MagicCryptoMVP
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MagicCryptoMVP
Software Version 1.0.0
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Document Version: 1.0.1
January 5, 2023
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................4
1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary ......................................................................5
1.2 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Functionality...........................................................................................7
2.1 Critical Security Parameters.........................................................................................................8
2.2 Public Keys....................................................................................................................................9
2.3 Keys Information..........................................................................................................................9
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................. 10
3.1 Roles and Services......................................................................................................................10
3.2 Authentication............................................................................................................................11
4 Self-Tests..................................................................................................................... 12
4.1 Power-up Test ............................................................................................................................12
4.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Test.......................................................................................................12
4.1.2 Software/Firmware Integrity Test ................................................................................................14
4.1.3 Critical Function Test ....................................................................................................................15
4.2 Conditional Test .........................................................................................................................16
4.2.1 Pair-Wise Consistency Test...........................................................................................................16
5 Operational Environment ............................................................................................ 16
5.1 Tested Environment...................................................................................................................16
5.2 Vendor Affirmed Environment...................................................................................................17
6 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy................................................................................ 18
6.1 Prevention of Timing Attacks on RSA.........................................................................................18
6.2 Prevention of ECC Side Channel Attack......................................................................................18
7 Security Rules and Guidance ........................................................................................ 19
8 References and Definitions .......................................................................................... 20
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations..........................................................................................4
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................4
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................5
Table 4 – Approved Algorithms ....................................................................................................................7
Table 5 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...............................................................................................8
Table 6 – Public Keys.....................................................................................................................................9
Table 7 – Services and CSP..........................................................................................................................10
Table 8 – Self-Test.......................................................................................................................................12
Table 9 – Self-Test Error Status...................................................................................................................12
Table 10 – Auto Call Function .....................................................................................................................12
Table 11 – Algorithm Test...........................................................................................................................13
Table 12 – Critical Function Tests ...............................................................................................................15
Table 13 – Conditional Tests.......................................................................................................................16
Table 14 – Tested Operating Environment.................................................................................................16
Table 15 – Vendor Affirmed Operating Environment.................................................................................17
Table 16 – References.................................................................................................................................20
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Boundary.................................................................................................5
Figure 2 – Integrity Test ..............................................................................................................................15
Figure 3 – Montgomery's Ladder Algorithm...............................................................................................18
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Dream Security MagicCryptoMVP module, hereafter
denoted the Module. The MagicCryptoMVP cryptographic module supports various types of
cryptographic algorithms to provide cryptographic services.
Functions were designed to make the interface easy to use by application program developers. This has
the advantage of making it easy to use various cryptographic algorithms without having to study them in
depth. In addition, it has been designed with high scalability, so that it is easy to add new algorithms, and
able to minimize modification of application programs due to modification of cryptographic modules.
The MagicCryptoMVP cryptographic module is in the form of a software shared library that runs on Linux
operating systems. The MagicCryptoMVP uses encryption API functions to provide cryptographic services
such as encryption/decryption, hash, digital signatures generation and verification, message
authentication (MAC), secret key generation, and key pair generation.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Module Component Operation System
MagicCryptoMVP libMagicCryptoMVP.so Linux kernel 4.19 (64bits)
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-2 validated
cryptographic module.
The MagicCryptoMVP cryptographic complies with Security Level 1 of the FIPS 140-2 standard. The
security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
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1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary
The MagicCryptoMVP is a software, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module that runs on a general-
purpose computer. The module is used as a shared library, linked to an application program, and exists
in the auxiliary memory of the system.
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Boundary
The MagicCryptoMVP cryptographic module is composed of a software library and provides a logical
interface through API. Through this logical interface, four interfaces of data input and output, control
input, and status output are supported. The API provides an interface in the form of a function for use in
an application program.
Data input/output interface is input/output parameter of the cryptographic module API function. Control
input is the cryptographic module API function call in an application program. Status output can be viewed
through the return value of the cryptographic module API function or the output parameter of the status
check function.
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Interface Logical Interface
Data input API Input parameters
Data output API Output parameters
Control input API function calls
Status output
Return values of all API functions. Status output through status check
function
[Physical Boundary]
Memory
[Logical Boundary]
External Interface
Keyboard
Mouse
Monitor
Other Devices
CPU
Crypto Module
Application 1
OS
System
Bus
POWER
Application 2
Digest Encrypt
Other Crypto Service
System Call
(get entropy)
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The cryptographic module defined IN and OUT through the preprocessor of C language to distinguish data
for input and data for output. Control input is distinguished with input parameters of the function and
status output is distinguished with return values of the function.
MagicCryptoMVP does not have a direct physical connection. The encryption module output data is
obtained through the data output interface.
1.2 Modes of Operation
The MagicCryptoMVP cryptographic module supports FIPS Mode only.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The following algorithms are supported in MagicCryptoMVP.
Table 4 – Approved Algorithms
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
#A948 AES [197]
ECB [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CTR [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CCM [38C]
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
Tag Len: 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 112,
128
Authenticated Encrypt,
Authenticated Decrypt,
Message Authentication
GCM [38D]
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
Tag Len: 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 112,
128
Authenticated Encrypt,
Authenticated Decrypt
GMAC [38D]
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
Tag Len: 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 112,
128
Message Authentication
Vender
Affirmed
CKG [133]
Section 4 & 5.1
Key Pairs for Digital Signature
Schemes
Key Generation
Section 4 & 5.2 Key Pairs for Key Establishment
Section 4 & 6.1 Derivation of Symmetric Keys
Section 6.2.2
Symmetric Keys Derived from Pre-
Existing Key
#A948 DRBG [90A] Hash SHA(256)
Deterministic Random
Bit Generation
Security Strength = 256
No assurance of the
minimum strength of
generated keys
#A948 ECDSA [186]
P-224, P-256, K-283, B-283, P-384,
P-521
Key Generation
P-224, P-256, K-283, B-283, P-384,
P-521
PKV
P-224, P-256, K-283, B-283, P-384,
P-521
Signature Generation
P-224, P-256, K-283, B-283, P-384,
P-521
Signature Verification
#A948 HMAC [198]
SHA-256
Key Sizes: <range or
enumeration>
λ = 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 128, 192,
256
Message Authentication,
KDF Primitive, Password
Obfuscation
SHA-384
Key Sizes: <range or
enumeration>
λ = 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 192, 256,
320, 384
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
SHA-512
Key Sizes: <range or
enumeration>
λ = 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 256, 320,
384, 448, 512
#A948 KBKDF [108] Counter SHA(256) Key Based Key Derivation
#A948
KTS-RSA
[56Br2]
KTS-OAEP
n = 2048
n = 3072
Key establishment
methodology provides
112 or 128 bits of
encryption strength
Provides Key
Encapsulation and Key
Un-Encapsulation
#A948 RSA [186]
X9.31
n = 2048
n = 3072
Key Generation
PKCS1_v1.5
n = 2048 SHA(256, 384, 512)
n = 3072 SHA(256, 384, 512)
Signature Generation
PSS
n = 2048 SHA(256, 384, 512)
n = 3072 SHA(256, 384, 512)
Signature Generation
PKCS1_v1.5
n = 2048 SHA(256, 384, 512)
n = 3072 SHA(256, 384, 512)
Signature Verification
PSS
n = 2048 SHA(256, 384, 512)
n = 3072 SHA(256, 384, 512)
Signature Verification
#A948 SHS [180]
SHA-224
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation, Password
Obfuscation
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
Cryptographic keys, such as secret keys, private keys, and public keys used in cryptographic modules, exist
in the context of the session in the form of an object. Applications that have obtained the correct session
information can perform cryptographic services through the CSP in the context. Applications that have
not obtained session information cannot access to the context by the session management mechanism of
the cryptographic module and the memory management mechanism of the operating system.
Table 5 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Service CSP Management Location Size (bits)
Symmetric
Encryption
AES Secret Key hObject 128/192/256
AES Round Key
Within context
mcCtx->mcKeyCtx
Size of ARIA_KEY
Message
Authentication
key
HMAC Secret Key
hObject
mcCtx->mcHashCtx
256/384/512 or more
SHA2_CTX structure
GMAC Secret Key
hObject
mcCtx->mcKeyCtx
Same as block encryption
key
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Service CSP Management Location Size (bits)
Public Key
Encryption
Private Key for
Decryption
hObject
mcCtx->mcKeyCtx
Size of ASN.1 encoded
RSA structure
Internal Random
Number for Encryption
Local variables within the
cryptographic functions
256
Digital
Signature
Private Key for
Generation
hObject
mcCtx->mcKeyCtx
Size of ASN.1 encoded
RSA/ECDSA structure
Internal Random
Number for Digital
Signature
Local variable within a digital
signature function
Depending on an
algorithm
Random
number
generator
Noise Sources Collected
Externally
Noise source collection
provided as variable from API
Depending on a noise
source
Internal State Variable
V,C
Global variables within the
cryptographic module
V:440
C:440
KDF
KBKDF CTR Derived
Master Key
hObject
mcCtx->mcKeyCtx
Depending on User Input
2.2 Public Keys
Table 6 – Public Keys
Service PSP Management Location Size (bits)
Operation
Mode
IV / CTR / Nonce
Within context
mcCtx->mcParam
128
Public Key
Encryption
Public Key for Encryption
hObject
mcCtx->mcKeyCtx
Size of ASN.1 encoded
RSA structure
Digital
Signature
Public Key for
Verification
hObject
mcCtx->mcKeyCtx
Size of ASN.1 encoded
RSA/ECDSA structure
2.3 Keys Information
All keys are generated using the FIPS mode random number generator. Internally used random numbers
(ex: RSA-PSS algorithm) are not stored in MC_CONTEXT within the cryptographic module. The module
implements a Hash_DRBG, which accepts input from entropy sources that are external to the
cryptographic boundary, for seed material. External entropy can be added by the calling application via
the API. The Cryptographic Module’s calling application shall use entropy sources that meet the security
strength required for the random bit generator Hash_DRBG (SHA-256). A minimum of 256 bits of entropy
must be provided by the calling application. No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys.
The DRBG is seeded with the following:
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• Initialize: SHA256DRBG_Init with Entropy input (32 bytes), nonce (16 bytes), and personalize
String (0 bytes)
• Reseed: SHA256DRBG_Reseed with Entropy input (32 bytes) and additional data (0 bytes)
The CSPs that are in the session context of this cryptographic module are created directly by a request of
an application program (ex: MC_GenerateKeyPair) or replaced by data entered by a user in plain text (ex:
MC_CreateObject).
When an application successfully establishes a session, then calls a service that returns the context's CSP,
the CSP is returned plain text form (MC_GetObjectValue).
There are no CSPs permanently stored in the module. The masking key used to verify the integrity of the
module is stored, but this is not applicable to the CSP.
The CSPs that are in the session or OBJECT are managed by an application program and provide a zeroizing
service function (MC_DestroyObject, MC_CloseSession) so that they can all be zeroized when the
cryptographic service ends.
3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Services
MagicCryptoMVP encryption module is a software library. It supports only a single crypto officer or user
(single-user mode of operation).
Roles can be separated into the crypto officer and user roles, and each have access to the supported
services.
The role of the crypto officer includes self-test, cryptographic module initialization, cryptographic module
shutdown, encryption/decryption, digital signature, hash, MAC, and cryptographic services such as
random number generation.
The MagicCryptoMVP is a Security Level 1 cryptographic module, and it does not have a maintenance
interface.
The detailed service items provided by the cryptographic module are shown in the following table.
Table 7 – Services and CSP
Service Description Keys & CSPs Role Access Keys
Basic
Service
Install/Remove
cryptographic module
- CO, U -
Self-test - CO, U
Initialize/Finalize
cryptogaphic module
- CO, U
Show status - CO, U
Create session - CO, U
Close session - CO, U
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Service Description Keys & CSPs Role Access Keys
Hash SHA - CO, U -
MAC HMAC, GMAC MAC Key CO, U Generate/Execute
Symmetric
Encryption
AES AES symmetric Keys CO, U Generate/Execute
Asymmetric
Encryption
RSA-ES
RSA asymmetric PublicKey
RSA asymmetric PrivateKey
CO, U Generate/Execute
Digital
Signature
RSA
ECDSA
PrivateKey for Sign generate
PublicKey for Sign Verification
CO, U Generate/Execute
Random Hash-DRBG CO, U Generate/Execute
Generate
KeyPair
RSA
EC
RSA PublicKey and PrivateKey
EC PublicKey and PrivateKey
CO, U Generate/Execute
KDF KBKDF_CTR Master Key CO, U Generate/Execute
3.2 Authentication
The MagicCryptoMVP encryption module is Security Level 1 and does not provide an authentication
mechanism for users and crypto officer.
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4 Self-Tests
The cryptographic module performs both power-up tests and conditional tests, and the details are as
follows.
Table 8 – Self-Test
Self-Test Test Description
Power-up Test Cryptographic
Algorithm test
Hash Algorithm KAT
HMAC Algorithm KAT
Random number generation Algorithm KAT
Symmetric Key Algorithm KAT
Asymmetric Key Algorithm test
Digital signature Algorithm test
Derived key KAT
Software integrity test
Conditional test Pair-wise consistency test
SP800-90A Health Tests (Instantiate, Generate, and Reseed)
If an error occurs in the self-test, the cryptographic module can no longer be used in the system.
MC_Selftest outputs status MC_OK on success and MC_FAIL on error.
Table 9 – Self-Test Error Status
Self-Test Result Return Code
Success MC_OK
Fail MC_FAIL
4.1 Power-up Test
The cryptographic module performs the test before it goes into an operating state when the power is
applied to the module without any user intervention. When the power-up test is completed, the result of
the test is output as the return value of the API function, which is the status output interface of
MC_Initialize.
Table 10 – Auto Call Function
OS Auto Call Function Description
Linux __attribute__((constructor)) _MC_Initialize() Constructor autoload function
4.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Test
To test each cryptographic algorithm used in the cryptographic module, KAT is performed to see if a
correct answer is output for a given input.
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Cryptographic algorithm tests are performed on encryption, decryption, message authentication,
message integrity, and random number generators.
Pair-wise consistency tests are performed when the output has more than one value for a given input,
such as the RSA digital signature algorithm. The test verifies the generated digital signature and the KAT
confirms the result of signature verification.
Table 11 – Algorithm Test
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Test Method
AES-128-ECB Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-192-ECB Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-256-ECB Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-128-CBC Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-192-CBC Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-256-CBC Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-128-CTR Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-192-CTR Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-256-CTR Encryption/Decryption KAT Test
AES-128-GCM Encryption/Decryption/Verification KAT Test
AES-192-GCM Encryption/Decryption/Verification KAT Test
AES-256-GCM Encryption/Decryption/Verification KAT Test
AES-128-CCM Encryption/Decryption/Verification KAT Test
AES-192-CCM Encryption/Decryption/Verification KAT Test
AES-256-CCM Encryption/Decryption/Verification KAT Test
HMAC-SHA-256 CreateMAC/VerifyMAC KAT Test
HMAC-SHA-384 CreateMAC/VerifyMAC KAT Test
HMAC-SHA-512 CreateMAC/VerifyMAC KAT Test
GMAC-AES-128 CreateMAC/VerifyMAC KAT Test
GMAC-AES-192 CreateMAC/VerifyMAC KAT Test
GMAC-AES-256 CreateMAC/VerifyMAC KAT Test
Hash-DRBG SHA-256 SHA256 Hash DRBG Algorithm (No PR) KAT Test
SHA-224 Hash KAT Test
SHA-256 Hash KAT Test
SHA-384 Hash KAT Test
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SHA-512 Hash KAT Test
RSAES-2048 PublicKey Encryption / PrivateKey Decryption Test
RSAES-3072 PublicKey Encryption / PrivateKey Decryption Test
RSA-SHA-256-2048 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
RSA-SHA-256-3072 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
RSA-SHA-384-2048 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
RSA-SHA-384-3072 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
RSA-SHA-512-2048 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
RSA-SHA-512-3072 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-256 P-224 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-256 P-256 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-256 P-384 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-256 P-521 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-256 B-283 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-256 K-283 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-384 P-224 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-384 P-256 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-384 P-384 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-384 P-521 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-384 B-283 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA-384 K-283 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA512-P-224 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA512-P-256 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA512-P-384 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA512-P-521 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA512-B-283 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
ECDSA-SHA512-K-283 Generation Signature by PrivateKey / Verification Signature by PublicKey Test
KDF-CTR Derived Key KAT Test
4.1.2 Software/Firmware Integrity Test
Software integrity test for the MagicCryptoMVP cryptographic module is performed during the power-up
self-test included in the initialization process. When the module calls the initialization function,
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MC_Initialize, the integrity test for the installed module is performed by calculating a HMAC (SHA-256)
integrity verification value for the shared library itself.
Figure 2 – Integrity Test
4.1.3 Critical Function Test
The cryptographic service APIs provided by the module can also be critical functions. The critical function
tests are performed in power-up test and conditional test. The following functions are tested.
Table 12 – Critical Function Tests
Critical Function Description
MC_SignInit Initialize digital signature generation
MC_Sign Generate digital signature
MC_VerifyInit Initialize digital signature verification
MC_Verify Verify digital signature
MC_EncryptInit Initialize message encryption
MC_Encrypt Encrypt message
MC_DecryptInit Initialize message decryption
MC_Decrypt Decrypt message
MC_DigestInit Initialize message digest
MC_Digest Generate message digest
MC_CreateMacInit Initialize MAC
MC_CreateMac Generate MAC value
MC_VerifyMacInit Initialize verify MAC
MagicCryptoM
VP Module
Application
MagicCryptoMVP Module
Calculate Integrity Value
(HMAC -SHA-256)
Integrity Value
Compare
Success or Fail
Dynamic
Link
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MC_VerifyMac Verify MAC value
MC_DeriveKey Derive key (KBKDF CTR)
4.2 Conditional Test
Conditional tests are automatically performed by the module when keypairs and random numbers are
generated.
Table 13 – Conditional Tests
Algorithm Test Method
RSA Pair wise consistency Test
ECDSA Pair wise consistency Test
Hash-DRBG Continuous Test
Hash-DRBG SP800-90A Health Tests (Instantiate, Generate, and Reseed)
4.2.1 Pair-Wise Consistency Test
The module generates public and private key pairs using MC_GenerateKeyPair function to generate and
verify digital signatures. When the private key and public key pair are generated, a pair-wise consistency
test is performed to check that the key pair is generated successfully.
The pair-wise consistency test verifies that the public key and the private key pair match by generate
signature and verify signature.
5 Operational Environment
The MagicCryptoMVP cryptographic module is a dynamic library that runs on Linux operating systems.
The MagicCryptoMVP cryptographic module is a software shared library that works in conjunction with
an application program when the application program is running.
Linux operating systems run running processes in a virtual memory area to logically separate them from
other processes, and the cryptographic module operates only in the area where the process is loaded.
Therefore, intermediate values for critical security parameters and key generation cannot access other
processes in the operating system.
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications.
5.1 Tested Environment
The Module was tested on the following environment:
Table 14 – Tested Operating Environment
Operating System/Platform Hardware Platform Processor Module bits
Linux 4.19 x86_64 64bits MacBookPro Intel Core i5 64bits
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5.2 Vendor Affirmed Environment
The following platforms have not been tested as part of the FIPS 140-2 level 1 validation. However,
DreamSecurity “vendor affirms” that these platforms are equivalent to the testedand validated platforms.
Additionally, DreamSecurity affirms that the module will function the same way and provide the same
security services on any of the systems listed below.
Table 15 – Vendor Affirmed Operating Environment
Platform Version Kernel bits Processor Module bits
Linux 2.6 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 3.2 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 3.4 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 3.10 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 3.11 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 3.13 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 3.16 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 3.18 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 3.19 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 4.1 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 4.4 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 4.9 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 4.10 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 4.13 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 4.14 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 4.19 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Linux 5.4 64bits X86_64 processor 64bits
Note: The Cryptographic Module will operate correctly on other GPC platforms running Linux.
Note: CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module when so ported if the specific
operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
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6 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
6.1 Prevention of Timing Attacks on RSA
The RSA algorithm is vulnerable to timing attacks. As a counter measure the RSA Fixed Window technique
was applied.
6.2 Prevention of ECC Side Channel Attack
Side channel attacks are known vulnerability for the ECC Point Multiplication algorithm. To prevent the
side channel attack, the Fixed Based Comb algorithm and Montgomery's ladder algorithm were applied.
The ECC P256R1/B283R1/B283K1 Curve was complemented using the Fixed Based Comb algorithm, and
the ECC P224R1 Curve was complemented using the Montgomery's ladder algorithm.
The Montgomery's ladder algorithm (Montgomery ladder with (X, Y) -only co-Z addition) used in the
cryptographic module is as follows.
Figure 3 – Montgomery's Ladder Algorithm
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7 Security Rules and Guidance
This section documents the security rules for the secure operation of the cryptographic module to
implement the security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
1. The Cryptographic Module provides two distinct operator roles. Roles can be separated into crypto
officer and users, and each have access to the same supported services.
2. The Cryptographic Module does not provide any operator authentication. The crypto officer and user
roles are implicitly assumed.
3. The Cryptographic Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power
or MC_SelfTest function.
4. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. The Cryptographic Module is available to perform services only after successfully completing the
Power-Up Self-Tests.
6. Data output are inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
8. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
9. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
10. The Cryptographic Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
11. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual key entry.
12. The Cryptographic Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for
entry/output of data.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not store any plaintext CSPs
15. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. Per IG A.5, the GCM IV is generated according to Scenario 2, where it is generated internally using the
DRBG. The IV length must be 96 bits or greater.
The module is installed by cryptographic officer by copying the library file (.so) to any directory within the
operating environment. The operating system running the MagicCryptoMVP module must be configured
in a single-user mode of operation. The directory path is then recorded and used by the calling application
to access the module.
MagicCryptoMVP
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8 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 16 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
[108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), October 2009
[131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, March 2019
[132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation, Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
June 2020
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1,
December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[202] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202, August
2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B,
May 2005
MagicCryptoMVP
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[38C] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special
Publication 800-38C, May 2004
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
[38E] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, Special
Publication 800-38E, January 2010
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F,
December 2012
[56Br2] NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, March 2019
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication
800-90A, June 2015.
[90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy
Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.