UNCLASSIFIED
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dell EMC™ Avamar® v18.1
Dell EMC™
9 October 2019
383-4-473
V1.0
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme,
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report,
and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other
organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product
by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its
associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Contact Centre and Information Services
Edward Drake Building
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation
Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) for
the Canadian CC Scheme and posted on the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common
Criteria Project).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 8
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 9
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................10
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................10
3.2 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................................................10
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................11
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................11
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................12
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................12
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................12
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................13
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................13
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................13
6.3 Independent Functional Testing ........................................................................................................................13
6.3.1 Functional Test Results.................................................................................................................................13
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing.......................................................................................................................14
6.4.1 Penetration Test results................................................................................................................................14
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................15
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................15
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................16
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................16
8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................16
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LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Dell EMC™ Avamar® v18.1 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Dell EMC™ , was the subject
of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation
demonstrate that TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the evaluated security
functionality.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed 9 October 2019 and was carried out
in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that
their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the conditions
of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified
Products list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International
Common Criteria Project).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Dell EMC™ Avamar® v18.1
Developer Dell EMC™
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE is claiming the following conformance;
EAL 2+ (ALC_FLR.2)
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE performs backups and restores for remote offices, data center local area networks (LAN), and VMware
environments. Using data deduplication technology, redundancies are identified at the source, saving network and data
storage resources. Backups are based on changes to data and occur at administrator-scheduled intervals, making each
backup a full backup, while significantly reducing backup time.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The TOE makes no claims regarding cryptographic functionality. The environment is responsible for protection of
communication between parts of the TOE and with administrators.
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 The TOE components, front-end hosts, back-end storage and management workstations will be interconnected by a
segregated network that protects the traffic from disclosure to or modification by untrusted systems or users.
 The hardware and software critical to TOE security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical
modification.
 The authorized administrators are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile, are appropriately trained and will follow
the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following features are disabled/not configured in the evaluated configuration;
• REST API - Disabled (requires installation)
• EMC Secure Remote Services (ESRS) – Not used (requires configuration)
• Enterprise authentication – Disabled (requires configuration)
• Local user access from clients (pass-through authentication) – Not used (requires configuration)
• LDAP support
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
 The TOE software (V18.1.0.33 with Hotfixes 301590, 300449,300443, 305019, 309443, and AvPlatformOsRollup
Security Patch) running on the Avamar Server Appliance (Multi-node system with Gen4T Hardware and supporting
the MCCLI)
 NDMP Accelerator Appliance (Gen4T NDMP Accelerator Node)
 Avamar NDMP Accelerator Software V18.1.0.33
 Avamar Agent for Windows V18.1.100.33
 Avamar Agent for Linux V18.1.100.33
 Avamar VMware Universal Proxy V18.1.100.33
 Avamar MCGUI for WindowsV18.1.0.33
 Avamar MCGUI for Linux V18.1.0
With support from the environment for;
• NDMP-Based storage running Unity 4.4.0
• VMWare vSphere ESXi 6.0 VMWare server
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) Dell EMC Avamar, Administration Guide, Version 18.1, July 2018
b) Dell EMC Avamar Backup Clients, User Guide, Version 18.1, July 2018
c) Dell EMC Avamar for VMware, User Guide, Version 18.1, July 2018
d) Dell EMC Avamar for Windows Servers, User Guide, Version 18.1, July 2018
e) Dell EMC Avamar, Management Console Command Line Interface (MCCLI) Guide, Version 18.1, July 2018
f) Dell EMC Avamar, NDMP Accelerator for Dell EMC NAS Systems, User Guide, Version 18.1, July 2018
g) Dell EMC Avamar, Product Security Guide, Version 18.1, July 2018
h) Dell EMC Avamar, Virtual Edition for VMware, Version 18.1, July 2018
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements (SFRs). The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are
protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and
performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s
test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developers tests; and
b. RBAC and Audit: The evaluator confirmed that RBAC is enforced as specified in the ST and that appropriate audit
records are generated.
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE
behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited
independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a) Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application layer
vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST; and
b) Hotfix verification: The evaluated verified that Hotfix 309443 was in place to prevent exploitation of CVE-2018-
16395.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This
certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CCCS or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is
expressed or implied.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
PP Protection Profile
RBAC Role Based Access Control
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Security Target for Dell EMC™ Avamar® v18.1.0.33 v1.8, 19 September 2019
Evaluation Technical Report for Dell EMC™ Avamar® v18.1.0.33 v1.1, 9 October 2019