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CELES-c001 Machine Readable Electronic Document
Security Target
SSCD Application
Public Version
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
Assurance Level EAL5+
Version 1.0
Date 2020-03-09
Reference TCLE160038
Classification PUBLIC
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Table of Contents
Abbreviations and notations ..........................................................................................12
1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................13
1.1 ST overview.......................................................................................................13
1.2 ST reference......................................................................................................13
1.3 TOE reference ...................................................................................................14
1.4 Glossary ............................................................................................................14
1.5 TOE overview....................................................................................................21
1.5.1 TOE type, usage, and major security features .......................................21
1.5.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware....................................22
2. TOE description .......................................................................................................23
2.1 TOE physical scope..........................................................................................23
2.2 TOE logical scope.............................................................................................23
2.2.1 Mutual authentication...............................................................................25
2.2.2 Generation of SCD/SVD pairs ..................................................................27
2.2.3 Signature creation with SCD....................................................................28
2.3 TOE life cycle ....................................................................................................28
2.3.1 Phase 1: Development..............................................................................31
2.3.2 Phase 2: Manufacturing............................................................................32
2.3.3 Phase 3: Personalization..........................................................................33
2.3.4 Phase 4: Operational use .........................................................................34
3. Conformance claims................................................................................................37
3.1 Common Criteria conformance claim.............................................................37
3.2 Package conformance claim ...........................................................................37
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3.3 Protection Profile conformance claim ............................................................37
3.4 Protection Profile conformance rationale ......................................................37
3.4.1 Security problem definition......................................................................38
3.4.2 Security objectives ...................................................................................38
3.4.3 Security functional requirements ............................................................39
3.4.4 Security assurance requirements ...........................................................40
4. Security problem definition.....................................................................................41
4.1 Assets, users, and threat agents ....................................................................41
4.2 Threats...............................................................................................................42
4.2.1 T.SCD_Divulg ............................................................................................42
4.2.2 T.SCD_Derive ............................................................................................42
4.2.3 T.Hack_Phys..............................................................................................42
4.2.4 T.SVD_Forgery ..........................................................................................42
4.2.5 T.SigF_Misuse...........................................................................................42
4.2.6 T.DTBS_Forgery........................................................................................43
4.2.7 T.Sig_Forgery............................................................................................43
4.2.8 T.Abuse-Func............................................................................................43
4.3 Organizational Security Policies .....................................................................43
4.3.1 P.CSP_QCert .............................................................................................43
4.3.2 P.QSign......................................................................................................44
4.3.3 P.Sigy_SSCD.............................................................................................44
4.3.4 P.Sig_Non-Repud......................................................................................44
4.3.5 P.Manufact.................................................................................................44
4.3.6 P.Personalization ......................................................................................45
4.4 Assumptions.....................................................................................................45
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4.4.1 A.CGA ........................................................................................................45
4.4.2 A.SCA.........................................................................................................45
5. Security objectives ..................................................................................................46
5.1 Security objectives for the TOE ......................................................................46
5.1.1 OT.Lifecycle_Security...............................................................................46
5.1.2 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen...........................................................................46
5.1.3 OT.SCD_Unique ........................................................................................46
5.1.4 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp .............................................................................46
5.1.5 OT.SCD_Secrecy.......................................................................................47
5.1.6 OT.Sig_Secure ..........................................................................................47
5.1.7 OT.Sigy_SigF.............................................................................................47
5.1.8 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE...........................................................................47
5.1.9 OT.EMSEC_Design ...................................................................................47
5.1.10 OT.Tamper_ID ...........................................................................................48
5.1.11 OT.Tamper_Resistance ............................................................................48
5.1.12 OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth.................................................................................48
5.1.13 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp..............................................................................48
5.1.14 OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp..............................................................................48
5.1.15 OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp............................................................................49
5.1.16 OT.AC_Pre-pers ........................................................................................49
5.1.17 OT.AC_Pers...............................................................................................49
5.1.18 OT.Abuse-Func .........................................................................................50
5.2 Security objectives for the operational environment ....................................50
5.2.1 OE.SVD_Auth ............................................................................................50
5.2.2 OE.CGA_QCert..........................................................................................50
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5.2.3 OE.DTBS_Intend .......................................................................................51
5.2.4 OE.Signatory .............................................................................................51
5.2.5 OE.Dev_Prov_Service...............................................................................51
5.2.6 OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth................................................................................52
5.2.7 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp .............................................................................52
5.2.8 OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp...............................................................................53
5.2.9 OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp ...........................................................................53
6. Security objectives rationale...................................................................................54
6.1 Coverage of security objectives......................................................................54
6.2 Sufficiency of security objectives...................................................................55
7. Extended components definition............................................................................61
7.1 Definition of family FPT_EMS..........................................................................61
7.2 Definition of family FIA_API.............................................................................62
7.3 Definition of family FMT_LIM...........................................................................63
8. Security functional requirements ...........................................................................66
8.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic support.................................................................68
8.1.1 FCS_CKM.1................................................................................................68
8.1.2 FCS_CKM.4................................................................................................69
8.1.3 FCS_COP.1................................................................................................69
8.2 Class FDP: User data protection.....................................................................70
8.2.1 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation ..........................................................70
8.2.2 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation...........................................................71
8.2.3 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer .......................................................................72
8.2.4 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer........................................................................72
8.2.5 FDP_ACC.1/Signature creation................................................................73
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8.2.6 FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation ................................................................74
8.2.7 FDP_RIP.1..................................................................................................75
8.2.8 FDP_SDI.2/Persistent................................................................................75
8.2.9 FDP_SDI.2/DTBS .......................................................................................76
8.2.10 FDP_DAU.2/SVD........................................................................................77
8.2.11 FDP_UIT.1/DTBS .......................................................................................77
8.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication ..................................................78
8.3.1 FIA_UID.1...................................................................................................78
8.3.2 FIA_UAU.1 .................................................................................................79
8.3.3 FIA_AFL.1/Signatory.................................................................................81
8.3.4 FIA_AFL.1/Admin ......................................................................................82
8.3.5 FIA_AFL.1/Pre-pers...................................................................................83
8.3.6 FIA_AFL.1/Pers .........................................................................................83
8.3.7 FIA_API.1 ...................................................................................................84
8.4 Class FMT: Security management ..................................................................85
8.4.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD.....................................................................................85
8.4.2 FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers ................................................................................85
8.4.3 FMT_SMR.1/Pers.......................................................................................85
8.4.4 FMT_SMF.1................................................................................................86
8.4.5 FMT_MOF.1................................................................................................86
8.4.6 FMT_MSA.1/Admin....................................................................................87
8.4.7 FMT_MSA.1/Signatory ..............................................................................87
8.4.8 FMT_MSA.2................................................................................................88
8.4.9 FMT_MSA.3................................................................................................88
8.4.10 FMT_MSA.4................................................................................................89
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8.4.11 FMT_MTD.1/Admin....................................................................................89
8.4.12 FMT_MTD.1/Signatory ..............................................................................90
8.4.13 FMT_MTD.1/Pre-pers ................................................................................90
8.4.14 FMT_MTD.1/Pers .......................................................................................91
8.4.15 FMT_LIM.1 .................................................................................................91
8.4.16 FMT_LIM.2 .................................................................................................92
8.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF....................................................................92
8.5.1 FPT_EMS.1 ................................................................................................92
8.5.2 FPT_FLS.1 .................................................................................................93
8.5.3 FPT_PHP.1.................................................................................................94
8.5.4 FPT_PHP.3.................................................................................................94
8.5.5 FPT_TST.1 .................................................................................................95
8.6 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels..................................................................95
8.6.1 FTP_ITC.1/SVD ..........................................................................................96
8.6.2 FTP_ITC.1/VAD..........................................................................................96
8.6.3 FTP_ITC.1/DTBS........................................................................................97
8.6.4 FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers...................................................................................98
8.6.5 FTP_ITC.1/Pers..........................................................................................99
9. Security assurance requirements.........................................................................101
10. Security requirements rationale ...........................................................................103
10.1 Coverage of security functional requirements ............................................103
10.2 Sufficiency of security functional requirements..........................................105
10.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements .............................109
10.4 Rationale for security assurance requirements...........................................113
11. TOE summary specification..................................................................................115
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12. References..............................................................................................................121
12.1 Acronyms........................................................................................................121
12.2 Technical references......................................................................................123
Appendix A Platform identification.....................................................................126
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List of Tables
Table 1-1 ST reference...................................................................................................13
Table 1-2 TOE reference................................................................................................14
Table 1-3 Technical terms pertaining to the TOE on the whole.................................14
Table 1-4 Technical terms pertaining to the TOE SSCD application.........................18
Table 2-1 Mapping between SSCD roles and their credentials..................................25
Table 2-2 Identification of RAD, VAD, and PUC in terms of Signatory’s credentials
...........................................................................................................................................26
Table 2-3 Legend for deliveries occurring between non-consecutive actors ..........29
Table 2-4 Identification of recipient actors for the guidance documentation of the
TOE SSCD application.....................................................................................................31
Table 3-1 Changes, additions, and deletions to the threats with respect to the PPs
...........................................................................................................................................38
Table 3-2 Changes, additions, and deletions to the OSPs with respect to the PPs.38
Table 3-3 Changes, additions, and deletions to the security objectives for the TOE
with respect to the PPs ...................................................................................................38
Table 3-4 Changes, additions, and deletions to the security functional requirements
with respect to the PPs ...................................................................................................39
Table 6-1 Mapping of the security problem definition to the security objectives for
the TOE.............................................................................................................................54
Table 6-2 Mapping of the security problem definition to the security objectives for
the operational environment...........................................................................................55
Table 8-1 Mapping of the security functional requirements to the PPs....................66
Table 8-2 Security attributes of subjects and objects for access control ................70
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Table 9-1 Security assurance requirements: EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5.....................................................................................................................101
Table 10-1 Mapping of the security functional requirements to the security
objectives for the TOE...................................................................................................103
Table 10-2 Satisfaction of dependencies of security functional requirements ......109
Table 10-3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security assurance requirements .....113
Table 11-1 Implementation of the security functional requirements in the TOE....115
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List of Figures
Figure 2-1 SSCD application operations split by SSCD life cycle phase and role...24
Figure 2-2 Life cycle of the TOE SSCD application.....................................................30
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Abbreviations and notations
Numerical values
Numbers are printed in decimal, hexadecimal or binary notation.
Hexadecimal values are indicated with a ‘h’ suffix as in XXh, where X is a hexadecimal digit
from 0 to F.
Decimal values have no suffix.
Example: the decimal value 179 may be noted as the hexadecimal value B3h.
Keywords
The words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”,
“SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119 [R27].
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1. Introduction
1.1 ST overview
This document is the sanitized version of the document Security Target for CELES-c001
Machine Readable Electronic Document – SSCD Application [R5].
This security target defines the security requirements, as well as the scope of the Common
Criteria evaluation, for the signature creation functionality of CELES-c001 Machine
Readable Electronic Document.
The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the integrated circuit chip Infineon M7892 G12 equipped
with operating system CELES-c001 and with e-Document applications, namely an
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) application compliant with ICAO Doc 9303
[R24] [R25] [R26], and a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) application compliant
with European Parliament Directive 1999/93/EC [R22]. The SSCD application can optionally
be configured as a PKCS #15 application [R39].
This security target specifies the security requirements for the SSCD application of the TOE.
Furthermore, the ICAO application of the TOE supports:
• Basic Access Control (BAC) compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 [R25],
which is addressed by another security target [R1] [R2], and:
• Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) compliant with ICAO
Doc 9303 [R25],
• Active Authentication (AA) compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 [R25],
• Extended Access Control (EAC) v1 compliant with BSI TR-03110 [R11] [R12],
which are addressed by still another security target [R3] [R5].
1.2 ST reference
Table 1-1 ST reference
Title
Security Target Lite for CELES-c001 Machine Readable Electronic
Document - SSCD Application
Version 1.0
Authors Marco EVANGELISTA, Giovanni LICCARDO, Pasquale NOCE
Date 2020-03-09
Reference TCLE160038
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1.3 TOE reference
Table 1-2 TOE reference
TOE name
CELES-c001 Machine Readable Electronic Document
SSCD Application
TOE version 1
TOE developer HID Global
TOE identifier CELES-c001_1
TOE identification data 43h 45h 4Ch 45h 53h 2Dh 63h 30h 30h 31h 5Fh 31h
Evaluation sponsor Eurowitcel S.A.
The TOE is delivered as a chip ready for pre-personalization. It is identified by the following
string, which constitutes the TOE identifier:
CELES-c001_1
(ASCII encoding: 43h 45h 4Ch 45h 53h 2Dh 63h 30h 30h 31h 5Fh 31h)
where:
• “CELES-c001” is the TOE name,
• the underscore character is a separator, and
• “1” is the TOE version number.
The ASCII encoding of the TOE identifier constitutes the TOE identification data, located in
the persistent memory of the chip. Instructions for reading these data are provided by the
guidance documentation [R6] [R7] [R8].
1.4 Glossary
Table 1-3 defines technical terms pertaining to the TOE on the whole and used throughout
this security target. Wherever applicable, terms are associated with the related acronyms.
Table 1-3 Technical terms pertaining to the TOE on the whole
Term Acronym Definition
Card Manufacturer
Actor that equips the IC with contact-based
and/or contactless interfaces, and embeds the
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Term Acronym Definition
IC into a smart card or a document booklet (cf.
section 2.3.2).
Configuration data
Data defined by the Embedded Software
Developer (cf. section 2.3.1), stored into the IC
persistent memory by the IC Manufacturer,
used to configure global features of the OS
(e.g. enabled command APDUs and
communication protocols).
Electronic document
(e-Document)
The contact-based or contactless smart card
integrated into plastic or paper, possibly with
an optical readable cover, and providing an
ICAO application and/or an SSCD application.
Embedded Software
Software developed by the Embedded
Software Developer (cf. section 2.3.1) and
stored into the IC persistent memory by the IC
Manufacturer (cf. section 2.3.2). Such software
consists of the OS, the ICAO application, and
the SSCD application.
Embedded Software
Developer
Actor that develops the Embedded Software
and the guidance documentation associated
with this TOE component (cf. section 2.3.1).
IC Dedicated Software
Software developed by the IC Developer (cf.
section 2.3.1) and stored into the IC persistent
memory by the IC Manufacturer (cf. section
2.3.2). Such software might support special
functionality of the IC hardware and be used,
amongst other, for implementing delivery
procedures between different players. The
usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain life cycle phases.
IC Developer
Actor that develops the integrated circuit, the
IC Dedicated Software, and the guidance
documentation associated with these TOE
components (cf. section 2.3.1).
IC initialization data
Data defined by the Embedded Software
Developer and stored into the IC persistent
memory by the IC Manufacturer. Particularly,
they include the pre-personalization key (cf.
section 2.3.2).
IC Manufacturer
Actor that produces the TOE integrated circuit,
containing the IC Dedicated Software and the
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Term Acronym Definition
Embedded Software, and stores the IC
initialization data into the IC persistent memory
(cf. section 2.3.2).
ICAO application
A part of the TOE containing non-executable,
related user data as well as data needed for
authentication, intended to be used, amongst
other, as a Machine Readable Travel
Document (MRTD).
Integrated Circuit IC
Electronic component designed to perform
processing and/or memory functions. The e-
Document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Machine Readable Travel
Document
MRTD
Official document issued by a state or
organization which is used by the holder for
international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains
mandatory visual (eye-readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine-read
[R24].
Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment
PACE
A communication establishment protocol
defined in [R25]. The PACE protocol is a
password-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol, providing implicit
password-based authentication of the
communication partners (e.g. the smart card
and the terminal connected); i.e., PACE
provides a verification whether the
communication partners share the same value
of a password. Based on this authentication,
PACE also provides a secure communication,
whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data
transferred within this communication channel
are maintained.
Personalization Agent
User in charge of performing the
personalization of the TOE, particularly of
writing personalization data (cf. section 2.3.3).
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Term Acronym Definition
Personalization data
Data defined and stored into the IC persistent
memory by the Personalization Agent.
Particularly, they include Administrator’s
credentials and part of Signatory’s credentials
(cf. Table 1-4 and section 2.3.3).
Personalization key
Cryptographic key used by the Personalization
Agent for mutual authentication with the TOE.
Pre-personalization Agent
User in charge of performing the pre-
personalization of the TOE, particularly of
writing pre-personalization data (cf. section
2.3.2).
Pre-personalization data
Data defined and stored into the IC persistent
memory by the Pre-personalization Agent.
Particularly, they include the personalization
key (cf. section 2.3.2).
Pre-personalization key
Cryptographic key used by the Pre-
personalization Agent for mutual
authentication with the TOE.
Product information
Readable information about the product as a
whole, such as TOE identification data and
traceability information, stored into the IC
persistent memory by the IC Manufacturer.
Secure Signature Creation
Device
SSCD
Configured software or hardware which is
used to implement signature creation and
which meets the requirements laid down in
[R22], Annex III ([R22], articles 2.5 and 2.6).
SSCD application
A part of the TOE containing non-executable,
related user data as well as data needed for
authentication, intended to be used, amongst
other, as a Secure Signature Creation Device
(SSCD).
Terminal
Any technical system communicating with the
TOE through either the contact-based or the
contactless interface.
TOE identification data
Data defined by the Embedded Software
Developer and stored into the IC persistent
memory by the IC Manufacturer (cf. section
2.3.2), used to unambiguously identify the
TOE subject to Common Criteria evaluation
(cf. section 1.3).
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Table 1-4 defines technical terms specifically pertaining to TOE Secure Signature Creation
Device (SSCD) application and used throughout this security target. Wherever applicable,
terms are associated with the related acronyms.
Table 1-4 Technical terms pertaining to the TOE SSCD application
Term Acronym Definition
Administrator
User in charge of performing SSCD
preparation (cf. section 2.3.4) and other
administrative operations of an SSCD.
Advanced electronic
signature
Digital signature which meets specific
requirements in [R22], article 2.2.
Note: According to [R22], a digital signature
qualifies as an advanced electronic signature if
it:
• is uniquely linked to the Signatory;
• is capable of identifying the Signatory;
• is created using means that the Signatory
can maintain under his sole control, and
• is linked to the data to which it relates in
such a manner that any subsequent
change of the data is detectable.
Authentication data
Information used to verify the claimed identity
of a user.
Certificate
Digital signature used as electronic attestation
binding an SVD to a person and confirming the
identity of that person as legitimate signer
([R22], article 2.9).
Certificate info
Information associated with an SCD/SVD pair
that may be stored in an SSCD.
Note: Certificate info is either:
• a signer’s public key certificate, or
• one or more hash values of a signer’s
public key certificate, together with an
identifier of the hash function used to
compute the hash values.
Certificate info may be combined with
information to allow the user to distinguish
between several certificates.
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Term Acronym Definition
Certificate Generation
Application
CGA
Collection of application components that
receive the SVD from an SSCD in order to
generate a certificate and create a digital
signature of the certificate.
Certification Service
Provider
CSP
Entity that issues certificates or provides other
services related to electronic signatures
([R22], article 2.11).
Data To Be Signed DTBS
All electronic data to be signed, including a
user message and signature attributes.
Data To Be Signed or its
unique Representation
DTBS/R
Data received by an SSCD as input in a single
signature creation operation.
Note: DTBS/R is either:
• a hash value of the data to be signed
(DTBS), or
• an intermediate hash value of a first part of
the DTBS complemented with a remaining
part of the DTBS, or
• the DTBS.
Human Interface Device HID
Human interface provided by the SCA for user
authentication.
Legitimate User
User of an SSCD who gains possession of it
from an SSCD provisioning service provider
and who can be authenticated by the SSCD as
its Signatory.
Middleware
Set of software applications, particularly
comprising the CGA and the SCA, meant for
being used by the Administrator and/or the
Signatory to interact with an SSCD during the
operational use phase (cf. section 2.3.4).
Middleware Developer Actor that implements the middleware.
Qualified certificate
Public key certificate that meets the
requirements laid down in [R22], Annex I and
that is provided by a CSP that fulfils the
requirements laid down in [R22], Annex II
([R22], article 2.10).
Qualified electronic
signature
Advanced electronic signature that has been
created with an SSCD with a key certified with
a qualified certificate ([R22], article 5.1).
Reference Authentication
Data
RAD
Data persistently stored by the TOE for
authentication of a user as authorized for a
particular role.
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Term Acronym Definition
Signatory
Legitimate user of an SSCD associated with it
in the certificate of the SVD and who is
authorized by the SSCD to operate the
signature creation function ([R22], article 2.3).
Signature attributes
Additional information that is signed together
with a user message.
Signature Creation
Application
SCA
Application complementing an SSCD with a
user interface with the purpose to create an
electronic signature.
Note: A signature creation application is
software consisting of a collection of
application components configured to:
• present the data to be signed (DTBS) for
review by the Signatory,
• obtain prior to the signature process a
decision by the Signatory,
• if the Signatory indicates by specific
unambiguous input or action its intent to
sign, send a DTBS/R to the TOE,
• process the electronic signature generated
by the SSCD as appropriate, e.g. as
attachment to the DTBS.
Signature Creation Data SCD
Private cryptographic key stored in an SSCD
under exclusive control by the Signatory to
create an electronic signature ([R22], article
2.4).
Signature Creation
System
SCS
Complete system that creates an electronic
signature, consisting of an SCA and an SSCD.
Signature Verification Data SVD
Public cryptographic key that can be used to
verify an electronic signature ([R22], article
2.7).
Signed Data Object SDO
Electronic data to which an electronic
signature has been attached to or logically
associated with as a method of authentication.
SSCD provisioning service
Service that prepares and provides an SSCD
to a subscriber, and supports the Signatory
with certification of generated keys and
administrative functions of the SSCD.
User
Entity (human user or external IT entity)
outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
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Term Acronym Definition
User Message
Data determined by the Signatory as the
correct input for signing.
Verification Authentication
Data
VAD
Data provided as input to an SSCD for
authentication by knowledge.
1.5 TOE overview
1.5.1 TOE type, usage, and major security features
The TOE is a combination of hardware and software configured to securely create, use, and
manage Signature Creation Data (SCD). The SSCD protects the SCD during its whole life
cycle as to be used in a signature creation process solely by its Signatory.
The TOE comprises all IT security functionality necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD
and the security of the electronic signature.
The TOE provides the following functions:
1. to generate Signature Creation Data (SCD) and the corresponding Signature
Verification Data (SVD),
2. to export the SVD for certification to the CGA over a trusted channel,
3. to prove the identity as SSCD to external entities,
4. to, optionally, receive and store certificate info,
5. to switch the SSCD from a non-operational state to an operational state, and
6. if in an operational state, to create digital signatures for data with the following steps:
a. select an SCD if multiple are present in the SSCD,
b. authenticate the Signatory and determine its intent to sign,
c. receive data to be signed or a unique representation thereof (DTBS/R) from
the SCA over a trusted channel,
d. apply an appropriate cryptographic signature creation function to the DTBS/R
using the selected SCD.
The TOE is prepared for the Signatory’s use by:
1. generating at least one SCD/SVD pair, and
2. personalizing for the Signatory by storing in the TOE:
a. the Signatory’s Reference Authentication Data (RAD),
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b. optionally, certificate info for at least one SCD in the TOE.
After preparation, the SCD shall be in a non-operational state. Upon receiving a TOE, the
Signatory shall verify its non-operational state and change the SCD state to operational.
After preparation, the intended legitimate user should be informed of the Signatory’s
Verification Authentication Data (VAD) required for use of the TOE in signing. The means of
providing this information is expected to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the
corresponding Reference Authentication Data (RAD).
If the use of an SCD is no longer required, then it shall be destroyed.
1.5.2 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
The TOE operates in the following operational environments:
• The preparation environment, where it interacts with a Certification Service Provider
(CSP) through a Certificate Generation Application (CGA) to obtain a certificate for
the Signature Verification Data (SVD) corresponding to the Signature Creation Data
(SCD) generated by the TOE. The TOE exports the SVD through a trusted channel
allowing the CGA to check its authenticity. The preparation environment interacts
further with the TOE to personalize it with the initial value of the Reference
Authentication Data (RAD).
• The signing environment, where it interacts with the signer through a Signature
Creation Application (SCA) to sign data after authenticating the signer as its
Signatory. The SCA provides the data to be signed or a unique representation thereof
(DTBS/R) as input to the TOE signature creation function, and obtains the resulting
digital signature. The TOE and the SCA communicate through a trusted channel to
ensure the integrity of the DTBS/R.
• The management environment, where it interacts with the user to perform
management operations, e.g. to reset a blocked RAD, after authenticating the user
as its Signatory. A single device, e.g. a smart card terminal, may provide the required
environment for management and signing.
Therefore, the use of the TOE requires any hardware, software, and firmware component of
such operational environments, particularly a Certificate Generation Application (CGA) and
a Signature Creation Application (SCA) supporting trusted channels with the TOE.
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2. TOE description
2.1 TOE physical scope
The TOE is comprised of the following parts:
• dual-interface chip Infineon M7892 G12 equipped with IC Dedicated Software (cf.
Appendix A for more details);
• smart card operating system CELES-c001;
• a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) application compliant with European
Parliament Directive 1999/93/EC [R22];
• guidance documentation in PDF format about the preparation and use of the SSCD
application, composed by:
o the Pre-personalization Guidance [R6],
o the Personalization Guidance [R7],
o the Operational User Guidance [R8].
Table 2-4 identifies, for each guidance document, the actors involved in TOE life cycle who
are the intended recipients of that document.
The TOE is distributed in accordance with the evaluated delivery procedure [R9].
2.2 TOE logical scope
The SSCD application of the TOE supports the same SSCD life cycle phases, i.e. SSCD
preparation and SSCD operational use, as well as the same SSCD roles, i.e. Administrator
and Signatory, as those defined in the PPs [R18] [R19] [R20].
Figure 2-1 illustrates the operations supported by the SSCD application of the TOE, split
according to the SSCD life cycle phases and the SSCD roles for which they are actually
available.
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Figure 2-1 SSCD application operations split by SSCD life cycle phase and role
Delivery to
Signatory
TOE SSCD application
SSCD
preparation
Administrator
Trusted
channel
SSCD
operational use
Signatory
Mutual authentication
Generation of SCD/SVD pairs
• Proof of SSCD authenticity
and Signatory’s identity
• SCD/SVD generation
• SVD export
• Certificate info import
CGA
Storage of Signatory’s
credentials
• RAD storage
• PUC storage
Mutual authentication
Generation of SCD/SVD pairs
• Proof of SSCD authenticity
and Signatory’s identity
• SCD/SVD generation
• SVD export
• Certificate info import
CGA Trusted
channel
Mutual authentication by RAD
Generation of SCD/SVD pairs
• Proof of SSCD authenticity
and Signatory’s identity
• SCD/SVD generation
• SVD export
• Certificate info import
SVD
SVD
Signature creation with SCD
• Activation of SCD
generated by the
Administrator (if any)
• Signature creation
• Certificate info export
SCD destruction
SCA Trusted
channel
DTBS/R
RAD change
Mutual authentication by PUC
RAD unblock
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Here below, each of the main operations reported in Figure 2-1 is described in more detail.
2.2.1 Mutual authentication
As a precondition for gaining access to further operations, both the Administrator and the
Signatory must perform a mutual authentication with respect to the SSCD application. The
authentication procedure is comprised of the following two steps:
1. mutual authentication under the MF by means of a PACE authentication compliant
with ICAO Doc 9303 [R25];
2. external authentication under the SSCD application by means of the verification of a
password over the trusted channel opened with PACE authentication.
All the algorithm combinations (i.e. key agreement algorithms, mapping algorithms, block
ciphers) and the standardized domain parameters specified in ICAO Doc 9303 [R25] are
supported for PACE authentication. All the encoding methods specified in PKCS #15 [R39]
are supported as regards the passwords used in the password verification step.
The export of the SVD to the CGA upon key pair generation, as well as the import of the
DTBS/R from the SCA upon signature creation, shall be executed over the trusted channel
compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 [R25] opened by means of PACE authentication.
Table 2-1 identifies the credentials associated to either of the SSCD roles, through which
they can perform their respective mutual authentication procedures.
Table 2-1 Mapping between SSCD roles and their credentials
SSCD roles Credentials Diversification
Administrator
• Administrator’s PACE key
• Administrator’s password
PACE key:
Same for each SSCD
Password:
Same/distinct for each SSCD
Signatory
(for ordinary
operations)
• Signatory’s PACE key (derived
from Signatory’s password #1)
• Signatory’s password #2
Password #1 (and PACE key):
Distinct for each SSCD
Password #2:
Distinct for each SSCD
Signatory
(for RAD
unblock)
• Signatory’s PACE key (derived
from Signatory’s password #1)
• Signatory’s password #3
Password #1 (and PACE key):
Distinct for each SSCD
Password #3:
Distinct for each SSCD
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In accordance with Table 2-1, either of the SSCD roles shall perform mutual authentication
as follows:
• The Administrator shall perform:
1. PACE authentication under the MF using Administrator’s PACE key;
2. password verification under the SSCD application using Administrator’s password.
• The Signatory shall perform:
1. PACE authentication under the MF using Signatory’s PACE key, which shall be
derived from the selected encoding of Signatory’s password #1 by means of the
key derivation function defined in ICAO Doc 9303 [R25];
2. password verification under the SSCD application using:
o Signatory’s password #2 for gaining access to ordinary operations;
o Signatory’s password #3 for gaining access to RAD unblock.
Table 2-2 identifies, for each of the Signatory’s authentication secrets provided for by the
PPs [R18] [R19] [R20], i.e. the RAD, the VAD, and the PUC1, the Signatory’s credentials of
which it is comprised.
Table 2-2 Identification of RAD, VAD, and PUC in terms of Signatory’s credentials
Signatory’s secret Signatory’s credentials
RAD
• Signatory’s password #1 (seed to derive Signatory’s PACE key)
• Signatory’s password #2
VAD Same as for the RAD
PUC
• Signatory’s password #1 (seed to derive Signatory’s PACE key)
• Signatory’s password #3
RAD change is implemented as the modification of Signatory’s password #2 only, namely
Signatory’s password #1, and then Signatory’s PACE key as well, cannot be changed.
Signatory’s password #1 is used just as a seed for key derivation, viz. Signatory’s PACE key
is precomputed and directly stored into the IC persistent memory. As a result, the length of
Signatory’s password #1 is not constrained, whereas the length of Administrator’s password,
Signatory’s password #2, and Signatory’s password #3 shall be comprised between 4 and
8 bytes.
1 The PPs implicitly provide for the existence of a PUC by allowing the support of RAD unblock.
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In addition to the mutual authentication mechanisms associated to the roles defined in the
PPs, a further such mechanism, consisting of a mutual authentication with a Middleware’s
PACE key, is available for the purposes of middleware integration. This key is the same for
each SSCD, is shared between the SSCDs and the middleware, and enables read access
to product information, certificate info, and PKCS #15 files (if present).
2.2.2 Generation of SCD/SVD pairs
The SSCD application supports the generation of multiple SCD/SVD pairs in the SSCD
preparation phase on the part of the Administrator, as well as in the SSCD operational use
phase on the part of both the Administrator and the Signatory. SCD keys are activated for
signature creation upon their generation just in case they are generated by the Signatory,
otherwise they are not active until the Signatory explicitly activates them. The import of
certificate info from the CGA is supported as well. If configured as a PKCS #15 application,
the SSCD application also supports the distinction between normal and trusted public keys
and certificate info defined in PKCS #15 [R39].
SCD/SVD pair generation is only allowed after the authentication of the user in either of the
SSCD roles (cf. section 2.2.1), and must be executed over the trusted channel opened via
the PACE authentication step. This ensures the protection of SVD integrity upon export of
the SVD to the CGA. The import of certificate info from the CGA must be executed over the
same trusted channel.
Moreover, the SSCD application supports Client/Server Authentication compliant with IAS
ECC specification [R23] as a means of performing an internal authentication of the SSCD
to the CGA. This allows the CGA to verify the authenticity of the SSCD and the identity of
its legitimate Signatory, as claimed by the certificate of the public key corresponding to the
private key which the SSCD proves to know via Client/Server Authentication. The export of
the generated SVD over the same trusted channel used for Client/Server Authentication
provides the CGA with evidence that the exported SVD be actually linked to the legitimate
Signatory, as well as to the SCD stored in the SSCD.
The SSCD application supports the generation of two-prime RSA key pairs compliant with
PKCS #1 [R38] of 2048 or 3072 bits.
In accordance with IAS ECC specification [R23], the SSCD application supports signature
creation algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 compliant with PKCS #1 [R38] for Client/Server
Authentication, with keys of 2048 or 3072 bits. The hash function (i.e. SHA-256 compliant
with [R36]) is expected to be applied by the terminal before the message to be signed is
sent to the SSCD application (cf. [R23]).
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2.2.3 Signature creation with SCD
In accordance with IAS ECC specification [R23], the SSCD application supports digital
signature creation with signature creation algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 compliant with
PKCS #1 [R38], hash algorithm SHA-256 compliant with FIPS PUB 180-4 [R36], and keys
of 2048 or 3072 bits.
The signature creation function of the SSCD application can take all of the following types
of data as input from the SCA:
• a hash value of the data to be signed;
• an intermediate hash value of a first part of the data to be signed, complemented with
the remaining part of such data;
• the data to be signed themselves (provided their length is not larger than 64 bytes).
The export of public keys and certificate info to the SCA is supported as well.
Signature creation is only allowed after the authentication of the user in the Signatory role
(cf. section 2.2.1), and must be executed over the trusted channel opened via the PACE
authentication step. This guarantees the protection of DTBS/R integrity upon import of the
DTBS/R from the SCA. The export of digital signatures to the SCA must be executed over
the same trusted channel.
2.3 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is comprised of four life cycle phases, i.e. development, manufacturing,
personalization, and operational use. With regard to the life cycle of the SSCD application,
these phases can be split into eight steps. The last two steps, which take place when the
TOE stands in the operational use phase, match the SSCD life cycle phases defined in the
PPs [R18] [R19] [R20], i.e. SSCD preparation and SSCD operational use.
Figure 2-2 represents the life cycle of the TOE SSCD application. Particularly, it illustrates
the correspondence between the life cycle phases of the TOE and the life cycle phases of
the SSCD application as defined in the PPs, and identifies the actors involved in each life
cycle step. Direct deliveries of items between actors are represented with continuous lines,
while deliveries in which intermediate actors may be in charge of receiving the exchanged
items and forwarding them to the subsequent actors are represented with dotted lines.
Deliveries of items occurring between non-consecutive actors are just marked with letters in
order to preserve the clarity of the diagram. A legend for these deliveries, which identifies
the exchanged items for each of them, is provided in Table 2-3.
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Table 2-3 Legend for deliveries occurring between non-consecutive actors
Delivery Delivered items
(a)
• Pre-personalization key
• Pre-personalization guidance
(b)
• Personalization guidance
• Middleware’s credentials
(c) • Operational user guidance
(d)
• Operational user guidance
• Middleware’s credentials
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Figure 2-2 Life cycle of the TOE SSCD application
- IC manufacturing documentation
- IC Dedicated Software
- Embedded Software
- Pre-personalization key
- TOE
- TOE
- TOE
- Personalization key
- TOE
- Signatory’s credentials
- Signatory’s guidance documentation
(a)
(b)
(c)
Step 1: Development of the IC and
the IC Dedicated Software
Phase 1: Development
Step 2: Development of
the Embedded Software
IC Developer
Embedded Software
Developer
Step 3: Manufacture of the IC IC Manufacturer
TOE delivery
Phase 1: Development
Phase 2: Manufacturing
Phase 2: Manufacturing
Step 4: Manufacture of the
smart card or document booklet
Card Manufacturer
Phase 2: Manufacturing
Step 5: Pre-personalization Pre-personalization Agent
Phase 3: Personalization
Personalization Agent
Step 6: Personalization
Administrator
Signatory
Middleware
Developer
Administrator
Phase 4: Operational use
Step 7: SSCD
preparation
(d)
Middleware
Developer
Phase 4: Operational use
Delivered
self-protected
TOE
- TOE
- Administrator’s credentials
- Signatory’s identification information
- Signatory’s password #1
Step 8: SSCD
operational use
TOE
under
construction
in
a
secure
environment
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Detailed information about the operations available in each life cycle phase of the TOE is
provided in the guidance documentation of the TOE SSCD application [R6] [R7] [R8]. Table
2-4 identifies, for each guidance document, the actors who are the intended recipients of
that document.
Table 2-4 Identification of recipient actors for the guidance documentation of the TOE
SSCD application
Guidance document Recipient actors
Pre-personalization guidance • Pre-personalization Agent
Personalization guidance • Personalization Agent
Operational user guidance
• Middleware Developer
• Administrator
The phases and steps of the TOE life cycle are described in what follows. The names of the
involved actors are emphasized using boldface.
2.3.1 Phase 1: Development
Step 1: Development of the IC and the IC Dedicated Software
The IC Developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software, and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
Finally, the following items are securely delivered to the Embedded Software Developer
and the IC Manufacturer:
• the IC manufacturing documentation,
• the IC Dedicated Software.
Step 2: Development of the Embedded Software
The Embedded Software Developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated
circuit and for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the Embedded
Software, consisting of the OS, the ICAO application, and the SSCD application, as well as
the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
Furthermore, the Embedded Software Developer generates the pre-personalization key.
In addition, the Embedded Software Developer generates middleware’s credentials. They
comprise Middleware’s PACE key, granting read access during operational use (cf. section
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2.2.1), and possibly also a middleware’s secret to be used in addition to users’ passwords
in the derivation of Administrator’s and Signatory’s PACE keys.
Finally:
• the Embedded Software and the pre-personalization key are securely delivered to
the IC Manufacturer;
• the pre-personalization key is securely delivered to the Pre-personalization Agent;
• middleware’s credentials are securely delivered to both the Middleware Developer
and the Personalization Agent.
As regards TOE guidance documentation, the operational user guidance is securely shared
with the Middleware Developer; moreover, either all documents are securely delivered to
the Pre-personalization Agent, or each document is securely delivered to the recipient
actors as identified in Table 2-4.
2.3.2 Phase 2: Manufacturing
Step 3: Manufacture of the IC
The IC Manufacturer produces the TOE integrated circuit, containing the IC Dedicated
Software and the Embedded Software, and creates in the IC persistent memory the high-
level objects relevant for the SSCD application.
Particularly, the pre-personalization key is stored into the IC persistent memory.
Finally, the TOE is securely delivered to the Card Manufacturer.
Application Note 1 The point of delivery of the TOE coincides with the completion of
step 3, i.e. with the delivery of the TOE, in the form of an IC not yet embedded, from the IC
Manufacturer to the Card Manufacturer. That is to say, this is the event upon which the
construction of the TOE in a secure environment ends, and the TOE begins to be self-
protected.
Step 4: Manufacture of the smart card or document booklet
The Card Manufacturer equips the IC with contact-based and/or contactless interfaces,
and embeds the IC into a smart card or a document booklet.
Finally, the TOE is securely delivered to the Pre-personalization Agent.
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Step 5: Pre-personalization
The Pre-personalization Agent generates the personalization key, then creates/modifies
in the IC persistent memory the high-level objects relevant for the SSCD application.
Particularly:
• The pre-personalization key is overwritten with the personalization key.
• The DIR file, if present, is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 [R32].
Finally, the TOE and the personalization key are securely delivered to the Personalization
Agent. Furthermore, if middleware’s credentials were delivered to the Pre-personalization
Agent rather than directly to the Personalization Agent, they are securely delivered to the
Personalization Agent.
As regards TOE guidance documentation, if the Pre-personalization Agent also received
the documents intended for the subsequent actors, then either all of these documents are
securely delivered to the Personalization Agent, or each document is securely delivered
to the recipient actors as identified in Table 2-4.
2.3.3 Phase 3: Personalization
Step 6: Personalization
The Personalization Agent establishes the identity of the Signatory to whom the TOE is to
be assigned, generates the following credentials:
• Administrator’s PACE key,
• Administrator’s password,
• Signatory’s password #1,
and derives Signatory’s PACE key from Signatory’s password #1. Both Administrator’s and
Signatory’s PACE keys are possibly derived employing, in addition to users’ passwords, a
middleware’s secret included in the middleware’s credentials received from the Embedded
Software Developer.
Then, the Personalization Agent creates/modifies in the IC persistent memory the high-
level objects relevant for the SSCD application.
Particularly:
• Administrator’s PACE key object, Signatory’s PACE key object, and Administrator’s
password object are filled with the generated credentials, while Middleware’s PACE
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key object is filled with the key included in the middleware’s credentials received from
the Embedded Software Developer.
• The number of the empty private/public key objects and certificate info files being
created, each associated with an unambiguous identifier, is equal to the maximum
possible number of key pairs required for signature creation in the operational use
phase. Although the key pairs are not generated yet, their lengths are fixed when the
key objects are created and cannot be changed afterwards.
• If the SSCD application is configured as a PKCS #15 application [R39], the private
key summary consists of a PrKDF file compliant with PKCS #15, and the TokenInfo,
UnusedSpace, ODF, AODF, PuKDF, Trusted PuKDF, CDF, and Trusted CDF files
are all present and compliant with PKCS #15 as well.
• Both a private key and a certificate attesting the identity of the Signatory are stored
for Client/Server Authentication, and logical records are correspondingly added to the
private key summary / PrKDF file and to the Trusted CDF file (if present).
Finally, the TOE is securely delivered to the Administrator, along with the following items:
• Administrator’s credentials,
• Signatory’s identification information,
• Signatory’s password #1.
As regards TOE guidance documentation, if the Personalization Agent also received the
operational user guidance, then this document is securely delivered to the Administrator.
2.3.4 Phase 4: Operational use
Step 7: SSCD preparation
The Administrator generates the remaining Signatory’s credentials, i.e.:
• Signatory’s password #2,
• Signatory’s password #3.
Then, the Administrator is required/allowed to modify in the IC persistent memory the high-
level objects relevant for the SSCD application.
Particularly:
• The Administrator can generate one or more key pairs for signature creation using
the CGA implemented by the Middleware Developer.
In this case, as many private/public key objects created in the personalization phase
are filled with the key pairs being generated. Moreover, as many logical records are
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added to the private key summary / PrKDF file and to the Trusted PuKDF file (if
present), and deleted from the UnusedSpace file (if present).
• The Administrator shall fill one or more certificate info files for each generated key
pair (if any). Moreover, as many logical records are added to the Trusted CDF file (if
present), and deleted from the UnusedSpace file (if present).
• The Administrator shall fill Signatory’s password #2 and password #3 objects with
the generated credentials, and shall update the AODF file (if present) to indicate that
these passwords have been initialized.
Finally, the TOE is securely delivered to the intended Signatory, along with Signatory’s
credentials and appropriate Signatory’s guidance documentation produced by the SSCD
provisioning service.
Step 8: SSCD operational use
The Administrator and the Signatory are allowed to modify in the IC persistent memory
the high-level objects relevant for the SSCD application.
Particularly:
• The Administrator can generate one or more key pairs for signature creation using
the CGA implemented by the Middleware Developer.
In this case, as many private/public key objects created in the personalization phase
are filled with the key pairs being generated. Moreover, as many logical records are
added to the private key summary / PrKDF file and to the Trusted PuKDF file (if
present), and deleted from the UnusedSpace file (if present).
• The Administrator shall fill one or more certificate info files for each generated key
pair (if any). Moreover, as many logical records are added to the Trusted CDF file (if
present), and deleted from the UnusedSpace file (if present).
• The Signatory can generate one or more key pairs for signature creation using the
CGA implemented by the Middleware Developer.
In this case, as many private/public key objects created in the personalization phase
are filled with the key pairs being generated. Moreover, as many logical records are
added to the private key summary / PrKDF file and to the PuKDF file (if present), and
deleted from the UnusedSpace file (if present).
• The Signatory shall fill one or more certificate info files for each generated key pair
(if any). Moreover, as many logical records are added to the CDF file (if present), and
deleted from the UnusedSpace file (if present).
Furthermore, the Signatory can use the SCA implemented by the Middleware Developer
to perform the following operations:
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• activate signature creation for the private keys generated by the Administrator;
• create digital signatures using the available signature creation private keys;
• destroy signature creation private keys;
• change or unblock Signatory’s password #2.
In addition to a mutual authentication by means of the Administrator’s or Signatory’s PACE
keys, read access to product information, certificate info, and PKCS #15 files (if present) is
also granted by a mutual authentication by means of the Middleware’s PACE key (cf. section
2.2.1).
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3. Conformance claims
3.1 Common Criteria conformance claim
This security target claims conformance to Common Criteria (CC) version 3.1, revision 5
[R14] [R15] [R16] [R17].
Particularly:
• Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are compliant with an extension of those
defined in CC Part 2 [R15];
• Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) are compliant with those defined in CC
Part 3 [R16].
The software part of the TOE runs on the chip Infineon M7892 G12. This IC is certified
against Common Criteria at Evaluation Assurance Level EAL6+ (cf. Appendix A).
3.2 Package conformance claim
This security target claims conformance to Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5, augmented
with the following security assurance requirements defined in CC Part 3 [R16]:
• ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”,
• AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”.
3.3 Protection Profile conformance claim
This security target claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profiles (PPs):
• Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key
generation, v2.0.1, January 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01 [R18],
• Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 4: Extension for device
with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation
application, v1.0.1, November 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012 [R19],
• Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 5: Extension for device
with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation application,
v1.0.1, November 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012 [R20].
3.4 Protection Profile conformance rationale
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3.4.1 Security problem definition
Changes, additions, and deletions to threats and OSPs with respect to the PPs (cf. section
3.3) are listed in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2.
Assumptions are unaltered with respect to those stated in the PPs.
Table 3-1 Changes, additions, and deletions to the threats with respect to the PPs
Threat Difference Rationale
T.Abuse-Func Addition
Added to cover the relevant platform threat
T.Abuse-Func.
Table 3-2 Changes, additions, and deletions to the OSPs with respect to the PPs
OSP Difference Rationale
P.Manufact Addition
Added to specify the security policy to be
enforced by the TOE in the manufacturing
phase of its life cycle (cf. section 2.3.2).
P.Personalization Addition
Added to specify the security policy to be
enforced by the TOE in the personalization
phase of its life cycle (cf. section 2.3.3).
3.4.2 Security objectives
Changes, additions, and deletions to the security objectives for the TOE with respect to the
PPs (cf. section 3.3) are listed in Table 3-3.
The security objectives for the operational environment are unaltered with respect to those
stated in the PPs.
Table 3-3 Changes, additions, and deletions to the security objectives for the TOE with
respect to the PPs
Security objective Difference Rationale
OT.AC_Pre-pers Addition
Added to specify the access control to be
enforced by the TOE as regards the storage of
pre-personalization data (cf. section 2.3.2).
OT.AC_Pers Addition
Added to specify the access control to be
enforced by the TOE as regards the storage of
personalization data (cf. section 2.3.3).
OT.Abuse-Func Addition
Added to cover the relevant platform security
objective for the TOE O.Abuse-Func.
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3.4.3 Security functional requirements
Changes, additions, and deletions to the security functional requirements with respect to the
PPs (cf. section 3.3) are listed in Table 3-4.
Table 3-4 Changes, additions, and deletions to the security functional requirements with
respect to the PPs
SFR Difference Rationale
FIA_UAU.1 Change
Refined to remove user identification from the
list of the actions allowed by the TOE before
the user is authenticated (cf. Application Note
19).
FIA_AFL.1/Signatory Change
Iteration performed on PP SFR FIA_AFL.1 due
to the introduction of further iterations, related
to the authentication mechanisms supported
by the TOE in addition to those addressed in
the PPs (cf. below).
Moreover, a refinement has been performed to
specify that the SFR refers to consecutive
failed authentication attempts with respect to
the RAD.
FIA_AFL.1/Admin Addition
Added to cover authentication with respect to
the Administrator’s credentials, supported by
the TOE in addition to the authentication
mechanisms addressed in the PPs.
FIA_AFL.1/Pre-pers Addition
Added to cover authentication with respect to
the pre-personalization key, supported by the
TOE in addition to the authentication
mechanisms addressed in the PPs (cf. section
2.3.2).
FIA_AFL.1/Pers Addition
Added to cover authentication with respect to
the personalization key, supported by the TOE
in addition to the authentication mechanisms
addressed in the PPs (cf. section 2.3.3).
FMT_SMR.1/SSCD Change
Iteration performed on PP SFR FMT_SMR.1
due to the introduction of further iterations,
related to the roles supported by the TOE in
addition to those specified in the PPs (cf.
below).
FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers Addition
Added to cover the Pre-personalization Agent
role, supported by the TOE in addition to the
roles specified in the PPs (cf. section 2.3.2).
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SFR Difference Rationale
FMT_SMR.1/Pers Addition
Added to cover the Personalization Agent role,
supported by the TOE in addition to the roles
specified in the PPs (cf. section 2.3.3).
FMT_MTD.1/Pre-pers Addition
Added to specify the requirements to be
enforced by the TOE as regards the
management of pre-personalization data (cf.
section 2.3.2).
FMT_MTD.1/Pers Addition
Added to specify the requirements to be
enforced by the TOE as regards the
management of personalization data (cf.
section 2.3.3).
FMT_LIM.1 Addition
Added to cover the relevant platform SFR
FMT_LIM.1.
FMT_LIM.2 Addition
Added to cover the relevant platform SFR
FMT_LIM.2.
FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers Addition
Added to account for the additional trusted
channel supported by the TOE for the import of
pre-personalization data (cf. section 2.3.2).
FTP_ITC.1/Pers Addition
Added to account for the additional trusted
channel supported by the TOE for the import of
personalization data (cf. section 2.3.3).
3.4.4 Security assurance requirements
The minimum package of security assurance requirements allowed for conformance to the
PPs (cf. section 3.3) is Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5.
As this security target claims conformance to Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5 augmented
with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 (cf. section 3.2), the aforesaid requirement is met.
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4. Security problem definition
4.1 Assets, users, and threat agents
The Common Criteria define assets as entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places
value upon. The term “asset” is used to describe the threats in the operational environment
of the TOE.
The PPs [R18] [R19] [R20] share the same assets, users, and threat agents, reported here
below.
Assets and objects:
1. SCD: private key used to perform an electronic signature operation. The
confidentiality, integrity, and Signatory’s sole control over the use of the SCD must
be maintained.
2. SVD: public key linked to the SCD and used to perform electronic signature
verification. The integrity of the SVD must be maintained when it is exported.
3. DTBS and DTBS/R: set of data, or its representation, which the Signatory intends to
sign. Their integrity and the unforgeability of the link to the Signatory provided by the
electronic signature must be maintained.
Users and subjects acting for users:
1. User: end user of the TOE who can be identified as Administrator or Signatory. The
subject S.User may act as S.Admin in the role R.Admin or as S.Sigy in the role R.Sigy.
2. Administrator: user who is in charge of performing SSCD preparation as well as other
administrative functions. The subject S.Admin is acting in the role R.Admin for this
user after successful authentication as Administrator.
3. Signatory: user who holds the TOE and uses it on their own behalf or on behalf of the
natural or legal person or entity they represent. The subject S.Sigy is acting in the
role R.Sigy for this user after successful authentication as Signatory.
4. Pre-personalization Agent: user in charge of performing step 5, pre-personalization,
of TOE life cycle (cf. section 2.3.2), particularly of writing pre-personalization data.
The subject S.Pre-pers is acting in the role R.Pre-pers for this user after successful
authentication as Pre-personalization Agent.
5. Personalization Agent: user in charge of performing step 6, personalization, of TOE
life cycle (cf. section 2.3.3), particularly of writing personalization data. The subject
S.Pers is acting in the role R.Pers for this user after successful authentication as
Personalization Agent.
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Threat agents:
1. Attacker: Human or process acting on their behalf located outside the TOE. The main
goal of the attacker is to access the SCD or to falsify the electronic signature. The
attacker has a high attack potential and knows no secret.
4.2 Threats
The PPs [R18] [R19] [R20] share the same threats, reported here below.
4.2.1 T.SCD_Divulg
Storage, copy, and release of Signature Creation Data
An attacker stores or copies the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the SCD
during generation, storage, and use for signature creation in the TOE.
4.2.2 T.SCD_Derive
Derivation of Signature Creation Data
An attacker derives the SCD from publicly known data, such as SVD corresponding to the
SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data exported outside the
TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
4.2.3 T.Hack_Phys
Physical attacks through TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts physically with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary
security compromises. This threat is directed against SCD, SVD, and DTBS.
4.2.4 T.SVD_Forgery
Forgery of Signature Verification Data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the CSP to the CGA. This results in loss of SVD
integrity in the certificate of the Signatory.
4.2.5 T.SigF_Misuse
Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE
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An attacker misuses the signature creation function of the TOE to create an SDO for data
the Signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts
possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and
concepts employed by the TOE.
4.2.6 T.DTBS_Forgery
Forgery of the DTBS/R
An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the TOE for
signing does not match the DTBS that the Signatory intended to sign.
4.2.7 T.Sig_Forgery
Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges an SDO, maybe using an electronic signature which has been created
by the TOE, and the violation of the integrity of the SDO is not detectable by the Signatory
or by third parties. The signature created by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by
experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles
and concepts employed by the TOE.
Here below is a further threat, added in this security target to those defined in the PPs.
4.2.8 T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of functionality
An attacker may abuse functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE delivery in
order (i) to manipulate or disclose the user data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or
disclose the TSF data stored in the TOE, or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate, or modify)
the TSF.
4.3 Organizational Security Policies
The PPs [R18] [R19] [R20] share the same OSPs, reported here below.
4.3.1 P.CSP_QCert
Qualified certificates
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The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified
certificate ([R22], article 2, clause 9, and Annex I) for the SVD generated by the SSCD. The
certificates contain at least the name of the Signatory and the SVD matching the SCD
implemented in the TOE under sole control of the Signatory. The CSP ensures that the use
of the TOE as SSCD is evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly
available information.
4.3.2 P.QSign
Qualified electronic signatures
The Signatory uses a Signature Creation System to sign data with an advanced electronic
signature ([R22], article 1, clause 2), which is a qualified electronic signature if it is based on
a valid qualified certificate (according to [R22], Annex I). The DTBS are presented to the
Signatory and sent by the SCA as DTBS/R to the SSCD. The SSCD creates the electronic
signature with an SCD implemented in the SSCD that the Signatory maintains under their
sole control, and is linked to the DTBS/R in such a manner that any subsequent change of
the data is detectable.
4.3.3 P.Sigy_SSCD
TOE as Secure Signature Creation Device
The TOE meets the requirements for an SSCD laid down in [R22], Annex III. This implies
that the SCD is used for digital signature creation under sole control of the Signatory and
the SCD can practically occur only once.
4.3.4 P.Sig_Non-Repud
Non-repudiation of signatures
The life cycle of the SSCD, the SCD, and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that the
Signatory is not able to deny having signed data if the signature is successfully verified with
the SVD contained in their unrevoked certificate.
Here below are further OSPs, added in this security target to those defined in the PPs.
4.3.5 P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the e-Document
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The IC Manufacturer writes IC initialization data in step 3, IC manufacturing, of TOE life
cycle, including the key for the authentication of the Pre-personalization Agent (cf. section
2.3.2).
The Pre-personalization Agent writes pre-personalization data in step 5, pre-
personalization, of TOE life cycle (cf. section 2.3.2), including the key for the authentication
of the Personalization Agent.
The Pre-personalization Agent acts on behalf of the SSCD provisioning service.
4.3.6 P.Personalization
Personalization of the e-Document
The Personalization Agent writes personalization data in step 6, personalization, of TOE life
cycle (cf. section 2.3.3), including the credentials for the authentication of the Administrator
and the PACE key for the authentication of the Signatory.
The Personalization Agent acts on behalf of the SSCD provisioning service.
4.4 Assumptions
The PPs [R18] [R19] [R20] share the same assumptions, reported here below.
4.4.1 A.CGA
Trustworthy Certificate Generation Application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the Signatory’s name or pseudonym and the SVD in
the (qualified) certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the CSP.
4.4.2 A.SCA
Trustworthy Signature Creation Application
The Signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS/R of
the data that the Signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
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5. Security objectives
5.1 Security objectives for the TOE
Here below are the security objectives for the TOE defined in PP Part 2 [R18].
5.1.1 OT.Lifecycle_Security
Life cycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialization, personalization, and operational usage.
The TOE shall securely destroy the SCD on demand of the Signatory.
Application Note 2 The TOE may contain more than one set of SCD. There is no need
to destroy the SCD in case of repeated SCD generation. The Signatory shall be able to
destroy the SCD stored in the SSCD, e.g. after the (qualified) certificate for the
corresponding SVD has expired.
5.1.2 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorized users only may invoke the
generation of the SCD and the SVD.
5.1.3 OT.SCD_Unique
Uniqueness of Signature Creation Data
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of an SCD/SVD pair that it creates as
suitable for the advanced or qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for signature
creation shall practically occur only once and shall not be reconstructible from the SVD. In
that context “practically occur once” means that the probability of equal SCDs is negligible.
5.1.4 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the
TOE. This includes unambiguous reference of a created SVD/SCD pair for export of the
SVD and in creating an electronic signature with the SCD.
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5.1.5 OT.SCD_Secrecy
Secrecy of Signature Creation Data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature creation) shall be reasonably assured against
attacks with a high attack potential.
Application Note 3 The TOE shall keep the confidentiality of the SCD at all times, in
particular during SCD/SVD generation, signature creation operation, storage, and secure
destruction.
5.1.6 OT.Sig_Secure
Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE shall create digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD,
through robust encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be reconstructible using the digital
signatures or any other data exportable from the TOE. The digital signatures shall be
resistant against these attacks, even when executed with a high attack potential.
5.1.7 OT.Sigy_SigF
Signature creation function for the legitimate Signatory only
The TOE shall provide the digital signature creation function for the legitimate Signatory only
and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack
potential.
5.1.8 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE
The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R. As by definition of the DTBS/R this may consist of the
DTBS themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature creation process where
the TOE hashes the provided DTBS (in part or entirely) for signature creation.
5.1.9 OT.EMSEC_Design
Provision of physical emanations security
The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible
emanations within specified limits.
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5.1.10 OT.Tamper_ID
Tamper detection
The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of its components,
and uses those features to limit security breaches.
5.1.11 OT.Tamper_Resistance
Tamper resistance
The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering with specified system devices and
components.
Here below are the security objectives for the TOE defined in PP Part 4 [R19].
5.1.12 OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth
Authentication proof as SSCD
The TOE shall hold unique identity and authentication data as SSCD and provide security
mechanisms to identify and to authenticate itself as SSCD.
5.1.13 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
TOE trusted channel for SVD export
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD
exported to the CGA. The TOE shall enable the CGA to detect alteration of the SVD exported
by the TOE.
Here below are the security objectives for the TOE defined in PP Part 5 [R20].
5.1.14 OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
TOE trusted channel for VAD import
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel for the protection of the confidentiality and integrity
of the VAD received from the HID as needed by the authentication method employed.
Application Note 4 This security objective for the TOE is partly covering OE.HID_VAD
from PP Part 2 [R18]. While OE.HID_VAD in PP Part 2 requires only the operational
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environment to protect VAD, PP Part 5 [R20] requires the HID and the TOE to implement a
trusted channel for the protection of the VAD: the HID exports the VAD and establishes one
end of the trusted channel according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp, the TOE imports VAD at the
other end of the trusted channel according to OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp. Therefore, PP Part 5
partly re-assigns the VAD protection from the operational environment as described by
OE.HID_VAD to the TOE as described by OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp, and leaves only the
necessary functionality by the HID.
5.1.15 OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
TOE trusted channel for DTBS import
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the SCA to detect alteration of the DTBS/R
received from the SCA. The TOE must not generate electronic signatures with the SCD for
altered DTBS.
Application Note 5 This security objective for the TOE is partly covering
OE.DTBS_Protect from PP Part 2 [R18]. While OE.DTBS_Protect in PP Part 2 requires only
the operational environment to protect DTBS, PP Part 5 [R20] requires the SCA and the
TOE to implement a trusted channel for the protection of the DTBS: the SCA exports the
DTBS and establishes one end of the trusted channel according to
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, the TOE imports DTBS at the other end of the trusted channel
according to OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp. Therefore, PP Part 5 partly re-assigns the DTBS
protection from the operational environment as described by OE.DTBS_Protect to the TOE
as described by OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp, and leaves only the necessary functionality by
the SCA.
Here below are further security objectives for the TOE, added in this security target to those
defined in the PPs.
5.1.16 OT.AC_Pre-pers
Access control for the pre-personalization of the e-Document
The TOE must ensure that pre-personalization data, including the personalization key, can
be written in step 5, pre-personalization, of TOE life cycle (cf. section 2.3.2) by the authorized
Pre-personalization Agent only.
5.1.17 OT.AC_Pers
Access control for the personalization of the e-Document
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The TOE must ensure that personalization data, including Administrator’s credentials and
Signatory’s PACE key, can be written in step 6, personalization, of TOE life cycle (cf. section
2.3.3) by the authorized Personalization Agent only.
5.1.18 OT.Abuse-Func
Protection against abuse of functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used after TOE delivery,
can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or disclose the user data stored in the TOE, (ii) to
manipulate or disclose the TSF data stored in the TOE, or (iii) to manipulate (bypass,
deactivate, or modify) the TSF.
5.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
PP Part 4 [R19] substitutes OE.SSCD_Prov_Service from PP Part 2 [R18] with
OE.Dev_Prov_Service, and adds the security objectives for the operational environment
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth, OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp in order to address the additional method of
use of SCD/SVD pair generation after delivery to the Signatory and outside a secure
preparation environment.
PP Part 5 [R20] replaces OE.HID_VAD from PP Part 2 [R18] with OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp,
and OE.DTBS_Protect from PP Part 2 with OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp.
Here below are the security objectives for the operational environment defined in PP Part 2
[R18].
5.2.1 OE.SVD_Auth
Authenticity of the SVD
The operational environment shall ensure the integrity of the SVD sent to the CGA of the
CSP. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the Signatory
and the SVD in the qualified certificate.
5.2.2 OE.CGA_QCert
Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA shall generate a qualified certificate that includes (among others):
• the name of the Signatory controlling the TOE,
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• the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and being under sole control of the
Signatory,
• the advanced signature of the CSP.
The CGA shall confirm with the generated qualified certificate that the SCD corresponding
to the SVD is stored in the SSCD.
5.2.3 OE.DTBS_Intend
SCA sends data intended to be signed
The Signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that:
• generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the
Signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE,
• sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS/R
by the TOE,
• attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
5.2.4 OE.Signatory
Security obligation of the Signatory
The Signatory shall check that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from the SSCD
provisioning service is in non-operational state. The Signatory shall keep their VAD
confidential.
Here below are the security objectives for the operational environment defined in PP Part 4
[R19].
5.2.5 OE.Dev_Prov_Service
Authentic SSCD provided by the SSCD provisioning service
The SSCD provisioning service handles authentic devices that implement the TOE,
prepares the TOE for proof as SSCD to external entities, personalizes the TOE for the
legitimate user as Signatory, links the identity of the TOE as SSCD with the identity of the
legitimate user, and delivers the TOE to the Signatory.
Application Note 6 This objective replaces OE.SSCD_Prov_Service from PP Part 2
[R18], which is possible as it does not imply any additional requirement for the operational
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environment when compared with OE.SSCD_Prov_Service (OE.Dev_Prov_Service is a
subset of OE.SSCD_Prov_Service).
5.2.6 OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth
Preparation of the TOE for SSCD authentication
The CSP shall check by means of the CGA whether the device presented for application of
a (qualified) certificate holds unique identification as SSCD, successfully proved this identity
as SSCD to the CGA, and whether this identity is linked to the legitimate holder of the device
as applicant for the certificate.
5.2.7 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp
CGA trusted channel for SVD import
The CGA shall detect alteration of the SVD imported from the TOE with the claimed identity
of the SSCD.
Application Note 7 The developer prepares the TOE for the delivery to the customer
(i.e. the SSCD provisioning service) in the development phase, not addressed by security
objectives for the operational environment. The SSCD provisioning service performs
initialization and personalization as TOE for the legitimate user (i.e. the device holder). If the
TOE is delivered to the device holder with SCD, the TOE is an SSCD. This situation is
addressed by OE.SSCD_Prov_Service except for the additional initialization of the TOE for
proof as SSCD and trusted channel to the CGA. If the TOE is delivered to the device holder
without SCD, the TOE will be an SSCD only after generation of the first SCD/SVD pair.
Because this SCD/SVD pair generation is performed by the Signatory in the operational use
stage, the TOE provides additional security functionality addressed by
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp. But this security functionality must be
initialized by the SSCD provisioning service as described in OE.Dev_Prov_Service.
Therefore, PP Part 4 [R19] substitutes OE.SSCD_Prov_Service by OE.Dev_Prov_Service,
allowing generation of the first SCD/SVD pair after delivery of the TOE to the device holder
and requiring initialization of security functionality of the TOE. Nevertheless, the additional
security functionality must be used by the operational environment as described in
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth and OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. This approach does not weaken the
security objectives and requirements for the TOE, but enforces more security functionalities
of the TOE for additional methods of use. Therefore, it does not conflict with the CC
conformance claim to PP Part 2 [R18].
Here below are the security objectives for the operational environment defined in PP Part 5
[R20].
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5.2.8 OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp
HID trusted channel for VAD export
The HID provides the human interface for user authentication. The HID will ensure
confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed,
including export to the TOE by means of a trusted channel.
Application Note 8 This security objective for the TOE is partly covering OE.HID_VAD
from PP Part 2 [R18]. While OE.HID_VAD in PP Part 2 requires only the operational
environment to protect VAD, this PP requires the HID and the TOE to implement a trusted
channel for the protection of the VAD: the HID exports the VAD and establishes one end of
the trusted channel according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp, the TOE imports VAD at the other
end of the trusted channel according to OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp. Therefore, PP Part 5 [R20]
partly re-assigns the VAD protection from the operational environment as described by
OE.HID_VAD to the TOE as described by OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp, and leaves only the
necessary functionality by the HID.
5.2.9 OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp
SCA trusted channel for DTBS export
The SCA provides a trusted channel to the TOE for the protection of the integrity of the
DTBS, to ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered undetected in transit between the SCA
and the TOE.
Application Note 9 This security objective for the TOE is partly covering
OE.DTBS_Protect from PP Part 2 [R18]. While OE.DTBS_Protect in PP Part 2 requires only
the operational environment to protect DTBS, this PP requires the SCA and the TOE to
implement a trusted channel for the protection of the DTBS: the SCA exports the DTBS and
establishes one end of the trusted channel according to OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, the TOE
imports DTBS at the other end of the trusted channel according to OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp.
Therefore, PP Part 5 [R20] partly re-assigns the DTBS protection from the operational
environment as described by OE.DTBS_Protect to the TOE as described by
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp, and leaves only the necessary functionality by the SCA.
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6. Security objectives rationale
6.1 Coverage of security objectives
Table 6-1 and Table 6-2 map the elements of the security problem definition to the security
objectives for the TOE and for the operational environment, respectively. The rows are split
according to the kind of element (threats, OSPs, assumptions), while the columns are split
according to the source of the security objectives (PP Part 2 [R18], PP Part 4 [R19], PP Part
5 [R20], or this security target).
Table 6-1 Mapping of the security problem definition to the security objectives for the TOE
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.AC_Pre-pers
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Abuse-Func
T.SCD_Divulg X
T.SCD_Derive X X
T.Hack_Phys X X X X
T.SVD_Forgery X X
T.SigF_Misuse X X X X X
T.DTBS_Forgery X X
T.Sig_Forgery X X
T.Abuse-Func X
P.CSP_QCert X X X
P.QSign X X
P.Sigy_SSCD X X X X X X X X X X X
P.Sig_Non-Repud X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
P.Manufact X X
P.Personalization X X X
A.CGA
A.SCA
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Table 6-2 Mapping of the security problem definition to the security objectives for the
operational environment
OE.SVD_Auth
OE.CGA_QCert
OE.DTBS_Intend
OE.Signatory
OE.Dev_Prov_Service
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp
OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp
T.SCD_Divulg
T.SCD_Derive
T.Hack_Phys
T.SVD_Forgery X X
T.SigF_Misuse X X X X
T.DTBS_Forgery X X
T.Sig_Forgery X
T.Abuse-Func
P.CSP_QCert X X
P.QSign X X
P.Sigy_SSCD X X X
P.Sig_Non-Repud X X X X X X X X X
P.Manufact X
P.Personalization X
A.CGA X X
A.SCA X
6.2 Sufficiency of security objectives
In PP Part 4 [R19], the rationale for T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive, T.Hack_Phys,
T.SigF_Misuse, T.DTBS_Forgery, T.Sig_Forgery, P.QSign, A.CGA, and A.SCA remains
unchanged as given in PP Part 2 [R18], section 7.3.2. The rationale how security objectives
address threat T.SVD_Forgery and policies P.CSP_QCert, P.Sigy_SSCD, and P.Sig_Non-
Repud changes as reported below.
In PP Part 5 [R20], the rationale for T.Hack_Phys, T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive,
T.Sig_Forgery, T.SVD_Forgery, P.CSP_QCert, P.QSign, P.Sigy_SSCD, A.CGA, and
A.SCA remains unchanged as given in PP Part 2 [R18], section 7.3.2. The rationale how
security objectives address threats T.DTBS_Forgery, T.SigF_Misuse and policy P.Sig_Non-
Repud changes as reported below.
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Here below is the rationale borrowed from PP Part 2 [R18].
T.SCD_Divulg (Storage, copy, and release of Signature Creation Data) addresses the
threat against the legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying of SCD
outside the TOE, as expressed in recital (18) of [R22]. This threat is countered by
OT.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD used for signature creation.
T.SCD_Derive (Derivation of Signature Creation Data) deals with attacks on the SCD via
publicly known data produced by the TOE, which are the SVD and the signatures created
with the SCD. OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen counters this threat by implementing
cryptographically secure generation of the SCD/SVD pair. OT.Sig_Secure ensures
cryptographically secure electronic signatures.
T.Hack_Phys (Physical attacks through TOE interfaces) deals with physical attacks
exploiting physical vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of
the SCD. OT.EMSEC_Design counters physical attacks through the TOE interfaces and
observation of TOE emanations. OT.Tamper_ID and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the
threat by detecting and by resisting tampering attacks.
T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the electronic signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the
electronic signature. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Unique, and OE.CGA_QCert address this
threat in general. OT.Sig_Secure ensures by means of robust cryptographic techniques that
the signed data and the electronic signature are securely linked together. OT.SCD_Unique
ensures that the same SCD cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding
SVD cannot be included in another certificate by chance. OE.CGA_QCert prevents forgery
of the certificate for the corresponding SVD, which would result in false verification decision
concerning a forged signature.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) states that the TOE and the SCA may be
employed to sign data with an advanced electronic signature, which is a qualified electronic
signature if based on a valid qualified certificate. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures Signatory’s sole
control of the SCD by requiring the TOE to provide the signature creation function for the
legitimate Signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others. OT.Sig_Secure
ensures that the TOE creates electronic signatures which cannot be forged without
knowledge of the SCD, through robust encryption techniques. OE.CGA_QCert addresses
the requirement of qualified or non-qualified electronic certificates building a base for the
electronic signature. OE.DTBS_Intend ensures that the SCA provides only those DTBS to
the TOE, which the Signatory intends to sign.
A.CGA (Trustworthy Certificate Generation Application) establishes the protection of the
authenticity of the Signatory’s name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the advanced
signature of the CSP by means of the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert, which
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ensures the generation of qualified certificates, and by OE.SVD_Auth, which ensures the
protection of the integrity of the received SVD and the verification of the correspondence
between the SVD and the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the Signatory.
A.SCA (Trustworthy Signature Creation Application) establishes the trustworthiness of the
SCA with respect to generation of DTBS/R. This is addressed by OE.DTBS_Intend, which
ensures that the SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that have been presented to the
Signatory as DTBS and which the Signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate
for being signed by the TOE.
Here below is the rationale borrowed from PP Part 4 [R19].
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of Signature Verification Data) deals with the forgery of the SVD
exported by the TOE to the CGA for the generation of the certificate. The threat is addressed
by OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which ensures correspondence between SVD and SCD and
unambiguous reference of the SVD/SCD pair for the SVD export and signature creation with
the SCD, and by OE.SVD_Auth, which ensures the integrity of the SVD exported by the
TOE to the CGA and verification of the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of
the Signatory and the SVD in the input provided to the certificate generation function of the
CSP. Additionally, the threat is addressed by OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp, which ensures that
the TOE sends the SVD in a verifiable form through a trusted channel to the CGA, as well
as by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp, which provides verification of SVD authenticity by the CGA.
P.CSP_QCert (Qualified certificates) states that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to
sign data with (qualified) electronic signatures, as defined by [R22], article 5, paragraph 1.
[R22], recital (15) refers to SSCDs to ensure the functionality of advanced signatures.
OE.CGA_QCert addresses the requirement of qualified (or advanced) electronic signatures
as being based on qualified (or non-qualified) certificates. According to
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth, the copies of the TOE will hold unique identity and authentication
data as SSCD and provide security mechanisms enabling the CGA to identify and to
authenticate the TOE as SSCD. OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth ensures that the CSP checks the
proof that the device is an SSCD presented by the applicant. OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA corresponds to the SCD stored in
the TOE and used by the Signatory. OT.Lifecycle_Security ensures that the TOE detects
flaws during initialization, personalization, and operational usage.
P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as Secure Signature Creation Device) requires the TOE to meet [R22],
Annex III. Paragraph 1(a) of Annex III is ensured by OT.SCD_Unique, requiring that the
SCD used for signature creation can practically occur only once. OT.SCD_Secrecy,
OT.Sig_Secure, OT.EMSEC_Design, and OT.Tamper_Resistance address the secrecy
of the SCD (cf. paragraph 1(a) of Annex III). OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet
the requirement in paragraph 1(b) of Annex III by the requirement to ensure that the SCD
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cannot be derived from SVD, the electronic signatures, or any other data exported outside
the TOE. OT.Sigy_SigF meets the requirement in paragraph 1(c) of Annex III by the
requirement to ensure that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the
legitimate Signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE meets the requirement in paragraph 2 of Annex III as the TOE
must not alter the DTBS/R. The usage of SCD under sole control of the Signatory is ensured
by OT.Lifecycle_Security, OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, and OT.Sigy_SigF.
OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the legitimate user obtains a TOE sample as an
authentic, initialized, and personalized TOE from an SSCD provisioning service through the
TOE delivery procedure. If the TOE implements SCD generated under control of the SSCD
provisioning service, the legitimate user receives the TOE as SSCD. If the TOE is delivered
to the legitimate user without SCD, in the operational phase the user applies for the
(qualified) certificate as the device holder and legitimate user of the TOE. The CSP will use
the TOE security feature (addressed by security objectives OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp) to check whether the device presented is an SSCD linked to the
applicant, as required by OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth, and whether the received SVD is sent by
this SSCD, as required by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. Thus, the obligation of the SSCD
provisioning service for the first SCD/SVD pair is complemented in an appropriate way by
the CSP for the SCD/SVD pair generated outside a secure preparation environment.
Here below is the rationale borrowed from PP Part 5 [R20].
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat
of misuse of the TOE signature creation function to create an SDO by others than the
Signatory, or to create an electronic signature on data for which the Signatory has not
expressed the intent to sign, as required by paragraph 1(c) of [R22], Annex III.
OT.Lifecycle_Security requires the TOE to detect flaws during initialization,
personalization, and operational usage, including secure destruction of the SCD, which may
be initiated by the Signatory. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures that the TOE provides the signature
creation function for the legitimate Signatory only. OE.DTBS_Intend ensures that the SCA
sends the DTBS/R only for data that the Signatory intends to sign. The combination of
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp and OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp counters the undetected
manipulation of the DTBS during the transmission from the SCA to the TOE.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE prevents the DTBS/R from alteration inside the TOE. If the SCA
provides a human interface for user authentication, OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp requires the HID
to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication
method employed. The HID and the TOE will protect the VAD by a trusted channel between
them according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp and OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp. OE.Signatory
ensures that the Signatory checks that an SCD stored in the SSCD, when received from an
SSCD provisioning service provider, is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used
before the Signatory obtains control over the SSCD. OE.Signatory also ensures that the
Signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
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T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS/R) addresses the threat arising from modifications
of the DTBS/R sent to the TOE for signing, which then does not match the DTBS/R
corresponding to the DTBS that the Signatory intends to sign. The threat is addressed by
security objectives OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp and OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, which ensure
that the DTBS/R is sent through a trusted channel and cannot be altered undetected in
transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE counters internally this threat by means of
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE, ensuring the integrity of the DTBS/R inside the TOE. The TOE
IT environment also addresses the threat by means of OE.DTBS_Intend, which ensures
that the trustworthy SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as
DTBS and which the Signatory intends to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
Here below is the rationale for policy P.Sig_Non-Repud, resulting from the combination of
the rationales provided in PP Part 4 [R19] and PP Part 5 [R20].
P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed data
by the Signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD
contained in their certificate valid at the time of signature creation. This policy is implemented
by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment,
that ensure the aspects of Signatory’s sole control over and responsibility for the electronic
signatures generated with the TOE. OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the Signatory uses
an authentic TOE, initialized and personalized for the Signatory. OE.CGA_QCert ensures
that the certificate allows to identify the Signatory and thus to link the SVD to the Signatory.
OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to ensure authenticity of the
SVD as being exported by the TOE and used under sole control of the Signatory.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE corresponds to the
SCD that is implemented in the TOE. OT.SCD_Unique ensures that the Signatory’s SCD
can practically occur just once.
OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory checks that the SCD stored in the SSCD received
from an SSCD provisioning service is in non-operational state (i.e. the SCD cannot be used
before the Signatory obtains sole control over the SSCD). The TOE security feature
addressed by security objectives OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp,
supported by OE.Dev_Prov_Service, enables the verification whether the device presented
by the applicant is an SSCD, as required by OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth, and whether the
received SVD is sent by the device holding the corresponding SCD, as required by
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures that only the Signatory may use the TOE
for signature creation. As prerequisite, OE.Signatory ensures that the Signatory keeps their
VAD confidential. The confidentiality of VAD is protected during the transmission between
the HID and the TOE according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp and OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp.
OE.DTBS_Intend, OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE, OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, and
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp ensure that the TOE generates electronic signatures only for a
DTBS/R that the Signatory has decided to sign as DTBS. The robust cryptographic
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techniques required by OT.Sig_Secure ensure that only this SCD may generate a valid
electronic signature that can be successfully verified with the corresponding SVD used for
signature verification. Security objectives for the TOE OT.Lifecycle_Security,
OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.EMSEC_Design, OT.Tamper_ID, and OT.Tamper_Resistance
protect the SCD against any compromise.
Here below is the rationale for the elements of the security problem definition added in this
security target to those defined in the PPs.
T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of functionality) addresses attacks abusing pre-delivery functionality
of the TOE to manipulate or disclose the stored user or TSF data, as well as to disable or
bypass the TSF. OT.Abuse-Func ensures that the usage of functions having not to be used
after the delivery of the TOE is effectively prevented.
P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the e-Document) requires the storage of pre-personalization
data to be restricted to the Pre-personalization Agent, which is ensured by OT.AC_Pre-
pers. Furthermore, since access control requires user authentication, the secure storage of
the pre-personalization key and the personalization key prescribed by the policy is implied
by OT.AC_Pre-pers and OT.AC_Pers, respectively. Finally, the fact that the Pre-
personalization Agent acts on behalf of the SSCD provisioning service, as stated by the
policy, is implied by OE.Dev_Prov_Service, which puts the whole preparation of the TOE
for its use as SSCD on the part of the Signatory under the responsibility of the SSCD
provisioning service.
P.Personalization (Personalization of the e-Document) requires the storage of
personalization data to be restricted to the Personalization Agent, which is ensured by
OT.AC_Pers. Furthermore, since access control requires user authentication, the secure
storage of Administrator’s credentials and Signatory’s PACE key prescribed by the policy is
implied by OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen and OT.Sigy_SigF. Finally, the fact that the
Personalization Agent acts on behalf of the SSCD provisioning service, as stated by the
policy, is implied by OE.Dev_Prov_Service, which puts the whole preparation of the TOE
for its use as SSCD on the part of the Signatory under the responsibility of the SSCD
provisioning service.
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7. Extended components definition
7.1 Definition of family FPT_EMS
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE emanation) of class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined in PP Part 2 [R18] to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE.
The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data, where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks
are evaluation of TOE electromagnetic radiation, Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential
Power Analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation, etc.
Family FPT_EMS describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible
emanations. This family belongs to class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection.
Other families within class FPT do not cover TOE emanations.
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
Family behaviour: This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible
emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS.1 (TOE emanation) has two constituents:
• FPT_EMS.1.1 (Limit of emissions) requires not to emit intelligible emissions
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
• FPT_EMS.1.2 (Interface emanation) requires not to emit interface emanation
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation
FPT_EMS TOE emanation 1
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1:
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in
excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2:
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to
use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to
gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
7.2 Definition of family FIA_API
The additional family FIA_API (Authentication proof of identity) of class FIA (Identification
and authentication) is defined in PP Part 4 [R19] to describe the IT security functional
requirements of the TOE.
This family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity of the
TOE by an external entity, whereas the other families of class FIA address the verification
of the identity of an external entity.
FIA_API Authentication proof of identity
Family behaviour: This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove its
identity and to be verified by an external entity in the TOE IT
environment.
Component levelling:
Management: FIA_API.1
FIA_API Authentication proof of identity 1
1
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The following actions could be considered for the management
functions in FMT:
• Management of authentication information used to prove
the claimed identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication proof of identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1:
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authentication mechanism]
to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
7.3 Definition of family FMT_LIM
The additional family FMT_LIM (Limited capabilities and availability) of class FMT (Security
management) is defined in the PACE PP [R13] to describe the functional requirements for
the test features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements are defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of the functions of the TSF. No other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions
and by limiting their availability.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour: This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and
availability of functions in a combined manner. Note that
FDP_ACF [R15] restricts access to functions, whereas the
component FMT_LIM.1 (Limited capabilities) of this family
requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific
manner.
Component levelling:
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• FMT_LIM.1 (Limited capabilities) requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
• FMT_LIM.2 (Limited availability) requires that the TSF restricts the use of functions;
refer to FMT_LIM.1 (Limited capabilities). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE life cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1.1:
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)”, the following policy is enforced: [assignment:
limited capability and availability policy].
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1:
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”,
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
1
2
1
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the following policy is enforced: [assignment: limited capability
and availability policy].
Application Note 10 The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume
the existence of two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which
together shall provide protection in order to enforce the related policy. This also allows that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment, but its
capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced, or conversely (ii) the TSF is designed
with high functionality, but it is removed or disabled in the product in its user environment.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the related policy.
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8. Security functional requirements
Common Criteria allow several operations to be performed on functional requirements:
refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration (cf. [R14], section 8.1). Each of these
operations is used in this security target.
A (non-editorial) refinement operation is used to add details to a requirement, and thus
further restricts a requirement (as regards the distinction between editorial and non-editorial
refinements, cf. [R14], section 8.1.4). Non-editorial refinements of security requirements are
written in bold text for additions or changes, in strikethrough text for deletions, and those
made by the authors of this security target on the requirements borrowed from the PPs are
signalled by an application note.
A selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. A selection that has been made in the PPs is indicated as underlined text, and
the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections filled in by the authors
of this security target are written in underlined bold text, and the original text of the
component is given by a footnote.
An assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. An assignment that that has been made in the PPs is
indicated as underlined text, and the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
Assignments filled in by the authors of this security target are written in underlined bold
text, and the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
An iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/” and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
Table 8-1 maps each SFR stated in this security target to the PPs in which it is defined, if
any. Particularly, SFR FIA_UAU.1 is mapped to both PP Part 4 [R19] and PP Part 5 [R20]
since both PPs extend the formulation of the SFR given in PP Part 2 [R18]. Therefore, the
formulation of the SFR given in this security target results from the combination of those
given in PP Part 4 and PP Part 5.
Table 8-1 Mapping of the security functional requirements to the PPs
Security functional requirement PP Part 2 PP Part 4 PP Part 5
FCS_CKM.1 X
FCS_CKM.4 X
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Security functional requirement PP Part 2 PP Part 4 PP Part 5
FCS_COP.1 X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer X
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature creation X
FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation X
FDP_RIP.1 X
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X
FDP_DAU.2/SVD X
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS X
FIA_UID.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X X
FIA_AFL.1/Signatory X
FIA_AFL.1/Admin
FIA_AFL.1/Pre-pers
FIA_AFL.1/Pers
FIA_API.1 X
FMT_SMR.1/SSCD X
FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers
FMT_SMR.1/Pers
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MSA.1/Admin X
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory X
FMT_MSA.2 X
FMT_MSA.3 X
FMT_MSA.4 X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin X
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory X
FMT_MTD.1/Pre-pers
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Security functional requirement PP Part 2 PP Part 4 PP Part 5
FMT_MTD.1/Pers
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FPT_EMS.1 X
FPT_FLS.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X
FPT_TST.1 X
FTP_ITC.1/SVD X
FTP_ITC.1/VAD X
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS X
FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers
FTP_ITC.1/Pers
8.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic support
8.1.1 FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1:
The TSF shall generate SCD/SVD pairs in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm two-prime
RSA2 and specified cryptographic key sizes 2048, 3072 bits3
that meet the following: PKCS #1 [R38]4.
2 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
3 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
4 [assignment: list of standards]
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Application Note 11 The refinement in the element FCS_CKM.1.1 substitutes
“cryptographic keys” with “SCD/SVD pairs” because it clearly addresses the SCD/SVD key
generation.
8.1.2 FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1:
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method overwriting
with zeros5 that meets the following: none6.
8.1.3 FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1:
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation7 in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
with SHA-2568 and cryptographic key sizes 2048, 3072 bits9
5 [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
6 [assignment: list of standards]
7 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
8 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
9 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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that meet the following: PKCS #1 [R38], FIPS PUB 180-4
[R36]10.
8.2 Class FDP: User data protection
The security attributes of subjects and objects relevant for access control and the related
values are reported in Table 8-2.
Table 8-2 Security attributes of subjects and objects for access control
Subject or object Security attribute Security attribute values
S.User Role R.Admin, R.Sigy
S.User SCD/SVD management authorized, not authorized
SCD SCD operational yes, no
SCD SCD identifier arbitrary value
SVD - -
DTBS/R - -
Application Note 12 DTBS/R has been added to the list of subjects and objects provided
in Table 8-2 because it is mentioned in SFRs FDP_ACC.1/Signature creation and
FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation.
The following data persistently stored by the TOE shall have the user data attribute “integrity
checked persistent stored data”:
• SCD,
• SVD.
The DTBS/R temporarily stored by the TOE has the user data attribute “integrity checked
stored data”.
8.2.1 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
Subset access control – SCD/SVD generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
10 [assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation:
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP11 on
• subjects: S.User,
• objects: SCD, SVD,
• operations: generation of SCD/SVD pairs12.
8.2.2 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
Security attribute based access control – SCD/SVD generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation:
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP13 to
objects based on the following: the user S.User is associated
with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management”14.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SCD/SVD_Generation:
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set
to “authorized” is allowed to generate SCD/SVD pairs15.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SCD/SVD_Generation:
11 [assignment: access control SFP]
12 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
13 [assignment: access control SFP]
14 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
15 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
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The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none16.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SCD/SVD_Generation:
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set
to “not authorized” is not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pairs17.
Application Note 13 Both the Administrator and the Signatory are allowed to generate
SCD/SVD pairs (cf. section 2.2.2).
8.2.3 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer
Subset access control – SVD transfer
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP18 on
• subjects: S.User,
• objects: SVD,
• operations: export19.
8.2.4 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
Security attribute based access control – SVD transfer
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
16 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
17 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
18 [assignment: access control SFP]
19 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
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FDP_ACF.1.1/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP20 to objects
based on the following:
• the S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role”,
• the SVD21.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: R.Admin, R.Sigy22 are allowed to export SVD23.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none24.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SVD_Transfer:
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none25.
Application Note 14 Both the Administrator and the Signatory are allowed to export SVD
to the CGA in order to apply for certificates (cf. section 2.2.2).
8.2.5 FDP_ACC.1/Signature creation
Subset access control – Signature creation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/Signature_Creation:
20 [assignment: access control SFP]
21 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
22 [selection: R.Admin, R.Sigy]
23 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
24 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
25 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
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The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP26 on
• subjects: S.User,
• objects: DTBS/R, SCD,
• operations: signature creation27.
8.2.6 FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation
Security attribute based access control – Signature creation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/Signature_Creation:
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP28 to objects
based on the following:
• the user S.User is associated with the security attribute
“Role”, and
• the SCD with the security attribute “SCD operational”29.
FDP_ACF.1.2/Signature_Creation:
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R
with SCD whose security attribute “SCD operational” is set to
“yes”30.
FDP_ACF.1.3/Signature_Creation:
26 [assignment: access control SFP]
27 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
28 [assignment: access control SFP]
29 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
30 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
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The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none31.
FDP_ACF.1.4/Signature_Creation:
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules:
S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for
DTBS/R with SCD whose security attribute “SCD operational” is
set to “no”32.
8.2.7 FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1:
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the
resource from33 the following objects: SCD34.
Application Note 15 The identification of integrity checked data that appears just before
the statement of SFR FDP_SDI.2/Persistent within PP Part 2 [R18] has been moved to the
beginning of section 8.2 in this security target.
8.2.8 FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
Stored data integrity monitoring and action – Persistent data
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
31 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]
32 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
33 [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]
34 [assignment: list of objects]
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FDP_SDI.2.1/Persistent:
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled
by the TSF for integrity errors35 on all objects, based on the
following attributes: integrity checked stored data36.
FDP_SDI.2.2/Persistent:
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
• prohibit the use of the altered data,
• inform the S.Sigy about the integrity error37.
8.2.9 FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
Stored data integrity monitoring and action – DTBS
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/DTBS:
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled
by the TSF for integrity errors38 on all objects, based on the
following attributes: integrity checked stored DTBS39.
FDP_SDI.2.2/DTBS:
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
• prohibit the use of the altered data,
• inform the S.Sigy about the integrity error40.
Application Note 16 The integrity of TSF data like RAD is also protected to ensure the
effectiveness of the user authentication.
35 [assignment: integrity errors]
36 [assignment: user data attributes]
37 [assignment: action to be taken]
38 [assignment: integrity errors]
39 [assignment: user data attributes]
40 [assignment: action to be taken]
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8.2.10 FDP_DAU.2/SVD
Data authentication with identity of guarantor
Hierarchical to: FDP_DAU.1 Basic data authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FDP_DAU.2.1/SVD:
The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that
can be used as a guarantee of the validity of SVD41.
FDP_DAU.2.2/SVD:
The TSF shall provide the CGA42 with the ability to verify
evidence of the validity of the indicated information and the
identity of the user that generated the evidence.
Application Note 17 As a means to generate evidence that can be used by the CGA as
a guarantee of the validity of SVD, as well as of the identity of the corresponding legitimate
Signatory, the TOE SSCD application supports Client/Server Authentication compliant with
IAS ECC specification [R23]. For more details, cf. section 2.2.2.
8.2.11 FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1/DTBS:
41 [assignment: list of objects or information types]
42 [assignment: list of subjects]
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The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP43 to
receive44 user data in a manner protected from modification and
insertion45 errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/DTBS:
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification or insertion46 has occurred.
8.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication
8.3.1 FIA_UID.1
Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1:
The TSF shall allow
• self-test according to FPT_TST.1,
• establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and
the TOE by means of TSF required by
FTP_ITC.1/SVD,
• establishing a trusted channel between the HID and
the TOE by means of TSF required by
FTP_ITC.1/VAD,
• establishing a trusted channel between the Pre-
personalization Agent’s terminal and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers,
• establishing a trusted channel between the
Personalization Agent’s terminal and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/Pers,
43 [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
44 [selection: transmit, receive]
45 [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
46 [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
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• returning product information to the Pre-
personalization Agent47 48
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2:
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
Application Note 18 The TOE does not maintain any user identification information prior
to user authentication; namely, the user is regarded as an unidentified terminal until user
authentication is accomplished. Hence, this security target performs the assignment of the
bullet (2) in the element FIA_UID.1.1 of PP Part 2 [R18] by listing the same actions specified
in the statement of SFR FIA_UAU.1.
8.3.2 FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1:
The TSF shall allow
• self-test according to FPT_TST.1,
• identification of the user by means of TSF required by
FIA_UID.1,
• establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and the
TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SVD,
• establishing a trusted channel between the HID and the
TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/VAD,
• establishing a trusted channel between the Pre-
personalization Agent’s terminal and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers,
47 [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]
48 [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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• establishing a trusted channel between the
Personalization Agent’s terminal and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/Pers,
• returning product information to the Pre-
personalization Agent49 50
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2:
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions
on behalf of that user.
Application Note 19 The TOE does not maintain any user identification information prior
to user authentication; namely, the user is regarded as an unidentified terminal until user
authentication is accomplished. Hence, this security target refines the element FIA_UAU.1.1
by deleting the bullet (2).
Application Note 20 PP Part 4 [R19] performs the assignment of the bullet (3) in the
element FIA_UAU.1.1 of PP Part 2 [R18] by adding the establishment of a trusted channel
to the CGA.
Application Note 21 PP Part 5 [R20] performs the assignment of the bullet (3) in the
element FIA_UAU.1.1 of PP Part 2 [R18] by adding the establishment of a trusted channel
to the HID.
Application Note 22 During TOE pre-personalization (cf. section 2.3.2), the Pre-
personalization Agent can retrieve product information before authentication and then
establish a trusted channel with the TOE through a CPS authentication following EMV CPS
specification [R21]. For further information, cf. the pre-personalization guidance [R6].
Application Note 23 During TOE personalization (cf. section 2.3.3), the Personalization
Agent can establish a trusted channel with the TOE through a CPS authentication following
EMV CPS specification [R21]. Any other operation, including product information retrieval,
requires CPS authentication as a precondition. For more information, cf. the personalization
guidance [R7].
49 [assignment: list of additional TSF-mediated actions]
50 [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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Application Note 24 During TOE operational use (cf. section 2.3.4), users can establish
a trusted channel with the TOE by means of a PACE authentication compliant with ICAO
Doc 9303 [R25]. Any other operation, including product information retrieval, requires PACE
authentication as a precondition. For more information, cf. section 2.2 and the operational
user guidance [R8].
8.3.3 FIA_AFL.1/Signatory
Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1/Signatory:
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within the range between 1 and 25551
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
consecutive failed authentication attempts52 with respect to
RAD.
FIA_AFL.1.2/Signatory:
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met53, the TSF shall block RAD54.
Application Note 25 This security target refines the element FIA_AFL.1.1/Signatory to
specify that it refers to consecutive failed authentication attempts with respect to the RAD.
Application Note 26 Distinct thresholds within the specified range apply to both steps of
Signatory’s authentication with respect to the RAD, namely PACE authentication and
password verification (cf. section 2.2.1). If the threshold for PACE authentication attempts is
reached, the outcome of subsequent attempts is returned with a delay of a few seconds until
a successful authentication is performed. If the threshold for password verification attempts
is reached, the password is blocked, which enforces the block of the RAD as a whole.
51 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
52 [assignment: list of authentication events]
53 [selection: met, surpassed]
54 [assignment: list of actions]
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The threshold for PACE authentication is set by the subject that creates Signatory’s PACE
key, namely the Pre-personalization Agent (cf. section 2.3.2), on behalf of the SSCD
provisioning service.
The threshold for password verification is set by the subject that creates Signatory’s
passwords, namely the Personalization Agent (cf. section 2.3.3), on behalf of the SSCD
provisioning service.
8.3.4 FIA_AFL.1/Admin
Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1/Admin:
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within the range between 1 and 25555
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
consecutive failed authentication attempts with respect to
the Administrator’s credentials56.
FIA_AFL.1.2/Admin:
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met57, the TSF shall block the
Administrator’s credentials58.
Application Note 27 Distinct thresholds within the specified range apply to both steps of
Administrator’s authentication, namely PACE authentication and password verification (cf.
section 2.2.1). If the threshold for PACE authentication attempts is reached, the outcome of
subsequent attempts is returned with a delay of a few seconds until a successful
authentication is performed. If the threshold for password verification attempts is reached,
the password is blocked, which enforces the block of the Administrator’s credentials as a
whole.
55 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
56 [assignment: list of authentication events]
57 [selection: met, surpassed]
58 [assignment: list of actions]
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The threshold for PACE authentication is set by the subject that creates Administrator’s
PACE key, namely the Pre-personalization Agent (cf. section 2.3.2), on behalf of the SSCD
provisioning service.
The threshold for password verification is set by the subject that creates Administrator’s
password, namely the Personalization Agent (cf. section 2.3.3), on behalf of the SSCD
provisioning service.
8.3.5 FIA_AFL.1/Pre-pers
Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1/Pre-pers:
The TSF shall detect when 363 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication
attempts with respect to the pre-personalization key64.
FIA_AFL.1.2/Pre-pers:
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met65, the TSF shall block the pre-
personalization key66.
8.3.6 FIA_AFL.1/Pers
Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
59 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
60 [assignment: list of authentication events]
61 [selection: met, surpassed]
62 [assignment: list of actions]
63 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
64 [assignment: list of authentication events]
65 [selection: met, surpassed]
66 [assignment: list of actions]
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FIA_AFL.1.1/Pers:
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within the range between 1 and 1567
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
consecutive failed authentication attempts with respect to
the personalization key68.
FIA_AFL.1.2/Pers:
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met69, the TSF shall block the
personalization key70.
Application Note 28 The threshold for authentication with respect to the personalization
key is set by the subject writing the key, namely the Pre-personalization Agent (cf. section
2.3.2), on behalf of the SSCD provisioning service.
8.3.7 FIA_API.1
Authentication proof of identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1:
The TSF shall provide Client/Server Authentication
compliant with IAS ECC specification [R23]71 to prove the
identity of the SSCD72.
Application Note 29 Via Client/Server Authentication, the TOE is able to authenticate
itself as SSCD to the CGA (cf. section 2.2.2), using authentication data implemented in the
TOE before the SSCD preparation phase (cf. section 2.3).
67 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
68 [assignment: list of authentication events]
69 [selection: met, surpassed]
70 [assignment: list of actions]
71 [assignment: authentication mechanism]
72 [assignment: authorized user or role]
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8.4 Class FMT: Security management
8.4.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1/SSCD:
The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy73.
FMT_SMR.1.2/SSCD:
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
8.4.2 FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers
Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1/Pre-pers:
The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Pre-pers75.
FMT_SMR.1.2/Pre-pers:
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
8.4.3 FMT_SMR.1/Pers
Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
73 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
74 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
75 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1/Pers:
The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Pers76.
FMT_SMR.1.2/Pers:
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
8.4.4 FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1:
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions:
• creation and modification of RAD,
• enabling the signature creation function,
• modification of the security attributes “SCD/SVD
management”, “SCD operational”,
• change the default value of the security attribute “SCD
identifier”,
• unblock of RAD,
• writing pre-personalization data,
• writing personalization data77 78.
8.4.5 FMT_MOF.1
Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
76 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
77 [assignment: list of other security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
78 [assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
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Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MOF.1.1:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable79 the functions
signature creation function80 to R.Sigy81.
8.4.6 FMT_MSA.1/Admin
Management of security attributes – Administrator
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/Admin:
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP82 to
restrict the ability to modify, none83 84 the security attributes
“SCD/SVD management”85 to R.Admin86.
8.4.7 FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
Management of security attributes – Signatory
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
79 [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]
80 [assignment: list of functions]
81 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
82 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
83 [assignment: other operations]
84 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
85 [assignment: list of security attributes]
86 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/Signatory:
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP87 to restrict
the ability to modify88 the security attributes “SCD operational”89
to R.Sigy90.
8.4.8 FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.2.1:
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
“SCD/SVD management” and “SCD operational”91.
Application Note 30 Since the TOE supports generation of SCD/SVD pairs on the part
of both the Administrator and the Signatory and a trusted channel for export of the SVD to
the CGA, the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” is set to “yes” for both of subjects
S.Admin and S.Sigy (cf. sections 2.2.2, 2.3).
8.4.9 FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
87 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
88 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
89 [assignment: list of security attributes]
90 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
91 [assignment: list of security attributes]
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FMT_MSA.3.1:
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP, SVD
Transfer SFP, and Signature Creation SFP92 to provide
restrictive93 default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2:
The TSF shall allow the R.Admin94 to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
8.4.10 FMT_MSA.4
Security attribute value inheritance
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.4.1:
The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security
attributes:
• If S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair
without S.Sigy being authenticated, the security attribute
“SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to “no” as a
single operation.
• If S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair, the
security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD shall be
set to “yes” as a single operation95.
8.4.11 FMT_MTD.1/Admin
Management of TSF data – Administrator
92 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
93 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
94 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
95 [assignment: rules for setting the values of security attributes]
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Admin:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create96 the RAD97 to
R.Admin98.
8.4.12 FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
Management of TSF data – Signatory
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Signatory:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify, unblock99 100 the
RAD101 to R.Sigy102.
8.4.13 FMT_MTD.1/Pre-pers
Management of TSF data – Pre-personalization Agent
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
96 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
97 [assignment: list of TSF data]
98 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
99 [assignment: other operations]
100 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
101 [assignment: list of TSF data]
102 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
103 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
104 [assignment: list of TSF data]
105 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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FMT_MTD.1.1/Pre-pers:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write106 the pre-
personalization data107 to R.Pre-pers108.
8.4.14 FMT_MTD.1/Pers
Management of TSF data – Personalization Agent
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Pers:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write109 the personalization
data110 to R.Pers111.
8.4.15 FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1.1:
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)”, the following policy is enforced: deploying test
features after TOE delivery does not allow user data of the
TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be
disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed, or
any substantial information about the construction of the
TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks112.
106 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
107 [assignment: list of TSF data]
108 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
109 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
110 [assignment: list of TSF data]
111 [assignment: the authorized identified roles]
112 [assignment: limited capability and availability policy]
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8.4.16 FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1:
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”,
the following policy is enforced: deploying test features after
TOE delivery does not allow user data of the TOE to be
disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or
manipulated, software to be reconstructed, or any
substantial information about the construction of the TSF
to be gathered which may enable other attacks113.
8.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
8.5.1 FPT_EMS.1
TOE emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1:
The TOE shall not emit any measurable emissions114 in
excess of intelligible thresholds115 enabling access to RAD116
and SCD117.
FPT_EMS.1.2:
113 [assignment: limited capability and availability policy]
114 [assignment: types of emissions]
115 [assignment: specified limits]
116 [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
117 [assignment: list of types of user data]
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The TSF shall ensure any users118 are unable to use the
following interface contact-based/contactless interface and
circuit contacts119 to gain access to RAD120 and SCD121.
Application Note 31 The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret
data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE.
Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE, or may origin from internal
operation of the TOE, or may origin by an attacker that varies the physical environment
under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced
by the technology employed to implement the TOE. Examples of measurable phenomena
are variations in the power consumption, the timing of transitions of internal states,
electromagnetic radiation due to internal operation, radio emission. Due to the
heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such emanations, evaluation
against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE is
assumed. Examples of such attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA),
timing attacks, etc.
8.5.2 FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1:
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur:
• self-test according to FPT_TST fails,
• a physical attack is detected122 123.
Application Note 32 The assignments address failures detected by a failed self-test or
revealing the occurrence of a physical attack, and requiring appropriate action to prevent
118 [assignment: type of users]
119 [assignment: type of connection]
120 [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
121 [assignment: list of types of user data]
122 [assignment: list of other types of failures in the TSF]
123 [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
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security violations. When the TOE is in a secure state, the TSF shall not perform any
cryptographic operations, and all data output interfaces shall be inhibited by the TSF.
8.5.3 FPT_PHP.1
Passive detection of physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.1.1:
The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical
tampering that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2:
The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether
physical tampering with the TSF’s devices or TSF’s elements
has occurred.
8.5.4 FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1:
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical
probing124 to the TSF125 by responding automatically such that
the SFRs are always enforced.
Application Note 33 The TOE implements appropriate measures to continuously counter
physical tampering which may compromise the SCD. The “automatic response” in the
element FPT_PHP.3.1 means (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time, and
(ii) countermeasures are provided at any time. Due to the nature of these attacks, the TOE
can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements (e.g. the TOE is destroyed). But
124 [assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
125 [assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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physical tampering does not reveal information of the SCD. E.g. the TOE may be physically
tampered in the power-off state of the TOE, which does not allow the TSF for overwriting
the SCD, but leads to physical destruction of the memory and all information therein about
the SCD. In case of physical tampering, the TSF may not provide the intended functions for
SCD/SVD pair generation or signature creation, but ensures the confidentiality of the SCD
by blocking these functions. The SFR FPT_PHP.1 requires the TSF to react to physical
tampering in such a way that the Signatory is able to determine whether the TOE was
physically tampered or not. The guidance documentation identifies the failure of TOE start-
up as an indication of physical tampering [R6] [R7] [R8].
8.5.5 FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1:
The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up,
and at the conditions: before any use of TSF data126 to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF127.
FPT_TST.1.2:
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF data128.
FPT_TST.1.3:
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF129.
8.6 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels
126 [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized
user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]]
127 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
128 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
129 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]
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8.6.1 FTP_ITC.1/SVD
Inter-TSF trusted channel – SVD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/SVD:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product CGA that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/SVD:
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product130 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/SVD:
The TSF or the CGA shall initiate communication via the
trusted channel for
• data authentication with identity of guarantor according to
FIA_API.1 and FDP_DAU.2/SVD,
• import of certificate info from the CGA131 132.
Application Note 34 The component FTP_ITC.1/SVD requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the CGA to export the SVD to the CGA. Moreover, the TSF
requires the use of the same trusted channel for the import of certificate info from the CGA
(cf. section 2.2.2).
8.6.2 FTP_ITC.1/VAD
Inter-TSF trusted channel – VAD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
130 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
131 [assignment: list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
132 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/VAD:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product HID that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/VAD:
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product133 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/VAD:
The TSF or the HID shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for
• user authentication according to FIA_UAU.1,
• import of a new value of the RAD from the HID134 135.
Application Note 35 The component FTP_ITC.1/VAD requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the HID to import the VAD from the HID. In more detail, the
trusted channel is opened by means of PACE authentication using a key derived from the
first VAD component, i.e. Signatory’s password #1, and then the second VAD component,
i.e. Signatory’s password #2, must be sent to the TSF over this trusted channel. Moreover,
the TSF requires the use of the same trusted channel for the import of a new value of the
RAD from the HID (cf. section 2.2.1).
8.6.3 FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
Inter-TSF trusted channel – DTBS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/DTBS:
133 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
134 [assignment: list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
135 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product SCA that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/DTBS:
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product136 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/DTBS:
The TSF or the SCA shall initiate communication via the
trusted channel for
• signature creation,
• export of digital signatures to the SCA137 138.
Application Note 36 The component FTP_ITC.1/DTBS requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the SCA to import the DTBS from the SCA. Moreover, the
TSF requires the use of the same trusted channel for the export of digital signatures to the
SCA (cf. section 2.2.3).
8.6.4 FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers
Inter-TSF trusted channel – Pre-personalization data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/Pre-pers:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product, the Pre-personalization
Agent’s terminal, that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of
136 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
137 [assignment: list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
138 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
139 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
140 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/Pre-pers:
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product141 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/Pre-pers:
The TSF or the Pre-personalization Agent’s terminal shall
initiate communication via the trusted channel for import of
pre-personalization data from the terminal142.
Application Note 38 The component FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the Pre-personalization Agent’s terminal to import pre-
personalization data from the terminal. This trusted channel is established through a CPS
authentication and uses cryptographic algorithm TDES [R35]. For further information, cf.
EMV CPS specification [R21] and the pre-personalization guidance [R6].
8.6.5 FTP_ITC.1/Pers
Inter-TSF trusted channel – Personalization data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/Pers:
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product, the Personalization Agent’s
terminal, that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/Pers:
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product143 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
141 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
142 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
143 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
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FTP_ITC.1.3/Pers:
The TSF or the Personalization Agent’s terminal shall initiate
communication via the trusted channel for import of
personalization data from the terminal144.
Application Note 39 The component FTP_ITC.1/Pers requires the TSF to enforce a
trusted channel established by the Personalization Agent’s terminal to import
personalization data from the terminal. This trusted channel is established through a CPS
authentication and uses cryptographic algorithm TDES [R35]. For further information, cf.
EMV CPS specification [R21] and the personalization guidance [R7].
144 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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9. Security assurance requirements
The Evaluation Assurance Level claimed by this security target is EAL5 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 [R16] (cf. section 3.2). Moreover, the refinements to security
assurance requirements for composite product evaluations are also applied [R34].
Table 9-1 summarizes the security assurance requirements enforced by this security target.
Table 9-1 Security assurance requirements: EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV
Development
ADV_ARC.1
Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5
Complete semiformal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_IMP.1
Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2
Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4
Semiformal modular design
AGD
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1
Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1
Preparative procedures
ALC
Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.5
Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1
Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1
Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.2
Compliance with implementation standards
ASE
Security target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1
Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1
Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1
ST introduction
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Assurance class Assurance components
ASE_OBJ.2
Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2
Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1
Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1
TOE summary specification
ATE
Tests
ATE_COV.2
Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3
Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing
ATE_IND.2
Independent testing - sample
AVA
Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.5
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
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10. Security requirements rationale
10.1 Coverage of security functional requirements
Table 10-1 maps the security functional requirements to the security objectives for the TOE.
The rows are split according to SFR classes, while the columns are split according to the
source of the security objectives (PP Part 2 [R18], PP Part 4 [R19], PP Part 5 [R20], or this
security target).
Table 10-1 Mapping of the security functional requirements to the security objectives for
the TOE
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.AC_Pre-pers
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Abuse-Func
FCS_CKM.1 X X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1 X X
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
X X
FDP_ACF.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
X X
FDP_ACC.1/
SVD_Transfer
X X
FDP_ACF.1/
SVD_Transfer
X X
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature creation
X X
FDP_ACF.1/
Signature creation
X X
FDP_RIP.1 X X
FDP_SDI.2/
Persistent
X X X
FDP_SDI.2/
DTBS
X X
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OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.AC_Pre-pers
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Abuse-Func
FDP_DAU.2/
SVD
X
FDP_UIT.1/
DTBS
X
FIA_UID.1 X X X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X X X
FIA_AFL.1/
Signatory
X X
FIA_AFL.1/
Admin
X
FIA_AFL.1/
Pre-pers
X
FIA_AFL.1/
Pers
X
FIA_API.1 X
FMT_SMR.1/
SSCD
X X
FMT_SMR.1/
Pre-pers
X X
FMT_SMR.1/
Pers
X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X X X
FMT_MOF.1 X X
FMT_MSA.1/
Admin
X X
FMT_MSA.1/
Signatory
X X
FMT_MSA.2 X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X X X
FMT_MSA.4 X X X
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OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.AC_Pre-pers
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/
Admin
X X
FMT_MTD.1/
Signatory
X X
FMT_MTD.1/
Pre-pers
X
FMT_MTD.1/
Pers
X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FPT_EMS.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X X
FTP_ITC.1/
SVD
X
FTP_ITC.1/
VAD
X
FTP_ITC.1/
DTBS
X
FTP_ITC.1/
Pre-pers
X
FTP_ITC.1/
Pers
X
10.2 Sufficiency of security functional requirements
Here below is the rationale for the security objectives borrowed from PP Part 2 [R18].
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OT.Lifecycle_Security (Life cycle security) is provided by the SFRs for SCD/SVD
generation FCS_CKM.1, SCD usage FCS_COP.1, and SCD destruction FCS_CKM.4,
which ensure a cryptographically secure life cycle of the SCD. The SCD/SVD generation is
controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation. The SVD transfer for certificate generation is
controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer. The SCD usage is ensured by access control
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation, FDP_AFC.1/Signature_Creation, which is based on
secure TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.4, FMT_MTD.1/Admin,
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1/SSCD, FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers, and
FMT_SMR.1/Pers. The test functions FPT_TST.1 provide failure detection throughout the
life cycle.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Authorized SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of
an SCD/SVD pair requires proper user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 provide user identification and user authentication prior to enabling access to
authorized functions. The SFRs FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation provide access control for the SCD/SVD generation.
The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialization. The SFR FMT_MSA.4
defines rules for inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD.
SFRs FIA_AFL.1/Signatory and FIA_AFL.1/Admin provide protection against trial-and-
error attacks (particularly, brute force attacks) with respect to the authentication credentials
of either of the two roles authorized to generate SCD/SVD pairs, i.e. the Signatory and the
Administrator.
OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of Signature Creation Data) implements the requirement of
practically unique SCD as laid down in [R22], Annex III, paragraph 1(a), which is provided
by the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD
corresponds to the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms
specified by FCS_CKM.1 to generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The security functions
specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the keys are not modified, so to retain the
correspondence. Moreover, the SCD identifier allows the environment to identify the SCD
and to link it with the appropriate SVD. The management functions identified by FMT_SMF.1
and by FMT_MSA.3 allow R.Admin to modify the default value of the security attribute “SCD
identifier”.
OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of Signature Creation Data) is provided by the security
functions specified by the following SFRs. FCS_CKM.1 ensures the use of secure
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cryptographic algorithms for SCD/SVD generation. Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pairs
shall prevent disclosure of SCD by cryptographic attacks using the publicly known SVD. The
security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual information
on SCD is destroyed after the SCD has been used for signature creation and that destruction
of SCD leaves no residual information.
The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data are
modified which could alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information on the
SCD. FPT_TST.1 tests the working conditions of the TOE, and FPT_FLS.1 guarantees a
secure state when integrity is violated and thus assures that the specified security functions
are operational. An example where compromising error conditions are countered by
FPT_FLS.1 is fault injection for Differential Fault Analysis (DFA).
SFRs FPT_EMS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE to ensure
the confidentiality of the SCD.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the
cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_COP.1, which ensures the cryptographic
robustness of the signature algorithms. FDP_SDI.2/Persistent corresponds to the integrity
of the SCD implemented by the TOE, and FPT_TST.1 ensures self-tests ensuring correct
signature creation.
OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate Signatory only) is provided by
SFRs for identification, authentication, and access control.
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 ensure that no signature creation function can be invoked before
the Signatory is identified and authenticated. The security functions specified by
FMT_MTD.1/Admin and FMT_MTD.1/Signatory manage the authentication function. SFR
FIA_AFL.1/Signatory provides protection against a number of attacks, such as
cryptographic extraction of residual information, or brute force attacks against
authentication. The security function specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS ensures the integrity of
stored DTBS, and FDP_RIP.1 prevents misuse of any resources containing the SCD after
de-allocation (e.g. after the signature creation process).
The security functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation and
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation provide access control based on the security attributes
managed according to the SFRs FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, and
FMT_MSA.4. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/SSCD list these management
functions and the roles. These ensure that the signature process is restricted to the
Signatory. FMT_MOF.1 restricts the ability to enable the signature creation function to the
Signatory. FMT_MSA.1/Signatory restricts the ability to modify the security attribute “SCD
operational” to the Signatory.
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OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensures that the DTBS/R is
not altered by the TOE. The integrity functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS require that
the DTBS/R has not been altered by the TOE.
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provision of physical emanations security) requires that no intelligible
information is emanated. This is provided by FPT_EMS.1.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by means of passive
detection of physical attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist physical
attacks.
Here below is the rationale for the security objectives borrowed from PP Part 4 [R19].
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth (Authentication proof as SSCD) requires the TOE to provide security
mechanisms to identify and to authenticate itself as SSCD, which is directly provided by
FIA_API.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.1 allows establishment of the trusted channel before the
(human) user is authenticated.
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (TOE trusted channel for SVD export) requires the TOE to provide
a trusted channel to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD exported to the CGA, which
is directly provided by:
• The SVD transfer for certificate generation is controlled by TSF according to
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer.
• FDP_DAU.2/SVD, which requires the TOE to provide the CGA with the ability to verify
evidence of the validity of the SVD and the identity of the user that generated the
evidence.
• FTP_ITC.1/SVD, which requires the TOE to provide a trusted channel to the CGA.
Here below is the rationale for the security objectives borrowed from PP Part 5 [R20].
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (TOE trusted channel for VAD import) is met by FTP_ITC.1/VAD,
which requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel to protect the VAD provided by the HID
to the TOE.
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (TOE trusted channel for DTBS import) is covered by
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS, which requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel to protect the DTBS
provided by the SCA to the TOE, and by FDP_UIT.1/DTBS, which requires the TSF to verify
the integrity of the received DTBS.
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Here below is the rationale for the security objectives added in this security target to those
defined in the PPs.
OT.AC_Pre-pers (Access control for the pre-personalization of the e-Document) is covered
by:
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1, which state that writing pre-personalization data requires
a previous authentication on the part of the Pre-personalization Agent;
• FIA_AFL.1/Pre-pers, which specifies how unsuccessful authentication attempts are
managed for the authentication as Pre-personalization Agent;
• FMT_MTD.1/Pre-pers (based on FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers and FMT_SMF.1), which
restricts the capability to write pre-personalization data to the Pre-personalization
Agent;
• FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers, which requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel for the
import of pre-personalization data, so as to ensure that the data actually written match
those sent by the Pre-personalization Agent.
OT.AC_Pers (Access control for the personalization of the e-Document) is covered by:
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1, which state that writing personalization data requires a
previous authentication on the part of the Personalization Agent;
• FIA_AFL.1/Pers, which specifies how unsuccessful authentication attempts are
managed for the authentication as Personalization Agent;
• FMT_MTD.1/Pers (based on FMT_SMR.1/Pers and FMT_SMF.1), which restricts
the capability to write personalization data to the Personalization Agent;
• FTP_ITC.1/Pers, which requires the TSF to enforce a trusted channel for the import
of personalization data, so as to ensure that the data actually written match those
sent by the Personalization Agent.
OT.Abuse-Func (Protection against abuse of functionality) is aimed at preventing TOE
functions not intended to be used after TOE delivery from manipulating or disclosing user
data, TSF data, or the TSF itself. This objective is covered by FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2,
which prevent abuse of test features of the TOE having not to be used after TOE delivery.
10.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements
Table 10-2 Satisfaction of dependencies of security functional requirements
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/
SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1/
SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACF.1/
SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SVD_Transfer
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1/
Signature_Creation
FDP_ACF.1/
Signature_Creation
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3
FDR_RIP.1 No dependencies -
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent No dependencies -
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS No dependencies -
FDP_DAU.2/SVD FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_AFL.1/Signatory FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FIA_AFL.1/Admin FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_AFL.1/Pre-pers FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_AFL.1/Pers FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_API.1 No dependencies -
FMT_SMR.1/SSCD FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMR.1/Pers FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies -
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.2
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation,
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
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Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FMT_MSA.4 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD/SVD_Generation,
FDP_ACC.1/
Signature_Creation
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Pre-pers
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Pers
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1/Pers
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies -
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies -
FPT_PHP.1 No dependencies -
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies -
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/SVD No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/VAD No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/Pers No dependencies -
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Table 10-3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security assurance requirements
Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
EAL5 package
Dependencies of the EAL5 package are not
reproduced here (cf. [R16])
By construction, all
dependencies are
satisfied in a CC EAL
package
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies -
AVA_VAN.5
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1145
ADV_FSP.4 ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1 ATE_DPT.3
10.4 Rationale for security assurance requirements
The assurance level for this security target is EAL5 augmented. EAL5 permits a developer
to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial
development practises, supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering
techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of
achieving EAL5 assurance. EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where
developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned
development and require a rigorous development approach, without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques (cf. [R16]).
The TOE described in this security target is just such a product. Augmentation results from
the selection of:
• ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”,
• AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”.
The selection of component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance on the security of the
development and manufacturing of the TOE.
The selection of component AVA_VAN.5 ensures that the TOE be resistant to penetration
attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential, which is necessary to
145 This assurance component and the subsequent ones are all included in the EAL5 package.
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meet security objectives OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF, and OT.Sig_Secure (cf. section
5.1).
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11. TOE summary specification
Table 11-1 describes how each security functional requirement claimed in this security target
is satisfied by the TOE.
Table 11-1 Implementation of the security functional requirements in the TOE
Security functional requirement Implementation
FCS_CKM.1
The private key objects storing the private keys meant for
signature creation (cf. section 2.3) contain an algorithm
identifier, as well as the length of the key to be
generated. Both fields refer to allowed values as
specified in the statement of the SFR.
FCS_CKM.4
The private key objects storing the private keys meant for
signature creation (cf. section 2.3) are overwritten with
zeros in case the keys are destroyed by the Signatory (cf.
section 2.3.4).
FCS_COP.1 As specified for SFR FCS_CKM.1.
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation As specified for SFR FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation.
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
The private key objects storing the private keys meant for
signature creation (cf. section 2.3) contain an access
condition for key generation, which refers to the logical
OR of Administrator’s and Signatory’s credentials (cf.
section 2.2.1).
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer As specified for SFR FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer.
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
The public key objects storing the public keys meant for
signature creation (cf. section 2.3) contain an access
condition for public key export, which refers to the logical
OR of Administrator’s and Signatory’s credentials (cf.
section 2.2.1).
FDP_ACC.1/Signature creation As specified for SFR FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation.
FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation
The private key objects storing the private keys meant for
signature creation (cf. section 2.3) contain an access
condition for signature creation, as well as a life cycle
state compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-9 [R33]. The access
condition refers to Signatory’s credentials (cf. section
2.2.1); moreover, signature creation is forbidden unless
the life cycle state matches “operational activated”.
FDP_RIP.1
Any volatile copy of, or pointer to, a private key meant for
signature creation is overwritten with zeros upon the
completion of either the generation of the key, or the
creation of a signature with the key.
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Security functional requirement Implementation
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
The private/public key objects storing the key pairs meant
for signature creation (cf. section 2.3) contain a CRC,
which is checked whenever the keys are used for
signature creation or public key export. In case such a
check fails, the OS enters an endless loop, so that the
resulting fall of communication informs the user about the
integrity error.
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
The volatile data structure storing the DTBS/R contains a
CRC, which is checked upon signature creation. In case
such a check fails, the OS enters an endless loop, so that
the resulting fall of communication informs the user about
the integrity error.
FDP_DAU.2/SVD Cf. Application Note 17.
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
DTBS/R import must be executed over the trusted
channel opened by means of Signatory’s PACE
authentication step (cf. sections 2.2.1, 2.2.3).
FIA_UID.1 Cf. Application Note 18.
FIA_UAU.1
Cf. Application Note 22, Application Note 23, Application
Note 24.
FIA_AFL.1/Signatory
The thresholds for authentication failures with respect to
the RAD are set by the actors that write the related
persistent objects (cf. Application Note 26).
The behaviour occurring if the thresholds are reached is
as specified in the statement of the SFR (cf. Application
Note 26).
FIA_AFL.1/Admin
The thresholds for authentication failures with respect to
the Administrator’s credentials are set by the actors that
write the related persistent objects (cf. Application Note
27).
The behaviour occurring if the thresholds are reached is
as specified in the statement of the SFR (cf. Application
Note 27).
FIA_AFL.1/Pre-pers
The threshold for authentication failures with respect to
the pre-personalization key is set by the actor that writes
the related persistent object, i.e. the IC Manufacturer
before TOE delivery (cf. section 2.3.2).
The behaviour occurring if the threshold is reached is as
specified in the statement of the SFR.
FIA_AFL.1/Pers
The threshold for authentication failures with respect to
the personalization key is set by the actor that writes the
related persistent object (cf. Application Note 28).
The behaviour occurring if the thresholds are reached is
as specified in the statement of the SFR.
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Security functional requirement Implementation
FIA_API.1 Cf. section 2.2.2.
FMT_SMR.1/SSCD
The Administrator and Signatory roles are distinguished
by storing the respective credentials into distinct file
system objects, viz. distinct PACE key objects and
password objects (cf. sections 2.2.1, 2.3), with distinct
identifiers. Then, upon user authentication, the OS keeps
track of the identifier of the employed credentials.
FMT_SMR.1/Pre-pers
The Pre-personalization Agent role is implicitly identified
via the corresponding authentication key.
FMT_SMR.1/Pers
The Personalization Agent role is implicitly identified
via the corresponding authentication key.
FMT_SMF.1 Cf. section 2.3.
FMT_MOF.1
The Signatory alone can activate the signature creation
function for each single private key, as specified for SFR
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory.
FMT_MSA.1/Admin
The private key objects storing the private keys meant for
signature creation (cf. section 2.3) contain an access
condition for key generation, which is assigned by the
Personalization Agent on behalf of the Administrator
upon creation of the objects (cf. section 2.3.3).
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
The private key objects storing the private keys meant for
signature creation (cf. section 2.3) contain an access
condition for the shift of the object life cycle state, which
refers to Signatory’s credentials, as well as the identifier
of Administrator’s credentials (cf. section 2.2.1).
Upon key generation, the private key object is shifted to
the “operational activated” state, unless the identifier of
the credentials employed for user authentication matches
the Administrator’s one stored in the object. In this case,
the object is shifted to the “operational deactivated” state,
and then the access condition allows the Signatory alone
to bring the state to “operational activated”.
FMT_MSA.2
As specified for SFRs FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory.
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Security functional requirement Implementation
FMT_MSA.3
The security attributes applying to key generation and
signature creation (as specified for SFRs
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation,
FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation), as well as those
applying to public key export (as specified for SFR
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer), respectively stored in
private and public key objects (cf. section 2.3), are
assigned by the Personalization Agent on behalf of the
Administrator upon creation of the objects (cf. section
2.3.3).
FMT_MSA.4 As specified for SFR FMT_MSA.1/Signatory.
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
The RAD is comprised of Signatory’s password #1 and
Signatory’s password #2 (cf. section 2.2.1).
The PACE key object storing the key derived from
Signatory’s password #1 (cf. section 2.3) is filled by the
Personalization Agent on behalf of the Administrator (cf.
section 2.3.3).
The password object storing Signatory’s password #2 (cf.
section 2.3) contains an access condition for password
initialization, which refers to Administrator’s credentials
(cf. section 2.2.1).
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
The RAD is comprised of Signatory’s password #1 and
Signatory’s password #2 (cf. section 2.2.1).
The PACE key object storing the key derived from
Signatory’s password #1 (cf. section 2.3) cannot be
modified (cf. section 2.2.1) and is never blocked (cf.
Application Note 26).
The password object storing Signatory’s password #2 (cf.
section 2.3) contains access conditions for password
modification and unblock, which refer to Signatory’s
credentials (cf. section 2.2.1).
FMT_MTD.1/Pre-pers
The command APDUs available for the writing of pre-
personalization data (cf. section 2.3.2) are protected by
an implicit access condition, which during pre-
personalization requires user authentication with respect
to the pre-personalization key.
FMT_MTD.1/Pers
The command APDUs available for the writing of
personalization data (cf. section 2.3.3) are protected by
an implicit access condition, which during personalization
requires user authentication with respect to the
personalization key.
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Security functional requirement Implementation
FMT_LIM.1
The test features of the OS, as well as the authentication
mechanism granting access to them, are permanently
disabled in the evaluated configuration of the OS.
As regards the test features of the IC, information on their
limitation is provided in the TOE summary specification of
the public security target of the supported IC for platform
SFRs FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 [R28].
FMT_LIM.2 As specified for SFR FMT_LIM.1.
FPT_EMS.1
Leakage of confidential data through side channels is
prevented by the security features of both the IC and the
OS, in accordance with the security recommendations
contained in the IC guidance documentation [R29] [R30]
[R31].
FPT_FLS.1
In case self-test fails or a physical attack is detected, the
OS enters an endless loop, so that all cryptographic
operations and data output interfaces are inhibited.
FPT_PHP.1
Detection of physical attacks is ensured by the security
features of both the IC and the OS, in accordance with
the security recommendations contained in the IC
guidance documentation [R29] [R30] [R31].
FPT_PHP.3
In case a physical attack is detected, the OS increments
an attack counter, stored in the IC persistent memory,
and then enters an endless loop. During initial start-up,
the OS checks whether the attack counter has reached
its threshold value, and enters an endless loop if this is
the case. Being executed at any start-up, this mechanism
ensures that all cryptographic operations and data output
interfaces are permanently inhibited.
FPT_TST.1
During initial start-up, the IC performs a self-test
procedure that tests alarm lines and environmental
sensor mechanisms (UmSLC test, cf. [R29] [R30] [R31]),
and the OS checks the integrity of the TSF by computing
a hash value of the code and comparing it with a
reference hash value stored internally. Moreover, the
integrity of TSF data is checked whenever they are used
(as specified for SFR FDP_SDI.2/Persistent as regards
private and public keys). In case any one of such checks
fails, the OS enters an endless loop, so that the resulting
fall of communication informs the user about the integrity
error.
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Cf. Application Note 34.
FTP_ITC.1/VAD Cf. Application Note 35.
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Cf. Application Note 36.
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Security functional requirement Implementation
FTP_ITC.1/Pre-pers Cf. Application Note 38.
FTP_ITC.1/Pers Cf. Application Note 39.
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12. References
12.1 Acronyms
AA Active Authentication
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BAC Basic Access Control
CC Common Criteria
CGA Certificate Generation Application
CPS Card Personalization Specification
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Certification Service Provider
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated/Directory File
DFA Differential Power Analysis
DTBS Data To Be Signed
DTBS/R Data To Be Signed Representation
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC European Citizen Card
EF Elementary File
FID File Identifier
HID Human Interface Device
IAS Identification Authentication Signature
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
LDS Logical Data Structure
MAC Message Authentication Code
MF Master File
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
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OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
PUC Personal Unblocking Code
RAD Reference Authentication Data
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCA Signature Creation Application
SCD Signature Creation Data
SCS Signature Creation System
SDO Signed Data Object
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA Simple Power Analysis
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Security Target
SVD Signature Verification Data
TDES Triple DES
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TR Technical Report
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VAD Verification Authentication Data
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12.2 Technical references
[R1] HID Global: Security Target for CELES-c001 Machine Readable Electronic
Document – ICAO Application – Basic Access Control, ref. TCAE160033
[R2] HID Global: Security Target Lite for CELES-c001 Machine Readable Electronic
Document – ICAO Application – Basic Access Control, ref. TCLE160036
[R3] HID Global: Security Target for CELES-c001 Machine Readable Electronic
Document – ICAO Application – EAC-PACE-AA, ref. TCAE160034
[R4] HID Global: Security Target Lite for CELES-c001 Machine Readable Electronic
Document – ICAO Application – EAC-PACE-AA, ref. TCAE160037
[R5] HID Global: Security Target for CELES-c001 Machine Readable Electronic
Document – SSCD Application, ref. TCAE160035
[R6] HID Global: Pre-personalization Guidance for CELES-c001 Machine Readable
Electronic Document – SSCD Application v1.3, ref. TCAE160027
[R7] HID Global: Personalization Guidance for CELES-c001 Machine Readable
Electronic Document – SSCD Application v1.3, ref. TCAE160028
[R8] HID Global: Operational User Guidance for CELES-c001 Machine Readable
Electronic Document – SSCD Application v1.3, ref. TCAE160029
[R9] HID Global: Secure Delivery Procedure, ref. TCAE110027
[R10] BSI: Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3-2018 for Infineon Security Controller
M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional
software from Infineon Technologies AG, 9 January 2018
[R11] BSI: Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Part 1: eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2
and EACv1, version 2.20, February 2015
[R12] BSI: Technical Guideline TR-03110-3, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Part 3: Common Specifications,
version 2.21, December 2016
[R13] BSI: Common Criteria Protection Profile, Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), version 1.01, July 2014, ref.
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01
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[R14] CCMB: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, ref. CCMB-2017-
04-001
[R15] CCMB: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security functional components, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, ref. CCMB-2017-
04-002
[R16] CCMB: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security assurance components, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, ref. CCMB-2017-
04-003
[R17] CCMB: Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation methodology, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, ref. CCMB-2017-04-004
[R18] CEN: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 2: Device with Key
Generation, version 2.0.1, ref. BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01, January 2012
[R19] CEN: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 4: Extension for
device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation
application, version 1.0.1, ref. BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012, November 2012
[R20] CEN: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device, Part 5: Extension for
device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation
application, version 1.0.1, ref. BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012, November 2012
[R21] EMV: Card Personalization Specification, version 1.0, June 2003
[R22] European Parliament: Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework for
electronic signatures, December 1999
[R23] GIXEL: European Card for e-Services and National e-ID Applications, IAS ECC,
Identification Authentication Signature European Citizen Card, Technical
Specifications, version 1.0.1, March 2008
[R24] ICAO: Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 10: Logical Data
Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless
Integrated Circuit (IC), Seventh Edition, 2015
[R25] ICAO: Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 11: Security
Mechanisms for MRTDs, Seventh Edition, 2015
[R26] ICAO: Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 12: Public Key
Infrastructure for MRTDs, Seventh Edition, 2015
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[R27] IETF Network Working Group: Request for Comments 2119, Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, March 1997
[R28] Infineon: Security Target Lite Common Criteria EAL6 augmented / EAL6+ M7892
Design Steps D11 and G12, revision 1.2 as of 2017-11-21
[R29] Infineon: 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70, Programmer’s Reference Manual, revision
8.4, May 2015
[R30] Infineon: M7892 Controller Family for Security Applications, Hardware Reference
Manual, revision 1.6, November 2014
[R31] Infineon: M7892 Controller Family for Security Applications, Security Guidelines,
January 2015
[R32] ISO/IEC: International Standard 7816-4, Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards
– Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange
[R33] ISO/IEC: International Standard 7816-9, Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards
– Part 9: Commands for card management
[R34] JIWG: Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, version 1.4, August 2015
[R35] NIST: FIPS PUB 46-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Data
Encryption Standard (DES), October 1999
[R36] NIST: FIPS PUB 180-4, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012
[R37] NIST: FIPS PUB 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 2001
[R38] RSA Laboratories: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, version 2.2, October
2012
[R39] RSA Laboratories: PKCS #15: Cryptographic Token Information Syntax Standard,
version 1.1, June 2000
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Appendix A Platform identification
The TOE is based on the secure microcontrollers of the M7892 G12 family, all equipped
with RSA library v2.03.008, EC library v2.03.008, SHA-2 library v1.01, Toolbox library
v2.03.008 and Symmetric Crypto Library v2.02.010.
Only the RSA library v2.03.008, EC library v2.03.008 and Toolbox library v2.03.008 are used
in the TOE.
The SHA-2 library v1.01 and Symmetric Crypto Library v2.02.010 are not used in the TOE.
This IC has obtained a Common Criteria certification at Evaluation Assurance Level EAL6
augmented with ALC_FLR.1.
The current certification report of chip M7892 G12 is identified in the bibliography (cf. [R10]),
and is associated with the following reference code:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3-2018
The current version of the public security target of the chip is identified in the bibliography,
too (cf. [R28]).
END OF DOCUMENT