4 RF Protocol Activation and Transmission Test (anti-
collision test, etc.).
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as
described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and modules
(including their interfaces), and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests, and conducted independent testing
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are
identical to the developer’s tests. The tests cover preparative procedures in
accordance with the guidance. Some tests were performed by design and source code
analysis to verify fulfillment of the requirements of the underlying platform to the COS
and MRTD Application. The implementation of the requirements of the platform’s ETR
and guidance as well as of the MRTD security mechanisms was verified by the
evaluators.
Also, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised by
the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. These
test cases cover testing APDU commands, bypass, fault injection, and so on. No
exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential
were found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [7].
Certification Report Page 13
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC and AA on S3D350A Family. The TOE
is composite product consisting of the following components:
 IC chip: S3D350A/S3D300A/S3D264A/S3D232A revision 2 provided by
Samsung Electronics, see ANSSI-CC-2019/01, and
 Embedded software: KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 - BAC and AA provided by
KOMSCO.
The TOE is identified by the name, version and release number. The TOE identification
information is provided by the command-response APDU as follows:
 Command APDU : 80FB000113
 Part of Response APDU : D35A 4250 4B53 9114 50 01 02 9000 or D30A 4250
4B53 9114 50 01 02 9000 or D26A 4250 4B53 9114 50 01 02 9000 or D23A
4250 4B53 9114 50 01 02 9000
 D35A : IC chip identifier (S3D350A : D35A, S3D300A : D30A, S3D264A :
D26A, S3D232A : D23A)
 4250 : IC Manufacturer (Samsung)
 4B53 : OS ID (KCOS e-Passport)
 9114 : OS Release Data (YDDD, 2019. 4. 24)
 50 : TOE Version (Version 5.0)
 01 : OS Release Level (Rev 1)
 02 : IC Chip Version (Revision 2)
 9000 : Response APDU Status Word
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 4] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [7] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2], and supporting
documents for the Smartcard and similar device [13], [14], [15], [16], [17] and [18]. Also
Certification Report Page 14
the evaluation facility utilized German scheme’s Evaluation Methodology for CC
Assurance Class for EAL5+ and EAL6 [22] under confirmation of the CB.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL4 augmented by ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
ST of the IC chip in accordance with the supporting document Composite Product
Evaluation [13].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
Certification Report Page 15
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools that yield consistent and
predictable results, and implementation standards have been applied. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_TAT.2.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, development tools and related
information, and the evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in
accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.5.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Additionally,
sufficiency of the measures as applied is intended be justified. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator in accordance with the
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [13].
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
Certification Report Page 16
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users whose incorrect actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their
own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
modules and enough information about the SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.4.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.5.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
The implementation representation is sufficient to satisfy the functional requirements of
the ST and is a correct realisation of the low-level design. Therefore the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_IMP.1.
The TSF internal is well-structured such that the likelihood of flaws is reduced and that
maintenance can be more readily performed without the introduction of flaws.
Certification Report Page 17
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_INT.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product in accordance with
supporting documents Composite Product Evaluation [13] and ADV_ARC Evaluation
[17][18].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description), and TSF internals description (which describes evidence of the structure
of the design and implementation of the TSF). In addition, there is a security
architecture description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to
explain how its security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design
and the security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST in accordance with the
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [13].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
Certification Report Page 18
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential in the
operational environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
AVA_VAN.3.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment in accordance with the
supporting documents Composite Product Evaluation [13] and other related supporting
documents [14][15][16].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don’t allow attackers possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential to
violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 19
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2 ALC_TAT.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2.2E PASS
ALC_CMS.5 ALC_CMS.5.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.4 ADV_TDS.4.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.4.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_FSP.5.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2 ADV_INT.2.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2.2E PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.3 ATE_DPT.3.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.3 AVA_VAN.3.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.3.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.3.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.3.4E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
Certification Report Page 20
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The documents listed in this report chapter 6, contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security recommendations have to be
considered. All aspects of Assumptions, Threats and Organizational Security
Policies in the ST [8][9] not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the
operational environment of the TOE.
 As the TOE supports S3D350A/S3D300A/S3D264A/S3D232A as the IC chip
platform, it is recommended to refer to the user’s manual provided along with
the TOE and check the identification information of the TOE.
 When secure messaging is not applied during personalization phase according
to the policy of the Personalization Agent, it is strongly recommended that the
physical, procedural and personal security measures are in place in order to
ensure confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data during
personalization phase.
 It has to be ensured that MRZ data which are used to derive BAC
authentication keys provides sufficient entropy to withstand related attacks.
 The TOE supports both SAC and BAC to ensure global interoperability. Thus,
the Inspection System should use SAC instead of BAC.
 The BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential. If
nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip
Authentication before getting access to data (except EF.DG14), as this
mechanism is resistant to high potential attacks.
 When accepting the TOE, it is recommended that the TOE user shall verify the
integrity of the Flash code and data in accordance with the documents (Refer
to chapter 6.) provided along with the TOE.
11. Security Target
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 – BAC and AA on S3D350A Family Security Target V1.1,
May 13, 2019 [8] is included in this report by reference. For the purpose of publication,
Certification Report Page 21
it is provided as sanitized version [9] according to the CCRA supporting document ST
sanitising for publication [19].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
CC Common Criteria
DG Data Group
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IS Inspection System
BIS BAC/SAC supporting Inspection System
EIS EAC supporting Inspection System
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
AA
(Active Authentication)
The security mechanism with which the IC chip
demonstrates its genuine to the IS by signing random
number transmitted from the IS and the IS verifies
genuine of the IC chip through verification with the
signed values
Application Protocol
Data Unit (APDU)
Standard communication messaging protocol between a
card accepting device and a smart card. The structure of
the APDU is defined by ISO/IEC 7816-4
BAC
(Basic Access Control)
The security mechanism that implements the symmetric
key‐based entity authentication protocol for mutual
authentication of the MRTD chip and the IS (BIS) and
the symmetric key‐based key distribution protocol to
generate the session keys necessary in establishing the
Certification Report Page 22
secure messaging for the MRTD chip and the IS
DS (Document Signer)
Certificate
The certificate of the Personalization agent signed with
the digital signature generation key of the PA‐PKI root
CA used by the IS to verify the SOD of the PA security
mechanism
EAC (Extended Access
Control)
The security mechanisms consisted with the EAC‐CA for
chip authentication and the EAC‐TA for the IS
authentication in order to enable only the EAC
supporting Inspection System (EIS) to read the biometric
data of the ePassport holder for access control to the
biometric data of the ePassport holder stored in the
MRTD chip
EAC‐CA
(EAC‐chip Authentication)
The security mechanism to implement the DH/ECDH key
distribution protocol to enable the MRTD chip
authentication by the EIS through key checking for the
EAC chip authentication public key and private key of
the MRTD chip and temporary public key and private key
of the EIS
EAC‐TA
(EAC‐terminal
Authentication)
The security mechanism that the EIS transmits values
digital signature with the digital signature generation key
of its own to the temporary public key used in the
EAC‐CA and the MRTD chip by using the IS certificate,
verifies the digital signature. This security mechanism
implements challenge‐response authentication protocol
based on digital signature through which the MRTD chip
authenticates the EIS.
ePassport The passport embedded the contactless IC chip in which
identity and other data of the ePassport holder stored in
accordance with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Standard
Organization (ISO)
IS
(Inspection System)
As an information system that implements optical MRZ
reading function and the security mechanisms (PA, BAC,
SAC, EAC and AA, etc.) to support the MRTD
inspection, the IS consists with a terminal that
establishes the RF communication with the IC chip and
Certification Report Page 23
the system that transmits commands to the IC chip
through this terminal and processes responses for the
commands
LDS
(Logical Data Structure)
Logical data structure defined in the ICAO document in
order to store the user data in the MRTD chip
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document, e.g. passport, visa
or official document of identity accepted for travel
purposes
MRTD Application Program for loaded in the MRTD chip that is
programmed by the LDS of the ICAO document and
provides security mechanisms of BAC, SAC, PA and
EAC, etc.
MRTD Chip The contactless IC chip that includes the MRTD
application and the IC chip operating system necessary
in operation of the MRTD application and that supports
communications protocol by ISO/IEC 14443
PA
(Passive Authentication)
The security mechanism to demonstrate that identity
data recorded in the MRTD has not been forgery and
corruption as the IS with the DS certificate verifies the
digital signature in the SOD and hash value of user data
in accordance with read‐right of the MRTD access
control policy
Personalization Agent The agent receives the ePassport identity data from the
Reception organization and generates the SOD by
digital signature on the data. After recording them in the
IC chip, the personalization agent generates TSF data
and stores it in the secure memory of the IC chip. The
agent also operates PA‐PKI and/ or EAC‐PKI
SAC
(Supplemental Access
Control)
The security mechanism is supplementary to BAC. The
SAC performs mutual authentication for the MRTD chip
and the IS (BIS) to access control of user data of the
MRTD and establishes the secure messaging for the
MRTD chip and the IS
SOD
(Document Security Object)
The SOD refers to the ePassport user data recorded in
the Personalization phase by the Personalization agent
that is signed by the Personalization agent with the
Certification Report Page 24
digital signature generation key
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 24, 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (September 12, 2017)
[5] Doc9303 Machine Readable Travel Documents Seventh Edition, International
Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO), 2015
[6] Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Version2.20, Bundesamtfür
Sicherheitinder Informationstechnik(BSI), February 2015
[7] TTA-CCE-18-004 KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 – BAC and AA on S3D350A
Family Evaluation Technical Report V1.3, June 12, 2019
[8] KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 – BAC and AA on S3D350A Family Security Target
V1.1, May 13, 2019 (Confidential Version)
[9] KCOS e-Passport Version 5.0 – BAC and AA on S3D350A Family Security Target
Lite V1.0, June 10, 2019 (Sanitized Version)
[10] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application” Basic Access Control V1.10, BSI-CC-PP-0055, March 2009
[11] Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2019/01 S3D350A/S3D300A/S3D264A/S3D232A
/S3D200A/S3K350A/S3K300A 32-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card with
optional AT1 Secure Libraries including specific IC Dedicated software, January
18, 2019, ANSSI
[12] Security Target Lite of S3D350A/S3D300A/S3D264A/S3D232A/S3D200A
/S3K350A/S3K300A 32-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card with optional AT1
Secure Libraries including specific IC Dedicated software Version 4.1, October
25, 2018
[13] Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices Version 1.5.1,
Certification Report Page 25
JIL, May 2018
[14] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards Version 2.9, JIL, January, 2013
[15] The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 3.0, JIL, February 2009
[16] Minimum ITSEF Requirements for Security Evaluation of Smart cards and similar
devices Version 2.0, JIL, January 2017
[17] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices, Version 2.0, JIL, January 2012
[18] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices - Appendix 1, Version 2.0, JIL, January 2012
[19] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[20] ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts
[21] ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards – Contactless ICCs - Proximity cards
[22] Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 34, Version 3, BSI,
March 9, 2009