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Juniper Networks SRX300, SRX320, SRX340, SRX345, SRX345-
DUAL-AC, SRX550M, SRX5400, SRX5600 and SRX5800 Services
Gateways
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Version: 1.5
Date: November 14, 2023
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
Copyright Juniper, 2023 Version 1.5 Page 2 of 52
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................6
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.........................................................................9
1.2 Mode of Operation.....................................................................................................................14
1.3 Zeroization..................................................................................................................................15
2 Cryptographic Functionality ......................................................................................... 16
2.1 Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................16
2.2 Allowed Algorithms....................................................................................................................20
2.3 Allowed Protocols ......................................................................................................................20
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms................................................................................................................22
2.5 Critical Security Parameters.......................................................................................................22
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................. 23
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles .......................................................................23
3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................23
3.3 Services.......................................................................................................................................24
3.4 Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................................26
4 Self-tests ..................................................................................................................... 27
5 Physical Security Policy................................................................................................ 29
5.1 General Tamper Evident Label Placement and Application Instructions...................................30
5.1.1 SRX300 (6 seals)............................................................................................................................30
5.1.2 SRX320 (8 seals)............................................................................................................................31
5.1.3 SRX 340/345 (29 seals)..................................................................................................................34
5.1.4 SRX550M (28 seals).......................................................................................................................37
5.1.5 SRX5400 (20 seals)........................................................................................................................41
5.1.6 SRX5600 (19 seals)........................................................................................................................43
5.1.7 SRX5800 (42 seals)........................................................................................................................46
6 Security Rules and Guidance ........................................................................................ 49
7 References and Definitions .......................................................................................... 50
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations..........................................................................................6
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................8
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................................14
Table 4 – SRX Branch Data Plane (Octeon Hardware Accelerator) Approved Cryptographic Functions ...16
Table 5 – SRX5K Data Plane (QAT Hardware Accelerator) Approved Cryptographic Functions.................17
Table 6 – Control Plane QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions ......................................................17
Table 7 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions..............................................................................18
Table 8 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions.............................................................................19
Table 9 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................................................................19
Table 10 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions ...............................................................................19
Table 11 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions .............................................................................................20
Table 12 – Protocols Using Approved Algorithms in FIPS Mode ................................................................20
Table 13 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...........................................................................................22
Table 14 – Public Keys.................................................................................................................................23
Table 15 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................24
Table 16 – Unauthenticated traffic.............................................................................................................25
Table 17 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................26
Table 18 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................27
Table 19 – Unauthenticated traffic.............................................................................................................27
Table 20 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................29
Table 21 – References.................................................................................................................................50
Table 22 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................51
Table 23 – Datasheets.................................................................................................................................52
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - SRX300 (Front) ..............................................................................................................................9
Figure 2 - SRX300 (Rear)................................................................................................................................9
Figure 3 - SRX320 (Front) ..............................................................................................................................9
Figure 4 - SRX320 (Rear)................................................................................................................................9
Figure 5 - SRX340 (Front) ............................................................................................................................10
Figure 6 - SRX340 (Rear)..............................................................................................................................10
Figure 7 - SRX345 (Front) ............................................................................................................................10
Figure 8 - SRX345 (Rear)..............................................................................................................................10
Figure 9 – SRX550M (Front)........................................................................................................................10
Figure 10 – SRX550M (Rear) .......................................................................................................................11
Figure 11 – SRX5400 (Front/Top)................................................................................................................11
Figure 12 – SRX5400 (Rear).........................................................................................................................11
Figure 13 – SRX5600 (Front/Top)................................................................................................................12
Figure 14 – SRX5600 (Rear).........................................................................................................................12
Figure 15 – SRX5800 (Front/Top)................................................................................................................13
Figure 16 – SRX5800 (Rear).........................................................................................................................13
Figure 17 - SRX300 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (TEL 1, 2, 3 & 4)........................................................30
Figure 18 - SRX300 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (USB Ports (2) Seals TEL 5 & 6) ................................31
Figure 19 - SRX320 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (I/O Slot (2) Seals TEL 1 & 2, USB ports (2) Seals TEL 3
& 4)..............................................................................................................................................................32
Figure 20 - SRX320 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Top Cover Screws (2) Seals TEL 5 & 6)....................32
Figure 21 - SRX320 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Base Cover Screws (2) Seals TEL 7 & 8)..................33
Figure 22 - SRX340/SRX345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Top Cover, Nine (9) Seals: TEL 1-5; Across
covering vertically the front I/O Slots , Four Seals: TEL 6-9).......................................................................34
Figure 23 - SRX 340/345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear Panel, Two (2) Seals: TEL 10 & 11) ........35
Figure 24 - SRX340/SRX345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Right Side Panels, Eight on each side – Sixteen
(16) Seals: TEL 12-27)..................................................................................................................................35
Figure 25 – SRX340/SRX345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (USB Ports, Two (2) Seals: TEL 28 & 29)....36
Figure 26 – SRX550M Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Front, Fifteen (15) Seals: TEL 1-15) ....................38
Figure 27 – SRX550M Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Side, Three a side (6) Seals: TEL 16-21)..............39
Figure 28 – SRX550M Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear, Seven (7) Seals: TEL 22-28) .......................40
Figure 29 - SRX5400 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Front, Ten (10) Seals: TEL 1-10) .............................42
Figure 30 - SRX5400 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Rear, Eight (8) Seals: TEL 11-18).............................42
Figure 31 - SRX5600 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Front, Eleven (11) Seals: TEL 1-11).........................44
Figure 32 - SRX5600 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Rear, Nine (9) Seals: TEL 12-20) .............................44
Figure 33 - SRX5600 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (USB Port, One (1) Seal: TEL 21)..............................45
Figure 34 - SRX5800 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Front, Thirty-six (36) Seals: TEL 1-36).....................47
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Figure 35 - SRX5800 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Rear, five (5) Seals: TEL 37-41)...............................48
Figure 36 - SRX5800 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Rear, Six (6) Seals: TEL 37,39,40-42) ......................49
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1 Introduction
The Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways are a series of secure routers that provide essential
capabilities to connect, secure, and manage work force locations sized from handfuls to hundreds of
users. By consolidating fast, highly available switching, routing, security, and applications capabilities in
a single device, enterprises can economically deliver new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end
user experience. All models run Juniper’s JUNOS firmware. The JUNOS firmware is FIPS-compliant, when
configured in FIPS-MODE called JUNOS-FIPS-MODE, version 19.2R1. The firmware image is junos-srssme-
19.2R1.8.tgz for the SRX300/320/340/345/345-DUAL-AC/SRX550M and junos-install-srx5000-x86-64-
19.2R1.8.tgz for the SRX5400/5600/5800. The firmware status service identifies itself as “Junos
19.2R1.8”.
This Security Policy covers the following models:
• SRX300, SRX320, SRX340, SRX345, SRX345-DUAL-AC and SRX550M. These models are meant for
corporate branch offices of various sizes (intended size is proportional to model number); and
• SRX5400, SRX5600 and SRX5800 models. These models are meant for service providers, large
enterprise networks, and public-sector networks.
The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple-chip standalone modules that execute the JUNOS-FIPS
firmware on the Juniper Networks SRX-series models listed in the table below.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Model Hardware Versions Firmware Distinguishing Features
SRX300 SRX300 JUNOS
19.2R1
6x 10/100/1000
2x SFP
1x 10/100/1000 management port
SRX320 SRX320 JUNOS
19.2R1
6x 10/100/1000;
2x SFP
SRX340 SRX340 JUNOS
19.2R1
8 x 10/100/1000
4x SFP
4x MPIM expansion slots
1x 10/100/1000 management port
SRX345 SRX345 JUNOS
19.2R1
8 x 10/100/1000
4x SFP
4x MPIM expansion slots
1x 10/100/1000 management port
SRX345-DUAL-
AC
SRX345-DUAL-AC JUNOS
19.2R1
8 x 10/100/1000
4x SFP
4x MPIM expansion slots
1x 10/100/1000 management port
Dual AC PSU
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SRX550M SRX550M JUNOS
19.2R1
6x 10/100/1000
4x SFP
6x GPIM expansion slots
1x 10/100/100 management port
SRX5400 SRX5400 JUNOS
19.2R1
Routing Engine: SRX5K-RE-1800X4
Switch Control Board: SRX5K-SCB3
Service Processing Card: SRX5K-SPC3
Module Interface Card: SRX-MIC-10XG-
SFPP, SRX-MIC-20GE-SFP, SRX-MIC-
2X40G-QSFP, SRXMIC-1X100G-CFP
Power: AC, HC or DC
SRX5600 SRX5600 JUNOS
19.2R1
Routing Engine: SRX5K-RE-1800X4
Switch Control Board: SRX5K-SCB3
Service Processing Card: SRX5K-SPC3
Module Interface Card: SRX-MIC-10XG-
SFPP, SRX-MIC-20GE-SFP, SRX-MIC-
2X40G-QSFP, SRXMIC-1X100G-CFP
Power: AC, HC or DC
SRX5800 SRX5800 JUNOS
19.2R1
Routing Engine: SRX5K-RE-1800X4
Switch Control Board: SRX5K-SCB3
Service Processing Card: SRX5K-SPC3
Module Interface Card: SRX-MIC-10XG-
SFPP, SRX-MIC-20GE-SFP, SRX-MIC-
2X40G-QSFP, SRXMIC-1X100G-CFP
Power: AC, HC or DC
All JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS N/A Tamper-Evident Seals
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The module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 overall:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 2
2 Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles and Services 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-test 2
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 2
The modules have a non-modifiable operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. They
include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of
this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the
module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
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1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical forms of the modules are depicted in Figure 1 through Figure 16 below. The cryptographic
boundary is defined as the outer edge of the chassis. The modules do not rely on external devices for
input and output of critical security parameters (CSPs).
Figure 1 - SRX300 (Front)
Figure 2 - SRX300 (Rear)
Figure 3 - SRX320 (Front)
Figure 4 - SRX320 (Rear)
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Figure 5 - SRX340 (Front)
Figure 6 - SRX340 (Rear)
Figure 7 - SRX345 (Front)
Figure 8 - SRX345 (Rear)
Figure 9 – SRX550M (Front)
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Figure 10 – SRX550M (Rear)
Figure 11 – SRX5400 (Front/Top)
Figure 12 – SRX5400 (Rear)
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Figure 13 – SRX5600 (Front/Top)
Figure 14 – SRX5600 (Rear)
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Figure 15 – SRX5800 (Front/Top)
Figure 16 – SRX5800 (Rear)
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Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet
(data)
LAN Communications
Control in, Data in, Data out,
Status out
Ethernet
(mgmt.)
Remote management.
Control in, Data in, Status out,
Data out
Serial Console serial port Control in, Status out
Power Power connector Power
Reset Button Reset Control in
LED Status indicator lighting Status out
SSD Solid state storage
Tamper Evident Label –
Inaccessible
USB Firmware load port/Storage device
Tamper Evident Label –
Inaccessible
Backplane Line card backplane interfaces Control in, Data in,
Status out, Data out
Control in, Data in, Status out,
Data out
WAN SHDSL, VDSL, T1, E1
Control in, Data in, Data out,
Status out
1.2 Mode of Operation
The JUNOS firmware image must be installed on the device. Once the image is installed, the Crypto-Officer
(CO) shall follow the instructions in Section 5 to apply the tamper seals to the module. Next, the module
is configured in FIPS-MODE, as described below, and rebooted. Once the module is rebooted and the
integrity and self-tests have run successfully on initial power-on in FIPS-MODE, the module is operating in
the FIPS-Approved mode. The Crypto-Officer (CO) must create a backup image of the firmware to ensure
it is also a JUNOS-FIPS-MODE image by issuing the request system snapshot command.
If the module was previously in a non-Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must
zeroize the CSPs by following the instructions in Section 1.3
The CO shall enable the module for FIPS mode of operation by performing the following steps.
For the SRX Branch devices (SRX300/320/340/345/345-DUAL-AC/SRX550M):
1. Enable the FIPS mode on the device.
user@host> set system fips level 2
2. Commit and reboot the device.
user@host> commit
For the SRX5K devices (SRX5400/5600/5800):
1. Add the Junos IKE package.
user@host> request system software add optional://junos-ike.tgz
2. Enable the FIPS mode on the device.
user@host# set system fips chassis level 1
3. Remove the CSPs on commit check and reboot the device.
user@host# commit
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When AES GCM is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec, the CO must configure the
module to use IKEv2 by running the following commands:
IKE:
root@host# set security ike proposal <ike_proposal_name> encryption-algorithm aes-256-
gcm
IPSec:
root@host# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec_proposal_name> encryption-algorithm aes-
128-gcm
root@host# set security ike gateway <gateway_name> version v2-only
root@host# commit
In order to ensure compliance with [IG A.13], the module must be configured to limit the number of blocks
encrypted by a specific key bundle with the Triple-DES algorithm to a value less than 2^20. Both IPsec and
IKEv2 may utilize Triple-DES encryption. In IPsec, Triple-DES may be used for transfer of data packets and
in IKEv2 Triple-DES may be utilized for re-keying operations that occur when the IPsec protocol reaches a
configured limit for the number of packets transmitted.
When Triple-DES is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IPsec, the CO must configure the IPsec
proposal lifetime-kilobytes to comply with [IG A.13] using the following command, setting <kilobytes> to
a value less than or equal to 8192 which is the maximum amount of kilobytes permitted to be encrypted
by a key:
co@fips-srx:fips# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec_proposal_name> lifetime-kilobytes
<kilobytes>”
co@fips-srx:fips# commit
Whenever <kilobytes> of data has been transmitted by the IPsec protocol, a re-key operation is triggered
to establish a new key bundle for IPsec. This rekey operation is negotiated by the IKE protocol. If the IKE
protocol is configured to use Triple-DES, it must also be configured to limit the number of blocks to a value
less than 2^20. Because the Maximum lifetime of IKE key is 24 hours, the IPsec limit needs to be set to
ensure that the number of rekey operations in a 24-hour period won’t cause the IKE protocol to encrypt
more than 2^20 blocks. To reduce the number of rekey operations requested by the IPsec protocol, it is
necessary to increase the number of blocks transmitted by the IPsec protocol. Therefore, when Triple-DES
is the encryption-algorithm for IKE, the lifetime-kilobytes for the associated IPsec proposal in the above
command must be greater than or equal to 6913080.
Because the lifetime-kilobytes cannot be set to a value that is less than 8192 and greater than 6913080,
Triple-DES encryption may not be used for IKE and IPsec simultaneously. e.g. if IKE is configured to use
Triple-DES, IPsec would be configured to use AES.
The show version command will display the version of the Junos OS on the device so that the CO can
confirm it is the FIPS validated version. The CO should also verify the presence of the suffix string “:fips”
in the cli prompt, indicating the module is operating in FIPS mode.
The show configuration security ike and show configuration security ipsec commands display the
approved and configured IKE/IPsec configuration for the device operating in FIPS-approved mode.
1.3 Zeroization
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-approved
cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of
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operation and the Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must run the following
commands to zeroize the Approved mode CSPs:
user@host> request system zeroize
This command wipes clean all the CSPs/configs as well as the disk. After zeroization, the device will have
to be reimaged to bring it back into FIPS mode, as all the disk partitions are securely erased. The CO must
follow the instructions in Section 1.2, including installing the FIPs validated image on the device and new
tamper evident labels after reimaging.
Use of the zeroize command is restricted to the Cryptographic Officer. The cryptographic officer shall
perform zeroization in the following situations:
1. Before FIPS Operation: To prepare the device for operation as a FIPS cryptographic module by
erasing all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its operation as a FIPS
cryptographic module.
2. Before non-FIPS Operation: To conduct erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a
device in preparation for repurposing the device for non-FIPS operation.
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
2 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 below. Although the module may have been tested for additional algorithms
or modes, only those listed below are actually utilized by the module.
Table 12 summarize the allowed high-level protocol and algorithm support.
2.1 Approved Algorithms
Table 4 – SRX Branch Data Plane (Octeon Hardware Accelerator) Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1109
AES
PUB 197-38A CBC Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
SP800-38D GCM Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits, λ =
128
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Digest Generation
Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A1
KAS-SSC
SP800-
56ARev3
FFC DH
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
Key Agreement Scheme (IKE)
1
Vendor affirmed as per IG D.1-rev3.
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ECC DH
P-256
P-384
Key Agreement Scheme (IKE)
Table 5 – SRX5K Data Plane (QAT Hardware Accelerator) Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1129
AES
PUB 197-38A CBC Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
SP800-38D GCM Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits, λ =
128
SHA-384
Key size: 384 bits, λ =
192
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest Generation
Triple-DES2
SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 6 – Control Plane QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths,
Curves, or Moduli
Functions
C1084
C1085
AES
PUB 197-38A CBC
Key Sizes: 128, 192,
256
Encrypt, Decrypt
SP800-38D GCM Key Sizes: 128, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
CVL SP 800-135
IKEv1 SHA 256, 384
Key Derivation
IKEv2 SHA 256, 384
DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
HMAC PUB 198
SHA-256
Key size: 256bits
λ = 256 Message Authentication, KDF
Primitive
SHA-384
Key size: 384 bits,
λ = 384
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest Generation
Triple-DES3
SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
2
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
3
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
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N/A KTS
AES Cert. #C1084 and C1085, and
HMAC Cert. #C1084 and C1085
key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Triple-DES Cert. #C1084 and C1085,
and HMAC Cert. #C1084 and C1085
key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
C1151
C1110
RSA PUB 186-4 PKCS1_V1_5
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigGen, SigVer4
C1151
C1085
ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
Table 7 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1107
AES PUB 197-38A
CBC
CTR
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
N/A5
KAS-SSC
SP800-56A
Rev3
FFC DH
MODP-2048 (ID=14) Key Agreement Scheme (IKE for
SRX5K, SSH)
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-3072 (ID=15
MODP-4096 (ID=16)
Key Agreement Scheme (IKE for
SRX5K)
N/A6
KAS-SSC
SP800-56A
Rev3
ECC DH
P-256
P-384
P-521 (SRX5K only)
Key Agreement Scheme (IKE for
SRX5K)
C1107
ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
SigGen, KeyGen, SigVer
HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1
Key size: 160 bits,
λ = 160
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits,
λ = 256
Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
SHA-512
Key size: 512 bits,
λ = 512
Message Authentication
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #C1107 and HMAC Cert.
#C1107
key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
4
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
5
Vendor affirmed as per IG D.1-rev3.
6
Vendor affirmed as per IG D.1-rev3.
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Triple-DES Cert. #C1107and HMAC
Cert. C1107
key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
C1107
RSA PUB 186-4
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
KeyGen7
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigGen
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigVer8
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation,
KDF Primitive
Triple-DES9
SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 8 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1111 CVL SP 800-135 SSH SHA 1, 256, 384 Key Derivation
Table 9 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1052
HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1
Key size:160 bits,
λ = 160
Password Hashing
SHA-256
Key size:256bits,
λ = 256
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation
Table 10 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1079 DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
7
RSA 4096 KeyGen was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available. RSA 2048 KeyGen
was tested and testing for RSA 4096 KeyGen is not available.
8
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
9
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
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C1106
HMAC PUB 198 SHA-256
Key size:256 bits,
λ = 256
DRBG Primitive
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
2.2 Allowed Algorithms
Table 11 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
NDRNG [IG] 7.14
Scenario 1a
The module generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for key generation.
Seeding the DRBG
2.3 Allowed Protocols
Table 12 – Protocols Using Approved Algorithms in FIPS Mode
Protocol
Key
Exchange
Groups
Auth Cipher Integrity
IKEv110
KAS-FFC
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
MODP-3072 (ID=15)11
MODP-4096 (ID=16)12
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
Triple-DES CBC13
AES CBC
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-
256
HMAC-SHA-
384
KAS-ECC
P-256
P-384
P-52114
IKEv215
KAS-FFC
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
MODP-3072 (ID=15)16
MODP-4096 (ID=16)17
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
Triple-DES CBC18
AES CBC
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-
256
HMAC-SHA-
384
10
RFC 2409 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the IKEv1 protocol.
11
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
12
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
13
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
14
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
15
IKEv2 generates the SKEYSEED according to RFC7296, from which all keys are derived, including Triple-
DES keys.
16
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
17
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
18
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
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KAS-ECC
P-256
P-384
P-52120
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
AES GCM19
128/256
IPsec
ESP
IKEv1 with
optional
KAS-FFC
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
MODP-3072 (ID=15)21
MODP-4096 (ID=16)22
IKEv1
Triple-DES CBC23
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM24
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA1-
96
HMAC-SHA-
256-128
HMAC-SHA-
38425
HMAC-SHA-
51226
IKEv1 with
optional
KAS-ECC
P-256
P-384
P-52127
IKEv2 with
optional
KAS-FFC
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
MODP-3072 (ID=15)28
MODP-4096 (ID=16)29
IKEv2
Triple-DES CBC30
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM31
128/192/256
IKEv2 with
optional
KAS-ECC
P-256
P-384
P-52132
SSHv233
KAS-FFC MODP-2048 (ID=14)
RSA 2048
ECDSA P-256
Triple-DES CBC34
AES CBC
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1-
96
HMAC-SHA-1
20
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
19
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC5282 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
21
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
22
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
23
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
24
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
25
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
26
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
27
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
28
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
29
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
30
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
31
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
32
Only available in SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models with SRX5K-SPC3 card.
33
RFC 4253 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the SSHv2 protocol
34
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
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AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-
256
HMAC-SHA-
512
No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The IKE and SSH
algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In reference
to the Allowed Protocols in Table 10 above: each column of options for a given protocol is independent
and may be used in any viable combination. These security functions are also available in the SSH connect
(non-compliant) service.
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms
These algorithms are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an
Approved mode of operation.
• RSA with key size less than 2048
• ECDSA with ed25519 curve
• ECDH with ed25519 curve
• ECDH with P-256, P-384 and P-521 (used with SSH)
• ARCFOUR
• Blowfish
• CAST
• DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-RIPEMD160
• UMAC
2.5 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 13 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG
DRBG_State V and Key values for the HMAC_DRBG
Entropy Input
String
256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate the DRBG
DH/ECDH
Shared Secret
The shared secret used in Diffie Hellman (DH) key agreement (256 bits)
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. RSA 2048, ECDSA
P-256. Used to identify the host.
SSH DH
SSH Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used in SSH.
DH (L=2048, N=2047)
SSH-SEKs
SSH Session Keys: SSH Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; SSH Session Integrity
Key: HMAC
ESP-SEKs
IPSec ESP Session Keys: IKE Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; IKE Session
Integrity Key: HMAC
IKE-PSK Pre-Shared Key used to authenticate IKE connections.
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IKE-Priv IKE Private Key. RSA 2048, RSA 4096 ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
IKE-SKEYID IKE SKEYID. IKE secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys.
IKE-SEKs
IKE Session Keys: IKE Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; IKE Session Integrity Key:
HMAC
IKE-DH-PRI
IKE Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used in IKE.
DH (L = 2048, N = 256), ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384
HMAC key The libMD HMAC keys: message digest for hashing password and critical function test.
CO-PW Password used to authenticate the CO.
User-PW Password used to authenticate the User.
Table 14 – Public Keys
Name Description and usage
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. RSA 2048, ECDSA P-256.
SSH-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in SSH key
establishment. DH (L=2048, N=2047)
IKE-PUB IKE Public Key. RSA 2048, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
IKE-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in IKE key
establishment. DH (L = 2048, N = 256), ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384
Auth-User Pub
User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P256,
P-384, P-512, RSA 2048, RSA 3072 or RSA 4096
Auth-CO Pub
CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P256, P-
384, P-512, RSA 2048, RSA 3072 or RSA 4096
Root-CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
Package-CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent
operators, but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the
separation of roles using either of the identity-based operator authentication methods in section 3.2.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As
root or super-user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module
and establish VPN tunnels.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The user role cannot not change the
configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-based authentication: username and password over the
Console and SSH, as well as username and public key over SSH.
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Password authentication
The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the 96 human readable ASCII
characters. The maximum password length is 20-characters; thus the probability of a successful random
attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0
time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-second
delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-second
delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of 7 possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best approach
for the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be spawned.
This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per hour/60
mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus
the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million. The probability of
a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 9/(9610
), which is less than
1/100,000.
Signature verification
Public key authentication in SSH uses either RSA or ECDSA signatures. Let 𝑥 denote the maximum number
of signature verifications that the IUT can perform in a minute. Assuming a minimum security strength of
112 bits for the signature algorithm (corresponding to 2048-bit key RSA signatures as per SP800-57 Part1
Rev3), the probability of success for a single random attempt is at most 1/2^112 , which is less than
1/10^6. It follows that the probability of a successful brute-force attack with multiple consecutive
attempts in a one-minute period is at most 𝑥/2^112 . For this probability to be greater than 1/100,000,
the number of verifications per minute should be 𝑥 > 2^112/10^5 ≅ 2^197, which is clearly an
infeasible amount of signature verifications. To see this, note that if the IUT was able to compute one
signature verification per CPU cycle, this would amount to 60 × 2.3 × 10^9 ≅ 2^37 ≪ 2^197, for the
fastest processor, which is 2.3GHz for the SRX5K. Thus, the success probability of a brute-force attack
during a one-minute period is less than 1/100,000, as required by FIPS 140-2.
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 17 lists the access to CSPs by
each service.
Table 15 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure
security
Security relevant configuration X
Configure Non-security relevant configuration X
Secure Traffic IPsec protected connection (ESP) X
Status Show status X X
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs X
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
X X
IPsec connect Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) X
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Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) X X
Remote reset Software initiated reset X
Load image
Verification and loading of a validated firmware
image into the switch.
X
Table 16 – Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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Table 17 – CSP Access Rights within Services
SERVICE
CSP
DRBG
Seed
DRBG
State
DRBG
Entropy
Input
DH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
DH
SSH-SEK
ESP-SEK
IKE-PSK
IKE-Priv
IKE-SKEYID
IKE-SEK
IKE-DH-PRI
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure
security
-- E -- -- GWR -- -- -- WR GWR -- -- -- G W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure
traffic
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- E -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z Z Z -- Z Z Z Z Z Z -- -- -- -- Z Z
SSH
connect
-- E -- GE E GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
IPsec
connect
-- E -- GE -- -- -- G E E GE G GE -- -- --
Console
access
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z Z Z Z
Local
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z -- Z Z
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Load
Image
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts except for SSH Connect
(non-compliant) and IPSec Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security
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functions identified in Section 2.4 and the SSHv2 row of Table 10. The IPsec (non-compliant) supports the
DSA in Section 2.4 and the IKEv1, IKEv2 and IPSec rows of Table 10.
Table 18 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration X
Configure (non-
compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration X
Secure Traffic (non-
compliant)
IPsec protected connection (ESP) X
Status (non-
compliant)
Show status X x
Zeroize (non-
compliant)
Destroy all CSPs X
SSH connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
X x
IPsec connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) X
Console access (non-
compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) X x
Remote reset (non-
compliant)
Software initiated reset X
Load image (non-
compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware
image into the router.
X
Table 19 – Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset (non-
compliant)
Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic (non-
compliant)
Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
4 Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module.
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be completed
successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the module
enters the Critical Failure error state.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
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• Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
• Data Plane KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384-KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o DH (L=2048, N=256) KAT
▪ Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o ECDH P-256 KAT
▪ Derivation of the expected shared secret.
• Control Plane QuickSec KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o ECDSA P-256 w/ SHA-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Decrypt KAT
o KDF-IKE-V1 KAT
o KDF-IKE-V2 KAT
• OpenSSL KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate.
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o DH (L=2048, N=256) KAT
▪ Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o ECDH P-256 KAT
▪ Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
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o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
• OpenSSH KATs
o KDF-SSH KAT
• LibMD KATs
o HMAC SHA-1
o HMAC SHA-256
o SHA-512
• Kernel KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-1
• Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a non-modifiable operational
environment, and verification of optional non-critical packages.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG
• Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
• Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA, and RSA key pairs.
• SP800-56A assurances as per SP 800‐56A Sections 5.5.2,5.6.2, and/or 5.6.3, in accordance to IG
9.6.
• Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification)
5 Physical Security Policy
The module’s physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 2 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated,
cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits,
cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within
the cryptographic boundary. Tamper-evident seals allow the operator to tell if the enclosure has been
breached. These seals are not factory-installed and must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer. (Seals
are available for order from Juniper using part number JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS.) The tamper-evident
seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS mode of operation.
The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals
and the direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the
tamper-evident seals or security appliances are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module
is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to a FIPS Approved state.
Table 20 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper seals (part # JNPR-
FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS),
opaque metal enclosure.
Once per month by the
Cryptographic Officer.
Seals should be free of any tamper
evidence.
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If the Cryptographic Officer observes tamper evidence, it shall be assumed that the device has been
compromised. The Cryptographic Officer shall retain control of the module and perform Zeroization of
the module’s CSPs by following the steps in section 1.3 of the Security Policy and then follow the steps in
Section 1.2 to place the module back into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
5.1 General Tamper Evident Label Placement and Application Instructions
For all seal applications, the Cryptographic Officer should observe the following instructions:
• Handle the seals with care. Do not touch the adhesive side.
• Before applying a seal, ensure the location of application is clean, dry, and clear of any residue.
• Place the seal on the module, applying firm pressure across it to ensure adhesion. Allow at least
1 hour for the adhesive to cure.
5.1.1 SRX300 (6 seals)
A tamper-evident seal must be applied to the following locations:
• Four (4) seals (TEL 1, 2, 3 & 4). Applied to base of the chassis, covering the four chassis screws
• Two (2) seals (TEL 5 & 6). Applied to the front of the device covering the USB ports.
Figure 17 - SRX300 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (TEL 1, 2, 3 & 4)
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Figure 18 - SRX300 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (USB Ports (2) Seals TEL 5 & 6)
5.1.2 SRX320 (8 seals)
A tamper-evident seal must be applied to the following locations:
• Two (2) seals (TEL 1 & 2). Applied vertically covering the front I/O Slots.
• Two (2) seals (TEL 3 & 4). Applied to the front of the device covering the USB ports.
• Two (2) seals (TEL 5 & 6). Applied to the top of the chassis, covering one of the four chassis
screws each.
• Two (2) seals (TEL 7 & 8). Applied to base of the chassis, covering one of the three chassis screws
each.
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Figure 19 - SRX320 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (I/O Slot (2) Seals TEL 1 & 2, USB ports (2) Seals TEL
3 & 4)
Figure 20 - SRX320 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Top Cover Screws (2) Seals TEL 5 & 6)
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Figure 21 - SRX320 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Base Cover Screws (2) Seals TEL 7 & 8)
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5.1.3 SRX 340/345 (29 seals)
Tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations:
• Five (5) seals (TEL 1-5). Applied to the top of the chassis, covering one of the five chassis screws
each.
• Four (4) seals (TEL 6-9). Applied vertically covering the front I/O Slots.
• Two (2) seals (TEL 10 & 11). Applied to the rear panel, covering the blank faceplate and the SSD
expansion slot.
• Sixteen (16) Seals (TEL 12-27), Eight on each side. Covering the side panels screw holes.
• Two (2) Seals (TEL 28 & 39). Covering the Front USB and Micro USB Ports.
Total of 29 seals.
Figure 22 - SRX340/SRX345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Top Cover, Nine (9) Seals: TEL 1-5; Across
covering vertically the front I/O Slots , Four Seals: TEL 6-9)
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Figure 23 - SRX 340/345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear Panel, Two (2) Seals: TEL 10 & 11)
Figure 24 - SRX340/SRX345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Right Side Panels, Eight on each side –
Sixteen (16) Seals: TEL 12-27)
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Figure 25 – SRX340/SRX345 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (USB Ports, Two (2) Seals: TEL 28 & 29)
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5.1.4 SRX550M (28 seals)
Tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations:
• The front of the module fifteen (15) Seals (TEL 1-15):
o Fifteen (13) Seals, Place vertically connecting each subplane to their vertically adjacent
neighbors. And additionally, connection each the top most and bottom most subplanes
to the main chassis of the device.
o Two (2) Seals, Place to cover the USB and Micro USB ports on the front of the device.
• On the Sides of the module three a side (6) Seals (TEL 16-21):
o One (1) seal on each side wrapping horizontally around to the front of the device.
o Two (2) seals on each side placed vertically over screws and wrapping around onto the
base of the device.
• On the back Seven (7) Seals (TEL 22-28):
o Six (6) seals placed vertically to secure the power supplies and expansion slots to the
main casing of the device.
o One (1) seal placed horizontally to secure the rightmost subplane to the main casing.
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Figure 26 – SRX550M Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Front, Fifteen (15) Seals: TEL 1-15)
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Figure 27 – SRX550M Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Side, Three a side (6) Seals: TEL 16-21)
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Figure 28 – SRX550M Tamper-Evident Seal Placement (Rear, Seven (7) Seals: TEL 22-28)
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5.1.5 SRX5400 (20 seals)
Tamper-evident seals shall be applied to the following locations:
• Front Pane (10 seals, TEL 1-10)
o Two seals (2), Vertical Covering the screws on the information panel at the top of the
device.
o Seven (7) seals, vertical, connection each expansion plane to its neighbors and the top
and button plane to the chassis.
o One (1) seal, vertical covering the USB port.
• Back Pane (8 seals TEL 11-18)
o Four (4) seals, vertical: one on each of the top four sub-panes, extending to the large
chassis plate below.
o Two (2) seals, vertical: on the horizontal screwed-in plate resting on the large central
chassis. Placed over screws.
o Two (2) seals, horizontal: placed on the low side sub-panes, extending to the large
central chassis area and wrapping around to the neighboring side panes.
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Figure 29 - SRX5400 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Front, Ten (10) Seals: TEL 1-10)
Figure 30 - SRX5400 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Rear, Eight (8) Seals: TEL 11-18)
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5.1.6 SRX5600 (19 seals)
Tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations:
• Front Pane (11 seals, TEL 1-11)
o Nine (9) seals, vertical: one for each horizontal sub-pane (excluding the honeycomb
plate on the top and the thin sub-pane a little below). The seals should attach to
vertically adjacent sub-panes. The extra on the bottom attaches to the lowermost sub-
pane and wraps around attaching to the bottom pane. It should be ensured that one of
the seals spans across the thin plate with ample extra distance on each side.
o Two (2) seals,
• USB Port (1 seal, TEL 12)
o One (1) Seal, Vertical Covering the front USB port.
• Back Pane (7 seals, TEL 13-18)
o Four (4) seals, vertical: one on each of the upper four sub-panes, attaching to the large
plate below.
o Two (2) seals, horizontal: one on each of the vertical side sub-panes, extending to side
the panes.
o One (1) Seal, Horizontal: connecting the small access pane on the lower right of the
chassis to the main panel.
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Figure 31 - SRX5600 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Front, Eleven (11) Seals: TEL 1-11)
Figure 32 - SRX5600 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Rear, Nine (9) Seals: TEL 12-20)
Copyright Juniper, 2023 Version 1.5 Page 45 of 52
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Figure 33 - SRX5600 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (USB Port, One (1) Seal: TEL 21)
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5.1.7 SRX5800 (42 seals)
Tamper-evident seals shall be applied to the following locations:
• Front Panel (36 seals: TEL 1-36)
o Thirty (30) seals, horizontal: two on each of the long vertical sub-panes, extending to the
neighboring two. If on an end sub-pane, seal should wrap around to the side.
o Three (3) seals, vertical: One over each of the thin panes – two near the bottom, one
near the top of the lower half.
o Two (2) seals, vertical: both on the console area at the top of the module, one extending
to the top and the other extending to the chassis area below.
o One (1) Seal, Diagonal covering the front USB port.
• Back Pane (6 seals: TEL 37-42)
o Five (5) seals, horizontal: Three spanning the gaps between the vertical sub-panels, and
then two more, one each on the far edges of the left and right panels. (These last two
should wrap around to the sides.)
o One (1) Seal, Vertical: At the top of the case connecting the DC system pane to the mesh
fan cover.
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Figure 34 - SRX5800 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Front, Thirty-six (36) Seals: TEL 1-36)
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Figure 35 - SRX5800 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Rear, five (5) Seals: TEL 37-41)
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Figure 36 - SRX5800 Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Rear, Six (6) Seals: TEL 37,39,40-42)
6 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically
refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements
indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
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3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext
CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the
firmware load service.
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. If the module loses power and then it is restored, then a new key shall be established for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption processes.
14. The cryptographic officer must configure the module to IPsec ESP lifetime-kilobytes to ensure the
module does not encrypt more than 2^20 blocks with a single Triple-DES key when Triple-DES is the
encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec ESP. The operator is required to ensure that Triple-DES keys
used in SSH do not perform more than 2^20 encryptions.
15. The module must be configured to disallow the use of ECDH in SSH by using the following CLI
command:
co@fips-qfx# s e t s y s t e m s e r v i c e s s s h k e y - e x c h a n g e d h - g r o u p 1 4 - s h a 1
7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 21 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1,
December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-
1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
June 2015.
[133] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation, Special Publication 800-133, Dec. 2012
Table 22 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SSH Secure Shell
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Acronym Definition
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
Table 23 – Datasheets
Model Title URL
SRX300
SRX320
SRX340
SRX345
SRX300 Line of Services Gateways for the
Branch
http://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/
local/pdf/datasheets/1000550-en.pdf
SRX550M SRX550 High Memory Services Gateway
Hardware Guide
https://www.juniper.net/documentati
on/en_US/release-
independent/junos/information-
products/pathway-
pages/hardware/SRX550/srx550-hm-
index.pdf
SRX5400
SRX5600
SRX5800
SRX Series Service Gateways for service
provider, large enterprise, and public
sector networks.
http://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/
local/pdf/datasheets/1000254-en.pdf