BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008
for
AppGate Security Server
version 8.0
from
AppGate Network Security AB
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008
Application Gateway
AppGate Security Server
version 8.0
from AppGate Network Security AB
Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 5 May 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................13
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................13
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................14
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................14
7.1 Developer testing...................................................................................................14
7.2 Evaluator testing....................................................................................................17
7.3 Evaluator penetration testing.................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................19
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became
effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by
the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed
in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the
CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product AppGate Security Server version 8.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product AppGate Security Server version 8.0 was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 5 May 2008. The
atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: AppGate Network Security AB
The product was developed by: AppGate Network Security AB
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008 Certification Report
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product AppGate Security Server version 8.0 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de)
and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
AppGate Network Security AB
Otterhällegatan 2
41118 Göteborg
SWEDEN
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an application level gateway which controls user access
to protected resources through a flexible rule system. All user traffic to the TOE is
encrypted using SSHv2. Central remote administration of the TOE is performed through an
easy-to-use graphical user interface (GUI).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 - Basic Flaw Remediation.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.AU Auditing
SF.IA Identification and Authentication
SF.AC Access Control
SF.CRYPTO Cryptographic Functions
SF.MGMT Security Management
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions 'medium' (SOF-medium) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of assumptions,
threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
For details on the evaluated configuration please refer to chapter 8 of this report.
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the Certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
AppGate Security Server version 8.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Security Server Ax4 based
on Sun Fire X4100 M2
Two Dual-core
AMD Opteron
64-bit processor
model 2216
Next-Generation
AMD Opteron
2000 Series
processors, one
MB Level 2
cache per core
2 SW AppGate Security Server 8.0.4 Appliance pre-installed on Sun
hardware running the Sun
Solaris 10 OS
3 HW USB memory stick
containing client and
administration console
packages (for Windows,
Linux, MacOS, Solaris and
Generic Unix), files needed
to run the applet version of
the AppGate connect client,
files needed to run the Java
Web Start versions of the
AppGate clients and console
and guidance
documentation
4 DOC GETSTART - Getting
Started
8.0.4 USB memory stick
5 DOC MAN - AppGate Security
Server
8.0.4 USB memory stick
6 DOC READ - Readme for
AppGate 8.0.4 appliance
n/a USB memory stick
7 DOC READCLIENTS - Readme
for AppGate clients
n/a USB memory stick
8 DOC RELNOTES - AppGate 8.0.4
Release Notes
8.0.4 USB memory stick
9 DOC USER - AppGate User guide 8.0.4 USB memory stick
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● SFR components of the class FAU define the audit functionality of the TOE
● SFR components of the class FCS define the generation, distribution and operation
of cryptographic key material used by the TOE
● SFR components of the class FDP define the access control for protected
resources
● SFR components of the class FIA define the mechanisms for identification and
authentication
● SFR components of the class FMT define the management functions that the TOE
provides
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is given in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1 by the definition of the TOE Security Functional
Requirements.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.AUTHKEY, OE.PHYSICAL, OE.NOEVIL, OE.ADMIN, OE.REMOTE,
OE.GATEWAY, OE.AUTH, OE.TIME and OE.RNG. Details can be found in the Security
Target [6] chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The AppGate Security Server is a centrally-managed, application-level VPN gateway that
separates networks of different security levels by granting or denying access from clients
residing in networks of a lower security level (called “unprotected networks” in the following
description) over secure communication channels to resources / applications in networks
of a higher security level (called “protected networks” in the following description) on the
basis of granular access rules. For example, clients residing in a LAN within a corporate
network, separated from internal networks consisting of databases with highly-secure
information only accessible by users with special rights.
The overall AppGate Architecture is implemented as a client server architecture with the
AppGate Security Server acting as an application-level gateway, separating unprotected
networks (on which the clients reside) from protected networks.
The AppGate Security Server is a software product delivered as an appliance with Sun
Solaris OS and a Sun hardware platform shipped from the factory as a single pre-installed
unit. The server is implemented as a set of application-layer programs and daemons.
These agents communicate internally via TCP, UDP, pipes, the file system, and secmsg, a
proprietary AppGate messaging system. The AppGate Security Server typically separates
networks of different security levels as described above. All traffic must pass through the
Security Server.
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The communication ways between the clients and the AppGate Security Server across the
unprotected network are secured through server authentication, secure key exchange,
data encryption and the ability to detect loss of data integrity, using SSHv2.
The Server identifies and authenticates remote users. For this task, the Server can use a
local database (flat file), or external databases like LDAP or SecurID server (the evaluated
configuration requires that user accounts must reside in the local database).
Based on the user data, authentication method, and environmental information, the Server
controls access to the protected network, or to itself in case of a remote administrator
connecting to the AppGate Security Server.
All kinds of client access is mediated by the server. The server is running on a dedicated
machine with no other applications running under the control of a user. This ensures that
normal users have no direct access to server resources, e.g., configuration and audit files.
The AppGate client software (not part of the evaluation) is deployed on the user machines
and provides the ability to connect to the AppGate Security Server and to establish a
secure channel through an unprotected network (VPN). For client applications using
services behind the AppGate Server, there is usually no need to make any configuration
changes to them on the client machines, e.g., a RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) client
application uses the established VPN channel without having to change the configuration
of the RDP client application.
There are two general types of clients: the AppGate Client for normal users, and the
AppGate Console for administrators of the AppGate Security Server. Both of these clients
can be either installed or used via Java Web Start technology.
Additional clients for mobile devices or clients using signed Java applets exist. It is also
possible to connect to the AppGate Security Server using a normal OpenSSH client.
However, these three client types have reduced functionality compared to the AppGate
Client/Console.
For the evaluated configuration, only clients installed from the AppGate installation media
should be used.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Instead of using a Sun Fire X4100 M2 as required in the evaluated configuration, the tests
were conducted on a Sun Fire X4100. The only difference is that the test machine has an
older generation of AMD Opteron 200 series processors, that caused increased
performance for testing compared to those used in the evaluated configuration. This does
not affect the behavior of the security functionality and was therefore accepted.
7.1 Developer testing
Testing configuration
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The developer provided the following requirements for the test configuration:
● A Java 1.5 runtime environment is needed.
● The Java library log4j. It can be downloaded from http://logging.apache.org/log4j.
● The Java library jgraph. It can be downloaded from http://www.jgraph.com.
● The test program relies on the MindTerm ssh client. The MindTerm classes are
included in the test program's jar file, but the API can be found at
http://www.appgate.com/products/80_MindTerm/80_API_Documentation.
● No NAT between test client and AppGate Server (it will mess up the client_ip
attribute test).
● SecurID must be configured (upload the sdconf.rec file) on the TOE before running
the tests. This is to avoid trouble with encryption keys shared between the TOE and
the SecurID Server. These keys must be cleared on the SecurID Server sometime
after the sdconf.rec file is uploaded, which makes the security function SF.MGMT.5
difficult to test automatically.
● The DNS of the TOE should be configured to be able to do a reverse lookup of the
IP address of the host running the test program.
● The smtp server of the TOE should be configured to be the host running the test
program.
● The snmp server of the TOE should be configured to be the host running the test
program.
● The user running the test program must be allowed to open a TCP listener on port
25 and an UDP listener on port 162 (this is only needed on an UNIX based system).
● The administrative AppGate user that is used by the test program to create users,
services, etc. needs to be member of the default AppGate role administrator-role.
● The needed components of that role are:
● The IP access ag-console-ip to be able to connect to the ag-mad daemon.
● The administrative component appgadmin to be able to add/modify/remove
objects such as users, components, thresholds, etc. The server command
terminal to be able to open a terminal session on the TOE.
The user used by the test program is called the Admin user.
The test environment is set up by the developer as follows:
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The developer ran the tests (Dev tests) on a different machine (Developer test client) than
the TOE, connecting to the TOE via ssh.
On the Developer test client, the normal ssh AppGate client was installed.
Testing approach
The developer performed almost all tests automatically, requiring manual input only for the
SecurID test.
There are fewer tests than security functions. Several tests cover more than one security
function.
All security functions as defined in the Security Target ([2]) have been subject to tests. Not
all behaviors of each security function were tested which the evaluator used as basis for
defining additional tests.
Testing results
All developer tests were performed successfully – expected and actual results were
consistent.
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Figure 1: Test setup
BSI-DSZ-CC-0418-2008 Certification Report
7.2 Evaluator testing
Testing configuration
The evaluator performed the tests on a TOE provided by the developer that was
configured with the flash image as is done for other TOEs delivered to AppGate
customers.
For the manual tests, the evaluator installed on her own workstation the AppGate client
from the USB stick that is part of a delivered package. The evaluator also used another
standard ssh-client: PuTTY.
The test environment was verified by the evaluator to conform to the evaluated
configuration.
Testing approach
The evaluator performed all automated developer tests that are described in the
developer's test documentation.
For the evaluator tests, the evaluator focused on enhancing the test coverage of the
security functions. Additionally, the evaluator put more effort in testing the access control
functionality, and the identification/authentication functionality using standard ssh-clients.
The evaluator tested all security functions.
Testing results
The subset of developer tests re-run by the evaluator performed successfully. All manual
and automated evaluator tests were performed successfully – expected and actual results
were consistent.
7.3 Evaluator penetration testing
Testing configuration
The penetration tests were executed in the same environment as the functional and
independent tests, following the developer requirements listed below:
● The administrative AppGate user that is used by the test program to create users,
services, etc. needs to be a member of the default AppGate role administrator-role.
The needed components of that role are:
● The IP access ag-console-ip must be able to connect to the ag-mad daemon.
● The administrative component appgadmin must be able to
add/modify/remove objects such as users, components, thresholds, etc.
● The server command terminal must be able to open a terminal session on
the TOE.
All penetration tests were performed with the evaluator test client in the unprotected
network. All tests used the SSH interface (the Nessus test also examined other protocols,
e.g., HTTP) to the TOE in its evaluated configuration. The evaluator determined that there
is no need to directly test interfaces in the protected network for vulnerabilities, because
these interfaces cannot be directly accessed by an attacker since the attacker resides in
the unprotected network (see A.GATEWAY in combination with the threat agent definitions
in the Security Target [6]). Therefore, the attacker cannot provide arbitrary input to these
interfaces to exploit any potentially-existing vulnerability.
Testing approach
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The evaluator performed four tests:
● Two tests were related to identification and authentication, trying to circumvent
password policy enforcement through accessing user accounts in the underlying
operating system.
● One test was related to verifying the correct configuration and the enforcement of
the functionality caused by the configuration in case of roaming.
● One test was comprised of a general network scan using the program Nessus,
searching for vulnerable services accessible by an attacker who has network
access to the TOE.
Testing results
All penetration tests were performed successfully – expected and actual results were
consistent.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
● user accounts must reside in the local database (internal user database)
● the allowed user authentication methods are:
● Password
● SecurID (which implies that a SecurID server is configured to perform the
SecurID authentication on behalf of the TOE)
● Roaming, secure printing, and secure messaging is not allowed
● Clustering functionality is not allowed
The CC Guide as part of [8] requires that AppGate Security Server version 8.0.4 is pre-
installed on a Sun Fire X4100 M2 with Solaris 10 in the evaluated configuration.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the class ASE
• All components of the EAL 2 augmented package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
• The component
ALC_FLR.1 - Basic Flaw Remediation
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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• for the functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: medium
SF.IA.5 (User password authentication)
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:
– the TOE Security Function SF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic functions)
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the target of evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
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TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretions of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0418-2008, Version 2.9, 10.04.2008, AppGate Network
Security AB
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 10.04.2008, atsec information security
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Guidance documentation for the TOE, AppGate Security Server, Version 8.0.4
8
AIS 14: Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen nach CC.
Version 4, Stand: 02.04.2007
AIS 23: Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler. Version 1, Stand: 07.11.2000.
AIS 32: Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche
Zertifizierungsschema. Version 1, Stand: 02.07.2001
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
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Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.
2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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