

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

JCOP 4.5 on P71D600



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1.0	July 18, 2022	Full Release, added CAVP Cert. # to Table 3
1.1	June 14, 2023	Update after first round NIST comments
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1 General

Introduction

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a sensitive but unclassified (SBU) environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140-3 program. The National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) provides accreditation to independent testing labs performing FIPS 140-3 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140-3 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-3 criteria.

More information is available on the CMVP website at: <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program>.

About this Document

This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the NXP Semiconductors JCOP 4.5 on P71D600 provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the overall Security Level 3 requirements of FIPS 140-3.

The JCOP 4.5 on P71D600 may also be referred to as the “Secure Element” or “module” in this document.

The module is available under several commercial type names addressing the different market segments relevant for NXP, such as:

- JCOP 4.5 on P71D600
- JCOP ID 2 on P71D600
- SE052F
- NCJ37B0HN

Disclaimer

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The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-3:

ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6 [Number Below]	FIPS 140-3 Section Title	Security Level
1	General	3
2	Cryptographic Module Specification	3
3	Cryptographic Module Interfaces	3
4	Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
5	Software/Firmware Security	3
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Physical Security	4
8	Non-Invasive Security	3
9	Sensitive Security Parameter Management	3
10	Self-Tests	3
11	Life-Cycle Assurance	3
12	Mitigation of Other Attacks	3

Table 1 – Security Levels

The module claims an Overall Security Level 3.

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

The module, validated to FIPS 140-3 overall Level 3, is a hardware module with single chip embodiment named JCOP 4.5 on P71D600 implementing the GlobalPlatform operational environment (Card Manager (ISD/SSD)) and the applications:

- NXP IoT applet v7.2.22
- NXP SEMS Lite applet v2.0.2.11

The module is designed for use in smart cards, IoT and automotive applications.

Module	Hardware [Part Number and Version]	Firmware Version				Distinguishing Features
		Platform ID	ROM ID	Patch ID	Applets	
JCOP 4.5 on P71D600	N7122 A1	J3R6000373181200	B3375FE9B5508BC4	00000000 00000000	NXP IoT applet v7.2.22 and NXP SEMS Lite applet v2.0.2.11	<p>The GlobalPlatform operational environment is identified with the Platform ID, the ROM ID, the Patch ID, and other information, describing the content in ROM, NVM and loaded patches;</p> <p>The Platform ID is a data string that allows the identification of the P71D600 Card</p>

Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration

The module is validated at an Overall Security Level 3 with Physical Security at Level 4 and all other areas at Level 3. The Operational Environment requirements do not apply to the module given that it meets Physical Security Level 4 requirements.

Cryptographic Boundary

The module is designed to be used as a part of a larger system. It works as an auxiliary security device attached to a host controller. The physical form of the module is depicted in Figures 1 and 2 (to scale); the outline depicts the cryptographic boundary, representing the surface of the chip and the bond pads. The red outline in Figure 3 also depicts the cryptographic boundary.

In production use, the module is delivered to either vendors or end user customers either on film frame carrier (FFC) or various packages such as PDM1.1, NXD6.2, MOB6/10 or HVQFN20 package. The package is outside the cryptographic boundary and thus excluded from the FIPS 140-3/ISO/IEC 19790 security testing.

The contactless ports of the module require connection to an antenna. The module relies on [ISO 7816] and [ISO 14443] card readers as input/output devices, or a [NXP I2C] connection to a host controller. No components have been excluded from within the cryptographic boundary.

Approved Mode of Operation

The module only supports an Approved mode of operation. The NXP SEMS Lite applet can support the NIST P-256 curve or the vendor Approved and NIST allowed Brainpool256r1 elliptic curve to perform the ECDSA or KAS-ECC operations. In the Approved mode of operation, the NXP SEMS Lite applet supports the Brainpool256r1 elliptic curve by default. The CO role may use SEMS Lite Module Management service to load NIST P-256 curve parameters.

The P71D600 GlobalPlatform operational environment component can be identified by using the IDENTIFY APDU command (*Info* service). This command returns the card identification data, which includes a Platform ID, a Patch ID and other information that allows the identification of the content in ROM, NVM and loaded patches. The Platform ID is a data string that allows the identification of the P71D600 Card Manager component.

The IDENTIFY APDU command is formatted as follows:

Code	Value	Parameter settings
CLA	'80'	GlobalPlatform
INS	'CA'	GET DATA (IDENTIFY) - ISD
P1	'00'	High order tag value
P2	'FE'	Low order tag value - proprietary data
Lc	'02'	Length of data field
Data	'DF28'	Module identification data
Le	'00'	Length of response data

The operator can verify that NXP SEMS Lite applet v2.0.2.11 is an Approved mode of operation by sending the three (3) following commands to the module:

1. The SELECT APDU command (*SEMS Lite General service*) shall be called with the following parameters: CLA = 00, INS = A4, P1 = 04, P2 = 00, Lc = 10, Incoming Data = A0000003965453000000010330000000, and Le = 00.
Return code shall be 90 00 (OK)
2. The GET DATA APDU command (*SEMS Lite General service*) shall be called with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = DE, and Le = 00. The command shall return DE04020002119000 with 02000211 indicating the NXP SEMS Lite applet version. This encoded applet version (02000211) corresponds to the decimal version v2.0.2.11 of the IoT Applet as specified in Table 2 in this document and the module certificate.
3. The GET DATA APDU command (*SEMS Lite General service*) shall be called with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = C6, and Le = 00.
The command shall return C601019000 with C60101 indicating the NXP SEMS Lite applet is configured in Approved mode of operation.

The module does not support a degraded operation.

In addition to the configurations tested by the laboratory, vendor-affirmed testing was performed on the following platforms:

- SE052
- NCJ37

Note: The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

Cryptographic Algorithms

The module implements the following Approved cryptographic algorithms.

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/ Method	Description/ Key Size(s)/ Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
A2713	AES-CBC	AES-CBC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key strength	Data Encryption/ Decryption

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/ Method	Description/ Key Size(s)/ Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
A2713	AES-CCM	AES-CCM	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key strength	Authentication Encryption with AES CTR mode and CBC-MAC
A2713	AES-CMAC	AES-CMAC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key Strength	Message Authentication; generation and verification SP800-108 KDF
A2713	AES-CTR	AES-CTR	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key Strength	Data Encryption/ Decryption
A2713	AES-ECB	AES-ECB	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key strength	Data Encryption/ Decryption
A2713	Counter DRBG	Counter DRBG	AES-256 with 256-bit security strength	Deterministic Random Bit Generation AES-256: RSA and ECDSA key generation
A2713	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 with 112, 128, 192 and 256-bit key strength	ECC Key Generation
A2713	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	P-224: (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512), P-256: (SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512), P-384: (SHA2-384, SHA2-512), P-521: (SHA2-512) with 112, 128, 192 and 256-bit key strength	Digital Signature Generation
A2713	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	P-224: (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512), P-256: (SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512), P-384: (SHA2-384, SHA2-512), P-521: (SHA2-512) with 112, 128, 192 and 256-bit key strength	Digital Signature Verification

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/ Method	Description/ Key Size(s)/ Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
A2713	HMAC-SHA-1	HMAC-SHA-1	HMAC-SHA-1 with 128-bit key strength	Message Authentication
A2713	HMAC-SHA2-256	HMAC-SHA2-256	HMAC-SHA-256 with 256-bit key strength	Message Authentication
A2713	HMAC-SHA2-384	HMAC-SHA2-384	HMAC-SHA-384 with 256-bit key strength	Message Authentication
A2713	HMAC-SHA2-512	HMAC-SHA2-512	HMAC-SHA-512 with 256-bit key strength	Message Authentication
A2713	KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	OnePass EC Diffie-Hellman FIPS 140-3 IG D.F Scenario 2 Path 2	P-256 with 128-bit key strength	ECKey session shared secret computation; SEMS Lite shared secret computation (with Brainpool256r1 curves); The module obtains assurances per Section 5.6.2 in NIST SP800-56Ar3 self-tests
A2713	KDA HKDF Sp800-56Cr1	Two-step key derivation function	HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512 with 128 and 256-bit key strength	HKDF Operations – extract-then-expand
A2713	KDF SP800-108	Counter	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192 and 256-bit key strength	Deriving keys from existing keys
A2713	KDF SP800-108	Feedback	HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512 with 128 and 256-bit key strength	HKDF Operations - expand only
A2713	RSA Decryption Primitive	RSA Decryption Primitive	n=2048 with 112-bit decryption strength	Decryption Primitive (standard and CRT)
A2713	RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	n=2048, 3072, 4096 with 112 and 128-bit key strength	Key Generation (standard and CRT)
A2713	RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	n=2048, 3072, 4096 with PKCS v1.5 and PKCS PSS and SHA2-(224, 256, 384, 512) with 112, 128 and 152 bit key strength	Signature Generation

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/ Method	Description/ Key Size(s)/ Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
A2713	RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	n=2048, 3072, 4096 with PKCS v1.5 and PKCS PSS and SHA-1 , SHA2-(224, 256, 384, 512) with 112, 128 and 152 bit key strength	Signature Verification
A2713	RSA Signature Primitive	RSA Signature Primitive	n=2048 with 112-bit security strength	Signature Primitive (standard and CRT)
A2713	SHA-1	SHA-1	SHA-1 with 128-bit security strength	Message Digest Generation, SEMS Lite command integrity
A2713	SHA2-224	SHA2-224	SHA2-224 with 112-bit or 192-bit security strength	Message Digest Generation, SEMS Lite command integrity
A2713	SHA2-256	SHA2-256	SHA2-256 with 128 or 256-bit security strength	Message Digest Generation, SEMS Lite command integrity
A2713	SHA2-384	SHA2-384	SHA2-384 with 192 or 256-bit security strength	Message Digest Generation, SEMS Lite command integrity
A2713	SHA2-512	SHA2-512	SHA2-512 with 256-bit security strength	Message Digest Generation, SEMS Lite command integrity
A2714	AES-GCM	AES-GCM	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key strength	Authentication Encryption with Associated Data MAC calculation, MAC verification
A2714	AES-GMAC	AES-GMAC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key strength	Authentication Encryption with Associated Data MAC calculation, MAC verification
A2714	AES-KW	AES-KW	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key strength	Key Wrapping (Decryption)
A2714	KDA OneStep Sp800-56Cr1	KDA OneStep Sp800-56Cr1 option 1	SHA-256 with 256-bit key strength	EcKey Session Key Derivation

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/ Method	Description/ Key Size(s)/ Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
A2714	KDF TLS	TLS version 1.2 Key Derivation SP800-135r1	HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512 with 256-bit key strength	Key Derivation Function used in TLS 1.2
A2714	PBKDF	PBKDF2 Option 1a acc. [SP800- 132r2]	HMAC-SHA-1 with 128-bit key strength	Password-based Key Derivation; This algorithm is provided as a service for module hosting the Module
A2715	KDA OneStep Sp800-56Cr1	KDA OneStep Sp800-56Cr1 option 1	SHA-256 with 256-bit key strength	SEMS Lite shared master key derivation
Vendor Affirmed	CKG SP800-133r2	Section 4: Symmetric keys and seeds used for generating the asymmetric keys are generated using methods described in Section 4 of SP800- 133r2 Section 5.1: Key Pairs for Digital Signature Schemes Section 6.2.1: Symmetric Keys Generated Using Key-Agreement Schemes Section 6.2.2: Symmetric Keys Derived from a Pre-existing Key Section 6.4: Distributing the Generated Symmetric Key		Key Generation is based on unmodified output of the DRBG cert. #A2713
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3/A2713 KDA HKDF Sp800- 56Cr1/A2713	KAS-1	SP 800-56Arev3 KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2)	P-256 curve providing 128 bits of encryption strength	KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Sp 800-56Ar3 with KDA (HKDF))
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3/A2713 KDA OneStep Sp800- 56Cr1/A2714	KAS-2	SP 800-56Arev3 KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2)	P-256 curve providing 128 bits of encryption strength	KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Sp 800-56Ar3 with KDA (OneStep KDF))
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3/A2713 KDA OneStep Sp800- 56Cr1/A2715	KAS-3	SP 800- 56Arev3. KAS- ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2)	P-256 curve providing 128 bits of encryption strength	KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Sp 800-56Ar3 with KDA (OneStep KDF))

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/ Method	Description/ Key Size(s)/ Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
AES-CBC/A2713 AES-CMAC/A2713	KTS-1	AES CBC / AES CMAC	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key strength	SP 800-38D and SP 800-38F KTS (key wrapping) per IG D.G
AES-KW/#A2714	KTS-2	KW	AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with 128, 192, 256-bit key strength	SP 800-38F KTS (key wrapping) per IG D.G

Table 3 – Approved Algorithms

Algorithm	Caveat	Use/Function
AES	Cert. #A2713, key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength Per IG D.G	Symmetric key unwrapping (according to RFC3394)
AES	Cert. #A2713, key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength Per IG D.G	Symmetric key unwrapping (according to GlobalPlatform Amendment-I)
ECDSA with non-NIST recommended curves	Provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength Per IG C.A	Signature Generation/Verification using non-NIST curves [Brainpool224r1, Brainpool256r1, Brainpool320r, Brainpool384r1, Brainpool512r1, Secp224k1, Secp256k1 with strengths]112, 128, 192 and 256 bits]
EC Diffie-Hellman with non-NIST recommended curves	Provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength Per IGs D.F and C.A	Shared secret computation using non-NIST curves [Brainpool224r1, Brainpool256r1, Brainpool320r, Brainpool384r1, Brainpool512r1, Secp224k1, Secp256k1 with strengths]112, 128, 192 and 256 bits]

Table 4 – Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in Approved Mode of Operation

The following non-Approved but allowed EC curves (per IG C.A) are implemented by the module for use in ECDSA and KAS-ECC:

EC	Standard	Strength	Singular	Field	Co-Factor
Brainpool224r1	[RFC5639]	112	No	IF_p	1

EC	Standard	Strength	Singular	Field	Co-Factor
Brainpool256r1	[RFC5639]	128	No	IF_p	1
Brainpool320r1	[RFC5639]	128	No	IF_p	1
Brainpool384r1	[RFC5639]	192	No	IF_p	1
Brainpool512r1	[RFC5639]	256	No	IF_p	1
Secp224k1	[SEC2]	112	No	IF_p	1
Secp256k1	[SEC2]	128	No	IF_p	1

The module does not support Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed and Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation.




Figure 1 – P71D600




Figure 2 – P71D600 Physical Form (Schematic)

Figure 3 below depicts the module operational environment.




Figure 3 – Module Block Diagram

The JavaCard and Global Platform APIs are internal interfaces available to applets. Only NXP applets and Card Manager (ISD/SSD) services are available at the card edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic boundary).

The product is delivered with:

- NXP IoT applet installed and configured before product's delivery to customer. The end-user can personalize the module with its objects but cannot modify the configuration of the module, the Module always operates in an Approved mode of operation.
- NXP SEMS Lite Applet installed and configured before product's delivery to customer. The end-user cannot modify the configuration of the module, the module always operates in an Approved mode of operation. Thus, the end-user cannot bring unauthorized changes to the Approved configuration of the module.

Overall Security Design and Rules of Operation

PBKDF Operation details

- **Password strength**

The password is stored in an APP-HMAC-KEY object as input to the PBKDF2 function. This key requires a minimum of 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will end up with the same output is:

- $1/(2^{112}) = 1.9E-34$ (using a minimum size for the password)

- **Iteration Count and Justification**

Iteration count should be at least 1000, following the recommendation in SP800-132r2.

If an application desires less iterations, the iteration count can be lower than 1000, but in any case, the iteration count shall be 2 or more.

- **Storage Only Statement**

Output of PBKDF Operation service shall be used in storage applications.

AES GCM IV

The module enforces the use of an Approved DRBG in accordance with IG C.H scenario 2; the internal Approved CTR_DRBG, which has a security strength of 128 bits, is used to generate the 96-bit IV.

TLS 1.2 Support

The module supports the TLS KDF Functions service. This service provides support for TLS v1.2 calculations. It does not implement the TLS v1.2 protocol. Per FIPS 140-3 IG D.C, no parts of this protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface	Data that Passes over Port/Interface
VSS, VDD	Power interface	These interfaces are used to supply power to the module in contact mode; The module starts when interface is powered
VIN, VOUT	Power interface	These interfaces are used to supply power to the module in contact, contactless and I2C mode in case deep power-down mode is used
RST_N	Control input interface	If a signal is sent on this interface on contact mode, the module will reboot (active low)
CLK	Control input interface	The interface is used by an external device (ex: smartcard reader) to provide a clock signal to the IC in contact mode; The IC will derive its own clock from this signal
IO1	Control input interface, Data input interface, Data output interface, Status output interface	The interface is used to communicate with an external entity (ex: SmartCard reader) in contact mode; It also functions as I2C master SDA in I2C mode
IO2	Control input interface, Data input interface, Data output interface, Status output interface	The interface is used to communicate with an external entity (ex: SmartCard reader) in contact mode; It also functions as I2C master SCL in I2C mode or as SPI interface
LA, LB	Power interface, Control input interface, Data input interface, Data output interface, Status output interface	The interface is used to communicate with an external entity (ex: smartcard reader) in contactless mode; This interface is also used to set the internal clock and to supply power to the module
SDA	Control input interface, Data input interface, Data output interface, Status output interface	The interface is used to communicate with an external entity such as a host controller
SCL	Control input interface	The interface is used by an external device (ex: host controller) to provide a clock signal to the I2C HW

Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces

The module does not support control output.

4 Roles, Services and Authentication

The module supports the following roles:

- Cryptographic Officer (CO): Manages module content and configuration, including management of module data via the SSD. Authenticated as described in Table 7 below.
- User (the device Holder (applet user)): Performs Approved cryptographic operations. Authenticated as described in Table 7 below.

Role	Service	Input	Output
ISD Services			
CO	Manage Content	APDU(s) used: DELETE LOAD INSTALL MANAGE CHANNEL	Command parameters (data objects, SSPs)
			Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
SSD Services			
CO	Lifecycle (Show status and Perform zeroisation)	APDU(s) used: SET STATUS GET STATUS	Target status
			Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
CO	Manage Content	APDU(s) used: PUT KEY STORE DATA	Command parameters (data objects, SSPs)
			Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
CO	Privileged Info (Show module's versioning information)	APDU(s) used: GET DATA	Command parameters (privileged data objects, but no SSPs)
			Requested information; Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
CO	Secure Channel	APDU(s) used: INITIALIZE UPDATE EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	Command parameters (data objects, SSPs)
			Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
IoT Applet Services			
CO	IoT Applet Management	APDU(s) used: SetLockState, SetPlatformSCPRequest, DeleteAll, SetAppletFeatures, ImportExternalObject	Authentication data to open an applet session
			Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Role	Service		Input	Output
User, CO	Module Usage (Perform Self-Tests and Show module's versioning information)	APDU(s) used: DisableSecureObjectCreation, SendCardManagerCommand, TriggerSelfTest, I2CM_ExecuteCommandSet, GetVersion, GetTimestamp, GetFreeMemory, GetRandom, ReadState	Command parameters (e.g. required length for GetRandom, memory type for GetFreeMemory, etc.)	Requested information; Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	Session Management	APDU(s) used: CreateSession, VerifySessionUserID, SCPInitializeUpdate, SCPEExternalAuthenticate, ECKeySessionInternalAuthenticate, ECKeySessionGetECKAPublicKey, ExchangeSessionData, ProcessSessionCmd, RefreshSession, CloseSession	Session creation C-APDU; authentication data to open the applet session	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	Secure Object Write Functionality	APDU(s) used: WriteECKey/WriteRSAKey, WriteSymmKey, WriteBinary, WriteUserID, WriteCounter, WritePCR, ImportObject	Object identifier; Secure Object characteristics (transient/persistent; Authentication rights or not; etc.); (optionally) Secure Object value; (optionally) Secure Object non-default policy (optionally) Secure Object version	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	Secure Object Read Functionality	APDU(s) used: ReadObject, ReadAttributes, ExportObject	Object identifier	Secure Object value (if non-secret) (optionally) Secure Object attributes Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Role	Service		Input	Output
User, CO	Secure Object Management	APDU(s) used: ReadType, ReadSize, ReadIDList, CheckObjectExists, DeleteSecureObject	Object identifier	Secure Object characteristics (type, size, exists, etc.) or listing of Secure Objects Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	EC Curve Management (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: CreateECCurve, SetECCurveParam, GetECCurveID, ReadECCurveList, DeleteECCurve	Curve Identifier; (optionally) curve parameters Secure Object identifier (for GetECCurveID)	Status Word (Response APDU 9000) Curve set indicators (for ReadECCurveList) Curve identifier (for GetECCurveID)
User, CO	Crypto Object Management	APDU(s) used: CreateCryptoObject, ReadCryptoObjectList, DeleteCryptoObject	Crypto object identifier; (optionally) Crypto Object characteristics	Status Word (Response APDU 9000) List of Crypto Object identifiers (for ReadCryptoObjectList)
User, CO	EC Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: ECDSASign, ECDSAVerify	Secure Object identifier; Input data (message/signature/external public key)	Output data (signature, result of verification, shared secret) Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	RSA Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: RSASign, RSAVerify, RSAEncrypt, RSADecrypt	Secure Object identifier; Input data (message/signature)	Output data (signature, result of verification, encrypted or decrypted data) Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	Symmetric Cipher Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: CipherInit, CipherUpdate, CipherFinal, CipherOneShot	Secure Object identifier or Crypto Object identifier Input data (message)	Output data (encrypted or decrypted message) Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Role	Service		Input	Output
User, CO	Authenticated Encryption Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: AEADInit, AEADUpdate, AEADFinal, AEADOneShot	Secure Object identifier or Crypto Object identifier Input data (message, AAD, tag, etc.)	Output data (encrypted or decrypted message, tag or result of tag verification) Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	MAC Calculation Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: MACInit, MACUpdate, MACFinal, MACOneShot	Secure Object identifier or Crypto Object identifier Input data (message, MAC (for verification))	Output data (MAC or result of MAC verification) Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	HKDF operations (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: HKDFExtractAndExpand, HKDFExpandOnly	Secure Object identifier HKDF input parameters (digest type, message, requested length, salt, output object, etc.)	Output data (derived data) if not stored on-chip Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	PBKDF Operation (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: PBKDF2DeriveKey	Secure Object identifier PBKDF2 input data (salt, iteration count, requested length)	Output data (derived data) Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	TLS KDF Functions (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: TLSGenerateRandom, TLSCalculatePremasterSecret, TLSPerformPRF	Secure Object identifier(s) TLS KDF input data (digest type, label, random, requested length)	Output data Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
User, CO	Secure Hash Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	APDU(s) used: DigestInit, DigestUpdate, DigestFinal, DigestOneShot	Digest mode or Crypto Object identifier Input data (message)	Output data (hashed message) Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
SEMS Lite Applet Services				

Role	Service		Input	Output
User, CO	SEMS Lite Authentication	APDU(s) used: PROCESS, SCRIPT, COMMAND	Authentication information or SEMS Secure channel	Allow or reject SEMS Lite Manage Content service or SEMS Lite Root Key Update or Error code
User, CO	SEMS Lite Manage Content	APDU(s) used: SEMS_SELECT, SEMS_APDU, SEMS_BEGIN_PERSO, SEMS_END_PERSO, SEMS_INSTALL_FOR_LOAD, SEMS_LOAD, SEMS_INSTALL_FOR_INSTALL, SEMS_DELETE, SEMS_BINDING_SE, BEGIN_MANAGE_ELF_UPGRADE, END_MANAGE_ELF_UPGRADE	Content management commands wrapped in SEMS Secure channel	Implicit indication via the successful completion of service
CO	SEMS Lite Root Key Update	APDU(s) used: SEMS_KEY_ROTATION	Key update commands wrapped in SEMS Secure channel	Implicit indication via the successful completion of service
CO, User, Unauthorised	Card Reset	APDU(s) used: N/A	Power cycle or reset the module	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
CO, User, Unauthorised	Context	APDU(s) used: SELECT. MANAGE CHANNEL	Command parameters (data objects, SSPs)	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
CO, User, Unauthorised	Info (Show status and Perform self-tests)	APDU(s) used: GET DATA	Command parameters (data objects, SSPs)	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
CO, User, Unauthorised	SEMS Lite General (Show module's versioning information)	APDU(s) used: SEMS_SELECT, GET DATA	Command parameters (data objects, SSPs)	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Table 6 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output

Authentication of each operator and their access to roles and services is as described below, independent of logical channel usage (identity-based authentication methods implemented).

- Only one operator at a time is permitted on a channel.
- Applet de-selection (including Card Manager), card reset, or power down terminates the current authentication. Re-authentication is required after any of these events for access to authenticated services.
- CO authentication method does not exchange plaintext CSP.
- User authentication data is encrypted and authenticated during entry with GlobalPlatform SCP03, is stored encrypted with OS-MKEK and is only accessible by authenticated services. This includes user identifier (UserID) in case of UserID session method.

Role	Authentication Method	Authentication Strength
CO User	SCP03	128 bits
	UserID Session	32 bits (minimum)
	AESKey Session	128 bits
	EKey Session	128 bits
	SEMS Lite Applet	128 bits

Table 7 – Roles and Authentication

Platform Authentication (Secure Channel Protocol 03 Authentication Method)

The Secure Channel Protocol authentication method is provided by the *Secure Channel* service. The SD-KENC and SD-KMAC keys are used to derive the SD-SENC, SD-SMAC, and SD-RMAC session keys. These sessions keys are used with AES-CBC and AES-CMAC to provide an end-to-end confidential and authenticated protected channel (Approved KTS) between the external entity (User) and the module.

The external entity participating in the mutual authentication sends a 64-bit challenge to the Secure Element. The Secure Element generates its own challenge and computes a 64-bit cryptogram with SD-SMAC key and both challenges. The Secure Element cryptogram and challenge are sent to the external entity which checks the Secure Element cryptogram and creates its own 64-bit cryptogram with both challenges. A 64-bit message authentication code (MAC) is also computed on the command containing the external entity cryptogram with AES-CMAC and SD-SMAC key. The MAC is concatenated to the command, and the command is sent to the Secure Element. The Secure Element checks the message authentication code and compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram. If all of this succeeds, the two participants are mutually authenticated (the external entity is authenticated to the module).

The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:

- $1/(2^{128}) = 2.9E-39$ (MAC|cryptogram) using a 128-bit block for authentication. This authentication method includes a counter of failed authentication called “velocity checking” by GlobalPlatform. The counter is decremented prior to any attempt to authenticate and is only reset to its threshold (maximum value) upon successful authentication.

The module enforces a maximum of 60 failed Global Platform SCP03 authentication attempts before permanently blocking the card. The probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute interval is (with the assumption here that one attempt is possible per second):

- $60/(2^{128}) = 1.7E-37$ (MAC | |cryptogram), using a 128-bit block for authentication

IoT applet Authentication

The applet allows creating an authenticated session using an Authentication Object which can be either UserID session, AESKey session, or ECKey session.

An authenticated session allows users to protect and safeguard their credentials against third party use as only the authenticated user has proper rights on the credentials. This is ensured by applying correct policies to the credentials. A policy binds functional access to an Authentication Object where an Authentication Object represents a user.

The different authentication methods are described in the sub-sections below.

UserID Session

An UserID session authentication method is provided by the *Session management* service.

During a UserID session, the session user identifier (UserID) is verified in order to allow setting up a session. If the UserID is correct, the session establishment will succeed; otherwise, the session will not be opened.

An UserID can be configured from a minimum of four (4) bytes up to a maximum of 16 bytes (128 bits). In the worst-case scenario, a 4-byte UserID is used, the probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:

- $1/(2^{32}) = 4.3E-9$

The number of authentication attempts is configurable. It can be an infinite attempt number, or it can be limited by a counter comprised between 1 and 255 attempts. A maximum of 4700 authentications can be performed in one minute. In the worst-case scenario, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute period is:

- $4700/(2^{32}) = 1.0E-6$.

AESKey Session

The AESKey session authentication method is provided by the *Session management* service. The APP-AES-KEY-AUTH key is used to derive the APP-SENC, APP-SMAC keys, and APP-RMAC. These sessions keys are used with AES-CBC and AES-CMAC to provide an end-to-end confidential and authenticated protected channel (Approved KTS) between the external entity (User) and the module.

The external entity participating in the mutual authentication sends a 64-bit challenge to the Secure Element. The Secure Element generates its own challenge and computes a 64-bit cryptogram with APP-SMAC key and both

challenges. The Secure Element cryptogram and challenge are sent to the external entity which checks the Secure Element cryptogram and creates its own 64-bit cryptogram with both challenges. A 64-bit message authentication code (MAC) is also computed on the command containing the external entity cryptogram with AES-CMAC and APP-SMAC key. The MAC is concatenated to the command, and the command is sent to the Secure Element. The Secure Element checks the message authentication code and compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram. If all of this succeeds, the two participants are mutually authenticated (the external entity is authenticated to the module in the CO/User role).

The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:

- $1/(2^{128}) = 2.9E-39$ (MAC | cryptogram, using a 128-bit block for authentication)

The number of authentication attempts is configurable. It can be an infinite attempt numbers or it can be limited by a counter comprised between 1 and 32767. A maximum of 4700 authentications can be performed in one minute. In the worst-case scenario, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute period is:

- $4700/(2^{128}) = 1.3E-35$ (MAC | cryptogram, using a 128-bit block for authentication).

ECKey Session

An ECKey session authentication method is provided by the *Session management* service.

The ECKey session authentication method consists of verifying a P-256 ECDSA signature. The P-256 EC public key is either initially imported by the User (APP-EC-PUBLIC-KEY-USER) or provisioned during the manufacturing (APP-EC-PUBLIC-KEY-CO). The user will own the corresponding ECDSA private key.

In addition to User's authentication, ECKey session is used to establish

APP-KAS-IOT-SS/APP-KAS-SEMS-SS with the Approved KAS algorithm. The shared secret is used to derive the AES-128 APP-AES-KEY-AUTH which is itself used to derive the APP-SENC, APP-SMAC and APP-RMAC session keys. These sessions keys are used with AES-CBC and AES-CMAC to provide an end-to-end confidential and authenticated protected channel (Approved KTS) between the external entity (User) and the module.

First, the user requests the module public key, APP-KAS-SSC-EC-PUB-KEY; this key is signed with the private key APP-KAS-SSC-EC-PRIV-KEY by the module. Then, the User sends the ephemeral KAS public key signed with User's ECDSA private key. Finally, the module verifies the ECDSA signature of the ephemeral key with either APP-EC-PUBLIC-KEY-USER or APP-EC-PUBLIC-KEY-CO before initiating the KAS shared secret computation.

The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:

- $1/(2^{256}) = 2.9E-39$ (using a 256-bit EC key for authentication)

The number of authentication attempts is configurable. It can be an infinite attempt numbers or it can be limited by a counter comprised between 1 and 32767. A maximum of 4700 authentications can be performed in one minute. In the worst-case scenario, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute period is:

- $4700/(2^{256}) = 1.4E-35$ (using a 256-bit EC key for authentication)

SEMS Lite Applet Authentication

The SEMS Lite applet is provided by the *SEMS Lite Authentication* service. The service provides authentication, confidentiality, and integrity of each authenticated service. The SEMS Lite Applet authentication consists of verifying a Brainpool256r1 ECDSA signature computed on a 113-byte data generated off the module and the CO public key APP-ECC-RT-PUB-AUT, see section 5.1.4 of [GP] Amendment-I.

The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:

- $1/(2^{128}) = 2.9E-39$ (using a 256-bit EC key for authentication)

To keep the SEMS Lite Applet from blocking, an infinite number of attempts is allowed. A maximum of 4700 authentications can be performed in one minute. In the worst-case scenario, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute period is:

- $4700/(2^{128}) = 1.4E-35$ (using a 256-bit EC key for authentication)

The module does not support bypass or self-initiated cryptographic output capabilities.

The module is a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The module includes a firmware load function to support necessary updates, but these are only limited to the vendor, NXP. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
ISD Services						
Manage Content	Load keys and data	N/A	OS-SKEK SD-KENC SD-KMAC SD-KDEK DAP-DAPK	CO	E, W, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
SSD Services						
Lifecycle (Show status and Perform zeroisation)	Get or modify the card or applet life cycle status	N/A	All	CO	E, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Manage Content	Load keys and data	N/A	OS-SKEK SD-KENC SD-KMAC SD-KDEK DAP-DAPK	CO	E, W, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Privileged Info (Show module's versioning information)	Read Module data (privileged data objects, but no CSPs)	N/A	OS-MKEK SD-KENC SD-KMAC SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC	CO	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Secure Channel	Establish and use a secure communication channel	CTR_DRBG (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-DRBG-EI OS-DRBG-SEED OS-DRBG-STATE OS-DRBG-KEY OS-DRBG-V OS-DRBG-OUTPUT OS-MKEK SD-KENC SD-KMAC SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC	CO	E, G, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
IoT Applet Services						

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
IoT Applet Management	This service manages the P71D600 applet	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) KDF SP800-108 (Cert. A2713) ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) KAS-ECC (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-ECC-RT-PRIV-KA APP-AES-RAM-K0-KEY APP-AES-RAM-Kn-KEY APP-EC-PUB-KEY-CO APP-EC-PUB-KEY-USER APP-ECC-RT-PUB-AUT APP-ECC-PUB-eKA APP-ECC-PUB-AUT APP-KAS-IOT-SS	CO	E, G, W	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
Module Usage (Perform Self-Tests and Show module's versioning information)	Perform Self-Tests and Show module's versioning information	All	All	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Session Management	This service manages the applet sessions; Users can decide to open a session or not; Opening a session requires to authenticate to the applet using either an UserID, an AES128 key or an EC key depending on the session type	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) KDF SP800-108 (Cert. A2713) ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) KAS-ECC (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-DRBG-EI OS-DRBG-STATE OS-DRBG-KEY OS-DRBG-V OS-DRBG-OUTPUT OS-MKEK SD-KENC SD-KMAC SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-KAS-SSC-EC-PRIV-KEY APP-KAS-IOT-SS APP-AES-KEY-AUTH APP-SENC APP-SMAC APP-RMAC APP-USERID-FILE APP-EC-PRIV-KEY APP-AES-KEY APP-KAS-SSC-EC-PUB-KEY APP-EC-PUB-KEY-CO APP-EC-PUB-KEY-USER	CO, User	E, G, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
Secure Object Write Functionality	This service manages the generation (either an RSA or EC key pair) or transport (EC keys, RSA keys, symmetric keys, binary files, UserIDs, monotonic counters, PCRs) of Secure Objects.	CTR_DRBG (A2713) AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) KDF SP800-108 (Cert. A2713) ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) KAS-ECC (Cert. A2713) P-256 RSA (Cert. A2713)2048, 3072, 4096 bits SHS (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-DRBG-EI OS-DRBG-STATE OS-DRBG-KEY OS-DRBG-V OS-DRBG-OUTPUT OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-TRANSPORT-CIPHER APP-TRANSPORT-MAC APP-AES-KEY-AUTH APP-USERID-FILE APP-EC-PRIV-KEY APP-RSA-PRIV-KEY APP-AES-KEY APP-HMAC-KEY APP-EC-PUB-KEY-CO APP-EC-PUB-KEY-USER APP-EC-PUB-KEY APP-RSA-PUB-KEY	CO, User	E, G, R, W, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
Secure Object Read Functionality	This service manages the reading of Secure Objects or its attributes; Asymmetric private keys or symmetric keys can never be read in plaintext	N/A	OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-TRANSPORT-CIPHER APP-TRANSPORT-MAC APP-EC-PRIV-KEY APP-RSA-PRIV-KEY APP-AES-KEY APP-HMAC-KEY APP-KAS-SSC-EC-PUB-KEY APP-EC-PUB-KEY-CO APP-EC-PUB-KEY-USER APP-EC-PUB-KEY APP-RSA-PUB-KEY	CO, User	E, R	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Secure Object Management	This service manages the reading of Secure Object attributes	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) HMAC (Cert. A2713) ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) RSA (Cert. A2713)2048, 3072, 4096 bits SHS (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-AES-KEY-AUTH APP-USER-ID-FILE APP-RSA-PRIV-KEY APP-AES-KEY APP-HMAC-KEY APP-EC-PUB-KEY-USER APP-EC-PUB-KEY APP-RSA-PUB-KEY	CO, User	E, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
EC Curve Management (Perform approved security functions)	This service manages the EC curves that can be used during EC cryptographic operations	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713)	SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Crypto Object Management	This service manages the Crypto Objects that can be used. Crypto Objects allow to do operations in multiple steps (init/update/final) Supported Crypto Objects allow to use a digest, cipher or MAC algorithm to be used	SHS (Cert. A2713) AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) HMAC (Cert. A2713)	SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-AES-KEY APP-HMAC-KEY	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
EC Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	This service triggers OS API for ECDSA signature generation and verification, and for EC DH shared secret calculation according to [56Ar3] Section 5.7.1.2	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 KAS-SSC (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-DRBG-EI OS-DRBG-STATE OS-DRBG-KEY OS-DRBG-V OS-DRBG-OUTPUT OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-EC-PRIV-KEY APP-EC-PUB-KEY	CO, User	E, G, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
RSA Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	This service triggers OS API for RSA signature generation and verification, and for RSA encryption and decryption (components only)	RSA (Cert. A2713)2048, 3072, 4096 bits SHS (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-DRBG-EI OS-DRBG-STATE OS-DRBG-KEY OS-DRBG-V OS-DRBG-OUTPUT OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-RSA-PRIV-KEY APP-RSA-PUB-KEY	CO, User	E, G, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
Symmetric Cipher Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	This service triggers OS API for AES encryption and decryption	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-AES-KEY	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Authenticated Encryption Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	This service provides execution of the AEAD function using OS API primitives for AES GCM encryption and decryption, and DRBG for internal IV generation	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) CTR_DRBG (A2713)	SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
MAC Calculation Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	This service triggers OS API for MAC Calculation	CMAC (Cert. A2713) HMAC (Cert. A2713)	OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-HMAC-KEY	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
HKDF operations (Perform approved security functions)	This service triggers OS API for HKDF operations (either Two Step Key Derivation using HMAC or the Key Derivation Function using Pseudorandom functions)	HKDF (Certs. A2713 and A2714)	OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC APP-HMAC-KEY	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
PBKDF Operation (Perform approved security functions)	This service provides execution of the Password-Based Key Derivation Function. The derived key is returned to the operator and not used by the module	PBKDF2 (Cert. A2714)	OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
TLS KDF Functions (Perform approved security functions)	This service provides support for TLS v1.2 calculations. It does not implement the TLS v1.2 protocol	KDF (Cert. A2713)	OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Secure Hash Crypto Operations (Perform approved security functions)	This service triggers OS API for [FIPS 180-4] compliant hash algorithms	SHA (Cert. A2713)	OS-MKEK SD-SENC SD-SMAC SD-RMAC	CO, User	E	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
SEMS Lite Applet Services						
SEMS Lite Authentication	The service provides the authenticated secure messaging	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) KAS-ECC (Cert. A2713) P-256 CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-MKEK APP-ECC-RT-PRIV-KA APP-AES-RAM-K0-KEY APP-AES-RAM-Kn-KEY APP-ECC-RT-PUB-AUT APP-ECC-PUB-eKA APP-ECC-PUB-AUT APP-CERT-KR-AUT APP-CERT-AUT DAP-DAPK	CO, User	E, G, W, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
SEMS Lite Manage Content	The service is used to load data. The data is wrapped in SEMS Lite Authentication	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) KAS-ECC (Cert. A2713) P-256 CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-MKEK APP-ECC-RT-PRIV-KA APP-AES-RAM-K0-KEY APP-AES-RAM-Kn-KEY APP-ECC-RT-PUB-AUT APP-ECC-PUB-eKA APP-ECC-PUB-AUT APP-CERT-KR-AUT APP-CERT-AUT DAP-DAPK	CO, User	E, G, W, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
SEMS Lite Root Key Update	This service updates APP-ECC-RT-PRIV-KA and APP-ECC-RT-PUB-AUT keys wrapped in SEMS Lite Authentication	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713) KAS-ECC (Cert. A2713) P-256 CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	OS-MKEK APP-ECC-RT-PRIV-KA APP-AES-RAM-K0-KEY APP-AES-RAM-Kn-KEY APP-ECC-RT-PUB-AUT APP-ECC-PUB-eKA APP-ECC-PUB-AUT APP-CERT-KR-AUT APP-CERT-AUT	CO	E, G, W, Z	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/ or SSPs	Indicator
Card Reset	Power cycle or reset the module	N/A	N/A	CO, User, Unauth- orised	N/A	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Context	Select an applet or manage logical channels	N/A	N/A	CO, User, Unauth- orised	N/A	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
Info	Read unprivileged data objects, e.g., module configuration or status information (Show Status). This service includes the Pre-operational Self-Test on-demand	N/A	N/A	CO, User, Unauth- orised	N/A	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)
SEMS Lite General	This service provides generic operations which are not required to be protected by applying security. It includes selecting the SEMS Lite applet, reading version of the SEMS Lite applet or APP-ECC-RT-PUB-AUT public key of SEMS Lite Applet	N/A	N/A	CO, User, Unauth- orised	N/A	Status Word (Response APDU 9000)

Table 8 – Approved Services

The modes of access shown in the table above are defined as:

- G = Generate: The service generates or derives the CSP/Public Key.
- W = Write: The service inputs the CSP/Public Key.
- E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP/Public Key.
- R = Read: The service outputs the CSP/Public Key. CSP are always protected with the approved KTS.
- Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the CSP/Public Key after usage. A zeroised CSP is not retrievable or reusable.

5 Software/Firmware Security

The cryptographic module is considered a hardware module with firmware components. An error detection code (32-bit CRC performed over all code located in Flash) is applied to all firmware components within the module. If the integrity test fails, the module enters the hard error (MUTE) state.

An operator of the module can perform the integrity test on demand with the GET DATA APDU command. As a single-chip hardware module, the executable form of the code, i.e., firmware is binary format. The module does not support loading of firmware from an external source.

ROM endurance has been proven to be more than 10 years after manufactured date. Therefore, per FIPS 140-3 IG 5.A, no pre-operational ROM integrity self-test has been implemented. The module's end-of-life procedures must be applied prior to the degradation of the ROM by setting the module to the TERMINATE state.

All data and control inputs, and data and status outputs of the cryptographic module and services are directed through the module's defined interfaces.

6 Operational Environment

The module claims to meet Physical Security Level 4 and thus the requirements per this section do not apply.

7 Physical Security

The module is a single-chip implementation that meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The module uses standard passivation techniques. The module includes Environmental Failure Protection features such as temperature and voltage sensors. Fault Induction mitigation techniques are light sensors and spike sensors on the supply voltage lines.

Identification of internal features such as sensitive components or interconnections is impeded by a fine mesh of metal shield lines that resides at the outermost layers of the chip.

Delivery forms of the module are QFN package, contactless chip card module, or sawn wafer. Therefore, the module does not rely on any physical security based on a package.

Physical Security Mechanism	Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test	Inspection/Test Guidance Details
N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 9 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines

	Temperature or voltage Measurement	EFP or EFT	Result (Shutdown/Zeroisation)
Low Temperature	-40°C	EFP	Shutdown
High Temperature	+105°C	EFP	Shutdown
Low Voltage	1.62V	EFP	Shutdown
High Voltage	6.0V	EFP	Shutdown

Table 10 – EFP/EFT

	Hardness tested temperature measurement
Low Temperature	-45°C
High Temperature	+125°C

Table 11 – Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges

8 Non-Invasive Security

Please see Section 12 below for information regarding non-invasive security countermeasures.

9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import /Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroisation	Use & Related Keys
OS-DRBG-EI CSP	384 bits	CTR_DRBG (Cert. A2713)	Internally via ENT (P)	N/A	N/A	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	Random value from ENT (P) used to seed reciprocally and AES-256 DRBG
OS-DRBG-STATE CSP	880 bits	CTR_DRBG (Cert. A2713)	Internally via SP800-90Ar1 DRBG process	N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM in plaintext; object identifier to entity association	Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/ Perform Zeroisation service); overwritten with zeroes	Current DRBG state value
OS-DRBG-KEY CSP	256 bits	CTR_DRBG (Cert. A2713)	Internally via SP800-90Ar1 DRBG process	N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM in plaintext; object identifier to entity association	Destroyed by termination of the Module (LifeCycle/ Perform Zeroisation service); overwritten with zeroes	Current DRBG state value

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
OS-DRBG-V CSP	256 bits	CTR_DRBG (Cert. A2713)	Internally via SP800-90Ar1 DRBG process	N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM in plaintext; object identifier to entity association	Destroyed by termination of the Module (LifeCycle/ Perform Zeroisation service); overwritten with zeroes	Current DRBG state value
OS-DRBG-OUTPUT CSP	256 bits	CTR_DRBG (Cert. A2713)	Internally via SP800-90Ar1 DRBG process	N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM in plaintext; object identifier to entity association	Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/ Perform Zeroisation service); overwritten with zeroes	Unmodified output from the DRBG used for SSP generation
OS-SKEK CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/ personalization	N/A	Stored in NVM in plaintext; object identifier to entity association	Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/ Perform Zeroisation service); overwritten with zeroes	Used to build OS-MKEK
OS-MKEK CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	OS-SKEK permutation (xor between OS-SKEK and a constant value)	N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM in plaintext; object identifier to entity association	Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/ Perform Zeroisation service); overwritten with zeroes	Used to encrypt all secret and private key data stored in NVM

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
SD-KENC CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	N/A	Entered during manu- facturing/ personali- zation Or AES-CBC (using SD- KDEK) encrypted (RFC 3394 method) and transpor- ted using platform SCP03 Exported using Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS- MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Used to derive SD-SENC
SD-KMAC CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	N/A	Entered during manu- facturing/pers- onalization Or AES-CBC (using SD- KDEK) encrypted (RFC 3394 method) and transpor- ted using platform SCP03 Exported using Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS- MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Used to derive SD-SMAC

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
SD-KDEK CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/personalization Or Entered encrypted with the previous SD-KDEK Exported using Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Sensitive data decryption key used to decrypt CSPs
SD-SENC CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) KDF SP800-108 (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	N/A	N/A	Derived with Approved KDF SP800-108	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	Session encryption key used to secure channel data

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
SD-SMAC CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) KDF SP800- 108 (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	N/A	N/A	Derived with Approved KDF SP800- 108	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	Session MAC key used to verify inbound secure channel data integrity
SD-RMAC CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) KDF SP800- 108 (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	N/A	N/A	Derived with Approved KDF SP800- 108	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	Session MAC key used to verify outbound secure channel data integrity
APP- TRANSPORT- CIPHER CSP	256 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	N/A	Entered during manufactu ring/perso nalization Output: N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS- MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Used to encrypt either exported or imported Secure Objects or data

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-TRANSPORT-MAC CSP	128 bits	AES CMAC (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/personalization Output: N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Used to authenticate either exported or imported Secure Objects
APP-KAS-SSC-EC-PRIV-KEY CSP	128 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 (Cert. A2713) KDA (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/personalization Output: N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	KAS Shared Secret computation private key
APP-KAS-IOT-SS CSP	128 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 (Cert. A2713) KDA (Cert. A2714)	N/A	N/A	Established with the SP800-56Arev3 KAS-ECC	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	KAS-ECC Shared Secret

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-AES-KEY-AUTH CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) or ECDSA (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/personalization Output: via Approved KTS	Approved KTS	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Used in AESKey session or ECKey session authentication methods
APP-SENC CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) or ECDSA (Cert. A2713) KDF SP800-108 (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	N/A	N/A	Derived with Approved KDF SP800-108	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	AES Key or EC Key session encryption key used to encrypt / decrypt secure channel data

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-SMAC CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) or ECDSA (Cert. A2713) KDF SP800- 108 (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	N/A	N/A	Derived with Approved KDF SP800- 108	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	AES Key or EC Key session MAC key used to verify inbound secure channel data integrity
APP-RMAC CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) or ECDSA (Cert. A2713) KDF SP800- 108 (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	N/A	N/A	Derived with Approved KDF SP800- 108	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	AES Key or EC Key session MAC key used to generate response secure channel data MAC

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-USERID-FILE CSP	N/A	N/A	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/personalization Output: via Approved KTS	Approved KTS	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	4-byte up to 16-byte UserID authentication data
APP-EC-PRIV-KEY CSP	112, 128, 192, 256 bits	ECDSA Key Generation P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	The Approved key pair generation method is compliant with FIPS 186-4, Sections B.43.23 (RSA) or B.4.2 (ECDSA), Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates ; Generated on the module using Approved DRBG, AES-256 CTR_DRBG	Entered: N/A Output: via Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Elliptic curve key that allows to perform EC cryptographic operations

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-RSA-PRIV-KEY CSP	112, 128, 152 bits	RSA Key Generation 2048, 3072, 4096 bits (Cert. A2713) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	The Approved key pair generation method is compliant with FIPS 186-4, Sections B.43.23 (RSA) or B.4.2 (ECDSA), Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates ; Generated on the module using Approved DRBG, AES-256 CTR_DRBG	Entered: N/A Output: via Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	RSA key that allows to perform RSA cryptographic operations
APP-AES-KEY CSP	128, 192, 256 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/personalization Output: via Approved KTS	Approved KTS	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation.	Used to perform AES cipher mode operations

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-HMAC-KEY CSP	128 and 256 bits	HMAC SHA-1, SHA2-256, 384, 512 (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/personalization Output: via Approved KTS	Approved KTS	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Used to perform KDF or HMAC operations
APP-ECC-RT-PRIV-KA CSP	256 bits	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-521 SHS (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/ personalization or Imported in secure channel specified by GP-Amd-I Output: N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	Destroyed because of OS-MKEK zeroisation	Private static key used in key establishment (KAS-SSC) operations
APP-KAS-SEMS-SS CSP	128 bits	KAS-ECC-SSCP-256 (Cert. #A2713) KDA (Cert. A2715)	N/A	N/A	Established with the SP800-56Arev3 KAS	Temporarily stored in RAM in plaintext (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	KAS Shared Secret CSP

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-AES-RAM-KO-Key CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714) CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	N/A	N/A	Established with the SP-800-56A Rev3 KAS-SCC followed by SHA256 as One Pass KDF	Temporarily stored in RAM (does not persist beyond a power cycle)	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	Used as secret key material in the very first decryption operations as part of Authentication and Secure Messaging service of SEMS Lite applet
APP-AES-RAM-Kn-Key CSP	128 bits	AES CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM, CMAC (Cert. A2713) GCM/GMAC (Cert. A2714)	N/A	Imported in secure channel specified by GP-Amd-I Output: N/A	N/A	Temporarily stored in RAM (does not persist beyond a power cycle)	Power-off (temporarily stored in RAM)	Used as secret key material in the subsequent decryption operations as part of SEMS Lite Authentication and Secure Messaging service
DAP-DAPK PSP	256 bits	ECDSA P-521 (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufacturing/ personalization	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	ECC public key used for Mandated DAP

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-KAS-SSC-EC-PUB-KEY PSP	128 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufactu ring/ personaliz ation Output: Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	KAS Shared Secret computation public key
APP-EC-PUB-KEY-CO PSP	128 bits	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufactu ring/ personaliz ation Output: Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	ECDSA public key used to authenticate the CO
APP-EC-PUB-KEY-USER PSP	128 bits	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 SHS (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered during manufactu ring/ personaliz ation Output: Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	ECDSA public key used to authenticate as user

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-EC-PUB-KEY PSP	128 bits	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-256 CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	The Approved key pair generation method is compliant with FIPS 186-4, Sections B.43.23 (RSA) or B.4.2 (ECDSA), Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates ; Generated on the module using Approved DRBG, AES-256 CTR_DRBG	Entered: N/A Output: Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	Used to execute EC cryptographic operations

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-RSA-PUB-KEY PSP	112, 128, 152 bits	RSA (Cert. A2713)2048, 3072, 4096 bits CKG (Vendor Affirmed)	The Approved key pair generation method is compliant with FIPS 186-4, Sections B.43.23 (RSA) or B.4.2 (ECDSA), Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates ; Generated on the module using Approved DRBG, AES-256 CTR_DRBG	Entered: N/A Output: Approved KTS	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	Used to execute RSA cryptographic operations
APP-ECC-PUB-eKA PSP	128 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered: Certificate is entered in plain text Output: N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	Ephemeral EC public key used in key establishment (KAS) operation

Key /SSP Name /Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener-ation	Import /Export	Establish-ment	Storage	Zero-isation	Use & Related Keys
APP-ECC-RT-PUB-AUT PSP	256 bits	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-521 SHS (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered: Certificate is entered in plain text Output: In plaintext	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	EC public key used in ECDSA verification operations
APP-ECC-PUB-AUT PSP	256 bits	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-521 SHS (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered: Certificate is entered in plain text Output: N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OS-MKEK; key version to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	Static EC public key used in ECDSA verification operations
APP-CERT-AUT PSP	256 bits	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-521 SHS (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered: Certificate is entered in plain text Output: N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM in plaintext; object identifier to entity association	N/A – Considered protected by ISO 19790 definition	Certificate with EC public key providing authorization and authenticity to SEMS Lite applet
APP-CERT-KR-AUT PSP	256-bits	ECDSA (Cert. A2713) P-521 SHS (Cert. A2713)	N/A	Entered: Certificate is entered in plain text Output: N/A	N/A	Stored in NVM in plaintext; object identifier to entity association	N/A – Considered ‘protected’ by ISO 19790 definition	Certificate with 256-bit EC public key providing authorization and authenticity to SEMS Lite applet for SEMS Lite Root Key Update service

Table 12 – SSPs

The module implements a NIST SP800-90Ar1 Approved CTR_DRBG. The unmodified outputs of the DRBG are used for Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) of Symmetric Keys and seeds for Asymmetric Key Generation as noted in Table 3 in this document per Section 4 in NIST SP800-133r2.

Entropy sources	Minimum Number of bits of entropy	Details
NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) – Used as entropy input to the Approved DRBG	256-bits of overall entropy for AES-256 CTR_DRBG; 0.912949 per entropy source output bit	Noise source based on hardware implementing an iterated Bernouli Shift Map

Table 13 – Non-Deterministic Number Generator Specification

Per FIPS 140-3 IG 9.5.A, the module supports AD/EE (Automated Distribution/Electronic Entry).

10 Self-Tests

On power-on or on demand, the module performs self-tests described below. The pre-operational self-test must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. The Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests are either performed at boot or prior to first use. The conditional self-tests are performed when the corresponding conditions occur. If one of the self-tests fails, the system is halted and will start again after a reset.

ROM endurance has been proven to be more than 10 years after manufactured date. Therefore, no pre-operational ROM integrity self-test has been implemented. The module's end-of-life procedures must be applied prior to the degradation of the ROM by setting the module to the TERMINATE state, The Flash Firmware Integrity check is performed on every reset or on demand.

Pre-operational Self-Tests

- Firmware Integrity: 32-bit CRC performed over all code located in Flash.

Conditional Self-Tests

- Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
 - AES CBC 128-bit Encrypt KAT
 - AES CBC 128-bit Decrypt KAT
 - AES CMAC 128-bit Encrypt KAT
 - AES CMAC 128-bit Decrypt KAT
 - CTR_DRBG 256-bit KAT (Health Tests: Generate, Reseed, Instantiate functions per Section 11 in NIST SP800-90Ar1)
 - ECDSA P-521 SHA-256 Signature Generation KAT
 - ECDSA P-521 SHA-256 Signature Verification KAT
 - HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
 - KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 KAT
 - KDF TLS 1.2 KAT
 - KDA KAT (One-Step KDF per SP800-56Cr1 for both Cert. #A2714 and #A2715)
 - KDA KAT (Two-Step KDF KAT (HKDF) per SP800-56Cr1 for Cert.#A2713)
 - NIST KDF SP800-108 KAT (Counter mode with AES-128)
 - NIST KDF SP800-108 KAT (Feedback Mode with HMAC-SHA1)
 - NIST SP800-132 KDF KAT (with HMAC-SHA-1)
 - RSA 2048-bit SHA2-256 Signature Generation KAT
 - RSA 2048-bit SHA2-256 Signature Verification KAT
 - SHA-1 KAT (for both Cert. #A2713 and #A2714)
 - SHA2-256 KAT (for both Cert. #A2713 and #A2714 (inclusive of SHA2-224, per IG 10.3.A))
 - SHA2-512 KAT (for both Cert. #A2713 and #A2714 (inclusive of SHA2-384, per IG 10.3.A))

- NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) Repetition Count Test (RCT) performed on raw data
- NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath Test Transition Count Test performed on the raw data
- NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath Test Chi-Square Test performed on the conditioned data
- NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath Test Amplitude Limiter Analog Test on the analog data
- Pairwise Consistency Tests
 - Generate PCT: Pairwise consistency test performed when an asymmetric key pair is generated for RSA or ECC. The conditional test is implemented at the applet level
 - Signature PCT: Pairwise consistency test performed when a signature is generated for RSA or ECDSA
- Firmware Load Test: Signature Verification based on ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256

Note: The module does not support loading of external firmware by the operator (it is limited to the vendor, NXP Semiconductors, at factory pre-shipment of the module). The Firmware Load Test above is performed by the module in support of the same.

All the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. The expected result is FE04DF4B0120. In case of a failure, the module enters a hard error (MUTE) state and returns a code/status indicator. The APDU code 9000 signifies success and 66A7 is the error indicator corresponding to the MUTE error state. The JCOP OS is intended to execute pre-operational self-tests (rather than conditional self- tests) periodically, since these tests are pre-defined to be executed post resets. The periodic time will thus always start from zero. RAM can be used to manage the periodic time interval which is the number of execution events e.g., number of APDUs/commands received (the tests are repeated after every 500,000 CAPDUs/commands).

11 Life-Cycle Assurance

All configuration management items are managed using an automated configuration management system. The module is designed to allow the testing of all provided security-related services. All firmware is implemented using a high-level language and is designed in a manner that avoids the use of code, parameters, or symbols not necessary for the module's functionality and execution.

While the module can be delivered with the Approved mode enabled by default, customers also have the option to receive a module which is in the unconfigured state, i.e., non-Approved mode. To comply with and maintain the FIPS 140-3 validation, it would be the CO's responsibility to enable the Approved mode of operation as follows (this information can also be found in the *JCOP 4.5 User guidance and administrator manual* document):

1. Install SEMS Lite applet to run in Approved mode of operation.
2. Install the IoT applet and configure the applet to run in Approved mode of operation.
3. Configure the Operation System to run in Approved mode of operation.

In each of these steps, it is in the CO's responsibility to apply proper security conditions and to ensure that once the device is put into Approved mode of operation, it will not be set into non-Approved mode of operation ever again. The operator can verify that the module is operating in the Approved mode by following instructions specified in Section 2 in this document.

There are no specific maintenance requirements for this module.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module is protected against the following non-invasive attacks: SPA, DPA, Timing Analysis and Fault Induction using a combination of firmware and hardware countermeasures. Protection features include detection of out-of-range supply voltages, frequencies or temperatures, fault induction mitigations like light sensors, voltage glitch sensors and an active shield, and detection of illegal address or instruction.

All cryptographic computations and sensitive operations such as critical data comparison provided by the module are designed to be resistant to timing and power analysis. Sensitive operations are performed in constant time, regardless of the execution context (parameters, keys, etc.), owing to a combination of hardware and firmware features. In addition to the non-invasive attacks, the module also uses standard passivation techniques and is protected by active shielding (a grid of top metal layer wires with tamper response) which qualifies for classification under mitigation of other attacks.

END OF DOCUMENT