BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013
for
NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers
P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC Dedicated
Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.72
BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013
Smart Card Controller
NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC Dedicated Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5
and ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 12 June 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ASE_TSS.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC Dedicated Software has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. The suffix "v" in the version information indicates the
hardware platform subrevision of the TOE, which can be either "A" or "B". This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers P5CD128V0v/
V0B(s), P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC Dedicated Software, was conducted by
T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 13 May 2013. T-Systems GEI
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013 Certification Report
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013
1 Executive Summary
The NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC128V0v/
V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CN145V0v/ V0B(s), each
including IC Dedicated Software provide a hardware platform for the implementation of a
smart card operating systems including multiple applications. The hardware platform
provides coprocessors for cryptographic algorithms Triple-DES with up to three keys and
AES with different key lengths as well as a coprocessor for large integer arithmetic
operations. In addition the hardware platform includes a True Random Number Generator
suitable to generate cryptographic keys. The TOE supports the ISO/IEC 7816 contact
interface with UART and the ISO/IEC 14443 A contactless interface. The contactless
interface together with IO3 can be configured in S2
C mode to support Near Field
Communication (NFC). The implementation of multiple applications is supported by the
CPU offering different CPU modes with gradual permissions and memory management
control supporting the separation of different memory segments. The MIFARE FleX or
MIFARE MSO as part of the IC Dedicated Software does not contribute to security
mechanisms of the devices and was not subject of the evaluation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.HW_AES AES coprocessor
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
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Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 and 3.3.
This certification covers several configurations of the TOE. For details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC
Dedicated Software
where “v” is either “A” or “B”.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
The subsequent information is taken from the ST, the first part covers the TOE version V0A
with MIFARE MSO as initially evaluated. The second part includes the TOE version V0A
with MIFARE FleX, the next two cover the version V0B with MIFARE FLeX option from the
two wafer . Note, that the MSO variation is not offered for the version V0B of the TOE.
TOE deliverables for the TOE version V0A with MIFARE MSO
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0A Release V0A (GDS
2 File: T051A_20090820.gds2) in form of wafer, modules and packages. The
dice include reference T051A.
Test ROM Software for MIFARE MSO (part of the IC Dedicated Test Software)
Version 97, December 9th, 2009, Test ROM on the chip
(tmfos_97_collected.ms3)
Boot ROM Software for MIFARE MSO (part of the IC Dedicated Support
Software) Version 97, December 9th, 2009, Test ROM on the chip
(tmfos_97_collected.ms3)
MIFARE Operating System MSO (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software)
thVersion 97, December 9 , 2009, Test ROM on the chip
(tmfos_97_collected.ms3)
Data Sheet P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family, Secure dual interface and contact PKI
smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 3.5, Document Number
177935, 14 February 2012
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5Cx128/ P5Cx145, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.7, Document Number:
185117, 19 March 2013
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TOE deliverables for the TOE version V0A and MIFARE FLeX
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0A
Release V0A (GDS 2 File: T051A_20090820.gds2) in form of wafer, modules
and packages. The dice include reference T051A.
Test ROM Software for MIFARE FLeX (the IC Dedicated Test Software) Version
102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_102_collected.hex)
Boot ROM Software for MIFARE FLeX (part of the IC Dedicated Support
Software) Version 102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip
(tmfos_102_collected.hex)
MIFARE FLeX Operating System (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software)
Version 102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_102_collected.hex)
Data Sheet P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family, Secure dual interface and contact PKI
smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 3.5, Document Number
177935, 14 February 2012
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5Cx128/ P5Cx145, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.7, Document Number:
185117, 19 March 2013
TOE deliverables for the TOE with release V0B from SSMC with MIFARE
FLeX
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0B Release V0B
(GDS 2 File: T051B_20100617_C.gds2) in form of wafer, modules and
packages. The dice include reference T051B.
Test ROM Software for MIFARE FLeX (the IC Dedicated Test Software) Version
102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_102_collected.hex)
Boot ROM Software for MIFARE FLeX (part of the IC Dedicated Support
Software) Version 102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip
(tmfos_102_collected.hex)
MIFARE FLeX Operating System (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software)
Version 102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_102_collected.hex)
Data Sheet P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family, Secure dual interface and contact PKI
smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 3.5, Document Number
177935, 14 February 2012
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5Cx128/ P5Cx145, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.7, Document Number:
185117, 19 March 2013
TOE deliverables for the TOE with release V0B from Globalfoundries with
MIFARE FLeX
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0B Release V0B
(GDS 2 File: s051B.gds2) in form of wafer, modules and packages. The dice
include reference T051B.
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Test ROM Software for MIFARE FLeX (the IC Dedicated Test Software) Version
102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_102_collected.hex)
Boot ROM Software for MIFARE FLeX (part of the IC Dedicated Support
Software) Version 102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip
(tmfos_102_collected.hex)
MIFARE FLeX Operating System (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software)
Version 102, April 27th, 2011, Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_102_collected.hex)
Data Sheet P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family, Secure dual interface and contact PKI
smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 3.5, Document Number
177935, 14 February 2012
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5Cx128/ P5Cx145, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.7, Document Number:
185117, 19 March 2013
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Note that only 4 items (the hardware platform and three documents) are delivered since
the IC Dedicated Software included in the ROM is delivered on the chip. There is one Data
Sheet and one Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for all configurations of the TOE.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE provides
countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall:
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Name Title
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
A.Check-Init Check of initialization data by the Security IC Embedded Software
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Name Title
A.Key-Function Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.4.
5 Architectural Information
The hardware platform comprises the following components: 8-bit CPU, Special Function
Registers, Triple-DES coprocessor, AES coprocessor, FameXE coprocessor and a
Random Number Generator (RNG). Further on the hardware platform implements a
contact-based interface and a contactless interface with power module including security
sensors and filters. The CPU is equipped with a Memory Management Unit and provides
different CPU Modes in order to support the separation of different applications running on
the TOE. Security features for physical protection are realized within the layout of the
whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers provide an interface to the TOE security functionality that
can be controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software. The NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0v/ V0B(s) provides different levels of access control to
the Special Function Register with the different CPU Modes including configurable access
control to Special Function Registers for the User Mode and the Mifare Mode. The
MIFARE operating system is called via CVEC7 from System Mode, when the
implementation is enabled with device configuration B1 or B4, respectively D1 or D4
The FameXE does not provide a cryptographic algorithm itself. The modular arithmetic
functions are suitable to implement different asymmetric cryptographic algorithms.
The TOE executes the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Software) during the start up
to configure and initialise the hardware. This software is executed in the Boot Mode. After
the start-up is finished and the CPU Mode changed to System Mode it is not possible to
re-enter the Boot Mode without forcing a reset.
The MIFARE Operating System supports the functions to exchange data in the
contact-less mode with other MIFARE components. The MIFARE Operating System is
executed in the MIFARE Mode to ensure a strict separation between IC Dedicated Support
Software and Security IC Embedded Software. Note, that the term MIFARE Operating
System as being used in the Security Target refers to both, the MIFARE MSO and the
MIFARE FLeX variant available for the TOE. Based on the partitioning of the memories the
MIFARE Operating System is not able to access the Security IC Embedded Software and
the data stored in the EEPROM area that is not reserved for the MIFARE Operating
System. In the same way the access to the program and the data of the MIFARE
Operating System is denied for the Security IC Embedded Software. A limited memory
area for the data exchange (between Security IC Embedded Software and MIFARE
Operating System) can be configured by the Security IC Embedded Software.
The hardware platform comprises a contact based interface and a contactless interface.
Both interfaces can be used independent from each other. Depending on the major
configuration the contactless interface is disabled, or configured as S2
C interface. Based
on a specific minor configuration and an associated clock configuration both interfaces
could be used simultaneously.
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6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following categories:
1. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
2. functional tests which are performed with special software
3. characterisation and verification tests to release the hardware platform for
production including tests with different operating conditions as well as special
verification tests for security services and security features of the hardware
4. functional tests at the end of the production process using IC Dedicated Test
Software. These tests are executed for every chip to check its correct functionality
as last step of phase 3.
The developer tests cover all TSFIs as identified in the functional specification as well as in
the test documentation.
The tests of the evaluators comprise special tests and examination of the hardware
platform using open samples. In addition the evaluators perform tests of the hardware
platform using different configurations.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all TOE Security Functionality into
consideration. Extensive penetration testing was performed to test the security
mechanisms used to provide the Security Services and Security Features. The tests for
the hardware platform comprise the use of bespoke equipment and expert knowledge. The
penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the hardware platform
including information that can be gathered by reverse engineering to support other attacks.
Further on attacks that do not modify the hardware platform physically such as side
channel analysis for the coprocessors (AES, Triple-DES) and perturbation attacks were
performed. The test of the hardware platform comprises attacks that must be averted by
the combination of the hardware platform and the Security IC Embedded Software as well
as attacks against the hardware platform directly.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5Cx128/P5Cx145V0v/ V0B(s) can be delivered
in different configurations, specifically it is delivered with different MIFARE versions. The
term “MIFARE Operating System” denotes the TOE with MIFARE MSO or MIFARE FLeX
option according to the ST. All configurations listed in the following table are covered by
the evaluation. Due to the naming conventions of the SMX family the configured TOEs
have different names.
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P5CD145V0v P5CC145V0v P5CD128V0v P5CC128V0v P5CN145V0v
Contactless available not available available not available
configured as
S2C interface
interface
Mifare OS
available not available available not available not available
accessible
EEPROM
144kByte 144kByte 128kByte 128kByte 144kByte
Tabelle 3: Overview of major configurations
The P5CD145V0v/V0v(s) and its major configurations were all tested during the
evaluation. All configurations are available to the evaluator. Beside the differences listed in
table 3 there are no other differences between the configurations (note that the MIFARE
Operating System is only available for the configurations with either contact-less interface
or S2C interface). The term “MIFARE Operating System” in this context according to the
ST, [6] covers both variants of the chip the MIFARE MSO option and the MIFARE FLeX
option. Note, that according to the ST, the MSO option is no longer offered as variant of
the TOE. This means that customers providing a new IC Security Embedded Software will
get the MIFARE FleX variant. The configuration does not have dependencies to security
features. Therefore the results described in this document are also applicable for the
P5CD128V0v/V0v(s), P5CC128V0v/V0v(s), P5CD145V0v/V0v(s), P5CC145V0v/V0v(s),
and the P5CN145V0v/V0v(s).
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 25, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
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● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was the extension of the life
cycle and the re-assessment. The extension of the life cycles includes an additional wafer
production site and a new assembly sites. In this context als the verification of the devices
from the additional production site as well as up to date side channel analysis as well as
fault analysis were part of the re-evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
● the TOE Security functionality SS.HW_DES for Triple-DES.
● the TOE Security functionality SS.HW_AES for AES
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalites it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionality 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE achieves
a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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NFC Near Field Communication
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
S2C Smart card interface standard complying with ISO/IEC 18092
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013, Version 2.1, 16 November 2012, NXP
Secure Smart Card Controllers P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) Security Target,
NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013, Version 2.1, 16 November 2012, NXP
Secure Smart Card Controllers P5Cx128V0v/P5Cx145V0v(s) Security Target Lite,
NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification (sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.5, 10 May 2013, Evaluation Technical Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0858, T-Systems GEI GmbH, (confidential document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, Version 1.0, 22 April 2013, ETR
for composition according to AIS36 as summary of the Evaluation Technical Report,
T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Configuration lists for the TOE:
• Configuration List P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s), NXP Semiconductors,
Business Unit Identification, Rev. 2.0, April 26th, 2013 (confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8,Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
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• Configuration list for composite evaluation P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s),
NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 1.9, April 17th, 2013
• Customer-Specific appendix of the Configuration List P5Cx128/P5Cx145
V0v/V0B(s), NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 1.8, April
17th, 2013
• Production flows, P5CD145V0A/B (T051A/B / s051B) P5CN145V0G (T051G)
Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev.
1.28, 13.11.2012
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE:
• Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5Cx128/ P5Cx145, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.7, Document Number:
185117, 19 March 2013
• Product Data Sheet Addendum Wafer Specification, P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family,
NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 3.5, Document Number
184935, 26.04.2013
• Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
• Data Sheet P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family, Secure dual interface and contact PKI
smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 3.5, Document Number
177935, 14 February 2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure PKI Smart Card Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 12 June 2013, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
The target of evaluation (TOE) is developed by:
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Unit Identification
Stresemannallee 101
D-22529 Hamburg
This site provides also customer support.
The evaluation deliverables are provided by:
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Unit Identification
Stresemannallee 101
D-22529 Hamburg
or
NXP Semiconductors (Thailand)
Assembly Plant Bangkok, Thailand (APB)
303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd.
Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand
for the hardware platform and
NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Identification
Document Control Office
Mikron-Weg 1
A-8101 Gratkorn
for the documentation of the TOE.
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Following sites are involved for the production of the TOE wafer fab and associated mask
shops:
Semiconductor Factory (chipfinishing and wafer production):
Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC)
70 Pasir Ris Drive 1
Singapore 519527
Singapore
Mask Shop for SSMC:
Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd.
345-1, Sooha-Ri ShinDoon-Myon
467-840 Ichon
South Korea
Semiconductor Factory (chipfinishing):
GLOBALFOUNDRIES Singapore Pte Ltd.
60 Woodlands Industrial Park D, Street 2
Singapore, 738406
Semiconductor Factory (wafer production):
GLOBALFOUNDRIES Singapore (Tampines) Pte Ltd
1 Tampines Industrial Avenue 5
Singapore 528830
Mask Shop for Globalfoundries:
Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd.
6 Loyang Industrial Park
Singapore 507099
Mask Shop for Globalfoundries:
Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC)
1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd.
Science-Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan R.O.C.
In addition, the following sites are involved for the bumping, testing, module inlay assembly
of the TOE:
Wafer Bumping:
Chipbond Technology Corporation
No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V
Science Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan R.O.C.
Test Centre:
NXP Semiconductors GmbH
IC Manufacturing Operations - Test Center Hamburg (IMO TeCH)
Stresemannallee 101
D-22529 Hamburg
Test Centre:
Assembly Plant Kaohsiung
NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd
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#10, Jing 5th Road, N.E.P.Z, Kaohsiung 81170
Taiwan, R.O.C
Test Center and Module Assembly:
NXP Semiconductors (Thailand)
Assembly Plant Bangkok, Thailand (APB)
303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd.
Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand
Module Assembly:
NedCard B.V.
Bijsterhuizen 25-29
6604 LM Wijchen
The Netherlands
Module Assembly:
Chipbond Technology Corporation
No. 1, Dàhuá 1st Rd.
Kaohsiung City
Taiwan 806, R.O.C.
Inlay assembly:
HID Global Galway
Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh
Balle na hAbhann
Co. Galway
Ireland
Inlay assembly:
Smartrac Technology Ltd.
142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Inlay assembly:
SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY GERMANY GmbH
Gewerbeparkstr. 10
51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath
Germany
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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