Apple Inc.
©2022 Apple Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel
(ccv10)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Module Version 10.0
Prepared for:
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, CA 95014
www.apple.com
Prepared by:
atsec information security Corp.
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
Document Version: 1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 2 of 26
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................................4
1.2 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION / COPYRIGHT...............................................................................................4
1.3 EXTERNAL RESOURCES / REFERENCES....................................................................................................4
1.3.1 Additional References .......................................................................................................... 4
1.4 ACRONYMS.........................................................................................................................................6
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ....................................................................... 7
2.1 MODULE DESCRIPTION .........................................................................................................................7
2.1.1 Module Validation Level ....................................................................................................... 7
2.1.2 Module components............................................................................................................. 7
2.1.3 Tested Platforms................................................................................................................... 8
2.2 MODES OF OPERATION .........................................................................................................................8
2.2.1 Approved Security Functions:............................................................................................. 9
2.2.2 Non-Approved Security Functions:.................................................................................. 11
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOUNDARY................................................................................................. 12
2.4 MODULE USAGE CONSIDERATIONS ...................................................................................................... 13
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES ....................................................... 14
4 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION.........................................................................15
4.1 ROLES.............................................................................................................................................. 15
4.2 SERVICES.......................................................................................................................................... 15
4.3 OPERATOR AUTHENTICATION .............................................................................................................. 17
5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................... 18
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..........................................................................................19
6.1 APPLICABILITY...................................................................................................................................19
6.2 POLICY.............................................................................................................................................19
7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT.............................................................................. 20
7.1 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION ..........................................................................................................20
7.2 KEY / CSP GENERATION.....................................................................................................................20
7.3 KEY / CSP ESTABLISHMENT................................................................................................................ 21
7.4 KEY / CSP ENTRY AND OUTPUT .......................................................................................................... 21
7.5 KEY / CSP STORAGE.......................................................................................................................... 21
7.6 KEY / CSP ZEROIZATION .................................................................................................................... 21
8 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE/ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMI/EMC)...... 22
9 SELF-TESTS..................................................................................................................... 23
9.1 POWER-UP TESTS.............................................................................................................................23
9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests......................................................................................... 23
9.1.2 Software / Firmware Integrity Tests ................................................................................. 23
9.1.3 Critical Function Tests........................................................................................................ 23
9.2 CONDITIONAL TESTS..........................................................................................................................24
9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test................................................................. 24
9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test............................................................................................... 24
9.2.3 SP 800-90A Health Tests ................................................................................................. 24
9.2.4 Critical Function Test.......................................................................................................... 24
10 DESIGN ASSURANCE..................................................................................................... 25
10.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT ..........................................................................................................25
10.2 DELIVERY AND OPERATION..................................................................................................................25
10.3 DEVELOPMENT ..................................................................................................................................25
Document Version: 1.4
Last update:2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 3 of 26
10.4 GUIDANCE ........................................................................................................................................25
10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance....................................................................................... 25
10.4.2 User Guidance..................................................................................................................... 25
11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................. 26
List of Tables
Table 1: Module Validation Level....................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Tested Platforms ..............................................................................................................................8
Table 3: Approved, Allowed and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions ........................................................10
Table 3a: Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions ...........................................................................10
Table 4: Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions ................................................................... 12
Table 5: Roles............................................................................................................................................... 15
Table 6: Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode ......................................................................16
Table 7: Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode........................................................................... 17
Table 8: Module Cryptographic key and CSPs.............................................................................................20
Table 9: Cryptographic Algorithm Tests ......................................................................................................23
List of Figures
Figure 1: Logical Block Diagram..................................................................................................... 13
Document Version: 1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 4 of 26
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary Security Policy for the Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel
(ccv10). It describes the module and the FIPS 140-2 cryptographic services it provides. This document
also defines the FIPS 140-2 security rules for operating the module.
This document was prepared in fulfillment of the FIPS 140-2 requirements for cryptographic modules and
is intended for security officers, developers, system administrators, and end-users.
FIPS 140-2 details the requirements of the Governments of the U.S. and Canada for cryptographic
modules, aimed at the objective of protecting sensitive but unclassified information.
For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
please refer to the NIST website [CMVP].
Throughout the document “Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10)”, “cryptographic
module”, “corecrypto” or “the module” are used interchangeably to refer to the Apple corecrypto User
Space Module for Intel (ccv10). macOS 10.15 is also referred as macOS Catalina or macOS Catalina 10.15.
“ccv10” is used to refer to the module version 10.0.
1.2 Document Organization / Copyright
This non-proprietary Security Policy document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original
entirety without any revision, ©2022 Apple Inc.
1.3 External Resources / References
The Apple website (http://www.apple.com) contains information on the full line of products from Apple
Inc. For a detailed overview of the operating system macOS and the associated security properties refer to
[MACOS] and [SEC]. For details on macOS releases with their corresponding validated modules and
Crypto Officer Role Guides refer to the “Product security certifications, validations, and guidance for
macOS” [UGuide]
1.3.1 Additional References
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program
FIPS 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, “FIPS PUB 140-2 Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,” May 2001
FIPS 140-2
IG
NIST, “Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program,” August, 2020
FIPS 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, March 2012, Secure Hash
Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013, Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001 Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)
FIPS 198 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198, July, 2008 The Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
SP800-38 A NIST Special Publication 800-38A, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation”, December 2001
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 5 of 26
SP800-38 C NIST Special Publication 800-38C, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality”, May 2004
SP800-38 D NIST Special Publication 800-38D, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC”, November 2007
SP800-38 E NIST Special Publication 800-38E, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices”, January 2010
SP800-38 F NIST Special Publication 800-38F, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping”, December 2012
SP800-57P1 NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1: General
(Revised),” July 2016
SP 800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A, “Recommendation for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators,” January 2012
SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132, “Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation”, December 2010
MACOS macOS Technical Overview
https://developer.apple.com/macos/
SEC Security Overview
https://developer.apple.com/security/
UGuide User Guide
https://support.apple.com/HT201159
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 6 of 26
1.4 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation
CFB Cipher Feedback mode of operation
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter mode of operation
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook mode of operation
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EC Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman based on ECC
ECDSA DSA based on ECC
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB Output Feedback (mode of operation)
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-based Key Derivation Function
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
PRF Pseudorandom Functions
RNG Random Number Generator
SHS Secure Hash Standard
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 7 of 26
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Description
The Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) is a software cryptographic module with
version v10.0 running on a multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing platform.
The cryptographic services provided by the module are:
• data encryption / decryption • random number generation
• generation of hash values • key generation
• key wrapping • signature generation / verification
• message authentication • key derivation
2.1.1 Module Validation Level
The module is intended to meet requirements of FIPS 140-2 security level 1 overall. The following Table 1
shows the security level for each of the eleven requirement areas of the validation.
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement Area Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Table 1: Module Validation Level
2.1.2 Module components
In the following sections the components of the Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) are
listed in detail. There are no components excluded from the validation testing.
2.1.2.1 Software components
corecrypto has an API layer that provides consistent interfaces to the supported algorithms. These
implementations include proprietary optimizations of algorithms that are fitted into the corecrypto
framework.
2.1.2.2 Hardware components
AES-NI hardware acceleration is included within the cryptographic module boundary.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 8 of 26
2.1.3 Tested Platforms
The module has been tested on the following platforms with and without AES-NI:
Manufacturer Model (Hardware,
Processor)
Operating System
Apple Inc. MacBook with Intel Core M macOS Catalina 10.15
Apple Inc. Mac mini with Intel Core i5 macOS Catalina 10.15
Apple Inc. MacBook Pro with Intel Core i7 macOS Catalina 10.15
Apple Inc. MacBook Pro with Intel Core i9 macOS Catalina 10.15
Apple Inc. iMac Pro with Intel Xeon W macOS Catalina 10.15
Table 2: Tested Platforms
In addition to the configurations tested by the laboratory, vendor-affirmed testing was performed on the
following platforms for macOS 10.15 Catalina:
• MacBook, MacBook Air, MacBook Pro and iMac with an Intel i5
• Mac mini, MacBook Air, MacBook and iMac with an Intel i7
• iMac with an Intel i9
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation
certificate (IG G.5).
2.2 Modes of operation
The Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) has an Approved and non-Approved mode of
operation. The Approved mode of operation is configured by default and cannot be changed. If the device
starts up successfully the corecrypto framework has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved
mode. Any calls to the non-Approved security functions listed in Table 4 will cause the module to assume
the non-Approved mode of operation.
The module transitions back into FIPS mode immediately when invoking one of the approved ciphers as all
keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) handled by the module are ephemeral and there are no keys
and CSPs shared between any functions. A re-invocation of the self-tests or integrity tests is not required.
Even when using this FIPS 140-2 non-approved mode, the module configuration ensures that the self-
tests are always performed during initialization time of the module.
The module contains multiple implementations of the same cipher as listed below. If multiple
implementations of the same cipher are present, the module automatically selects which cipher is used
based on internal heuristics. This includes the hardware-assisted AES and SHA implementations (AES-NI).
The Approved security functions are listed in Table 3. The Algorithm Certificate numbers obtained from
NIST are based on the successful ACVT validation testing of the cryptographic algorithm implementations
of the module that runs on the hardware platforms referenced in Table 2.
Refer to [CAVP] for the current standards, test algorithm requirements, and special abbreviations used in
the following Table 3.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 9 of 26
2.2.1 Approved Security Functions:
Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Options Algorithm
Certificate
Random Number
Generation
[SP 800-90A]
DRBG
CTR_DRBG
Modes:
AES-128,
AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
A7 (c_asm)
A8 (c_ltc)
A10 (vng_asm)
A21 (c_aesni)
A31 (vng_asni)
HMAC_DRBG
Modes:
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Without Prediction Resistance
A8 (c_ltc)
A22 (c_avx)
A27 (c_ssse3)
A33 (c_avx2)
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
[FIPS 197]
AES
SP 800-38 A
SP 800-38 C
SP 800-38 D
SP 800-38 E
Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes:
CBC ECB
CCM GCM
CFB128 OFB
CFB8 XTS (128 and 256-bits key size only)
CTR
A7 (c_asm)
A8 (c_ltc)
A21 (c_aesni)
Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes
CBC
A11 (c_glad)
Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes:
CBC XTS (128 and 256-bits key size only)
ECB
A19 (asm_aesni)
A25 (asm_x86)
Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes:
ECB GCM
CCM
CTR
A10 (vng_asm)
A31 (vng_asni)
[SP 800-67]
Triple-DES
(Keying Option: 1; All Keys Independent)
Modes:
CBC CTR
CFB64 ECB
CFB8 OFB
A8 (c_ltc)
Key Wrapping SP 800-38 D Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes:
AES-CCM
AES-GCM
A7 (c_asm)
A8 (c_ltc)
A10 (vng_asm)
A21 (c_aesni)
A31 (vng_asni)
SP 800-38 F Key Length: 128, 192, 256
Modes:
AES-KW
A7 (c_asm)
A8 (c_ltc)
A21 (c_aesni)
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 10 of 26
Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Options Algorithm
Certificate
Digital Signature
and Asymmetric
Key Generation
[FIPS186-4]
RSA
Key Generation (ANSI X9.31),
Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Generation
(PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS)Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Verification
(PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS)Modulus: 1024, 2048, 3072,
4096
A8 (c_ltc)
A22 (c_avx)
A27 (c_ssse3)
A33 (c_avx2)
[FIPS 186-4]
ECDSA
ANSI X9.62
Key Pair Generation (PKG):
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Public Key Validation (PKV):
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Signature Generation:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Signature Verification:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
A8 (c_ltc)
A22 (c_avx)
A27 (c_ssse3)
A33 (c_avx2)
Message Digest [FIPS 180-4]
SHS
Modes:
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
A8 (c_ltc)
A22 (c_avx)
A27 (c_ssse3)
A29 (vng_Intel)
A33 (c_avx2)
Keyed Hash [FIPS 198]
HMAC
Key size: 112 bits or greater
Modes
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
A8 (c_ltc)
A22 (c_avx)
A27 (c_ssse3)
A29 (vng_Intel)
A33 (c_avx2)
Key Derivation [SP 800-132]
PBKDF
Password Based Key Derivation using HMAC with SHA-1 or
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 PRFs
Vendor Affirmed
CKG [SP800-133r2] RSA Key Generation (ANSI X9.31),
Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096
ECDSA Key Pair Generation (PKG):
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Vendor Affirmed
RSA
Key Wrapping
[SP 800-56B] KTS RSAOAEP
Modulus size: 2048, 3072 or 4096-bits
Vendor Affirmed
Table 3: Approved, Allowed and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions
Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Options Algorithm
Certificate
MD5
(used as part of the
TLS key
establishment
scheme only)
Message Digest
[RFC 1321]
Digest Size: 128-bit Non-Approved,
but Allowed
NDRNG
(is provided by the
underlying
operational
environment)
Random Number
Generation
N/A Non-Approved,
but Allowed
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 11 of 26
Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Options Algorithm
Certificate
RSA
Key Wrapping
Non-[SP 800-
56B], IG D.9
[SP800-131A]
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
Modulus size: 2048, 3072 or 4096-bits
Non-Approved,
but allowed
Table 3a: Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions
Note: PBKDFv2 is implemented to support all options specified in section 5.4 of [SP800-132]. The
password consists of at least 6 alphanumeric characters from the ninety-six (96) printable and human-
readable characters. The probability that a random attempt at guessing the password will succeed or a
false acceptance will occur is equal to 1/96^6. The derived keys may only be used in storage applications.
Additional guidance to appropriate usage is specified in section 7.3.
2.2.2 Non-Approved Security Functions:
Cryptographic
Function
Usage / Description Caveat
RSA
Signature Generation /
Signature Verification /
Asymmetric Key Generation
ANSI X9.31
Signature Generation
Key Pair Generation
Key Size < 2048
Signature Verification
Key Size < 1024
Non-Approved
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
Signature Generation
Key Size < 2048
Signature Verification
Key Size < 1024
RSA Key Wrapping PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
Key Size < 2048
Non-Approved
Diffie-Hellman Key Generation For all key sizes Non-Approved
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret
Computation
For all key sizes Not compliant to
56A rev3
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Key Agreement Scheme Non-Approved
EC Diffie-Hellman Key
Generation
For all key sizes Non-Approved
EC Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret Computation
For all key sizes Not compliant to
56A rev3
EC Diffie-Hellman Key
Agreement
Key Agreement Scheme Non-Approved
Ed25519 Key Agreement
Sig(gen)
Sig(ver)
Non-Approved
ANSI X9.63 KDF Hash based Key Derivation Function Non-Approved
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function Non-Approved
DES Encryption / Decryption
Key Size 56-bits
Non-Approved
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 12 of 26
Cryptographic
Function
Usage / Description Caveat
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 40 to 128 bits in 8-bit increments
Non-Approved
RC4 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 8 to 4096-bits
Non-Approved
RC2 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 8 to 1024-bits
Non-Approved
MD2 Message Digest
Digest size 128-bit
Non-Approved
MD4 Message Digest
Digest size 128-bit
Non-Approved
RIPEMD Message Digest
Digest size 128, 160, 256, 320 -bits
Non-Approved
ECDSA PKG: Curve P-192
PKV: Curve P-192
Signature Generation: Curve P-192
Signature Verification: Curve P-192
Non-Approved
Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points Non-Approved
Integrated Encryption Scheme
on elliptic curves
Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC) MAC generation Non-Approved
Triple-DES Encryption / Decryption
Two Key Implementation
Non-Approved
asm_x86 (Optimized Assembler) ImplementationEncryption /
Decryption
Mode: CTR
Non-Compliant
AES-CMAC AES-128/192/256 MAC generation/verification Non-Approved
[SP800-108] KBKDF HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA-224 or HMAC-SHA-256 or
HMAC-SHA-384 or HMAC-SHA-512 and AES-CMAC
based PRFs
Modes: CTR and Feedback
Non-Compliant
A8 (c_ltc )
A22 (c_avx)
A27 (c_ssse3)
A33 (c_avx2)
[SP800-56C] Key Derivation Function Non-Compliant
Table 4: Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions
Note: A Non-Approved function in Table 4 is that the function implements a non-Approved algorithm,
while a Non-Compliant function is that the function implements an Approved algorithm but the
implementation is either not validated by the CAVP or/and the self-tests are not implemented (IG 9.4).
2.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary
The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the macOS device that contains the
module. Consequently, the embodiment of the module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module.
The logical module boundary is depicted in the logical block diagram given in Figure 1.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 13 of 26
Figure 1: Logical Block Diagram
2.4 Module Usage Considerations
A user of the module must consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module:
- AES-GCM IV is constructed in accordance with [SP800-38D] in compliance with IG A.5 scenario 1.
The GCM IV generation follows RFC 5288 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2.
Users should consult [SP 800-38D], especially section 8, for all of the details and requirements of
using AES-GCM mode. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the
AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed.
- AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the XTS-AES
data unit does not exceed 220
blocks
- When using AES, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the functions
of ccaes_[cbc|ecb|…]_[encrypt|decrypt]_mode.
- When using SHA, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the functions
ccsha[1|224|256|384|512]_di.
- In order to meet the IG A.13 requirement, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt
more than 216
64-bit blocks of data.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 14 of 26
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs). In detail these interfaces are the following:
• Data input and data output are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable service
invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers. Hereafter, APIs and callable services will be
referred to as “API.”
• Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated parameters,
as well as mach-o header holding the HMAC check file.
• Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each API lists
possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language APIs within
the module is provided in the header files and the API documentation. Messages are documented
also in the API documentation.
The module is optimized for library use within the macOS user space and does not contain any terminating
assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as an macOS dynamically loadable library. The dynamically
loadable library is loaded into the macOS application and its cryptographic functions are made available.
Any internal error detected by the module is reflected back to the caller with an appropriate return code.
The calling macOS application must examine the return code and act accordingly. There is one notable
exception: ECDSA and RSA do not return a key if the pair-wise consistency test fails.
The function executing FIPS 140-2 module self-tests does not return an error code but causes the system
to crash if any self-test fails – see section 9.
The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return
codes, thus indicating the module’s status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle exceptional
conditions in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner.
Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers.
Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by the module.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 15 of 26
4 Roles, Services and Authentication
This section defines the roles, services and authentication mechanisms and methods with respect to the
applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.
4.1 Roles
The module supports a single instance of the two authorized roles: the Crypto Officer and the User. No
support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a Maintenance operator.
Role General Responsibilities and Services (details see below)
User Utilization of services of the module listed in section 2.1 and 4.2.
Crypto Officer (CO) Utilization of services of the module listed in section 2.1 and 4.2.
Table 5: Roles
4.2 Services
The module provides services to authorized operators of either the User or Crypto Officer roles according
to the applicable FIPS 140-2 security requirements.
Table 6 contains the cryptographic functions employed by the module in the Approved mode. For each
available service it lists, the associated role, the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and cryptographic
keys involved, and the type(s) of access to the CSPs and cryptographic keys.
CSPs contain security-related information (for example, secret and private cryptographic keys) whose
disclosure or modification can compromise the main security objective of the module, namely the
protection of sensitive information.
The access types are denoted as follows:
• ‘R: the item is read/execute or referenced by the service
• ‘W’: the item is written or updated by the service
• ‘Z’: the persistent item is zeroized by the service
Service Roles CSPs & Crypto Keys Access
Type
USER CO
Triple-DES Encryption / Decryption X X
Triple-DES key R
AES Encryption / Decryption
X X AES key R
AES Key Wrapping
X X AES R
RSA Key Wrapping
X X RSA Private Key R
Secure Hash Generation X X none N/A
HMAC generation
X X HMAC key R
RSA signature generation and verification
X X RSA key pair R
ECDSA signature generation and verification
X X ECDSA key pair R
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 16 of 26
Service Roles CSPs & Crypto Keys Access
Type
USER CO
Random number generation X X Entropy input string, Nonce, V and Key R
W
Z
PBKDF Password-based key derivation X X derived key, password R
W
Z
ECDSA key pair generation X X ECDSA key pair W
RSA key pair generation X X RSA key pair W
Release all resources of symmetric crypto
function context
X X AES/Triple-DES key Z
Release all resources of hash context X X HMAC key Z
Release of all resources of asymmetric crypto
function context
X X RSA keys Z
Self-test X X Software integrity key R
Show Status X X None N/A
Table 6: Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode
Service Roles
User CO
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves Encryption / Decryption X X
DES Encryption / Decryption X X
Triple-DES (Optimized Assembler-asm_x86- Implementation) Encryption / Decryption
Mode: CTR
X X
Triple-DES (Two-Key implementation) Encryption / Decryption X X
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption X X
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption X X
RC4 Encryption / Decryption X X
RC2 Encryption / Decryption X X
MD2 Hash X X
MD4 Hash X X
RIPEMD Hash X X
RSA Key Wrapping using Key Size < 2048 X X
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Generation and Verification
Key Sizes: 1024-4096-bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in Table 3
X X
RSA ANSI X9.31 Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation and Signature Verification
Key sizes (modulus): 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in Table 3
Public key exponent values: 65537 or larger
X X
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points X X
ECDSA
PKG: curves P-192
PKV: curves P-192
SIG(gen): curves P-192SIG(ver): curves P-192
X X
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 17 of 26
Service Roles
User CO
Diffie-Hellman Key Generation X X
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation X X
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement X X
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Generation X X
EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation X X
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement X X
Ed25519 Key agreement, Signature Generation, Signature Verification X X
[SP800-56C] Key Derivation Function X X
Hash based Key Derivation Function using ANSI X9.63 X X
[SP800-108] Key Derivation Function using HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA-224 or HMAC-SHA-256
or HMAC-SHA-384 or HMAC-SHA-512 and AES-CMAC Based Pseudo Random Functions
Modes: Feedback, Counter
X X
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function X X
AES-CMAC (AES-128/192/256) MAC Generation/Verification X X
OMAC MAC Generation X X
Table 7: Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode
4.3 Operator authentication
Within the constraints of FIPS 140-2 level 1, the module does not implement an authentication mechanism
for operator authentication. The assumption of a role is implicit in the action taken.
The module relies upon the operating system for any operator authentication.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 18 of 26
5 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto User Space Module
for Intel (ccv10) since it is a software module.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 19 of 26
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Applicability
The Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) operates in a modifiable operational
environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. It is part of macOS 10.15, a commercially available
general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.1.3.
6.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (single-user mode; i.e. concurrent operators are
explicitly excluded).
When the operating system loads the module into memory, it invokes the FIPS Self-Test functionality,
which in turn runs the mandatory FIPS 140-2 tests.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 20 of 26
7 Cryptographic Key Management
The Table 8 summarizes the cryptographic keys and CSPs used in the Apple corecrypto User Space
Module for Intel (ccv10), with the ley lengths supported, the available methods for key generation, key
entry and key output, and zeroization.
Name Key / CSP Size Generation
Entry /
Output
Zeroization
AES Keys 128, 192, 256 bits N/A. The key is entered via API
parameter
Entry : calling
application
(see 7.4)
Output: calling
application
(see 7.4)
automatic
zeroization when
structure is
deallocated or
when the system
is powered down
(see 7.6).
HMAC Keys min 112- bits
Triple-DES Keys 192 bits
ECDSA key pair P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521
curves
The private keys are generated
using FIPS186-4 Key Generation
method, and the random value
used in the key generation is
generated using SP800-90A DRBG
RSA key pair 2048, 3072,
4096
Entropy Input
string
Obtained from the NDRNG. Entry: OS
Output: N/A
DRBG nonce Obtained from the NDRNG.
DRBG V, Key Derived from entropy input string
as defined by SP800-90A
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
PBKDF Keys min: 112 bits Internally generated via SP800-132
PBKDF key derivation algorithm
Entry: N/A
Output: calling
application
(see 7.4)
PBKDF Password N/A. The password is provided by
calling application
Entry : calling
application
(see 7.4)
Output: N/A
Table 8: Module Cryptographic key and CSPs
7.1 Random Number Generation
A FIPS 140-2 approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as specified in NIST
[SP 800-90A] is used. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation (i.e., random
padding, nonce/salt generation, etc.) is a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function and without
prediction resistance. Additionally, the module provides the caller with additional random number
generation functionality through an HMAC-DRBG which can be configure by the caller. The deterministic
random bit generators are seeded by /dev/random. The /dev/random is the User Space interface that
extracts random bits from the entropy pool. The NDRNG feeds entropy from the pool into the DRBG on
demand. The NDRNG provides 256-bits of entropy.
7.2 Key / CSP Generation
The following approved key generation methods are used by the module:
• The module does not implement symmetric key generation.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per [SP800-133] (vendor affirmed), compliant with
[FIPS186-4], and using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in
asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90A] DRBG. The key generation service for
RSA, ECDSA as well as the [SP 800-90A] DRBG have been ACVT tested with algorithm
certificates found in Table 3.
It is not possible for the module to output information during the key generating process.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 21 of 26
7.3 Key / CSP Establishment
The module provides the following key establishment services in the Approved mode:
• AES key wrapping using KW, CCM and GCM modes,
• RSA key wrapping, RSA key wrapping encompasses:
o RSA key wrapping using OAEP mode compliant to [SP 800-56B] (vendor affirmed)
o RSA key wrapping using PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS modes, non-approved but allowed per IG D.9
• [SP800-132] PBKDFv2 algorithm. The PBKDFv2 function is provided as a service and returns the
key derived from the provided password to the caller. The keys derived from [SP800-132] map to
section 4.1 of [SP800-133] as indirect generation from DRBG. The caller shall observe all
requirements and should consider all recommendations specified in [SP800-132] with respect to
the strength of the generated key, including the quality of the salt as well as the number of
iterations. The implementation of the PBKDFv2 function requires the user to provide this
information.
The encryption strengths for the key establishment methods are determined in accordance with FIPS 140-
2 Implementation Guidance [IG] section 7.5 and NIST Special Publication 800-57 (Part1) [SP800-57P1].
• AES key wrapping is used for key establishment. Methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits
of encryption strength.
• RSA key wrapping is used for key establishment. Methodology provides between 112 and 152 bits
of encryption strength.
7.4 Key / CSP Entry and Output
All keys are entered from, or output to, the invoking application running on the same device. All keys
entered into the module are electronically entered in plain text form. Keys are output from the module in
plain text form if required by the calling application. The same holds for the CSPs.
7.5 Key / CSP Storage
The Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) considers all keys in memory to be ephemeral.
They are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the calling application. The
same holds for CSPs.
The module protects all keys, secret or private, and CSPs through the memory protection mechanisms
provided by the operating system. No process can read the memory of another process.
7.6 Key / CSP Zeroization
Keys and CSPs are zeroized when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the system is
powered down.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 22 of 26
8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The EMI/EMC properties of the Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) are not meaningful
for the software library. The devices containing the software components of the module have their own
overall EMI/EMC rating. The validation test environments have FCC, part 15, Class B rating.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 23 of 26
9 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the
correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, the DRBG requires continuous
verification. The FIPS Self-Tests application runs all required module self-tests. This application is invoked
by the macOS startup process upon device initialization.
The execution of an independent application for invoking the self-tests in the corecrypto.dylib makes use
of features of the macOS architecture: the module, implemented in corecrypto.dylib, is linked by
libcommoncrypto.dylib which is linked by libSystem.dylib. The libSystem.dylib is a library that must be
loaded into every application for operation. The operating system ensures that there is a strict CSP
separation between the instances used by each application.
All self-tests performed by the module are listed and described in this section.
9.1 Power-Up Tests
The following tests are performed each time the Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10)
starts and must be completed successfully for the module to operate in the FIPS approved mode. If any of
the following tests fails the device fails to startup. To invoke the self-tests on demand, the user may
reboot the system.
9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests2
Algorithm Modes Test
Triple-DES CBC KAT (Known Answer Test)
Separate encryption / decryption
operations are performed
AES implementations selected by the module for
the corresponding environment.
AES-128
CBC, ECB, GCM, XTS,
CCM
KAT
Separate encryption / decryption
operations are performed
DRBG (CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG; tested
separately)
N/A KAT
HMAC-SHA implementations selected by the
module for the corresponding environment.
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
512
N/A KAT
RSA Signature Generation /
Signature Verification;
Encrypt / Decrypt
KAT,
Separate encryption /decryption
operations are performed
ECDSA Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
pair-wise consistency test
Table 9: Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
9.1.2 Software / Firmware Integrity Tests
A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the Apple corecrypto User Space Module
for Intel (ccv10). The corecrypto’s HMAC-SHA256 is used as an approved algorithm for the integrity test.
If the test fails, then the device powers itself off.
9.1.3 Critical Function Tests
No other critical function test is performed on power up.
2 The module also includes KATs for DH and ECDH shared secret computation but they are a non-approved algorithms hence are
not listed in this table.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 24 of 26
9.2 Conditional Tests
The following sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple corecrypto User Space
Module for Intel (ccv10).
9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test
The Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) performs a continuous random number
generator test on the noise source (i.e. NDRNG), whenever it is invoked to seed the [SP800-90A] DRBG.
9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test
The Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) generates RSA and ECDSA asymmetric keys
and performs the required pair-wise consistency tests with the newly generated key pair.
9.2.3 SP 800-90A Health Tests
The Apple corecrypto User Space Module for Intel (ccv10) performs the health tests as specified in
section 11.3 of [SP800-90A].
9.2.4 Critical Function Test
No other critical function test is performed conditionally.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 25 of 26
10 Design Assurance
10.1 Configuration Management
Apple manages and records source code and associated documentation files by using the revision control
system called “Git.”
The Apple module hardware data, which includes descriptions, parts data, part types, bills of materials,
manufacturers, changes, history, and documentation are managed and recorded. Additionally,
configuration management is provided for the module’s FIPS documentation.
The following naming/numbering convention for documentation is applied.
<evaluation>_<module>_<os>_<mode>_<doc name>_<doc version (##.##)>
Example: FIPS_CORECRYPTO_MACOS_US_SECPOL_5.0
Document management utilities provide access control, versioning, and logging. Access to the Git
repository (source tree) is granted or denied by the server administrator in accordance with company and
team policy.
10.2 Delivery and Operation
The corecrypto is built into macOS 10.15. For additional assurance, it is digitally signed.
10.3 Development
The Apple crypto module (like any other Apple software) undergoes frequent builds utilizing a “train”
philosophy. Source code is submitted to the Build and Integration group (B & I). Integration can only take
place after the corecrypto project successfully passes internal integration and system tests on all
platforms. B & I builds, integrates, system tests on all the platforms and checks on the operating systems
and apps that they produce. Copies of older versions are archived offsite in underground granite vaults.
10.4 Guidance
The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module’s validated status
while in use.
10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance
The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into
the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4. If the device
starts up successfully then corecrypto has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.
A Crypto Officer Role Guide is provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the
necessary technical information to ensure FIPS 140-2 Compliance of macOS 10.15 systems. This guide
walks the reader through the system’s assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps
necessary if module integrity requires remediation. A link to the Guide can be found on the Product
security, validations, and guidance page found in [UGuide].
10.4.2 User Guidance
As explained above, the Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only
be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in Table
4. If the device starts up successfully then corecrypto has passed all self-tests and is operating in the
Approved mode.
Document Version1.4
Last update: 2022-06-23 ©2022 Apple Inc. Page 26 of 26
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module protects against the utilization of known Triple-DES weak keys. The following keys are not
permitted:
{0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01},
{0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE},
{0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E},
{0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1},
{0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01},
{0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E},
{0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01},
{0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E},
{0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E},
{0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01},
{0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE},
{0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}