



# AMD Ryzen PRO 6000 Series PSP Cryptographic CoProcessor

Module Version: bc0d0253FIPS002

## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Overview

This section is informative to the reader to reference cryptographic services and other services of AMD Ryzen PRO 6000 Series PSP Cryptographic CoProcessor (the “module”) from Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) (the “vendor”). Only the components listed in Section 3.1 are subject to the FIPS 140-3 validation. The CMVP (Cryptographic Module Validation Program) makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys (when supported) if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

## 1.2. This Security Policy Document

This Security Policy describes the features and design of the module named AMD Ryzen PRO 6000 Series PSP Cryptographic CoProcessor<sup>1</sup> using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-3 specification. The FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Module specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST/CCCS Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic module to FIPS 140-3. Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated information.

The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-3 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- The validation report prepared by the lab.
- The Entropy Assessment Report (EAR) if applicable.
- Other supporting documentation and additional references.

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## 1.3. How this Security Policy was Prepared

The vendor has provided the non-proprietary Security Policy of the cryptographic module, which was further consolidated into this document by atsec information security together with other vendor-supplied documentation. In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing.

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<sup>1</sup> PSP: Platform Security Processor

## 2. General

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version bc0d0253FIPS002 of the AMD Ryzen PRO 6000 Series PSP Cryptographic CoProcessor cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1 module.

Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the security levels of those individual areas.

*Table 1: Security levels*


ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6 (full section below)	FIPS 140-3 Section Title	Security Level
6.1	General	1
6.2	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
6.3	Cryptographic Module Interfaces	1
6.4	Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
6.5	Software/Firmware Security	1
6.6	Operational Environment	1
6.7	Physical Security	1
6.8	Non-invasive Security	n/a
6.9	Sensitive Security Parameter Management	1
6.10	Self-tests	1
6.11	Life-cycle Assurance	1
6.12	Mitigation of Other Attacks	n/a
<b>Overall</b>		<b>1</b>

### 3. Cryptographic Module Specification

The following subsections describe the cryptographic module and how it conforms to the FIPS 140-3 specification in each of the required areas.

#### 3.1. Module Overview, Embodiment, Type

The AMD Ryzen PRO 6000 Series PSP Cryptographic CoProcessor (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is defined as a hybrid firmware module in a single chip embodiment, with hardware (the coprocessor) and firmware components implementing general purpose cryptographic algorithms. The module supports the Ryzen PRO 6000 Series SoC (System on a Chip) by providing digital signature verification of the key database during secure boot procedures. The module resides within the Ryzen SoC that contains the module, the processor, the firmware, and other components in a single chip embodiment (Figure 1).



*Figure 1: The AMD Ryzen PRO SoC, representing all versions of the single chip tested platforms.*

The Operational Environments tested for the module are described in Section 3.4

#### 3.2. Module Design, Components and Versions

Figure 2 shows a block diagram that represents the design of the module. In this diagram, the physical perimeter of the operational environment, defined by the perimeter of the AMD Ryzen PRO SoC (i.e., the enclosure of the SoC), is indicated by a purple dashed line. The cryptographic boundary is represented by the components painted in orange blocks. These components are further described in Table 2.

*Table 2: Components in the cryptographic boundary.*

Component	Type	Version	Description
Bootloader (boot_loader_stage1.sbin)	Firmware	bc0d0253FIPS002	Performs self-tests, provides service indicator and show status service.
BootROM	Non-reconfigurable	bc0d0253FIPS002	Provides interface to the hardware cryptographic implementations.

Component	Type	Version	Description
	memory		
RSA implementation in the CCP	Hardware	bc0d0253FIPS002	Hardware implementation of the algorithm.
SHA2-384 implementation in the CCP	Hardware	bc0d0253FIPS002	Hardware implementation of the algorithm.
AES-128 implementation in the CCP (non-approved)	Hardware	bc0d0253FIPS002	Hardware implementation of the algorithm (which is non-approved in this module).

The flow of information between the components and the relation between that data and the module's FIPS interfaces are depicted through arrows. The arrows are colored differently to facilitate visualization. The color does not identify the type of data: the type of data flow (namely, data input, data output, status output and control input) is indicated by labels pointing to the arrows.

Components in white are only included in the diagram for informational purposes. They are not included in the cryptographic boundary (and therefore not part of the module's validation). For example, the processor is responsible for executing the non-cryptographic code in the bootloader and bootROM firmware components.






Figure 2: The block diagram depicting the physical perimeter of the operational environment and cryptographic boundary, and the data flow between the components in the single chip.

### 3.2.1. Components Excluded from Security Requirements

There are no components within the cryptographic boundary that are excluded from the FIPS 140-3 security requirements.

### 3.3. Security Level

The module is validated according to FIPS 140-3 at overall security level 1. The security levels of individual areas are indicated in Table 1.

### 3.4. Tested Operational Environments

The module has been tested on the operational environments indicated in Table 3 with the corresponding module variants and configuration options.

Table 3: Tested operational environments.

#	Operating System	Hardware Platform	SoC/Processor	PAA/Acceleration
1	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6650H	AMD Ryzen PRO 6650H	None

#	Operating System	Hardware Platform	SoC/Processor	PAA/Acceleration
		(100-000000543)	(100-000000543)	
2	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6650H (100-000000565)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6650H (100-000000565)	None
3	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6650U (100-000000539)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6650U (100-000000539)	None
4	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6650U (100-000000551)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6650U (100-000000551)	None
5	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6850H (100-000000542)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6850H (100-000000542)	None
6	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6850H (100-000000564)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6850H (100-000000564)	None
7	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6850U (100-000000538)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6850U (100-000000538)	None
8	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6850U (100-000000550)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6850U (100-000000550)	None
9	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6950H (100-000000541)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6950H (100-000000541)	None
10	N/A	AMD Ryzen PRO 6950H (100-000000563)	AMD Ryzen PRO 6950H (100-000000563)	None

### 3.5. Modes of Operation of the Module

The module implements two modes of operation: (1) the approved mode, in which the approved services are available; and (2) the non-approved mode, in which the non-approved services are available. After the pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests are successfully concluded, the module automatically transitions to the operational state by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling the non-Approved service listed in Table 5. The current mode of operation of the module can be inferred by the service indicator, which indicates the approval state of the current service being invoked.

### 3.6. Security Functions

#### 3.6.1. Approved Security Functions

Table 4 lists all approved security functions (cryptographic algorithms) of the module, including specific key lengths employed for approved services, and implemented modes or methods of operation of the algorithms.

*Table 4: Approved cryptographic algorithms.*

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size/Key Strength	Use/Function
<a href="#">A2578</a>	RSA (FIPS186-4)	PKCSPSS with SHA2-384	4096	Digital signature verification
<a href="#">A2578</a>	SHA (FIPS180-4)	SHA2-384	N/A	Message digest

### 3.6.2. Non-Approved Security Functions Allowed in Approved Services

The module does not offer any non-approved security functions that are allowed in approved services.

### 3.6.3. Non-Approved Security Functions Allowed in Approved Services with No Security Claimed

The module does not offer any non-approved security functions that are allowed in approved services but claim no security.

### 3.6.4. Non-Approved Security Functions Not Allowed in Approved Services

Table 5 lists all non-approved security functions not allowed in approved services of the module.

Note that, although this algorithm is approved for usage per SP 800-140C, it was not tested under CAVP for this module, nor does the module implement a cryptographic algorithm self-test for this security function, thus making it non-approved.

*Table 5: Non-approved cryptographic algorithms not allowed in approved services.*

Algorithm	Use/Function
AES-128-ECB	Decryption

## 3.7. Rules of operation

The module initializes upon power-on. After the pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests are successfully concluded, the module automatically transitions to the operational state.

In the operational state, the module de-obfuscates the stage 2 firmware obfuscation key (considered unprotected plaintext) using AES-128-ECB (which is a non-approved algorithm for this module), if required. Then, the module automatically performs the signature verification of the key database using the RSA signature verification service. The key database and RSA public key are accessed by the module bootloader component (who then acts as the operator of the module) without operator input. After the successful signature verification of the key database, the module loads the next stage 2 firmware into memory, verifies its integrity using the RSA signature verification service, and, if required, de-obfuscates the firmware using AES-128-ECB and the stage 2 firmware obfuscation key. Finally, the module unloads itself from memory, ceasing its operation.

All the procedures described above are conducted without operator assistance. To perform the procedures again, the module must be reset, which will trigger a new boot.

## 4. Cryptographic Module Interfaces

Table 6 summarizes the cryptographic module interfaces<sup>2</sup>. The logical interfaces are logically separated from each other by the API design. The power interface is physically separated from any other interface.

*Table 6: Ports and interfaces.*

Physical Port	Logical Interface	Data that passes over port/interface
SRAM	Data Input	API input parameters for data.
SRAM	Data Output	API output parameters for data.
SRAM	Control Input	API function calls, API input parameters for control.
SRAM	Status Output	API return codes, status values.
Power port	Power (input) interface	Power port or pin in the single chip.

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<sup>2</sup>The module does not implement a control output interface.

## 5. Roles, Services and Authentication

### 5.1. Roles

Table 7 lists the roles supported by the module with corresponding services with input and output. The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly and always assumed by the operator of the module.

*Table 7: Roles, service commands, input, and output.*

Role	Service	Input	Output
Crypto Officer	Digital Signature Verification	Pointer to message, signature, public key.	Success, fail.
Crypto Officer	De-obfuscation of stage 2 firmware obfuscation key	Pointer to stage 2 firmware obfuscation key, key-obfuscation-key.	Success, fail.
Crypto Officer	De-obfuscation of stage 2 firmware	Pointer to stage 2 firmware, obfuscation key.	Success, fail.
Crypto Officer	Show Version	None.	Name and version information in data output interface.
Crypto Officer	Show Status	None.	Current status in status output interface (as return codes and/or log messages).
Crypto Officer	On-Demand Self-Test	None.	None.
Crypto Officer	On-Demand Integrity Test	None	None.
Crypto Officer	Zeroize	None.	None.

### 5.2. Authentication

The module does not support authentication for roles.

### 5.3. Services

The module provides services to operators that assume the available role. All services are described in detail in the user documentation.

The next subsections define the services that utilize approved, allowed, and non-approved security functions in this module. For the respective tables, the convention below applies when specifying the access permissions (types) that the service has for each SSP.

- **Generate (G):** The service establishes the SSP by generation, agreement, or derivation.
- **Read (R):** The SSP exists in the module and is read by the service, and may be output.
- **Write (W):** The caller provides the SSP to the service to be imported into the module; written; or updated if the SSP already exists in the module.

- **Execute (E) (or use):** The service uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Other access types identify the provenance of the SSP.
- **Zeroize (Z):** The service zeroizes the SSP.
- **N/A:** The service does not access any SSP or key during its operation.

The approved service indicators are readable after successful completion of the pre-operational and conditional self-tests.

### 5.3.1. Approved Services

Table 8 lists the approved services in this module, the roles that can request the service, the algorithms involved, the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) involved and how they are accessed, and the respective service indicator. The service indicator can be inspected by an external operator using the Trusted Execution Environment Component (TEEC) command with ID 16. See Section 12.1.1.3 for more information on how to inspect the service indicator.

In the service tables, CO specifies the Crypto Officer role.

*Table 8: Services that use approved and allowed algorithms.*

Service	Service Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys, SSPs	Role	Access Types	Indicator
Digital Signature Verification	Verify signature operations	RSA PSS using SHA2-384	RSA public key	CO	W, E	The first bit in FIPS_selftest_status is set to 1.
Show Version	Show the version of the module's components	N/A	None	CO	N/A	None.
Show Status	Show status of the module state	N/A	None	CO	N/A	None.
On-Demand Self-Test	Initiate power-on self-tests by reset	N/A	None	CO	N/A	None.
On-Demand Integrity Test	Initiate the integrity test (pre-operational self-test)	SHA2-384	None	CO	N/A	Successful completion.
Zeroize	Zeroize PSP in volatile memory	N/A	All SSPs	CO	Z	None.

### 5.3.2. Non-Approved Services

Table 9 lists the non-approved services that utilize the non-approved security functions listed in Table 5.

*Table 9: Services that use non-approved algorithms.*

Service	Service Description	Algorithms Accessed	Role	Indicator
De-obfuscation of stage 2 firmware obfuscation key	De-obfuscate the stage 2 firmware obfuscation key	AES-128-ECB	CO	The first bit in FIPS_selftest_status is set to 0.
De-obfuscation of stage 2 firmware	De-obfuscate the stage 2 firmware using the stage 2 firmware obfuscation key	AES-128-ECB	CO	The first bit in FIPS_selftest_status is set to 0.

## 6. Software/Firmware Security

### 6.1. Integrity Techniques

The integrity of the bootloader component of the module (in firmware) is verified by comparing a SHA2-384 digest value calculated at run time with the SHA2-384 digest value stored in the module that was computed at build time.

The bootROM component of the module is a non-reconfigurable memory (specifically masked ROM), thus exempt from the requirements of integrity test. The vendor declares that this bootROM component composed of non-reconfigurable memory does not degrade before 10 (ten) years of manufacture date, thus complying with the requirements of IG 5.A. Please refer to Section 12.1.3.

### 6.2. On-Demand Integrity Test

Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. The integrity test may be invoked on-demand in two ways: through the On-Demand Self-Test service, and through the On-Demand Integrity Test service.

The module provides the On-Demand Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand. This service performs the same cryptographic algorithm tests executed during power-up, i.e., the cryptographic algorithm self-tests and the pre-operational self-test. This service is invoked by powering-off and reloading the module.

The On-Demand Integrity Test service can be used to perform only the on-demand pre-operational self-tests. This service is invoked by calling the integrity test API using the module's logical interfaces. More details on the API are provided by the vendor in its developer's manual.



## 7. Operational Environment

### 7.1. Applicability

The module operates in a non-modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications: no changes are possible to module firmware code, nor the bootloader firmware code that interacts with the module.

### 7.2. Tested Operational Environments

Please see Section 3.4.

### 7.3. Policy and Requirements

The operational environment provides context separation for the memory and registers utilized by the module. When these components are used by the module, no other process or sub-component can access the information concurrently.

The bootloader component also acts as the sole operator of the module, thus there are no concurrent operators.

No configuration of the operational environment is required for the module to operate in an approved mode. Therefore, there are no rules, settings, or restrictions to the configuration of the operational environment.

The module does not have the capability of loading software or firmware from an external source.

## 8. Physical Security

### 8.1. General

The embodiment of the module is a single chip consisting of production-grade components. The coating is a standard sealing coat applied over the single chip.

The module provides no additional physical security techniques.

## 9. Non-Invasive Security

The module claims no non-invasive security techniques.

## 10. Sensitive Security Parameter Management

Table 10 summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module in the approved services (Table 8).

*Table 10: Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs).*

SSP	Strength	Security Function and Cert. #	Generation	Import /Export	Establishment	Storage	Zero-ization	Use
RSA public key	150 bits	RSA signature verification ( <a href="#">A2578</a> )	N/A	Input in plaintext through data input interface.  No output.	MD/EE	Volatile memory	Module reset	RSA signature verification

### 10.1. SSP Generation

The module does not generate SSPs.

### 10.2. SSP Establishment

The module does not implement automated SSP establishment.

### 10.3. SSP Entry/Output

The module only supports manual distribution, electronic entry of the RSA public key, which is provided in plaintext by the bootloader operator via the data input interface.

No other SSPs are entered into the module. No SSPs are output from the module.

### 10.4. SSP Storage

SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the respective functions.

The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs; keys in use by the module exist in volatile memory only.

### 10.5. SSP Zeroization

The module's functions deallocates and zeroizes temporary SSP values in volatile memory used during the function's execution. The zeroization consists of writing zeroes to the memory location used by the SSP before deallocating the area. The module does not overwrite the SSP with another SSP.

The zeroization service for the SSP in volatile memory consists of powering off the module, which will remove power from the volatile memory. This action will cause the value of the SSP in volatile memory to be overwritten by random values the next time the module is powered on. The successful act of powering off the module serves as the implicit indicator of zeroization.

## 10.6. Random Number Generation

The module does not implement random number generation.

## 11. Self Tests

The module performs pre-operational self-tests and conditional self-tests. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited until the tests are successfully completed.

All the self-tests are listed in Table 11, with the respective condition under which those tests are performed. The firmware integrity test is performed after all conditional algorithm self-tests (CASTs) are performed.

Table 11: Self-tests.

Algorithm	Parameters	Condition for Test	Type	Test
RSA	SHA2-384 and 4096-bit key	Power up	Conditional Algorithm Self-Test	KAT signature verification
SHA2-384	N/A	Firmware integrity test on bootloader component at power up (after all CASTs)	Pre-Operational Self-Test	Digest verification on bootloader firmware component
SHA2-384	N/A	Power up	Conditional Algorithm Self-Test	KAT SHA2-384

### 11.1. Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module performs pre-operational tests automatically when the module is powered on. The pre-operational self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The module transitions to the operational state only after the pre-operational self-tests are passed successfully.

The types of pre-operational self-tests are described in the next sub-sections.

#### 11.1.1. Firmware Integrity Test

The integrity of the bootloader component of the module (in firmware) is verified by comparing a SHA2-384 digest value calculated at run time with the SHA2-384 digest value stored in the module that was computed at build time. If the comparison verification fails, the module transitions to the error state (Section 11.3). The SHA2-384 algorithm goes through its conditional algorithm self-test before the integrity test is performed (Table 11).

The bootROM component of the module is considered non-reconfigurable memory, thus exempt from the requirements of integrity test. The vendor declares that this bootROM component composed of non-reconfigurable memory does not degrade before 10 (ten) years of manufacture date, thus complying with the requirements of IG 5.A.

## 11.2. Conditional Tests

### 11.2.1. Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests

The module performs self-tests on all approved cryptographic algorithms as part of the approved services supported in the approved mode of operation, using the tests shown in Table 11 and indicated as Conditional Algorithm Self-Tests. Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the self-tests. The cryptographic algorithm self-tests are performed in the form of Known Answer Tests (KATs), in which the calculated output is compared with the expected known answer (that are hard-coded in the module). A failed match causes a failure of the self-test.

### 11.2.2. Periodic/On-Demand Self-Test

The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests in Table 11 is then executed.

The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.

## 11.3. Error States

If the module fails any of the self-tests, the module enters the error state. In the error state, the module outputs the error type through the status indicator and status output interface. In the error state, the data output interface is inhibited and the module accepts no more inputs or requests. The module does not implement a control output interface.

Table 12 lists the error state and the status indicator (through FW\_STATUS variable) values that explains the error that has occurred.

*Table 12: Error states.*

Error State	Error Condition	Status Indicator (FW_STATUS)
Error	SHA2-384 self-test error	Error code AA0000FB
	RSA self-test error	Error code AA0000FC
	Integrity test error	Error code AA0000FD

To recover from the error state (clearing the error condition), the module shall be restarted or reset.

## 12. Life-Cycle Assurance

### 12.1. Delivery and Operation

#### 12.1.1. Procedures for Secure installation, Initialization, Start-up, and Operation of the Module

The procedures herein described are directed at OEMs for producing and configuring their BIOS so that the FIPS module is properly enabled to operate as the validated module in conformance with the rules in this Security Policy document.

Once properly installed and enabled, no configuration is necessary for the module to operate. The module automatically transitions to the approved mode when an approved service is invoked, and to the non-approved mode when a non-approved service is invoked.

##### 12.1.1.1. To enable the FIPS capability

1. Reserve 16KiB at least for Platform Security Processor level 1 directory, as the FIPS module requires additional 8KiB of ROM space for the Platform Security Processor L1 Bootloader.
2. The Platform BIOS must include the file with “\_FIPS” postfix in the file name as Platform Security Processor entry 0x1. For example, the file PspBootLoader\_stage1\_prod\_AB\_RN\_FIPS.sbin has “\_FIPS” postfix in the file name. This file is thus a FIPS capable Platform Security Processor boot loader. Conversely, the file PspBootLoader\_stage1\_prod\_AB\_RN.sbin does not have “\_FIPS” postfix in the file name, making this file a non-FIPS capable Platform Security Processor boot loader.
3. Set BIT 32 of Platform Security Processor soft fuse chain (Platform Security Processor entry 0xB) to enable FIPS capability.
  - a. The BIT32 in Platform Security Processor entry 0xB is defined as FIPS capability enablement. If 0, the FIPS capability is OFF; if 1, the FIPS mode is ON (i.e., the module is properly installed as the validated module described in this document).

##### 12.1.1.2. To verify whether FIPS capability is on

1. Boot the system into UEFI shell with secure boot disabled.
2. Use the UEFI shell version of the AFF Tool version 0.3 and beyond. This tool is provided by the vendor. Run the AFF Tool with the command: afftool -fips from the interactive UEFI shell provided by the BIOS.
  - a. If it shows “FIPS mode: on”, this is the FIPS capable module installed.
  - b. If it shows “FIPS mode: off”, the module (described in this document) is disabled.

The screenshot in Figure 3 shows the usage of the AFF Tool. The output indicates that the FIPS module is disabled. In this condition, the module does not operate in conformance with this Security Policy document.



```
FS0:\> afftool.efi

AFF Tool Version 0.3
Usage: afftool <option>
Options:
--status          Summarize current field fuse settings
--psb             Display status of PSB testmode
--far            Display Info of Firmware Anti-rollback
--fips           Display status of FIPS mode
Operation Succeeded.
FS0:\> afftool.efi --fips

AFF Tool Version 0.3
Checking status of FIPS mode...
      FIPS mode: off.
Operation Succeeded.
FS0:\> _
```

Figure 3: AFF Tool indicates that the module was not enabled.

The screenshot in Figure 4 again shows the usage of the AFF Tool. The output demonstrates that the FIPS module is enabled and thus will operate as the FIPS validated module according to the rules in this Security Policy document.

```
FS0:\EFI\Boot>
FS0:\EFI\Boot>
FS0:\EFI\Boot> afftool.efi --fips

AFF Tool Version 0.3
Checking status of FIPS mode...
      FIPS mode: on.
Operation Succeeded.
FS0:\EFI\Boot>
FS0:\EFI\Boot>
```

Figure 4: AFF Tool indicating that the module is enabled.

### 12.1.1.3. How to Inspect the Service Indicator

The service indicator can be inspected by an external operator using the TEEC command with ID 16. When this command is sent (with the first parameter set to 1) to the trusted application loaded on the AMD chip, the trusted application retrieves the FIPS status and version variables from the AMD Trusted OS (TOS). The FIPS\_selftest\_status variable contains the service indicator:

- If the first bit of this variable is set to 0, the service indicator is OFF.
- If the first bit is set to 1, the service indicator is ON and an approved service is invoked.

### **12.1.2. Maintenance Requirements**

There are no maintenance requirements.

### **12.1.3. End of Life**

The process for performing “End of Life” occurs at the chronological point of 10 years starting from manufacturing date of the module.

As stated in Section 10.4, the module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs. The SSP value only exists in volatile memory and that value vanishes when the module is powered off. The procedure for secure sanitization of the module at the end of life is simply to power it off, which is the action of zeroization of the SSPs (Section 10.5) . As a result of this sanitization via power-off, the SSP is removed from the module, so that the module may either be distributed to other operators or disposed.

## **12.2. Administrator Guidance**

All the functions, ports and logical interfaces described in this document are available to the Crypto Officer. The module implicitly transitions between the approved mode and the non-approved mode contingent on the service that is invoked. As such, there are no special procedures to administer the modes of operation.

## **12.3. Non-Administrator Guidance**

The module implements only the Crypto Officer. There are no requirements for non-administrator operators.

## 13. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks.

## 14. Glossary and Abbreviations

<b>AES</b>	Advanced Encryption Standard
<b>CAVP</b>	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
<b>CMVP</b>	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
<b>CSP</b>	Critical Security Parameter
<b>DRBG</b>	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
<b>FIPS</b>	Federal Information Processing Standards
<b>HMAC</b>	Hash Message Authentication Code
<b>HSTI</b>	(Microsoft) Hardware Security Test Interface
<b>KAT</b>	Known Answer Test
<b>MAC</b>	Message Authentication Code
<b>NIST</b>	National Institute of Science and Technology
<b>OS</b>	Operating System
<b>PAA</b>	Processor Algorithm Acceleration
<b>PSS</b>	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
<b>RNG</b>	Random Number Generator
<b>RSA</b>	Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
<b>SHA</b>	Secure Hash Algorithm
<b>SHS</b>	Secure Hash Standard
<b>XTS</b>	XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing

## 15. References

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