F5®
vCMP Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Module Version:
14.1.0.3 EHF
FIPS Security Level 2
Document Version 1.3
Document Revision: June 2022
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 5
1.1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION....................................................................................... 5
1.1.1. Module Description ........................................................................................................ 5
1.2. FIPS 140-2 VALIDATION LEVEL ................................................................................................... 6
1.3. DESCRIPTION OF MODES OF OPERATION ......................................................................................... 6
1.4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOUNDARY ........................................................................................... 9
1.4.1. Hardware Block Diagram ............................................................................................... 9
1.4.2. Logical Block Diagram.................................................................................................. 10
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES..............................................11
3. ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION .............................................................13
3.1. ROLES .................................................................................................................................. 13
3.2. AUTHENTICATION .................................................................................................................... 14
3.3. SERVICES .............................................................................................................................. 14
4. PHYSICAL SECURITY............................................................................................20
4.1. TAMPER LABEL PLACEMENT ....................................................................................................... 20
5. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................24
6. CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT....................................................................25
6.1. KEY GENERATION .................................................................................................................... 25
6.2. KEY ESTABLISHMENT................................................................................................................ 26
6.3. KEY ENTRY / OUTPUT ............................................................................................................... 26
6.4. KEY / CSP STORAGE................................................................................................................ 26
6.5. KEY / CSP ZEROIZATION .......................................................................................................... 26
6.6. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION ................................................................................................. 26
7. SELF-TESTS ........................................................................................................28
7.1. POWER-UP TESTS ................................................................................................................... 28
7.1.1. Integrity Tests.............................................................................................................. 28
7.1.2. Cryptographic algorithm tests ..................................................................................... 28
7.2. ON-DEMAND SELF-TESTS .......................................................................................................... 29
7.3. CONDITIONAL TESTS ................................................................................................................ 29
8. GUIDANCE ..........................................................................................................31
8.1. DELIVERY AND OPERATION ........................................................................................................ 31
8.2. CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE...................................................................................................... 31
8.2.1. Installing Tamper Evident Labels ................................................................................. 31
8.2.2. Initial Configuration...................................................................................................... 31
8.2.3. Password Strength Requirement.................................................................................. 32
8.2.4. Additional Guidance..................................................................................................... 32
8.2.5. Configuration Confirmation.......................................................................................... 33
8.3. USER GUIDANCE ..................................................................................................................... 33
9. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS..........................................................................34
Figure 1 :Hardware Block Diagram ................................................................................................. 10
Figure 2: Logical Block Diagram ..................................................................................................... 10
Figure 3 – BIG-IP i5000/i5820-DF .................................................................................................... 12
Figure 4 – BIG-IP i7000/i7820-DF .................................................................................................... 12
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Figure 5 – BIG-IP i15800.................................................................................................................. 12
Figure 6 – VIPRION B2250 front panel............................................................................................. 12
Figure 7 – VIPRION B4450 front panel............................................................................................. 12
Figure 8 – VIPRION B2250 in chassis (1 of 6 tamper labels shown) ................................................ 21
Figure 9 – VIPRION B2250 top view (5 of 6 tamper labels shown) .................................................. 21
Figure 10 – BIG-IP i5000 (3 of 3 tamper labels)............................................................................... 21
Figure 11 – BIG-IP i5820-DF (4 of 4 tamper labels shown) .............................................................. 21
Figure 12 – BIG-IP i7000 (6 of 6 tamper labels shown) ................................................................... 22
Figure 13 – BIG-IP i7820-DF (4 of 4 tamper labels shown) .............................................................. 22
Figure 14 – BIG-IP i15800 (Front tamper labels 1-3 labels shown).................................................. 22
Figure 15 – BIG-IP i15800 (Back tamper labels 4 and 5 labels shown)............................................ 22
Figure 16 – VIPRION B4450 in chassis............................................................................................. 22
Figure 17 – VIPRION B4450 front (1 of 5 tamper labels shown) ...................................................... 22
Figure 18 – VIPRION B4450 top-view (4 of 5 tamper labels shown) ................................................ 23
Table 1 – Tested Platforms................................................................................................................ 5
Table 2 – Security Levels .................................................................................................................. 6
Table 3 – FIPS Approved Algorithms ................................................................................................. 7
Table 3a - FIPS non-Approved but Allowed Algorithms ..................................................................... 8
Table 4 – Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms/Modes............................................................................... 9
Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................... 11
Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Roles .............................................................................................................. 14
Table 7 – Authentication of Roles.................................................................................................... 14
Table 8 – Management Services ..................................................................................................... 17
Table 9 – Crypto Services in FIPS mode of operation...................................................................... 17
Table 10 – Services in non-FIPS mode of operation ........................................................................ 18
Table 10a – Non-Authenticated Services ........................................................................................ 19
Table 11 – Inspection of Tamper Evident Labels............................................................................. 20
Table 11a – Number of Tamper Labels per hardware appliance ..................................................... 20
Table 12 – Life cycle of CSPs........................................................................................................... 25
Table 13 – Self-Tests....................................................................................................................... 29
Table 14 – Conditional Tests ........................................................................................................... 30
Copyrights and Trademarks
F5® and BIG-IP® are registered trademarks of F5, Inc..
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Intel® and Xeon® are registered trademarks of Intel® Corporation.
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1. Introduction
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy of F5® vCMP Cryptographic
Module with the firmware version 14.1.0.3 EHF. It contains the security rules under which the
module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS
PUB 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 2
module.
1.1. Cryptographic Module Specification
The following section describes the cryptographic module and how it conforms to the FIPS 140-2
specification in each of the required areas.
1.1.1. Module Description
The F5® vCMP Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a firmware module
which is a purpose-built hypervisor built on top of F5’s market leading Application Delivery
Controller (ADC) technology, and specifically designed for F5 hardware, which allows the
segmentation of purpose-built, scalable resources into independent, virtual ADCs.
BIG-IP hardware and software leverages F5’s proprietary operating system, Traffic Management
Operating System (TMOS). TMOS is a highly optimized system providing control over the
acceleration, security, and management through purpose-built hardware and software systems.
The module has been tested on the following multichip standalone devices:
Hardware1 Processor Host OS with hypervisor
VIPRION B2250 Intel® Xeon® E5-2658 TMOS 14.1.0.3 EHF with vCMP
VIPRION B4450 Intel® Xeon® E5-2658A TMOS 14.1.0.3 EHF with vCMP
BIG-IP i5000 Intel® Xeon® E5-1630 TMOS 14.1.0.3 EHF with vCMP
BIG-IP i5820-DF Intel® Xeon® E5-1630 TMOS 14.1.0.3 EHF with vCMP
BIG-IP i7000 Intel® Xeon® E5-1650 TMOS 14.1.0.3 EHF with vCMP
BIG-IP i7820-DF Intel® Xeon® E5-1650 TMOS 14.1.0.3 EHF with vCMP
BIG-IP i15800 Intel® Xeon® E5-2680 TMOS 14.1.0.3 EHF with vCMP
Table 1 – Tested Platforms
1 Note: The module cannot be ported to other operational environment as the IG G.5 only applies
at level 1.
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1.2. FIPS 140-2 Validation Level
For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the F5® vCMP Cryptographic Module is defined as a
multi-chip standalone firmware cryptographic module validated at overall security level 2. The
table below shows the security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS
140-2 standard:
FIPS 140-2 Section Security Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 2 – Security Levels
1.3. Description of modes of operation
The module must be installed in the FIPS validated configuration as stated in Section 8 – Guidance.
In the operation mode, the module supports two modes of operation:
• in "FIPS mode" (the FIPS Approved mode of operation) only approved or allowed security
functions with sufficient security strength can be used.
• in "non-FIPS mode" (the non-Approved mode of operation) only non-approved security
functions can be used.
The module enters operational mode after power-up tests succeed. Once the module is
operational, the mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the security function
invoked and the security strength of the cryptographic keys. Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
used or stored in FIPS mode are not used in non-FIPS mode, and vice versa.
In the FIPS Approved Mode, the cryptographic module will provide the CAVP certified cryptographic
algorithms listed in Table 3. Here the Control, or Management, plane refers to the connection from
an administrator to the BIG-IP for system management. The Data Plane refers to the traffic passed
between external entities and internal servers.
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Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs
Certificate
Number(s)
Control
Plane2
Data
Plane3
AES-ECB
AES-CBC
AES-GCM
Encryption and
Decryption
128/192/256-bit AES key C696 N/A
AES-CBC
AES-GCM
Encryption and
Decryption
128/256-bit AES key N/A C697,
C698
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG AES-256
Random Number
Generation
Entropy input string, V
and Key values
C696 C697,
C698
FIPS 186-4 RSA Key Pair
Generation
RSA Key
Generation
RSA key pair with
2048/3072-bit modulus
size
C696 N/A
PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA
Signature Generation and
Signature Verification
RSA Signature
Generation and
Verification
RSA private key with
2048/3072-bit modulus
and SHA-1 (Sig Ver only),
SHA-256 and SHA-384
C696 C697,
C698
FIPS 186-4 ECC Key Pair
Generation and Verification
(Appendix B.4.2)
ECDSA Key Pair
Generation and
Verification (PKV)
ECDSA key pair for P-256
and P-384 curves
C696 C697,
C698
FIPS 186-4 ECDSA
Signature Generation and
Signature Verification
ECDSA Signature
Generation and
Verification
ECDSA private key
(P-256, P- 384 curves)
C697,
C698
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest N/A C696 C697,
C698
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
Message
Authentication
HMAC key
(>=112-bit of strength)
C696 C697,
C698
TLS Version4 v1.0/1.1, v1.2
with SHA-256 and SHA-384
C696 C697,
C698
Table 3 – FIPS Approved5 Algorithms
2 For Control Plane, the platforms VIPRION B2250, BIG-IP i5000, BIG-IP i5820-DF, BIG-IP i7000, BIG-
IP i7820-DF, BIG-IP i15800 and VIPRION B4450, with E5 processor share the same CAVP certificate.
3 For Data Plane, the platform VIPRION B2250 with E5 processor has its own CAVP certificate. The
platforms VIPRION B4450, BIG-IP i5000, BIG-IP i5820-DF, BIG-IP i7000, BIG-IP i7820-DF, and BIG-IP
i15800 with E5 processor share the same CAVP certificate.
4 No parts of the TLS protocol except the KDF has been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP
5 Please refer to section 6.2 for the strength caveats of the key establishment schemes. Also note
that not all algorithms/modes tested through CAVS are used within the module
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Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs Notes
RSA PKCS Key Wrapping RSA key pair of 2048
or 3072-bit size
Non-Approved but
Allowed
NDRNG DRBG seed generation seed Non-Approved but
Allowed
Table 3a- FIPS non-Approved but Allowed Algorithms
The Table 4 lists the non-FIPS Approved algorithms along with their usage:
Algorithm Usage Notes
AES Symmetric Encryption
and Decryption
using OFB, CFB, CTR, XTS6 and KW modes
DES
RC4
Triple-DES
SM2, SM4
N/A
RSA Asymmetric Encryption
and Decryption
using modulus sizes less than 2048-bits or
greater than 3072-bits
RSA Asymmetric Key
Generation
FIPS 186-4 less than 2048-bit modulus size
DSA using any key size
ECDH using all P-curves, in Control Plane
implementation.
ECDSA using public/private key pair for curves other
than P-256 and P-384
RSA Digital Signature
Generation and
Verification
PKCS#1 v1.5 using key sizes other than
2048 and 3072 bits
PKCS#1 v1.5 using SHA-1, SHA-224 and
SHA-512 and 2048/3072-bit key sizes
Used in the SSH protocol
Used in the TLS protocol with DH/ECDH key
exchange
using X9.31 standard
using Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS)
DSA using any key size and SHA variant
ECDSA FIPS 186-4 using curves other than P-256
and P-384
6 The AES-XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage
devices. The AES-XTS shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in
transit.
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FIPS 186-4 using curves P-256 and P-384
with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-512
SHA-224/ SHA-512
MD5
SM3
Message Digest N/A
HMAC-SHA-224
HMAC-SHA-512
AES-CMAC
Triple-DES-CMAC
Message Authentication N/A
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Scheme N/A
ECDH shared secret computation using all P-curves
TLS KDF Key Derivation function using SHA-1/SHA-224/SHA-512
SSH KDF using any SHA variant
SNMP KDF
IKEv1 and IKEv2 KDF
Table 4 – Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms/Modes
1.4. Cryptographic Module Boundary
The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined by the exterior surface of the appliance (red
dotted line). The block diagram below shows the module, its interfaces and the delimitation of its
logical boundary.
1.4.1. Hardware Block Diagram
The block diagram below depicts the major component blocks and the flow of status output (SO),
control input (CI), data input (DI) and data output (DO). Description of the ports and interfaces can
be found in Table 5.
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Figure 1 :Hardware Block Diagram
1.4.2. Logical Block Diagram
The module’s logical boundary consists of the firmware image for the module with the version
14.1.0.3 EHF that runs in the guest environment.
Figure 2: Logical Block Diagram
Power
Interface
(PSU)
SSL
Accelerator
Memory
Interface
(RAM)
Central
Processing
Unit (CPU)
Storage
Interface
(SSD)
Display
Interface
(LCD, LED, USB)
Network
Interface
(Ethernet, Fiber)
- DO
- SO
- DI
- DO
- SO
- CI
- PI
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2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical
ports of the hardware platform on which it runs.
The logical interfaces are the commands through which users of the module request services. The
Table 5 summarizes the physical interfaces with details of the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces they
correspond to:
Logical Interface Physical Interface Description
Data Input • Network
Interface
Depending on module, the network interface consists
of SFP, SFP+, and/or QSFP+ ports (Ethernet and/or
Fiber Optic) which allow transfer speeds from 1Gbps
up to 100 Gbps.
Data Output • Network
Interface
• Display
Interface
Depending on module, the network interface consists
of SFP, SFP+, and/or QSFP+ ports (Ethernet and/or
Fiber Optic) which allow transfer speeds from 1Gbps
up to 100 Gbps. In addition, status logs may be
output to USB found in the interface.
Control Input • Display
Interface
• Network
Interface
The control input found in the display interface
includes the power button and reset button. The
control input found in the network interface includes
the commands which control module state (e.g. reset
module, power-off module). Console port provides
capability to remotely power-on, power-off and reset
the module.8
Status Output • Display
Interface
• Network
Interface
Depending on module, the display interface can
consist of an LCD display, LEDs, and/or output to
STDOUT and the USB ports which provide module
status information. In addition, command outputs
that contain status information flow through the
Network Interface. Console port provides capability to
remotely read status information.4
Power Input • Power Interface Two removable power supplies
Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces
Figure 3 to Figure 7 depict the various test platforms that were tested. Please use the images to
familiarize yourself with the devices.
8 Console access shall not be allowed in operational mode. Refer to section 8.2.4
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Figure 3 – BIG-IP i5000/i5820-DF
Figure 4 – BIG-IP i7000/i7820-DF
Figure 5 – BIG-IP i15800
Figure 6 – VIPRION B2250 front panel
Figure 7 – VIPRION B4450 front panel
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3. Roles, Services and Authentication
3.1. Roles
The module supports the role-based authentication and the following roles are defined:
• User role: Performs cryptographic services (in both FIPS mode and non-FIPS mode), key
zeroization, module status requests, and on-demand self-tests. The FIPS140-2 role of User
is mapped to multiple BIG-IP roles which are responsible for different components of the
module (e.g. auditing, certificate management, user management, etc.). The user can
access the module through Web Interface described below.
• Crypto Officer (CO) role: Crypto officer is represented by the administrator of the BIG-IP.
This entity performs module installation and initialization. This role has full access to the
module and has the ability to create, delete, and manage other user roles on the module.
The module supports concurrent operators belonging to different roles: one CO and one User role,
which creates two different authenticated sessions, achieving the separation between the
concurrent operators.
The Web interface can be used to access the module. The Web interface consists of HTTPS over
TLS interface which provides a graphical interface for system management tools. The Web
Interface can be accessed from a TLS-enabled web browser.
Note: The module does not maintain authenticated sessions upon power cycling. Restarting the
module requires the authentication credentials to be re-entered. When entering authentication
data through the Web interface, any character entered will be obfuscated (i.e. replace the
character entered with a dot on the entry box).
FIPS 140-2
Role
BIG-IP Role Purpose of Role
Crypto
Officer
Administrator Main administrator of the of the BIG-IP module. This role has
complete access to all objects in the module. Entities with this role
cannot have other roles within the module.
User Auditor Entity who can view all configuration data on the module, including
logs and archives.
Certificate
Manager
Entity who manages digital certificates and keys.
Firewall
Manager
Grants a user permission to manage all firewall rules and supporting
objects. Notably, the Firewall Manager role has no permission to
create, update, or delete non-network firewall configurations,
including Application Security or Protocol Security policies.
iRule
Manager
Grants a user permission to create, modify, view, and delete iRules.
Users with this role cannot affect the way that an iRule is deployed.
Operator Grants a user permission to enable or disable nodes and pool
members.
Resource
Manager
Grants a user access to all objects on the module except BIG-IP user
accounts. With respect to user accounts, a user with this role can
view a list of all user accounts on the module but cannot view or
change user account properties except for their own user account.
Users with this role cannot have other user roles on the module.
User
Manager
Entity who manages User Role accounts.
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Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Roles
3.2. Authentication
FIPS 140-2
Role
Authentication
type and data
Strength of Authentication (Single-
Attempt)
Strength of
Authentication (Multiple-
Attempt)
Crypto
Officer
Password
based (Web
Interface)
The password must consist of
minimum of 6 characters with at least
one from each of the three-character
classes. Character classes are defined
as: digits (0-9), ASCII lowercase letters
(a-z), ASCII uppercase letters (A-Z)
Assuming a worst-case scenario that
comprises 6 (six) characters that
consist of a set of 4 (four) digits, 1
(one) ASCII lowercase letter and 1
(one) ASCII uppercase letter. The
probability to guess every character
successfully is (1/10)^4 * (1/26)^1*
(1/26)^1 = 1/6,760,000 which is much
smaller than 1/1,000,000.
The maximum number of
login attempts is limited to
6 after which the account is
locked. This means that at
worst case an attacker has
the probability of guessing
the password in one minute
as 6/6,760,000 which is less
than the requirement of
1/100,000.
User Password
based (Web
Interface)
The password must consist of
minimum of 6 characters with at least
one from each of the three-character
classes. Character classes are defined
as: digits (0-9), ASCII lowercase letters
(a-z), ASCII uppercase letters (A-Z)
Assuming a worst-case scenario that
comprises 6 (six) characters that
consist of a set of 4 (four) digits, 1
(one) ASCII lowercase letter and 1
(one) ASCII uppercase letter. The
probability to guess every character
successfully is (1/10)^4 * (1/26)^1 *
(1/26)^1 = 1/6,760,000 which is much
smaller than 1/1,000,000.
The maximum number of
login attempts is limited to
6 after which the account is
locked. This means that at
worst case an attacker has
the probability of guessing
the password in one minute
as 6/6,760,000 which is less
than the requirement of
1/100,000.
Table 7 – Authentication of Roles
3.3. Services
The module provides services to users that assume one of the available roles. All services are
described in detail in the user documentation.
Table 8 lists the Management Services which are only available after authentication has
succeeded. Usage of any of the following services using non-approved algorithms will place the
module in non-approved mode.
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Service Description Keys/CSPs Access
Type
(R9, W, Z)
Read/Write/
Zeroize
Authorization
Crypto
Officer
User
User Management Services
List Users Display list of user None - ü User
Manager
Resource
Manager
Create User Create additional users password W ü User
Manager
View Users View users None - ü User
Manager
Delete User Delete users from module password Z ü User
Manager
Unlock User Remove Lock from user who
has exceeded login attempts
None - ü User
Manager
Update own
password
Update own password password W All Roles
Update others
password
Update password for user that
is not self
password W ü User
Manager
Configure
Password Policy
Set password policy features None - ü None
Certificate Management Services
Create SSL
Certificate
Generate a self-signed
certificate
RSA/ECDSA
private Key
R ü Certificate
Manager
Create SSL Key Generate SSL Certificate key
file
RSA/ECDSA
private Key
W ü Certificate
Manager
Check-Cert Examines certificate and
display or logs expiration date
of installed certificates
None - ü Certificate
Manager
List Certificates Display certificates installed None - ü Certificate
Manager
Import SSL
Certificate
Import SSL certificate into
module
None - ü Certificate
Manager
Delete SSL
Certificate
Delete a certificate from the
module.
None - ü Certificate
Manager
Export
Certificate File
Export SSL certificate into
module
None - ü Certificate
Manager
9 The R access type refers to Reading of the CSP. This access type can be thought as synonymous
to Execute CSP/key.
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Service Description Keys/CSPs Access
Type
(R9, W, Z)
Read/Write/
Zeroize
Authorization
Crypto
Officer
User
ssh-keyswap
utility service
Use ssh-keyswap utility to
create or delete ssh keys
Session
encryption and
authentication
keys, EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared secret
W, Z ü Certificate
Manager
Firewall Management Services
Configure
firewall settings
Configure firewall policy rules,
and address-lists for use by
firewall rules.
None - ü Firewall
Manager
Show firewall
state
Display the current module-
wide state of firewall rules
None - ü Firewall
Manager
Show statistics Displays statistics of firewall
rules on the BIG-IP system
None - ü Firewall
Manager
Audit Management Services
View Audit Logs Display various service logs None - ü Auditor
Export Analytics
Logs
Export analytics logs None - ü Auditor
Enable/Disable
audition
Enables/Disables auditing None - ü Auditor
System Management Services
Configure Boot
Options
Enable Quit boot, manage boot
locations
None - ü Resource
Manager
Configure SSH
access options
Enable/Disable SSH access,
Configure IP address whitelist
None - ü None
Update private key RSA/ECDSA
private keys
R,W ü User
Manager
Resource
Manager
Configure
Firewall Users
Manage firewall rules None - ü Firewall
Manager
Configure nodes
and pool
members
Enable/Disable nodes and pool
members
None - ü Operator
Configure iRules create, modify, view, and
delete iRules
None - ü iRule
Manager
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Service Description Keys/CSPs Access
Type
(R9, W, Z)
Read/Write/
Zeroize
Authorization
Crypto
Officer
User
Secure Erase Full module zeroization All CSPs in
Table 12.
W, Z ü None
Table 8 – Management Services
Table 9 lists the crypto services available in FIPS mode of operation and the roles that can request
the service, the algorithms involved, the CSPs involved and how they are accessed.
Service Algorithms / Key
Sizes
Role Keys/CSPs Access Type
(R, W, Z)
Read/ Write/
Zeroize
Interface
TLS Services Data
Plane
Control
Plane
Establish
TLS session
Signature Generation
and Verification:
RSA or ECDSA with
SHA-256/SHA-384
User
CO
RSA, ECDSA signing
key
R, W Yes Yes
Key Exchange:
RSA Key wrapping
(allowed)
RSA wrapping key,
TLS pre-master secret
and master secret
R, W Yes Yes
Maintaining
TLS session
Data Encryption: AES
CBC, GCM
Data Authentication:
HMAC SHA-1/SHA-
256/SHA-384
User
CO
AES and HMAC Keys R, W Yes Yes
Closing TLS
session
N/A User
CO
session keys, secret Z Yes Yes
Table 9 – Crypto Services in FIPS mode of operation
Table 10 lists all of the non-approved services available in the non-FIPS-Approved mode of
operation.
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Service Role Usage/Notes
TLS Services
Establishing TLS session User
CO
Signature generation and verification using
DSA or RSA/ ECDSA with SHA-1/SHA-224/SHA-512
RSA with keys less than 2048
Key Exchange using:
Diffie-Hellman
RSA Key wrapping with keys less than 2048 or greater than
3072
ECDH shared secret computation with SP800-135 KDF
Maintain TLS session Data encryption using Triple-DES, AES-CTR
Data authentication using HMAC SHA-224/SHA-512
SSH Services
Establish SSH session User
CO
Signature generation and verification using:
DSA, Ed25519
ECDSA with SHA-1/SHA-224/ SHA-256/ SHA-384 /SHA-512
and all P-curves
RSA with key size less than 2048-bit and 2048/ 3072-bits
key sizes (SHA-1 and SHA-2)
Key exchange using
Diffie-Hellman, Ed25519, ECDH shared secret computation
Key derivation
SP800-135 SSH KDF
Maintain SSH session Data encryption using Triple-DES
Data authentication using HMAC SHA-1/SHA-224/ SHA-256/
SHA-384 /SHA-512
Other Services
IPsec User
CO
The configuration and usage of IPsec is not approved
iControl REST access Access to the module through REST using non-approved crypto
from BouncyCastle
Configuration using SNMP Management of the module via SNMP is not approved.
Table 10 – Services in non-FIPS mode of operation
The Table 10a lists the module’s services that can be performed without authentication.
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Service Usage/Notes
Show Status Displays system status information over LCD screen (e.g.
network info, system operational status, etc.)
Self-Tests When the BIG-IP system has been started, the Self-Tests are
performed. This includes the integrity check and Known Answer
Tests. On-Demand self-tests are initiated by manually power
cycling the system.
Table 10a – Non-Authenticated Services
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4. Physical Security
All of the platforms listed in Table 1 – Tested Platforms are enclosed in a hard-metallic case that
provides obscurity from visual inspection of internal components. Each platform is fitted with
tamper evident labels to provide physical evidence of attempts to gain access inside the case. The
tamper evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in approved mode of operation.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for inspecting the quality of the tamper labels on a regular basis
to confirm the modules have not been tampered with. The Crypto Officer must follow instructions
provided for proper placement and storage instructions. In the event that additional tamper
evident labels are needed, a kit is available for purchase (P/N: F5-ADD-BIG-FIPS140). The kit comes
with twenty-five (25) tamper labels. It is the responsibility of the Crypto Officer for the storage of
any unused labels.
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended
Inspection Frequency
Guidance
Tamper Evident
Labels
Once per month Check the quality of the tamper evident
labels for any sign of removal, replacement,
tearing, etc. If any label is found to be
damaged or missing, contact the system
administrator immediately.
Table 11 – Inspection of Tamper Evident Labels
4.1. Tamper Label Placement
The details below show the location of all tamper evident labels for each hardware appliance.
Label application instructions are provided in the F5 Platforms: FIPS Kit Installation guide delivered
with each hardware appliance.
Hardware
Appliance
# of Tamper Labels Hardware
Appliance
# of Tamper Labels
VIPRION B2250 6 BIG-IP i15800 5
VIPRION B4450 5 BIG-IP i7000 6
BIG-IP i5000 3 BIG-IP i7820-DF 4
BIG-IP i5820-DF 4
Table 11a – Number of Tamper Labels per hardware appliance
Label 1
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Figure 8 – VIPRION B2250 in chassis (1 of 6 tamper labels shown)
Figure 9 – VIPRION B2250 top view (5 of 6 tamper labels shown)
Figure 10 – BIG-IP i5000 (3 of 3 tamper labels)
Figure 11 – BIG-IP i5820-DF (4 of 4 tamper labels shown)
Label 2
Label 6
Label 4
Label 5
Label 3
Front
Label
Label
Label
Label 1 Label 2 Label 3 Label 4
Label 5
Label 6
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Figure 12 – BIG-IP i7000 (6 of 6 tamper labels shown)
Figure 13 – BIG-IP i7820-DF (4 of 4 tamper labels shown)
Figure 14 – BIG-IP i15800 (Front tamper labels
1-3 labels shown)
Figure 15 – BIG-IP i15800 (Back tamper labels
4 and 5 labels shown)
Figure 16 – VIPRION B4450 in chassis
Figure 17 – VIPRION B4450 front (1 of 5 tamper
labels shown)
Label 1
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Figure 18 – VIPRION B4450 top-view (4 of 5 tamper labels shown)
Label 2
Label 3
Label 4
Label 5
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5. Operational Environment
The module operates in a non-modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 2
specifications and as such the operational environment requirements do not apply.
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6. Cryptographic Key Management
The following table summarizes the CSPs that are used by the cryptographic services implemented
in the module:
Name Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy input
string
Obtained from NDRNG. RAM Zeroized by module reboot
DRBG seed, V and Key
values
Derived from entropy string as
defined by [SP800-90A]
RAM
TLS RSA signing private
key
Generated using FIPS 186-4
Key generation method and
the random value used in the
key generation is generated
using SP800-90A DRBG.
Disk Zeroized when key file is
deleted or by secure erase
option at boot.
TLS RSA signing public
key
TLS ECDSA signing
private key
TLS ECDSA signing public
key
TLS RSA wrapping
private key
RAM Zeroized by closing TLS
session or by or rebooting the
module.
TLS RSA wrapping public
key
TLS Pre-Master Secret
and Master Secret
Established during the TLS
handshake
RAM Zeroized by closing TLS
session or by or rebooting the
module.
Derived TLS session key
(AES, HMAC)
Derived from the master
secret via SP800-135 TLS KDF
User Password Entered by the user Disk Zeroized by secure erase
option at boot or overwritten
when password is changed
Table 12 – Life cycle of CSPs
The following sections describe how CSPs, in particular cryptographic keys, are managed during its
life cycle.
6.1. Key Generation
For generation of RSA and ECDSA keys, the module implements asymmetric key generation
services compliant with [FIPS186-4] and using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e. the
random value) used in asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90A] DRBG.
The module does not implement symmetric key generation as an explicit service. The symmetric
HMAC and AES keys used by the module are derived from the TLS pre-master secret by applying
SP 800-135 as part of the TLS protocol (section 6.2 of the SP 800-133r2).
In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed).
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6.2. Key Establishment
The module provides RSA Key wrapping scheme which is used as part of TLS protocol with the key
derivation implemented by SP 800-135 TLS KDF. The module also includes a SP 800-38F key
wrapping in the context of TLS protocol where a key may be within a packet or message that is
encrypted and authenticated using approved authenticated encryption mode i.e. AES GCM or a
combination method which includes approved symmetric encryption algorithm i.e. AES together
with approved authentication method i.e. HMAC-SHA. These schemes provide the following
security strength in FIPS mode:
• RSA key wrapping provides 112 or 128-bits of encryption strength
• SP 800-38F key wrapping using an approved authenticated encryption mode i.e. AES GCM
provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength (AES Cert. #C696)
• SP 800-38F key wrapping using an approved authenticated encryption mode i.e. AES GCM
provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength (AES Certs. #C697 and #C698)
• SP 800-38F key wrapping using a combination of an approved AES encryption and HMAC
authentication method provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength (AES
Cert. #C696 and HMAC Cert. #C696)
• SP 800-38F key wrapping using a combination of approved AES encryption and HMAC
authentication method provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength (AES Certs. #C697
and #C698 and HMAC Certs. #C697 and #C698)
6.3. Key Entry / Output
The module does not support manual key entry or intermediate key generation key output. During
the TLS handshake, the keys that are entered or output to the module over the network, includes
RSA/ECDSA public keys and the TLS pre-master secret. For TLS with RSA key exchange, when
module acts as a TLS client, the TLS pre-master secret is generated using DRBG and is output from
the module wrapped with server’s public RSA key. When module acts as a TLS server, the TLS pre-
master secret encrypted with module's RSA key is input into the module.
Once the TLS session is established, the TLS traffic is protected by AES encryption.
6.4. Key / CSP Storage
As shown in the above table most of the keys are stored in the volatile memory in plaintext form
and are destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization calls or the module is rebooted.
The keys stored in plaintext in non-volatile memory are static and will remain on the module
across power cycle and are only accessible to the authenticated administrator.
6.5. Key / CSP Zeroization
The zeroization methods listed in the above Table, overwrites the memory occupied by keys with
“zeros”. Additionally, the user can enforce it by performing procedural zeroization. For keys
present in volatile memory, calling reboot command will clear the RAM memory. For keys present
in non-volatile memory, using secure erase option (can only be triggered by the administrator
during reboot of the module) will perform single pass zero write erasing the disk contents.
6.6. Random Number Generation
The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90A] for the
generation of random value used in asymmetric keys, and for providing an RNG service to calling
applications. The Approved DRBG provided by the module is the CTR_DRBG with AES-256. The
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DRBG is initialized during module initialization. The module performs DRBG health test according
to [SP800-90A] section 11.3.
The module uses a Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG) to seed the DRBG. A
Continuous Random Number Generation Test (CRNGT) is performed on the output of the NDRNG
prior to seeding the DRBG and also on the DRBG output. The NDRNG provides at least 256- bits of
entropy to the DRBG during initialization (seed) and reseeding (reseed). The NDRNG is within its
physical boundary.
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7. Self-Tests
7.1. Power-Up Tests
The module performs power-up tests automatically during initialization when the module is started
without requiring any operator intervention; power-up tests ensure that the module’s firmware is
not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected.
During the execution of power-up tests, services are not available and input and output are
inhibited. Upon successful completion of the power-up tests, the module is initialized and enters
operational mode where it is accessible for use. If the module fails any of the power-up tests, it
enters into the ‘Halt Error’ state and halts the module. In this state, the module will prohibit any
data outputs and cryptographic operations and will not be available for use. The module will be
marked unusable and the administrator will need to reinstall the module to continue.
7.1.1. Integrity Tests
The integrity of the module is verified by comparing the MD5 checksum value of the installed
binaries calculated at run time with the stored value computed at build time. If the values do not
match the module enters halt error state and the module will not be accessible. In order to recover
from this state, the module needs to be reinstalled.
7.1.2. Cryptographic algorithm tests
The module performs self-tests on all FIPS-Approved cryptographic algorithms supported in the
approved mode of operation and is done on the Data plane as well as Control Plane side, using the
Known Answer Test (KAT) and Pair-wise Consistency Test (PCT) as listed in the following table:
Algorithm10 Test
Control Plane Self-tests
CTR_DRBG KAT using AES 256-bit with and without derivation function
AES KAT of AES encryption with GCM mode and 128-bit key
KAT of AES decryption with ECB mode and 128-bit key
RSA KAT of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation with 2048 bit key and
SHA-256
KAT of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification with 2048 bit key and
SHA-256
ECDSA PCT of ECDSA signature generation and verification with P-256 curve
HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
KAT of HMAC-SHA-1
KAT of HMAC-SHA-256
KAT of HMAC-SHA-384
10 The module also includes KATs for ECDH shared secret computation but it is a non-approved
algorithm hence it is not listed in this table.
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Algorithm10 Test
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 Covered by respective HMAC KATs
Data Plane Self-Tests
AES KAT of AES encryption with GCM mode and 128-bit key
KAT of AES decryption with CBC mode and 128-bit key
RSA KAT of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation with 2048 bit key and
SHA-256
KAT of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification with 2048 bit key and
SHA-256
ECDSA PCT of ECDSA signature generation and verification with P-256 curve
CTR_DRBG Covered by Control Plane Self-Tests. (Date Plane makes use of the
same DRBG implementation provided by Control Plane)
HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
KAT of HMAC-SHA-1
KAT of HMAC-SHA-256
KAT of HMAC-SHA-384
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 Covered by respective HMAC KATs
Table 13 – Self-Tests
7.2. On-Demand self-tests
The module does not explicitly provide the Self-Test service to perform on demand self-tests. On-
demand self-tests can be invoked by powering-off and powering-on the module in order to initiate
the same cryptographic algorithm tests executed during power-up. During the execution of the on-
demand self-tests, crypto services are not available and no data output or input is possible.
7.3. Conditional Tests
The module performs conditional tests on the cryptographic algorithms shown in the following
table. If the module fails any of these tests, the module reboots and enters into the Halt Error state
prohibiting any data output or cryptographic operations and the module will be inoperable. The
module must be re-installed in order to clear the error condition.
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Algorithm Test
DRBG Continuous random number generator test (CRNGT) on the output of the
DRBG
NDRNG Continuous random number generator test (CRNGT) on the output of the
NDRNG prior to seeding the CTR_DRBG
RSA key generation Pair-wise Consistency Test (PCT) using SHA-256
ECDSA key
generation
Pair-wise Consistency Test (PCT) using SHA-256
Table 14 – Conditional Tests
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8. Guidance
8.1. Delivery and Operation
The module is distributed as a part of a BIG-IP product which includes the hardware and an
installed copy of 14.1.0.3 EHF. For FIPS compliance, the following steps defined in section 8.2
must be completed by the Crypto Officer prior to access to the module is allowed. The hardware
devices are shipped directly from the hardware manufacturer/authorized subcontractor via trusted
carrier and tracked by that carrier. The hardware is shipped in a sealed box that includes a
packing slip with a list of components inside, and with labels outside printed with the product
nomenclature, sales order number, and product serial number. Upon receipt of the hardware, the
customer is required to perform the following verifications:
• Ensure that the shipping label exactly identifies the correct customer name and address as
well as the hardware model.
• Inspect the packaging for tampering or other issues.
• Ensure that the external labels match the expected delivery and the shipped product.
• Ensure that the components in the box match those on the documentation shipped with the
product.
• The hardware model can be verified by the model number given on the shipping label as
well as on the hardware device itself.
8.2. Crypto Officer Guidance
8.2.1. Installing Tamper Evident Labels
Before the module is installed in the production environment, tamper-evident labels must be
installed in the location identified for each module in section 4.1. The following steps shall be
taken when installing or replacing the tamper evident labels on the module. The instructions are
also included in F5 Platforms: FIPS Kit Installation provided with each module.
• Use the provided alcohol wipes to clean the chassis cover and components of dirt, grease,
or oil before you apply the tamper evidence seals.
• After applying the seal, run your finger over the seal multiple times using extra high
pressure.
• The seals completely cure within 24 hours.
It is the responsibility of the Crypto Officer to inspect the tamper evident labels for damage or any
missing labels as specified in Section 4.
8.2.2. Initial Configuration
Follow the instructions in the "BIG-IP System: Initial Configuration" guide to configure the device.
The following summarize the steps:
• Run the Setup wizard to license and provision the BIG-IP system.
• Activate the Base Registration Key provided with the purchase of the BIG-IP platform.
• Add the FIPS license. Installing the FIPS license for the host system is required for module
activation. Guidance on Licensing the BIG-IP system can be found in
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K7752. A summary is provided below:
o Before you can activate the license for the BIG-IP system, you must obtain a base
registration key. The base registration key is pre-installed on new BIG-IP systems.
When you power up the product and connect to the Configuration utility, the
Licensing page opens and displays the registration key. After a license activation
method is selected (activation method specifies how you want the system to
communicate with the F5 License Server), the F5 product generates a dossier which
is an encrypted list of key characteristics used to identify the platform. If the
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automated activation method is selected, the BIG-IP system automatically connects
to the F5 License Server and activates the license.
o If the manual method is selected, The Crypto Officer shall go to the F5 Product
Licensing page at secure.f5.com, paste the dossier in the “Enter Your Dossier” box
which produces a license. The Crypto Officer will then copy and paste it into the
“License” box in the Configuration Utility. The BIG-IP system then reloads the
configuration and is ready for additional system configuration. This concludes the
product licensing
8.2.2.1. Configure vCMP Guest
• Each vCMP guest inherits the license of the vCMP host configured above. The license allows
you to deploy the maximum number of guests that the platform allows. The crypto officer
must follow the “vCMP for Appliance Models: Administration” to create a vCMP guest. A
summary is provided below:
• First, provision the vCMP feature as a whole. The BIG-IP system will dedicate most of the
disk space to running the vCMP and creates the host portion of the vCMP system.
• Second, for each guest, the Crypto Officer logs in and provisions the BIG-IP modules. This
involves the following:
• Create vCMP guests, including allocating system resources to each guest
• Create and manage VLANs
• Manage interfaces
• Configure access control to the host by other host administrators (e.g. User Manager)
• Set the password requirements and follow additional guidance as documented in Section
8.2.4 below
Once configured, initialized and POST is completed, the module enters operational state. In this
state the mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the service invoked. See section
8.3 for details.
8.2.3. Password Strength Requirement
The Crypto officer must create her/his own password after assuming the role for the first time. The
crypto officer must then modify the BIG-IP password policy to meet or exceed the requirements
defined in Table 7 – Authentication of Roles. Instructions for this can be found in the “BIG-IP
System: User Account Administration” guide.
8.2.4. Additional Guidance
The Crypto Officer shall verify that the following specific configuration rules are followed in order
to operate the module in the FIPS validated configuration:
• All command shells other than tmsh are not allowed. For example, bash and other user-
serviceable shells are excluded. Additionally note that the use of tmsh is considered non-
approved because it makes used of SSH protocol that is marked as non-approved service in
Table 10. Only access via GUI interface that makes use of TLS channel is considered
approved.
• Management of the module via the appliance's LCD display is not allowed.
• Usage of f5-rest-node and iAppLX and provisioning of iRulesLX is not allowed.
• Only the provisioning of AFM and LTM is included.
• Remote access to the Lights Out / Always On Management capabilities of the module are
not allowed.
• Serial port console access from the host platform shall not be allowed after the initial power
on and communications setup of the hardware.
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• High availability configuration must not be enabled.
8.2.5. Configuration Confirmation
Once the module is installed, licensed and configured, the Crypto Officer shall confirm that the
module is installed and licensed correctly.
8.2.5.1. Version Confirmation
The Crypto Officer should through the Big-IP Configuration Utility (Web interface) HTTPS access,
navigate within the GUI to Main -> System -> Configuration -> Device -> General and then verify
that the version matches: Version: 14.1.0.3, Edition: Engineering Hotfix. Any firmware loaded into
the module other than version 14.1.0.3 EHF is out of the scope of this validation and will mean
that the module is not operating as a FIPS validated module.
8.2.5.2. License Confirmation
The FIPS validated module activation requires installation of the license referred as ‘FIPS license’.
The Crypto Officer should through the Big-IP Configuration Utility (Web interface) HTTPS access,
navigate within the GUI to Main -> System -> License and then verify that ‘FIPS 140-2’ is in list of
Active Modules.
8.3. User Guidance
The module supports two modes of operation. Table 9 – Crypto Services in FIPS mode of operation
list the FIPS approved services and Table 10 – Services in non-FIPS mode of operation lists the non-
FIPS approved services. Using the services in Table 4 – Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms/Modes
means that the module operates in non-FIPS Approved mode for the particular session of a
particular service, where the non-FIPS approved algorithm or mode was selected.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or
decryption shall be re-distributed. The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the [RFC5288]
and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5;
thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52]. The implementation of the nonce_explicit
management logic inside the module ensures that when the IV exhausts the maximum number of
possible values for a given session key, the module triggers a new handshake request to establish
a new key.
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9. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks.
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Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFB Cipher Feedback
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OFB Output Feedback
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
vCMP Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text stealing
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Appendix B. References
FIPS140-2 FIPS PUB 140-2 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules
May 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
FIPS140-2_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
May 2019
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips 180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198 1/FIPS-198 1_final.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP800-56A NIST Special Publication 800-56A - Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised)
March 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56A/SP800-56A_Revision1_Mar08-
2007.pdf
SP800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Recommendation for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
January 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf
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SP800-131A NIST Special Publication 800-131A - Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning
the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
November 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar1.pdf