Copyright © 2023 Nutanix, Inc.
This non-proprietary Security Policy document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.2
March 27, 2023
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Nutanix, Inc.
1740 Technology Drive, Suite 150
San Jose, CA 95110
nutanix.com
KeyPair Consulting Inc.
987 Osos Street
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401
keypair.us
+1 805.316.5024
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 2 of 18
Table of Contents
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 4
2 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels................................................................................................ 5
3 Cryptographic Module Specification................................................................................ 6
3.1 Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................................. 6
4 Modes of Operation ........................................................................................................ 7
5 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces..................................................................... 7
6 Roles, Authentication and Services.................................................................................. 8
7 Physical Security.............................................................................................................. 9
8 Operational Environment................................................................................................ 9
9 Cryptographic Algorithms & Key Management.............................................................. 10
9.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms......................................................................................... 10
9.2 Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................... 11
9.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms................................................................................. 11
9.4 Cryptographic Key Management............................................................................................... 12
9.5 Public Keys ................................................................................................................................ 12
9.6 Key Generation ......................................................................................................................... 13
9.7 Key Storage ............................................................................................................................... 13
9.8 Key Zeroization.......................................................................................................................... 13
10 Self-Tests....................................................................................................................... 14
10.1 Power-On Self-Tests.................................................................................................................. 14
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests................................................................................................................ 14
11 Mitigation of other Attacks ........................................................................................... 15
12 Guidance and Secure Operation .................................................................................... 16
12.1 Installation Instructions............................................................................................................. 16
12.2 Secure Operation ...................................................................................................................... 16
12.2.1 Initialization.................................................................................................................................. 16
12.2.2 Usage of AES OFB, CFB and CFB8................................................................................................... 16
12.2.3 Usage of AES-GCM........................................................................................................................ 16
12.2.4 Usage of Triple-DES....................................................................................................................... 16
12.2.5 RSA and ECDSA Keys...................................................................................................................... 16
12.2.6 Usage of RSA Key Transport .......................................................................................................... 16
13 References and Standards ............................................................................................. 17
14 Acronyms and Definitions ............................................................................................. 17
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 3 of 18
List of Tables
Table 1 - Tested Operational Environments................................................................................................ 4
Table 2 - Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section......................................................................................... 5
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................................... 7
Table 4 - Approved Services, Roles and Access Rights ................................................................................ 8
Table 5 - Non-Approved or Non-Security Relevant Services ....................................................................... 8
Table 6 - Non-Security Relevant Services.................................................................................................... 9
Table 7 - Approved Algorithms and CAVP Certificates.............................................................................. 10
Table 8 - Allowed Algorithms.................................................................................................................... 11
Table 9 - Non-Approved Algorithms ......................................................................................................... 11
Table 10 - Keys and CSPs Supported ......................................................................................................... 12
Table 11 - Public Keys Supported.............................................................................................................. 12
Table 12 - Power-On Self-Tests................................................................................................................. 14
Table 13 - Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................... 14
Table 14 - References and Standards........................................................................................................ 17
Table 15 - Acronyms and Definitions ........................................................................................................ 17
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Logical Boundary......................................................................................................................... 6
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 4 of 18
1 Introduction
The Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL (hereafter referred to as the “module”) is an open-
source, general-purpose cryptographic library which provides FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic
algorithms to serve BoringSSL and other user-space applications. The validated version of the library is
ae223d6138807a13006342edfeef32e813246b39. For the purposes of the FIPS 140-2 validation, its
embodiment type is defined as multi-chip standalone.
The cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environments on the general-purpose
computer (GPC) platforms detailed below:
Table 1 - Tested Operational Environments
# Operating System Platform
1 CentOS 7 Nutanix NX-3040-G7 with Intel® Xeon® Silver 4208 (with PAA)
2 CentOS 7 Nutanix NX-3040-G7 with Intel® Xeon® Silver 4208 (without PAA)
The cryptographic module is also supported on the following operational environments for which
operational testing and algorithm testing was not performed:
• CentOS 7 running on the following Nutanix platforms:
o NX-1120S-G7
o NX-3060-G7
o NX-1065N-G8
o NX-1065-G8
o NX-1175S-G8
o NX-3060N-G8
o NX-3060-G8
o NX-3155G-G8
o NX-3170-G8
o NX-8035N-G8
o NX-8035-G8
o NX-8150-G8
o NX-8155-G8
o NX-8170-G8
As per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5, compliance is maintained for other versions of the
respective operational environments where the module binary is unchanged. No claim can be made as to
the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys if any source code is
changed and the module binary is reconstructed.
The GPC(s) used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined by
47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B. FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained when
the module is operated on other versions of the GPOS running in single user mode, assuming that the
requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are met.
The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation
certificate.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 5 of 18
2 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
Table 2 - Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 6 of 18
3 Cryptographic Module Specification
3.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for use by
other processes that require cryptographic functionality. All operations of the module occur via calls from
host applications and their respective internal daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted
services calling the services of the module.
The physical cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.
The logical cryptographic boundary of the module is a single object file named “bcm.o” which is statically
linked to BoringSSL. The module performs no communications other than with the calling application (the
process that invokes the module services) and the host operating system.
Figure 1 shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software and hardware
components of the computer.
Figure 1 - Logical Boundary
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 7 of 18
4 Modes of Operation
The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in FIPS-
approved mode when all power up self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved algorithms
are invoked. See Table 7 below for a list of the supported Approved algorithms and Table 8 for allowed
algorithms. The non-Approved mode is entered when a non-Approved algorithm is invoked. See Table 9
for a list of non-Approved algorithms.
5 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output interface
consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface consists of the actual
API input parameters. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API functions.
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces
FIPS Interface Physical Ports Logical Interfaces
Data input Physical ports of the tested platforms API input parameters
Data output Physical ports of the tested platforms API output parameters and return values
Control input Physical ports of the tested platforms API input parameters
Status output Physical ports of the tested platforms API return values
Power input Physical ports of the tested platforms N/A
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module
is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the module’s logical data output interfaces is
inhibited.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 8 of 18
6 Roles, Authentication and Services
The cryptographic module implements both User and Crypto Officer (CO) roles. The module does not
support user authentication. The User and CO roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services
implemented by the module. A user is considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the module
and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.
The Approved services supported by the module and access rights within services accessible over the
module’s public interface are listed in the table below.
Table 4 - Approved Services, Roles and Access Rights
Service Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or CSPs Roles Access Rights to
Keys and/or CSPs
Module Initialization N/A N/A CO N/A
Symmetric Encryption/
Decryption
AES Encryption/Decryption,
Triple-DES Decryption
AES key,
Triple-DES key
User, CO Execute
Keyed Hashing HMAC-SHA HMAC key User, CO Execute
Hashing SHS None User, CO N/A
Random Bit Generation CTR_DRBG DRBG seed, internal
state V and Key values
User, CO Write/Execute
Signature Generation/
Verification
CTR_DRBG, RSA, ECDSA RSA, ECDSA private key User, CO Write/Execute
Key Transport AES Key Wrapping/
Unwrapping
AES wrapping key User, CO Write/Execute
Key Agreement KAS ECC EC DH private key User, CO Write/Execute
Key Generation CTR_DRBG, RSA, ECDSA RSA, ECDSA private key User, CO Write/Execute
On-demand Self-test None None User, CO Execute
Zeroization None All keys User, CO Write/Execute
Show Status None None User, CO N/A
The module provides the following non-Approved services which utilize algorithms listed in Table 9:
Table 5 - Non-Approved or Non-Security Relevant Services
Service Non-Approved Functions Roles Keys and/or CSPs
Symmetric Encryption/
Decryption
AES (non-compliant), DES, Triple-DES (non-compliant) User, CO N/A
Hashing MD4, MD5, POLYVAL User, CO N/A
Signature Generation/
Verification
RSA (non-compliant), ECDSA (non-compliant) User, CO N/A
Key Transport RSA (non-compliant) User, CO N/A
Key Generation RSA (non-compliant), ECDSA (non-compliant) User, CO N/A
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 9 of 18
The module also provides the following non-Approved or non-security relevant services over a non-public
interface:
Table 6 - Non-Security Relevant Services
Service Approved Security Functions Roles Access Rights to Keys
and/or CSPs
Large integer operations None User, CO N/A
Disable automatic generation of
CTR_DRBG "additional_input" parameter
CTR_DRBG User, CO N/A
Wegman-Carter hashing with POLYVAL None User, CO N/A
7 Physical Security
The cryptographic module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
8 Operational Environment
The cryptographic module operates under CentOS 7. The module runs on a GPC running one of the
operating systems specified in Table 1. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads
in a logically separated manner. The module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application that
instantiates the module.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 10 of 18
9 Cryptographic Algorithms & Key Management
9.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements the following FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms:
Table 7 - Approved Algorithms and CAVP Certificates
CAVP
Cert. #
Algorithm Standard Mode/Method/Size Use
A2612 AES SP 800-38A
FIPS 197
SP 800-38F
128, 192, 256 CBC, ECB, CTR Encryption, Decryption,
Authentication
A2612 AES SP 800-38D 128 and 256 GCM/GMAC Authenticated Encryption,
Authenticated Decryption
A2612 KTS SP 800-38F 128, 192, 256 KW, KWP Key Wrapping, Key Unwrapping
A2612 CVL SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 KDF1
Key Derivation
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG SP 800-133 Cryptographic Key Generation Key Generation
A2612 DRBG SP 800-90Arev1 AES-256 CTR_DRBG Random Bit Generation
A2612 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation Component,
Key Pair Generation,
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification,
Public Key Validation
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Digital Signature Services
A2612 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
Generation, Authentication
A2612 RSA FIPS 186-4 Key Generation,
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
(1024, 2048, 3072)
Note: Key size 1024 is only used
for Signature Verification
Digital Signature Services
A2612 SHA FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Digital Signature Generation,
Digital Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature Applications
A2612 Triple-DES SP 800-67
SP 800-38A
TCBC, TECB Decryption (Encryption was
algorithm tested but is not
available in the Approved mode
of operation.)
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC SP 800-56rev3 EC Diffie-Hellman P-224, P-256,
P-384 and P-521 (SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512)
Key Agreement Scheme – Key
Agreement Scheme Shared Secret
Computation (KAS-SSC) per SP
800-56Arev3, Key Derivation per
SP 800-135 (CVL Cert. #A2612 TLS
KDF)
1
The module supports FIPS 140-2 approved/allowed cryptographic algorithms for TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 11 of 18
9.2 Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 Approved but allowed algorithms that may be used in
the Approved mode of operation.
Table 8 - Allowed Algorithms
Algorithm Use
MD5 (No Security
Claimed)
When used with the TLS protocol version 1.0 and 1.1
NDRNG Used only to seed the Approved DRBG
9.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module employs the methods listed in Table 9, which are not allowed for use in a FIPS-Approved
mode. Their use will result in the module operating in a non-Approved mode.
Table 9 - Non-Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Algorithm
MD5, MD4 DES
AES-GCM (non-compliant) AES (non-compliant)
ECDSA (non-compliant) RSA (non-compliant)
POLYVAL Triple-DES (non-compliant)
RSA key transport (non-compliant with SP 800-56B Rev. 2)
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 12 of 18
9.4 Cryptographic Key Management
The table below provides a complete list of Private Keys and CSPs used by the module:
Table 10 - Keys and CSPs Supported
Key/CSP Name Key Description Generated/Input Output
AES Key AES (128/192/256) encrypt/decrypt
key
Input via API in plaintext Output via API in
plaintext
AES-GCM/GMAC
Key
AES (128/256) encrypt/decrypt/
generate/verify key
Input via API in plaintext Output via API in
plaintext
AES Wrapping Key AES (128/192/256) key wrapping
key
Input via API in plaintext Output via API in
plaintext
Triple-DES Key Triple-DES (3-Key) decrypt key Input via API in plaintext Output via API in
plaintext
ECDSA Signing Key ECDSA (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521)
signature generation key
Internally generated or
input via API in plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
EC DH Private Key EC DH (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521)
private key
Internally generated or
input via API in plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
HMAC Key Keyed hash key
(160/224/256/384/512)
Input via API in plaintext Output via API in
plaintext
RSA Signature
Generation Key
RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature
generation key
Internally generated or
input via API in plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
Shared Secret; 48 bytes of
pseudorandom data
Internally Generated Output via API in
plaintext
TLS Master Secret Shared Secret; 48 bytes of
pseudorandom data
Internally derived via key
derivation function
defined in SP 800-135 KDF
(TLS)
Output via API in
plaintext
CTR_DRBG V (Seed) 128 bits Internally generated Does not exit the
module
CTR_DRBG Key 256 bits Internally generated Does not exit the
module
CTR_DRBG Entropy
Input
384 bits Input via API in plaintext Does not exit the
module
9.5 Public Keys
The table below provides a complete list of the Public keys used by the module:
Table 11 - Public Keys Supported
Public Key Name Key Description
ECDSA Verification Key ECDSA (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521) signature verification key
EC DH Public Key EC DH (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521) public key
RSA Signature Verification Key RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 13 of 18
9.6 Key Generation
The module supports generation of ECDSA, EC Diffie-Hellman and RSA key pairs as specified in Section 5
of NIST SP 800-133. The module employs a NIST SP 800-90A random bit generator for creation of the seed
for asymmetric key generation. The module requests a minimum number of 128 bits of entropy from its
Operational Environment per each call.
The output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected from processes
performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the data output
interface when the module zeroizes keys.
9.7 Key Storage
The cryptographic module does not perform persistent storage of keys. Keys and CSPs are passed to the
module by the calling application. The keys and CSPs are stored in memory in plaintext. Keys and CSPs
residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed
using the module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from
unauthorized access.
9.8 Key Zeroization
The module is passed keys as part of a function call from a calling application and does not store keys
persistently. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module. The
Operating System and the calling application are responsible to clean up temporary or ephemeral keys.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 14 of 18
10 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires the module to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the
correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. Some functions require conditional tests during
normal operation of the module. The supported tests are listed and described in this section.
10.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module and do not require operator intervention
to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will not initialize. The module will enter an error state and no
services can be accessed.
The module implements the following power-on self-tests:
Table 12 - Power-On Self-Tests
Type Test
Integrity Test HMAC-SHA-512
Known Answer Test
(KAT)
AES KAT (encryption and decryption. Key size: 128-bits)
AES-GCM/GMAC KAT (encryption and decryption. Key size: 128-bits)
Triple-DES KAT (encryption (legacy use only) and decryption. Key size: 168-bits)
ECDSA KAT (signature generation/signature verification. Curve: P-256)
HMAC KAT (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-512)
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT (Key size: 256-bits)
RSA KAT (signature generation/signature verification and encryption/decryption (legacy
use only). Key size: 2048-bit)
SHA KAT (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512)
Each module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the module is initialized. All power-on
self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power-on self-tests can
be run on demand by power-cycling the host platform.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are run during operation of the module. If any of these tests fail, the module will
enter an error state, where no services can be accessed by the operators. The module can be reinitialized
to clear the error and resume FIPS mode of operation. Each module performs the following conditional
self-tests:
Table 13 - Conditional Self-Tests
Type Test
Pair-wise Consistency Test ECDSA Key Pair generation
RSA Key Pair generation
CRNGT Performed on NDRNG per IG 9.8
DRBG Health Tests Performed on DRBG, per SP 800‐90A Section 11.3. Required per IG C.1.
Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and
Encrypt/Decrypt.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 15 of 18
11 Mitigation of other Attacks
The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 16 of 18
12 Guidance and Secure Operation
12.1 Installation Instructions
During the manufacturing process, Nutanix executes the build and installation instructions for the module.
The module is pre-installed and configured in supported Nutanix solutions. FIPS mode is enabled by
default. There are no additional installation or configuration instructions for operators intending to use
the module.
12.2 Secure Operation
12.2.1 Initialization
The cryptographic module is initialized by loading the module before any cryptographic functionality is
available. In User Space the operating system is responsible for the initialization process and loading of
the library. The module is designed with a default entry point (DEP) which ensures that the power-up tests
are initiated automatically when the module is loaded.
12.2.2 Usage of AES OFB, CFB and CFB8
In approved mode, users of the module must not utilize AES OFB, CFB and CFB8.
12.2.3 Usage of AES-GCM
In the case of AES-GCM, the IV generation method is user selectable and the value can be computed in
more than one manner. AES GCM encryption and decryption are used in the context of the TLS protocol
version 1.2 (compliant to Scenario 1 in FIPS 140-2 A.5). The module is compliant with NIST SP 800-52 and
the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The module ensures that it's strictly
increasing and thus cannot repeat. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a
given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition may either trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key in accordance with RFC 5246, or fail. In either case, the
module prevents and IV duplication and thus enforces the security property.
The module supports internal IV generation by the module’s Approved DRBG. The DRBG seed is generated
inside the module’s physical boundary. The IV is 96-bits in length per NIST SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.2 and
FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 scenario 2.
The selection of the IV construction method is the responsibility of the user of this cryptographic module.
In approved mode, users of the module must not utilize GCM with an externally generated IV.
Per IG A.5, in the event module power is lost and restored the consuming application must ensure that
any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
12.2.4 Usage of Triple-DES
In the approved mode, users of the module must not utilize the Triple-DES encryption function.
12.2.5 RSA and ECDSA Keys
The module allows the use of 1024 bits RSA keys for legacy purposes including signature generation, which
is disallowed to be used in FIPS Approved mode as per NIST SP 800-131A. Therefore, the cryptographic
operations with the non-approved key sizes will result in the module operating in non-Approved mode
implicitly.
Approved algorithms shall not use the keys generated by the module’s non-Approved key generation
methods.
12.2.6 Usage of RSA Key Transport
The RSA key transport (encryption/decryption) function implemented in the module is not compliant with
SP 800-56B Rev. 2. In the approved mode, users of the module must not utilize this function.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 17 of 18
13 References and Standards
The following Standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 14 - References and Standards
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for
CBC Mode
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
SP 800-56A Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
SP 800-56B Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography
SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
SP 800-52 Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Implementations
SP 800-133 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
14 Acronyms and Definitions
Table 15 - Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter-mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Nutanix Cryptographic Module for BoringSSL
Page 18 of 18
Acronym Definition
EC DH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GPC General Purpose Computer
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Not-Applicable
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OS Operating System
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard