



## Seagate Secure<sup>®</sup> TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module

### Non-Proprietary Security Policy

#### Security Level 2

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**Seagate Technology, LLC**

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Scope

This security policy applies to the FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module (CM) embedded in **Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives**.

This document meets the requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard (Appendix C) and Implementation Guidance (section 14.1). It does not provide interface details needed to develop a compliant application.

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## 1.2 Security Levels

FIPS 140-2 Requirement Area	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services and Authentication	2
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
Electromagnetic Interface / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI / EMC)	3
Self – tests	2
Design Assurance	2
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Table 1: Security Levels

The overall security level pursued for the cryptographic modules is Security Level 2.

## 1.3 References

1. FIPS PUB 140-2
2. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2
3. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
4. TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 3.00, January 10, 2011
5. TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 0.9, May 24, 2007
6. TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification, Specification Version 1.0
7. SCSI Primary Commands-4 Rev 15 (SPC-4)
8. SCSI Block Commands Rev15 (SBC-3)
9. Serial Attached SCSI-2 Rev 13 (SAS-2)

## 1.4 Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
ASIC	Application Specific Integrated Circuit
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining, an operational mode of AES
CM	Cryptographic Module
CO	Crypto-officer
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode (SP800-38D)
HDA	Head and Disk Assembly
HDD	Hard Disk Drive
HMAC	Hash-based message authentication code
IV	Initialization Vector for encryption operation

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LBA	Logical Block Address
KAT	Known Answer Test
MEK	Media Encryption Key
MSID	Manufactured SID, public drive-unique value that is used as default PIN, TCG term
POR	Power-on Reset (power cycle)
PN	Part Number(s)
POST	Power on Self-Test
PSID	Physical SID, public drive-unique value
RNG	Random Number Generator
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SID	Security ID, PIN for Drive Owner CO role, TCG term
SoC	System-on-a-Chip
SP	Security Provider or Security Partition (TCG), also Security Policy (FIPS 140)

## 2 Cryptographic Module Description

### 2.1 Overview

The Seagate Secure® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drives FIPS 140 Module is embodied in Seagate **Exos 7E2000** Self-Encrypting Drives model disk drives. These products meet the performance requirements of the most demanding Enterprise applications. The cryptographic module (CM) provides a wide range of cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, instantaneous user data disposal with cryptographic erase, independently controlled and protected user data LBA bands and authenticated FW download. The services are provided through industry-standard TCG Enterprise SSC and SCSI protocols.

The CM has a multiple-chip embedded physical embodiment. The physical interface to the CM is a SAS connector. The logical interfaces are the industry-standard SCSI (refer to Section 1.3, items 7 & 8), TCG SWG (refer to Section 1.3, item 4), and Enterprise (refer to Section 1.3, item 4) protocols, carried on the SAS (refer to Section 1.3, item 9) transport interface. The primary function of the module is to provide data encryption, access control and cryptographic erase of the data stored on the hard drive media. The human operator of the drive product interfaces with the CM through a “host” application on a host system. The cryptographic boundary of the CM surrounds the entire drive unit, including all of its hardware, firmware, and electronics.

### 2.2 Logical to Physical Port Mapping

For HW versions that support SCSI protocol (defined in Section 2.3):

FIPS 140-2 Interface	Module Ports
Data Input	SAS Connector
Data Output	SAS Connector
Control Input	SAS Connector
Status Output	SAS Connector
Power Input	Power Connector

Table 2: Logical to Physical Port Mapping

### 2.3 Product Versions

The following models are validated with the following FW versions:

Product Name	Capacity, Model #	FW Versions
Exos 7E2000	2000 GB: ST2000NX0333	FW Version(s): KF06
Exos 7E2000	2000 GB: ST2000NX0353	FW Version(s): EF06

Table 3: Product Versions

HW versions that support SCSI protocol are:

- Exos 7E2000

The photograph on the title page consists of a representative HW version of the models mentioned in this section.

## 2.4 FIPS Approved Algorithms

Algorithm	Certificate Number	Modes/Key Sizes/Etc. Used
ASIC AES	#2842	CBC/ECB/XTS 256-bits [SP 800-38A/SP 800-38E]
ASIC SHS	#2383	SHA-256 [FIPS 180-4]
AES	#1343	CBC/ECB 256-bits [SP 800-38A]
AES-GCM	#2841	GCM 256-bits [SP 800-38D]
AES KW	#2947	256-bits Encrypt/Decrypt [SP 800-38F]
CKG	Vendor Affirmed	[SP 800-133rev2]
ENT (P)	N/A	[SP 800-90B]
DRBG	#62	Hash based using SHA-256 [SP 800-90A]
HMAC	#1597	SHA-256 [FIPS 198-1]
PBKDF	#A1777	HMAC, Option 2A [SP 800-132]
RSA	#1021	PKCS1.5 SigVer 2048-bit [FIPS 186-2]
SHS	#1225	SHA-256 [FIPS 180-4]

Table 4: FIPS Approved Algorithms

The module only uses a subset of the modes/key sizes/options listed in the CAVP certificates.

## 2.5 Self-Tests

Function Tested	Self-Test Type	Implementation	Failure Behavior
ASIC AES	Power-On	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
ASIC SHS	Power-On	Digest KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
AES	Power-On	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
AES GCM	Power-On	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
ENT (P)	Power-On	First 4096 consecutive entropy samples tested using Repetition Count and Adaptive Proportion tests as per SP 800-90B.	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State
DRBG	Power-On	DRBG KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
HMAC	Power-On	Digest KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
PBKDF	Power-On	PBKDF KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Fail State and rejects host commands with error code.
RSA	Power-On	Sign Verify KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
Firmware Integrity Check	Power-On	Signature Verification	Enters FW Integrity Error State and does not become operationally ready.

Function Tested	Self-Test Type	Implementation	Failure Behavior
Firmware Load Check	Conditional: When new firmware is downloaded	RSA PKCS#1 signature verification of new firmware image is done before it can be loaded.	Firmware download is aborted.
DRBG	Conditional: When a random number is generated	Instantiate, generate, reseed and un-instantiate health tests per section 11.3 of SP 800-90A	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State
DRBG	Conditional: When a random number is generated	Newly generated random number is compared to the previously generated random number. Test fails if they are equal.	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
ENT (P)	Conditional: When a non-Approved but Allowed random number is generated	Newly generated random number is compared to the previously generated random number. Test fails if they are equal.	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State and rejects host commands with error code.
ENT (P)	Conditional: When a seed for DRBG is requested	Repetition Count and Adaptive Proportion tests as per SP 800-90B	Enters FIPS Self Test Error State
AES XTS	Conditional: When a AES XTS key is generated	Generate XTS keys Key_1 and Key_2 are compared, per IG C.I, before being used. The XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications, per SP 800-38E.	Keys are discarded

Table 5: Self-Tests

## 2.6 FIPS 140 Approved Modes of Operation

Before the operator performs Secure Initialization steps detailed in Section 7.1, the drive will operate in a non- FIPS Approved mode (uninitialized state).

For CM that support SCSI protocol on the SAS interface, the operator can only initialize the CM as “TCG Security” mode. After setting up (configuring) the module per the Security Rules of this policy, the CM is always in Approved mode of operation except when a critical failure has been detected, when any ‘Exit FIPS mode’ services are invoked, or when the module is not in ‘Use’ state. For CM that supports both Approved modes, an operator can switch the CM between these Approved modes of operation and to do so, the CM must transition to the uninitialized state (via ‘Exit FIPS mode’ service) which results in zeroization of keys and CSPs.

The module’s FIPS modes of operation are enforced through configuration and policy. Violating the Security rules and ongoing policy restrictions (detailed in Section 7.1 and Section 7.2) would mean that one is no longer using the drive in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.

### 2.6.1 TCG Security Mode

This mode has the capability to have multiple Users with independent access control to read/write/crypto erase independent data areas (LBA ranges). Note that by default there is a single “Global Range” that encompasses the whole user data area.

In addition to the Drive Owner and User(s) roles, this mode implements a CO role (EraseMaster) to administer the above capability.

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## 2.7 User Data Cryptographic Erase/Sanitize Methods

Since all user data is encrypted / decrypted by the CM for storage / retrieval on the drive media, the data can be erased / sanitized using cryptographic methods. The data is effectively erased/sanitized by changing the media encryption key (MEK). Thus, the FIPS 140 key management capability “zeroization” of the key effectively erases all the user data in that read operations will decrypt with a different key value and thus the data is not returned as it was written.

Other FIPS services can be used to erase all the other private keys and CSPs (see Section 2.8).

## 2.8 RevertSP Method

The TCG RevertSP method may be invoked to transition the CM back to the manufactured state (uninitialized). This corresponds to the Exit FIPS Mode service and is akin to a “restore to factory defaults” operation. This operation also provides a means to zeroize keys and CSPs. Subsequently, the CM has to be re-initialized before it can return to a FIPS Approved mode of operation. This RevertSP method is invoked as an unauthenticated service by virtue of the use of a public credential (PSID).

## 2.9 Show Status

Show status service (refer to Section 4.1) can be used to determine if the drive is operational under the security constraints of FIPS. For this purpose TCG Level 0 Discovery mechanism and TCG Get method are utilized.

TCG Level 0 Discovery mechanism maybe invoked by the operator to know if drive in “use” or security “fail” state. If the Drive Security Life Cycle State is 0x80 then drive is in Use State i.e. security is operational. If the Drive Security Life Cycle State is 0xFF the drive is in security Fail State i.e. drive is not operational in terms of FIPS services.



## 3 Identification and Authentication (I&A) Policy

### 3.1 Operator Roles

Note: The following identifies the CO and User roles with a *general* description of the purposes. For further details of the services performed by each role in each FIPS mode, see section 4.1.

#### 3.1.1 Crypto Officer Roles

##### 3.1.1.1 Drive Owner

This CO role corresponds to the SID (Secure ID) Authority on the Admin SP as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section 1.3, item 4]. This role is used to transition the CM to TCG Security Mode and to download a new FW image. Note: only a FIPS validated firmware version can be loaded to the module. Otherwise, the module is not operating in FIPS mode.

##### 3.1.1.2 EraseMaster (TCG Security Mode)

This CO role corresponds to same named role as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section 1.3, item 4]. This role is used to enable/disable User roles, and erase user data region (LBA band). An operator is authenticated to this role with role-based authentication.

#### 3.1.2 User Roles

##### 3.1.2.1 BandMasters (0-15) (TCG Security Mode)

This user role corresponds to the same named role as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section 1.3, item 4]. This role is used to lock/unlock and configure a user data band (“LBA band”) for read/write access.

A CM can be configured to support up to 16 user data bands, which are controlled by their respective BandMaster credentials. By default 2 user bands are enabled. BandMasters are enabled/disabled using the EraseMaster role. An operator is authenticated to the BandMaster role with identity-based authentication. If a user data band is erased (EraseMaster service) then the BandMaster PIN is reset to MSID.

##### 3.1.3 Unauthenticated Role

This role can perform the Show Status service.

If the operator has physical access to the drive, this role can also reset the module with a power cycle (which results in POSTs). This role can also use the public PSID value to invoke the Exit FIPS Mode service. See section 4.1 for details.

### 3.2 Authentication

#### 3.2.1 Authentication Types

Some operator roles have role-based authentication and others have identity-based authentication. For example, the Drive Owner role uses role-based authentication as there is only one ID and one PIN. In TCG Security Mode, the CM has up to 16 User operators. Each of these operators is assigned a unique ID to which a PIN is associated, thus this provides identity-based authentication.

For some services the authentication is performed in a separate associated service; e.g. the Read Unlock service is the authentication for subsequent User Data Read service. If the User Data Read service is attempted without prior authentication then the command will fail.

#### 3.2.2 Authentication in TCG Security Mode

Operator authentication is provided within a TCG session. The host application can have only a single session open at a time. Authentication of an operator, using the TCG interface, uses the Authenticate method to authenticate to a role after a session has been started. Authentications will persist until the session is closed.

During a session the application can invoke services for which the authenticated operator has access control. Note that a security rule of the CM is that the host must not authenticate to more than one operator (TCG authority) in a session.

For the Show Status the host application will authenticate to the “Anybody” authority which does not have a private credential. Therefore this operation is effectively an unauthenticated service.

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### 3.2.3 Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength

Operator authentication with PINs is implemented by hashing the operator input value and comparing it to the stored hash of the assigned PIN. The PINs have a retry attribute (“TryLimit”) that controls the number of unsuccessful attempts before the authentication is blocked until a module reset. The PINs have a maximum length of 32 bytes.

Per the policy security rules, the minimum PIN length is 4 bytes (Rule 2 in Section 7.1). This gives a probability of  $1/2^{32}$  of guessing the PIN in a single random attempt. This easily meets the FIPS 140 authentication strength requirements of less than  $1/1,000,000$ .

In TCG interface, each failed authentication attempt takes a minimum of 15ms to complete. Thus a maximum of  $\{(60*1000)/15\}$  attempts can be processed in one minute. Thus the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is  $4000/2^{32}$ . This is significantly lower than the FIPS requirement of  $1/100,000$ .

### 3.2.4 Personalizing Authentication Data

The initial value for SID and various other PINs is a manufactured value (mSID). This is a device-unique, 32-byte, public value. The Security Rules (Section 7) for the CM requires that the PIN values must be “personalized” to private values using the “Set PIN” service.

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## 4 Access Control Policy

### 4.1 Services

The following tables represent the FIPS 140 services for each FIPS Approved Mode in terms of the Approved Security Functions and operator access control.

Hardware versions that support the SCSI protocol (defined in Section 2.3) provide services in Tables 6 and 7 (when in TCG Security Mode).

For cryptographic algorithm certificates and hardware version association, refer to Section 2.4.

Note the following:

- Use of the services described below is only compliant if the module is in the noted Approved mode.
- Underlying security functions used by higher level algorithms are not represented (e.g. hashing as part of asymmetric key)
- Operator authentication is not represented in this table.
- Some security functions listed are used solely to protect / encrypt keys and CSPs.
- Service input and output details are defined by the TCG and SCSI standards.
- Unauthenticated services (e.g. Show Status) do not provide access to private keys or CSPs.
- Some services have indirect access control provided through enable / disable or lock / unlock services used by an authenticated operator; e.g. User data read / write.
- If the Operator value contains “optional” then the access is dependent on the module setup (see Section 3.2.2).

<b>FIPS 140 Authenticated Services (TCG Security Mode)</b>				
<b>Service Name</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Operator Access Control</b>	<b>Security Function</b>	<b>Command(s)/Event(s)</b>
Set PIN	Change operator authentication data.	EraseMasterBandMasters, Drive Owner	Hashing	TCG Set Method
Firmware Download	Enable/Disable FW download and load complete firmware image. If the self-test of the code load passes then the device will run with the new code.	Drive Owner**	Asymmetric Key	TCG Set Method, SCSI Write Buffer,
Enable / Disable BandMasters	Enable / Disable a User Authority.	EraseMaster	None	TCG Set Method
Set Range Attributes	Set the location, size, and locking attributes of the LBA range.	BandMasters	None	TCG Set Method
Lock / Unlock User Data Range for Read and/or Write	Block or allow read (decrypt) / write (encrypt) of user data in a range.	BandMasters	None	TCG Set Method,
User Data Read / Write	Encryption / decryption of user data to/from a LBA range. Access control to this service is provided through Lock / Unlock User Data Range.	None*	Symmetric Key	SCSI Read, Write Commands
Cryptographic Erase	Erase user data in an LBA range by cryptographic means: changing the encryption key. BandMaster PIN is also reset.	EraseMaster,	DRBG, Symmetric Key	TCG Erase Method

Table 6: FIPS 140 Authenticated Services

<b>FIPS 140 Unauthenticated Services (TCG Security Mode)</b>				
<b>Service Name</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Operator Access Control</b>	<b>Security Function</b>	<b>Command(s)/Event(s)</b>
Show Status	Reports if the CM is operational in terms of FIPS services and approved mode of operation value.	None	None	TCG Level 0 Discovery, TCG Get Method Drive Security Life Cycle State =0x80(Use State) and, Approved mode of operation value =0x02.
Reset Module	Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP RAM.	None	None	POR
DRBG Generate Bytes	Returns an SP 800-90A DRBG Random Number of 256 bytes	None	None	TCG Random()
Exit FIPS Mode	Exit Approved Mode of Operation. Note: CM will enter non-FIPS mode.	None (using PSID)	None	TCG AdminSP.RevertSP()
FIPS 140 Compliance Descriptor	Reports FIPS 140 Revision, Overall Security Level, Hardware and Firmware revisions and Module name	None	None	SCSI SECURITY PROTOCOL IN – Protocol 0

Table 7: FIPS 140 Unauthenticated Services

\*Security has to be Unlocked

\*\*FW Download Port has to be Unlocked

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## 4.2 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs

The following table defines the keys / CSPs and the operators / services which use them. Note the following:

- The module generates the 96-bit AES-GCM IVs internally using the DRBG, which meets Scenario 2 of IG A.5.
- The use of PIN CSPs for authentication is implied by the operator access control.
- The Set PIN service is represented in this table even though generally it is only used at module setup.
- All non-volatile storage of keys and CSPs is in the system area of the drive media to which there is no logical or physical access from outside of the module.
- The module uses SP 800-90A DRBG and adopts Hash\_DRBG mechanism.
- Read access of private values are internal only to the CM and are thus not represented in this table.
- There is no security-relevant audit feature.
- Symmetric keys are generated using the direct unmodified output of the DRBG.

"Key Management"					
Name	Description	Type (Pub / Priv, key / CSP (e.g. PIN)), size	Operator Role	Services Used In	Access **(W, X)
SID (Secure ID), aka Drive Owner PIN	Auth. Data	Private, PIN, 32 bytes	Drive Owner	Set PIN	W
EraseMaster BandMasters (0-15) Passwords	EraseMaster, Auth Data Users Auth. Data	Private, PIN, 32 bytes	EraseMaster BandMasters	SetPIN	W
				Cryptographic Erase	X
				Set PIN	W
				Unlock User Data	X
LBA Range MEKs	MEK (per LBA band)	Private, AES Key, 512 bits	Users	Unlock User Data	X
Entropy Input String	*Input to a DRBG mechanism of a string of bits that contains entropy	Private, 256 bits	None	Services which use the DRBG (e.g. cryptographic erase, sanitize)	X
Seed	*String of bits that is used as input to a DRBG mechanism	Private, Hash seed, 56 bytes	None	Services which use the DRBG (e.g. cryptographic erase, sanitize)	X
Internal State	*Collection of stored information about DRBG instantiation	Private, V and C	None	Services which uses the DRBG (e.g. cryptographic erase, sanitize)	X
ORG0-0 - ORG0-1	Firmware Load Test Signature Verify Key	Public, RSA Key, 2048 bits	Drive Owner (enable FW download)	FW Download	X
MEKEK (MEK Encryption Key)	This key is used to protect the MEK	Private, AES Key, 32 bytes	Master, User, BandMasters, EraseMaster	Unlock User Data, Cryptographic Erase, Set PIN	W, X
Master Key	This key is used to protect the MEKEK	Private, AES Key, 32 bytes	Master, User, BandMasters, EraseMaster	Unlock User Data, Cryptographic Erase, Set PIN	W,X
CSPSK	Used internally within PBKDF	Private, AES Key, 32 bytes	Master, User, BandMasters, EraseMaster	Unlock User Data, Cryptographic Erase, Set PIN	W, X
HMAC Key	Used internally within PBKDF	Private, HMAC Key, 32 bytes	Master, User, BandMasters, EraseMaster	Unlock User Data, Cryptographic Erase, Set PIN	W, X

Table 8: Key Management

\* Source: Section 4 Terms and Definitions of NIST Special Publication SP 800-90A

\*\* W - Write access is allowed, X - Execute access is allowed

## 5 Physical Security

### 5.1 Mechanisms

The CM has the following physical security:

- Production-grade components with standard passivation
- One opaque, tamper-evident security label (TEL) on the exposed (back) side of the PCBA applied by Seagate manufacturing prevents electronic design visibility and protects physical access to the electronics by board removal
- Two tamper-evident security labels applied by Seagate manufacturing prevent top and bottom cover removal for access or visibility to the media
- Exterior of the drive is opaque
- The tamper-evident labels cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without tamper-evidence
- The tamper-evident labels cannot be easily replicated with a low attack time



Figure 1: Exos 7E2000 (SAS Interface)

- Security labels on back of drive to provide tamper-evidence of HDA cover removal.




*Figure 2: Exos 7E2000 (SAS Interface)*



*Figure 3: Exos 7E2000 (SAS Interface) Bottom*





*Figure 4: Exos 7E2000 (SAS Interface) security label on side of drive*



*Figure 5: Exos 7E2000 (SAS Interface) security label on side of drive*

## 5.2 Operator Requirements

The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically for one or more of the following tamper evidence:

- Security label over screws at indicated locations is missing or penetrated,




Figure 6: Exos 7E2000 (SAS Interface) Screws covered by Security Label

- Text (including size, font, orientation) on security label does not match original,
- Security label cutouts do not match original.

Upon discovery of tamper evidence, the module should be removed from service.

## 6 Operational Environment

The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates in a “non-modifiable operational environment”. That is, while the module is in operation the operational environment cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. FW can be upgraded (replaced) with a signed FW download operation. If the code download is successfully authenticated then the module will begin operating with the new code image.

## 7 Security Rules

### 7.1 Secure Initialization

The following are the security rules for initialization and operation of the CM in a FIPS 140 compliant manner. Reference the appropriate sections of this document for details.

1. Users: At installation and periodically examine the physical security mechanisms for tamper evidence. CM that supports SCSI protocol on the SAS interface can only transition to TCG Security Mode.
  - Transition to TCG Security Mode is done by authenticating to Locking SP as BandMaster 0, BandMaster 1 or EraseMaster.
2. COs and Users: At installation, set all operator PINs applicable for the FIPS mode to private values of at least 4 bytes length:
  - TCG Security: Drive Owner, EraseMaster and BandMasters
3. Drive Owner: At installation, disable the “Makers” authority<sup>1</sup>.
4. At installation, the value of LockOnReset<sup>1</sup> for FW Download must be set to “Power Cycle” and it must not be modified.
5. At installation, the value of PortLocked<sup>1</sup> for FW Download must be set to “TRUE”.

### 7.2 Ongoing Policy Restrictions

1. Prior to assuming a new role, close the current Session and start a new Session, or do a power cycle, so that the previous authentication is cleared.
2. Users for TCG Security Mode: User Data Read/Writes shall be an authenticated service<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, set ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled to “TRUE” (the default value is “FALSE”). If a band is configured with a value of “FALSE” then the band is to be considered excluded from the module boundary.

## 8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The CM does not make claims to mitigate against other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2.

<sup>1</sup> Refer to Section 1.3, Item 5.

<sup>2</sup> Refer to Section 4.1, FIPS Authenticated Services table.