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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Validation
Hardware Version(s): 4600 and 6350 with Quad NIU
Firmware Version: S-Cz9.0
Date: January 24, 2024
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
i
Title: Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Date: January 24, 2024
Author: Acumen Security, LLC.
Contributing Authors:
Oracle Communications Engineering
Oracle Security Evaluations – Global Product Security
Oracle Corporation
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Acme Packet 4600, Acme Packet 6300 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Title Page
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Document Organization.................................................................................................................................... 1
2. Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350...................................................................................................... 2
2.1 Functional Overview......................................................................................................................................... 2
2.2 FIPS 140-2 Validation Scope ............................................................................................................................. 2
3. Cryptographic Module Specification............................................................................................................... 3
3.1 Definition of the Cryptographic Modules ......................................................................................................... 3
3.2 Approved or Allowed Security Functions.......................................................................................................... 4
3.3 Non-Approved But Allowed Security Functions................................................................................................ 7
3.4 Vendor Affirmed Security Functions................................................................................................................. 7
4. Module Ports and Interfaces........................................................................................................................ 13
5. Physical Security.......................................................................................................................................... 17
6. Operational Environment ............................................................................................................................ 18
7. Roles and Services....................................................................................................................................... 19
Operator Services and Descriptions................................................................................................................ 19
Unauthenticated Services and Descriptions ................................................................................................... 22
Operator Authentication ................................................................................................................................ 23
7.3.1. Password-Based Authentication............................................................................................................................23
7.3.2. Public key-Based Authentication ...........................................................................................................................24
Key and CSP Management ........................................................................................................................... 25
9. Self-Tests .................................................................................................................................................... 33
9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................... 33
Firmware Integrity Test .........................................................................................................................................33
Mocana Cryptographic Library Self-Tests...............................................................................................................33
Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library Self-Tests ............................................................................................33
Nitrox Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................34
Octeon II Self-tests ................................................................................................................................................34
Octeon III Self-tests ...............................................................................................................................................34
SP 800-90B Health Tests........................................................................................................................................34
9.2 Critical Functions Self-Tests............................................................................................................................ 34
9.3 Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................................................... 34
10. Crypto-Officer and User Guidance................................................................................................................ 36
10.1 Secure Setup and Initialization ....................................................................................................................... 36
Secure Setup and Initialization...............................................................................................................................36
10.2 AES-GCM IV Construction/Usage.................................................................................................................... 37
11. Mitigation of Other Attacks ......................................................................................................................... 38
Acronyms Terms and Abbreviations.................................................................................................................... 39
Acme Packet 4600, Acme Packet 6300 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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References......................................................................................................................................................... 40
Acme Packet 4600, Acme Packet 6300 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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List of Tables
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements............................................................................................................ 2
Table 2: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library.................... 5
Table 3: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Oracle Acme Packet Mocana Cryptographic Library..... 6
Table 4: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Cavium Nitrox ............................................................ 6
Table 5: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Cavium Octeon II (AP 4600) ........................................ 6
Table 6: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Cavium Octeon III (AP 6350) ....................................... 7
Table 7: Approved SP 800-90B Entropy Source...................................................................................................... 7
Table 8: Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions ........................................................................................ 7
Table 9: Vendor Affirmed Functions...................................................................................................................... 7
Table 10: Acme Packet 4600 - Mapping of FIPS 140 Logical Interfaces to Physical Ports ........................................ 13
Table 11: Acme Packet 4600 - Physical Ports ....................................................................................................... 14
Table 12: Acme Packet 6350 - Mapping of FIPS 140 Logical Interfaces to Physical ports ........................................ 15
Table 13: Acme Packet 6350 Physical Ports ......................................................................................................... 16
Table 14: Service Summary................................................................................................................................. 19
Table 15: Operator Services and Descriptions...................................................................................................... 22
Table 16: Operator Services and Descriptions...................................................................................................... 22
Table 17: Password based Authentication........................................................................................................... 23
Table 18: Public key-Based Authentication.......................................................................................................... 24
Table 19: CSP Table ............................................................................................................................................ 32
Table 20: Acronyms............................................................................................................................................ 39
Table 21: References .......................................................................................................................................... 40
List of Figures
Figure 1: Acme Packet 4600.................................................................................................................................. 3
Figure 2: Acme Packet 6350.................................................................................................................................. 3
Figure 3: Acme Packet 4600 - Front View ............................................................................................................ 14
Figure 4: Acme Packet 4600 - Rear View.............................................................................................................. 14
Figure 5: Acme Packet 6350 - Front View ............................................................................................................ 16
Figure 6: Acme Packet 6350 - Rear View.............................................................................................................. 16
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1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
This document is the Security Policy for the Acme Packet 4600 and the Acme Packet 6350 appliances
manufactured by Oracle Communications, a business unit within Oracle Corporation. Oracle Communications are
legally bound by the rules of Oracle Corporation as this is the legal entity. Acme Packet 4600 and the Acme
Packet 6350 are also referred to as “the module” or “modules”. This Security Policy specifies the security rules
under which the module shall operate to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1. It also describes how the
Acme Packet 4600 and the Acme Packet 6350 appliances function to meet the FIPS requirements, and the actions
that operators must take to maintain the security of the modules.
This Security Policy describes the features and design of the Acme Packet 4600 and the Acme Packet 6350
modules using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-2 specification. FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module
utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST/CCCS Cryptographic
Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic modules to FIPS 140-2. Validated products are
accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated
information.
1.2 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. The Submission Package
contains:
• Oracle Non-Proprietary Security Policy
• Oracle Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Machine
• Entropy Assessment Document
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
Except for this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to Oracle
and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please
contact Oracle.
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2. Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
2.1 Functional Overview
The Acme Packet 4600 and the Acme Packet 6350 appliances are specifically designed to meet the unique price
performance and manageability requirements of the small to medium sized enterprise and remote office/ branch
office. Ideal for small site border control and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) trunking service termination
applications, the Acme Packet 4600 and the Acme Packet 6350 appliances deliver Oracle’s industry leading ESBC
capabilities in a small form factor appliance. With support for high availability (HA) configurations, hardware
assisted transcoding and Quality of Service (QoS) measurement, the Acme Packet 4600 and the Acme Packet
6350 appliances are a natural choice when uncompromising reliability and performance are needed in an entry-
level appliance. With models designed for the smallest branch office to the largest data center, the Acme Packet
ESBC product family supports distributed, centralized, or hybrid SIP trunking topologies.
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 appliances address the unique connectivity, security, and control
challenges enterprises often encounter when extending real-time voice, video, and UC sessions to smaller sites.
The appliances also help enterprises contain voice transport costs and overcome the unique regulatory
compliance challenges associated with IP telephony. TDM fallback capabilities ensure continuous dial out service
at remote sites in the event of WAN or SIP trunk failures. Stateful high availability configurations protect against
link and hardware failures. An embedded browser based graphical user interface (GUI) simplifies setup and
administration.
2.2 FIPS 140-2 Validation Scope
The Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 appliances are being validated to overall FIPS 140-2 Level 1
requirements. See Table 1 below.
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles and Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Machine Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements
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3. Cryptographic Module Specification
3.1 Definition of the Cryptographic Modules
The modules consist of the Acme Packet 4600 and the Acme Packet 6350 appliances running firmware version S-
Cz9.0. The hardware platforms/versions that correspond to each of the tested modules are 4600 and 6350 with
Quad NIU. The modules are classified as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The physical
cryptographic boundary for the Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 with a Quad NIU is all components with
exception of the removable power supplies. A representation of the cryptographic boundary is defined as the
chassis of the module as shown in the Figures below:
Figure 1: Acme Packet 4600
Figure 2: Acme Packet 6350
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3.2 Approved or Allowed Security Functions
The appliances contain the FIPS Approved Algorithms listed in Table 2 (Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic
Library), Table 3 (Oracle Acme Packet Mocana Cryptographic Library) and Table 4 (Cavium Nitrox). Additionally,
the Acme Packet 4600 contains the FIPS Approved Algorithms listed in Table 5 (Cavium Octeon II) and the Acme
Packet 6350 contains the FIPS Approved Algorithms listed in Table 6 (Cavium Octeon III):
Approved or Allowed Security Functions Cert#
SymmetricAlgorithms
AES CBC, ECB, GCM, GMAC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 256
CTR; Encrypt; Key Size = 128,256
A1634
Triple DES1
CBC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 192
A1634
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
A1634
Data Authentication Code
HMAC HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
A1634
AsymmetricAlgorithms
RSA RSA: FIPS186-4:
186-4 KEY(gen): FIPS186-4_Fixed (2048)
ALG[ANSIX9.31] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA(256 , 384)), (4096 SHA(256 , 384))
ALG[ANSIX9.31] SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA(1, 256, 384))
RSA: FIPS186-2 :
ALG[ANSIX9.31] SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA(1, 256, 384)), (4096 SHA (1, 256, 384))
A1634
ECDSA Firmware: FIPS186-4
KeyGen: (P-256, P-384)
SigGen: CURVES (P-256: (SHA-256, 384) P-384: (SHA-256, 384)
SigVer: CURVES (P-256: (SHA-256, 384) P-384: (SHA-256, 384))
A1634
RandomNumber Generation
DRBG Firmware:
CTR_DRBG: [ Prediction Resistance Tested: Not Enabled; BlockCipher_Use_df: (AES-
256)]
A1634
1
Per IG A.13 the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^20 64-bit blocks of data.
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Key Agreement
KAS-SSC KAS-ECC-SSC:
Scheme: “Ephemeral Unified” with curve P-256 & P-384
KAS-FFC-SSC:
Scheme: “dhEphem” and domain parameter generation method “ffdhe2048”
A1634
KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A1634, CVL Cert. #A1634) IG D.8 Scenario X1 Option 2.
N/A
Key Establishment
Key Derivation
(CVL)
Firmware: SSH KDF, SNMP KDF, SRTP KDF, TLS KDF
(CVL) A1634
KeyTransport
KTS KTS (AES Cert. #A1634 and HMAC Cert. #A1634; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits
of encryption strength) – AES modes: CBC/CTR/GCM (128-bit and 256-bit).
KTS (Triple-DES Cert. #A1634 and HMAC Cert. #A1634; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits
of encryption strength)
Table 2: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library
Approved or Allowed Security Functions Cert #
SymmetricAlgorithms
AES CBC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 192, 256
CTR; Encrypt; Key Size = 128,256
A1633
Triple DES2
CBC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 192
A1633
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
A1633
Data Authentication Code
HMAC HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
A1633
AsymmetricAlgorithms
RSA RSA: 186-4:
186-4 KEY(gen): FIPS186-4_Fixed (2048)
ALG [PKCS1.5]: SIG(Ver) (1024 SHA(1); (2048 SHA (1))
A1633
Key Agreement
KAS-SSC KAS-FFC-SSC:
Scheme: “dhEphem” and domain parameter generation method “MODP-
2048” and “MODP-3072”
A1633
2
Per IG A.13 the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^20 64-bit blocks of data.
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Approved or Allowed Security Functions Cert #
KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A1633, CVL Cert. #A1633) IG D.8 Scenario X1 Option 2.
N/A
Key Establishment
Key Derivation
(CVL)
IKEv1/IKEv2 KDF
(CVL) A1633
KeyTransport
KTS KTS (AES Cert. #A1633 and HMAC Cert. #A1633; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and
256 bits of encryption strength) –AES modes: CBC (128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit) and CTR (128-bit and 256-bit).
KTS (Triple-DES Cert. #A1633 and HMAC Cert. #A1633; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength)
Table 3: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Oracle Acme Packet Mocana Cryptographic Library
Approved or Allowed Security Functions Cert #
SymmetricAlgorithms
AES CBC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 256 5257
Triple DES3 CBC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 192 2659
Table 4: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Cavium Nitrox
Approved or Allowed Security Functions Cert #
SymmetricAlgorithms
AES ECB; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128
CTR; Encrypt; Key Size = 128
5256
Key Establishment
Key Derivation
(CVL)4
SRTP KDF (CVL) 1727
Table 5: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Cavium Octeon II (AP 4600)
Approved or Allowed Security Functions Cert#
SymmetricAlgorithms
AES CBC, ECB, GCM, GMAC; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 192, 256 3301
Triple DES5
CBC, ECB; Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 192 1881
3
Per IG A.13 the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^20 64-bit blocks of data.
4
SRTP KDF for Cavium Octeon II is CAVP tested but not used by any of the services implemented in Approved mode of operation.
5 Per IG A.13 the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^20 64-bit blocks of data.
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Approved or Allowed Security Functions Cert#
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
SHS6
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 2737
Data Authentication Code
HMAC7
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 2095
AsymmetricAlgorithms
RSA RSA: FIPS186-4 :
ALG[PKCS 1.5] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA (224, 256, 384, 512)), 3072 SHA (224, 256, 384,512))
ALG[PKCS 1.5] SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA (224, 256, 384, 512)), 3072 SHA (224, 256, 384,512))
1745
RandomNumber Generation
DRBG8
CTR_DRBG: [ Prediction Resistance Tested: Not Enabled; BlockCipher_Use_df: (AES-
256)]
Hash_DRBG: [ Prediction Resistance Tested: Not Enabled (SHA-512)
819
Table 6: FIPS Approved and Allowed Security Functions for Cavium Octeon III (AP 6350)
Algorithm Usage
ENT (NP) Greater than 256 bits entropy input from the CPU jitter RNG for seeding the SP 800-90A DRBG.
Table 7: Approved SP 800-90B Entropy Source
3.3 Non-Approved But Allowed Security Functions
The following are considered non-Approved but allowed security functions:
Algorithm Usage
MD5 (TLS 1.2) (no
security claimed)
MACing: HMAC MD5, Hashing: MD5
Table 8: Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions
3.4 Vendor Affirmed Security Functions
The following service is considered vendor affirmed security function:
Algorithm Vendor Affirmed Security Functions
CKG In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG) as per SP800-133 rev2 (vendor affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric
keys and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from an
NIST SP 800-90A DRBG.
Table 9: Vendor Affirmed Functions
6 SHA-224 was CAVP tested but is not utilized by the module’s services associated with the Cavium Octeon III Cryptographic Library.
7 HMAC-SHA-224 was CAVP tested but is not utilized by the module’s services associated with the Cavium Octeon III Cryptographic Library.
8 CTR & Hash_based DRBGs in the Octeon III were CAVP tested but are not utilized by the module’s services associated with the Cavium Octeon
III Cryptographic Library
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4. Module Ports and Interfaces
The module interfaces can be categorized as follows the FIPS 140-2 Standard:
• Data Input Interface
• Data Output Interface
• Control Input interface
• Status Output Interface
• Power Interface
The table below provides a mapping of ports for the Acme Packet 4600:
Logical Interface Physical Ports Information Input/Output
Data Input Ethernet SFP Ports (P0,1,2,3)
Ethernet RJ-45 ports (P4 and P5)
Ethernet MGT Ports
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2)
Cipher text
Plain text
Data Output Ethernet SFP Ports (P0,1,2,3)
Ethernet RJ-45 ports (P4 and P5)
Ethernet MGT Ports
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2)
Cipher text
Plain text
Control Input Ethernet SFP Ports (P0,1,2,3)
Ethernet RJ-45 ports (P4 and P5)
Console Port
Reset Button
Power Switch
USB Port
Ethernet MGT Ports
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2)
Plaintext control input via console port
(configuration commands, operator
passwords)
Ciphertext control input via network
management (EMS control, CDR
accounting, CLI management)
Status Output Ethernet SFP Ports (P0,1,2,3)
Ethernet RJ-45 ports (P4 and P5)
Console Port
Alarm Port
Ethernet MGT Ports (Mgmt0, Mgmt1,
Mgmt2)
LEDs
LCD
Plaintext status output via console
port.
Ciphertext status output via network
management
Power Power Plug N/A
Table 10: Acme Packet 4600 - Mapping of FIPS 140 Logical Interfaces to Physical Ports
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The table below provides a description and use of the physical ports for the Acme Packet 4600:
Physical Interface Number of Ports Description / Use
Console Port 1 Provides console access to the module. The module supports only
one active serial console connection at a time.
Console port communication is used for administration and
maintenance purposes from a central office (CO) location. Tasks
conducted over a console port include:
• Configuring the boot process and management network
• Creating the initial connection to the module
• Accessing and using functionality available via the ACLI
• Performing in-lab system maintenance (services described
below)
• Performing factory-reset to zeroize nvram and keys
Alarm Port 1 Provides status output
USB Ports 1 This port is used for recovery. e.g. system re-installation after
zeroization.
Ethernet
Management ports
3
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1,
Mgmt2)
Used for EMS control, CDR accounting, CLI management, and other
management functions
Signaling and Media
Ethernet ports
6
(SFP P0,1,2,3
RJ-45 P4, P5)
Provide network connectivity for signaling and media traffic.
These ports are also used for incoming and outgoing data (voice)
connections.
Table 11: Acme Packet 4600 - Physical Ports
Figure 3: Acme Packet 4600 - Front View
Figure 4: Acme Packet 4600 - Rear View
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The table below provides a mapping of ports for the Acme Packet 6350 (Hardware version: 6350 with Quad NIU):
Logical Interface Physical Ports Information Input/Output
Data Input Ethernet Ports Quad NIU:
(Slot 0: P0, P1, P2 and P3)
Ethernet MGT Ports
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2)
Cipher text
Plain text
Data Output Ethernet Ports Quad NIU:
(Slot 0: P0, P1, P2 and P3)
Ethernet MGT Ports
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2)
Cipher text
Plain text
Control Input Console Port
Reset Button
Power Switch
Ethernet Ports Quad NIU:
(Slot 0: P0, P1, P2 and P3)
Ethernet MGT Ports
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2)
Plaintext control input via console port
(configuration commands, operator passwords)
Ciphertext control input via network management
(EMS control, CDR accounting, CLI management)
Status Output Console Port
Alarm Port
Ethernet Ports Quad NIU:
(Slot 0: P0, P1, P2 and P3)
Ethernet MGT Ports
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2)
LEDs
LCD
Plaintext status output via console port.
Ciphertext status output via network management
Power Power Plug N/A
Table 12: Acme Packet 6350 - Mapping of FIPS 140 Logical Interfaces to Physical ports
The table below describes the interfaces on the Acme Packet 6350 (Hardware version: 6350 with Quad NIU):
Physical
Interface
Number of
Ports 6350
w/Quad NIU
Description / Use
Console Port 1 Provides console access to the module. The module supports
only one active serial console connection at a time.
Console port communication is used for administration and
maintenance purposes from a central office (CO) location.
Tasks conducted over a console port include:
• Configuring the boot process and management network
• Creating the initial connection to the module
• Accessing and using functionality available via the ACLI
• Performing in-lab system maintenance (services described
below)
• Performing factory-reset to zeroize nvram and keys in
Flash
Alarm Port 1 Provides status output
USB Ports 1 (disabled) This port is used for recovery. e.g. system re-installation
after zeroization.
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Physical
Interface
Number of
Ports 6350
w/Quad NIU
Description / Use
Management
Ethernet ports
3
(Mgmt0,
Mgmt1,
Mgmt2)
Used for EMS control, CDR accounting, CLI management, and other
management functions.
Signaling and
Media Ethernet
ports
4
(Slot 0:
P0, P1,
P2 and P3)
Provide network connectivity for signaling and media traffic.
These ports are also used for incoming and outgoing data (voice)
connections.
Table 13: Acme Packet 6350 Physical Ports
Figure 5: Acme Packet 6350 - Front View
Figure 6: Acme Packet 6350 - Rear View
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5. Physical Security
The module’s physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 1 Physical Security
requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rack mountable chassis.
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6. Operational Environment
The modules support a limited modifiable operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 Section 4.6.
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7. Roles and Services
As required by FIPS 140-2 Level 2, there are three roles (a Crypto Officer Role, User Role, and Unauthenticated Role) in the module that operators
may assume. The module supports role-based authentication, and the respective services for each role are described in the following sections.
The below table gives a high-level description of all services provided by the module and lists the roles allowed to invoke each service.
Operator Role Summary of Services
User • View configuration versions and system performance data
• Test pattern rules, local policies, and session translations
• Display system alarms.
Crypto Officer Allowed access to all system commands and configuration privileges
Unauthenticated • Request Authentication
• Show Status
• Initiate self-tests
Table 14: Service Summary
Operator Services and Descriptions
The below table provides a full description of all services provided by the module and lists the roles allowed to invoke each service.
U CO Service Name Service Description Keys and CSP(s) Access Type(s)
X Configure Initializes the module for FIPS mode of operation HMAC-SHA-256 key R, W, X
X Zeroize CSP’s Clears keys/CSPs from memory and disk All CSP’s Z
X Firmware
Update
Updates firmware Firmware Integrity Key (RSA) R, X
X Bypass Configure bypass using TCP or UDP and viewing
bypass service status
HMAC-SHA-256 Bypass Key R, W, X
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U CO Service Name Service Description Keys and CSP(s) Access Type(s)
X X Decrypt Decrypts a block of data Using AES or Triple-DES in
FIPS Mode
TLS Session Keys (Triple-DES)
TLS Session Keys (AES128)
TLS Session Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key (AES128)
SSH Session Key (AES256)
SRTP Session Key (AES-128)
SNMP Privacy Key (AES-128)
IKE Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES,
AES-128 CBC/CTR, AES-192 CBC, AES-
256 CBC/CTR)
IPsec Session Encryption Key (Triple-
DES, AES-128 CBC/CTR, AES-192 CBC,
AES-256 CBC/CTR)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X Encrypt Encrypts a block of data Using AES or Triple-DES in
FIPS Mode
TLS Session Keys (Triple-DES)
TLS Session Keys (AES128)
TLS Session Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key (AES128)
SSH Session Key (AES256)
SRTP Session Key (AES-128)
SNMP Privacy Key (AES-128)
IKE Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES,
AES-128 CBC/CTR, AES-192 CBC, AES-
256 CBC/CTR)
IPsec Session Encryption Key (Triple-
DES, AES-128 CBC/CTR, AES-192 CBC,
AES-256 CBC/CTR)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X Generate Keys Generates AES or Triple-DES for encrypt/decrypt
operations.
TLS Session Keys (Triple-DES)
TLS Session Keys (AES128)
TLS Session Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key (AES128)
SSH Session Key (AES256)
SRTP Session Key (AES-128)
SNMP Privacy Key (AES-128)
IKE Session Encryption Key (Triple-DES,
AES-128 CBC/CTR, AES-192 CBC, AES-
256 CBC/CTR)
IPsec Session Encryption Key (Triple-
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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U CO Service Name Service Description Keys and CSP(s) Access Type(s)
DES, AES-128 CBC/CTR, AES-192 CBC,
AES-256 CBC/CTR)
R, W
Generates Diffie-Hellman, EC Diffie-Hellman for key
establishment.
Diffie-Hellman Public Key (DH)
Diffie-Hellman Private Key (DH)
EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key (ECDH)
EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key (ECDH)
SSH authentication private Key (RSA)
SSH authentication public key (RSA)
TLS authentication private Key
(ECDSA/RSA)
TLS authentication public key
(ECDSA/RSA)
TLS premaster secret,
TLS Master secret,
SRTP Master key
IKE Private Key (RSA)
IKE Public Key (RSA)
SKEYSEED
SKEYID
SKEYID_d
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
R, W
X X Verify Used as part of the TLS, SSH protocol negotiation SSH authentication private Key (RSA)
SSH authentication public key (RSA)
TLS authentication private Key
(ECDSA/RSA)
TLS authentication public key
(ECDSA/RSA)
Diffie-Hellman Public Key (DH)
Diffie-Hellman Private Key (DH)
EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key (ECDH)
EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key (ECDH)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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U CO Service Name Service Description Keys and CSP(s) Access Type(s)
X X Generate Seed Generate an entropy_input for CTR DRBG DRBG Seed
DRBG Entropy Input String
R, W, X
R, W, X
X X Generate
Random
Number
Generate random number. DRBG C
DRBG V
DRBG Key
R, W, X
R, W, X
R, W, X
X X HMAC Generate HMAC SNMP Authentication Key
SRTP Authentication Key
SSH Integrity Keys
TLS Integrity Keys
IPsec Session
Authentication Key
IKE Session
Authentication Key
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X Generate
Certificate
Generate certificate Web UI Certificate R, W, X
X X Authenticate Authenticate Users Operator Password
Operator RSA public key
R, W, X
R, W, X
R – Read, W – Write, X – Execute, Z – Zeroize
Table 15: Operator Services and Descriptions
Unauthenticated Services and Descriptions
The below table provides a full description of the unauthenticated services provided by the module:
Service Name Service Description
Authentication Request authentication to an authorized role.
On-Demand Self-Test Initialization This service initiates the FIPS self-test when requested.
Show Status This service shows the operational status of the module
Table 16: Operator Services and Descriptions
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Operator Authentication
7.3.1. Password-Based Authentication
In FIPS approved mode of operation, the module is accessed via Command Line Interface over the Console ports or via SSH or SNMPv3 over the
Network Management Ports. Other than status functions available by viewing the Status LEDs, the services described are available only to
authenticated operators.
Method Probability of a Single Successful Random Attempt Probability of a Successful Attempt within a Minute
Password-Based
(CO and User
Authentication
to management
interfaces)
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. The
password can consist of alphanumeric values, {a-z, A-Z, 0-9,
and special characters], yielding 94 choices per character.
The probability of a successful random attempt is 1/94^8,
which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. The password can
consist of alphanumeric values, {a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and special characters],
yielding 94 choices per character Assuming 10 attempts per second via
a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with
multiple attempts in a one-minute period is 600/94^8, which is less
than 1/100,000.
SNMPv3
Passwords
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. The
password can consist of alphanumeric values, {a-z, A-Z, 0-9,
and special characters], yielding 94 choices per character.
The probability of a successful random attempt is 1/94^8,
which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. The password can
consist of alphanumeric values, {a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and special characters],
yielding 94 choices per character. Assuming 10 attempts per second
via a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with
multiple attempts in a one-minute period is 600/94^8, which is less
than 1/100,000.
Password-Based
(SIP
Authentication
Challenge
Response)
Passwords must be a minimum of 12 numeric characters. 0-
9, yielding 10 choices per character. The probability of a
successful random attempt is 1/10^12, which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 12 numeric characters. 0-9, yielding
10 choices per character. Assuming 10 attempts per second via a
scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with multiple
attempts in a one-minute period is 600/10^12, which is less than
1/100,000.
Table 17: Password based Authentication
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7.3.2. Public key-Based Authentication
The module also supports public key-based authentication for the Crypto-Officer and User Role with at least 2048-bit RSA keys as implemented
by the SSH protocol.
Method Probability of a Single Successful Random Attempt Probability of a Successful Attempt within a Minute
Public key-Based A 2048-bit RSA has at least 112-bits of equivalent strength.
The probability of a successful random attempt is 1 /2^112,
which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Assuming the module can support 60 authentication attempts in one
minute, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts
in a one-minute period is 60/2^112, which is less than 1/100,000.
Table 18: Public key-Based Authentication
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Key and CSP Management
The following keys, cryptographic key components and other critical security parameters are contained in the module. No parts of the SSH, TLS,
or SNMP protocol, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
Operator Passwords Generated by the crypto
officer as per the module
policy
Agreement: NA
Entry: Entry via console or SSH
or TLS management session
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Non Volatile RAM Authentication of the crypto officer and
user
Operator RSA public
key
Input by the crypto officer
and user during the
authentication via public
keys.
Agreement: NA
Entry: Entry via SSH
management session
Output: N/A
Non Volatile RAM Authentication of the crypto officer and
user via SSH management session using
RSA public keys.
Firmware Integrity
Key (RSA)
Generated externally Entry: RSA (2048 bits) entered
as part of Firmware image
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Flash Public key used to verify the integrity of
firmware and updates
DRBG Entropy Input
String
Generated internally from
hardware sources
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
DRBG Seed Generated internally from
hardware sources
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
Output: None
DRBG Key Internal value used as part
of SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
DRBG V Internal value used as part
of SP 800-90A DRBG
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
DRBG C Internal value used as part
of SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used in the random bit generation
process
Diffie-Hellman Public
Key (DH) 2048-bit
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: Diffie-Hellman
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used to derive the secret session key
during DH key agreement protocol
Diffie-Hellman
Private Key (DH) 224
bit
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: Diffie-Hellman
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used to derive the secret session key
during DH key agreement protocol
ECDH Public Key (P-
256 and P-384)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: EC Diffie-Hellman
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used to derive the secret session key
during ECDH key agreement protocol
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
ECDH Private Key (P-
256 and P-384)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: EC Diffie-Hellman
Entry: NA
Output: None
Volatile RAM Used to derive the secret session key
during ECDH key agreement protocol
SNMP Privacy Key
(AES-128)
NIST SP 800-135 KDF Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Volatile RAM For encryption / decryption of SNMP
session traffic
SNMP Authentication
Key (HMAC-SHA1)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Volatile RAM 160-bit HMAC-SHA-1 for message
authentication and verification in
SNMP
SRTP Master Key
(AES-128)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved Hash_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: Diffie-Hellman
Entry: NA
Output: encrypted or output as
part of HA direct physical
connection
Volatile RAM Generation of SRTP session keys
SRTP Session Key
(AES-128)
NIST SP 800-135 KDF Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Volatile RAM For encryption / decryption of SRTP
session traffic
SRTP Authentication
Key (HMAC-SHA1)
Derived from the master
key
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
Volatile RAM 160-bit HMAC-SHA-1 for message
authentication and verification in SRTP
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
direct physical connection
SSH Authentication
Private Key (RSA)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Flash Memory RSA private key for SSH authentication
SSH Authentication
Public Key (RSA)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Flash Memory RSA public key for SSH authentication.
SSH Session Keys (
AES-128, AES-256)
Derived via SSH KDF.
Note: These keys are
generated via SSH (IETF RFC
4251). This protocol
enforces limits on the
number of total possible
encryption/decryption
operations.
Agreement: Diffie-Hellman Volatile RAM Encryption and decryption of SSH
session
SSH Integrity Keys
(HMAC-SHA1)
Derived via SSH KDF. Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Volatile RAM 160-bit HMAC-SHA-1 for message
authentication and verification in SSH
TLS Authentication
Private Key
(ECDSA/RSA)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Flash Memory ECDSA/RSA private key for TLS
authentication
TLS Authentication
Public Key
(ECDSA/RSA)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG
Agreement NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Volatile RAM ECDSA/RSA public key for TLS
authentication.
TLS Premaster Secret
(48 Bytes)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: NA
Entry: Input during TLS
negotiation
Volatile RAM Establishes TLS master secret
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
Output: Output to peer
encrypted by Public Key
TLS Master Secret
(48 Bytes)
Derived from the TLS Pre-
Master Secret
Agreement: NA Volatile RAM Used for computing the Session Key
TLS Session Keys
(Triple-DES, AES-128
CBC, AES-256)
Derived from the TLS
Master Secret
Note: These keys are
generated via TLS (IETF RFC
5246). This protocol
enforces limits on the
number of total possible
encryption/decryption
operations.
Agreement: NA Volatile RAM Used for encryption & decryption of
TLS session
TLS Integrity Keys
(HMAC-SHA1)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection
Volatile RAM 160-bit HMAC-SHA-1 for message
authentication and verification in TLS
SKEYSEED
(20 Bytes)
Derived by using key
derivation function defined
in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 160 bit shared secret known only to IKE
peers. Used to derive IKE session keys
SKEYID
(20 Bytes)
Derived by using key
derivation function defined
in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
Volatile RAM 160 bit secret value used to derive
other IKE secrets
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
direct physical connection to
another box
SKEYID_d
(20 Bytes)
Derived using SKEYID, Diffie
Hellman shared secret and
other non-secret values
through key derivation
function defined in
SP800135 KDF
(IKEv1/IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 160 bit secret value used to derive IKE
session keys
IKE Pre-Shared Key Preloaded by the Crypto
Officer.
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Flash Memory Secret used to derive IKE skeyid when
using pre-shared secret authentication
IKE Session
Encryption Key
(Triple-DES, AES-128
CBC/CTR, AES-192
CBC, AES-256
CBC/CTR)
Derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2)
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM Triple-DES, AES 128 and 256 key used
to encrypt data
IKE Session
Authentication Key
(HMAC-SHA-512)
Derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2)
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 512 bit key HMAC-SHA-512 used for
data authentication
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CSP Name Generation/Input Establishment/ Export Storage Use
IKE Private Key
(RSA 2048 bit)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM RSA 2048 bit key used to authenticate
the module to a peer during IKE
IKE Public Key
(RSA 2048-bit)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM RSA 2048 bit public key for TLS
authentication.
IPsec Session
Encryption Key
(Triple-DES, AES-128
CBC/CTR, AES-192
CBC, AES-256
CBC/CTR)
Derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM Triple-DES, AES 128 or 256 bit key used
to encrypt data
IPsec Session
Authentication Key
(HMAC-SHA-512)
Derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2).
Agreement: NIST SP 800-135
KDF
Entry: NA
Output: Output as part of HA
direct physical connection to
another box
Volatile RAM 512 bit HMAC-SHA-512 key used for
data authentication for IPsec traffic
Web UI Certificate Internal generation by FIPS
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: NA
Output: TLS session with
operator
Flash Web server certificate
Bypass Key (HMAC-
SHA-256)
Internal generation by FIPS-
approved CTR_DRBG in
firmware
Agreement: NA
Output: NA
Flash Memory 256-bit HMAC-SHA-256 used to protect
bypass table
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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Table 19: CSP Table
Note: When the module generates symmetric keys or seeds used for generating asymmetric keys, unmodified DRBG output is used as the
symmetric key or as the seed for generating the asymmetric keys.
Note: All keys generated by the module use the direct output of a FIPS approved DRBG. This meets the requirements of SP 800-133 rev2.
The module employs the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90A] for the random number generation. The DRBG used
for the modules is CTR_DRBG. The module performs the DRBG health tests as defined in section 11.3 of [SP800-90A]. The module uses CPU jitter
as an entropy source for seeding the DRBG. The source is compliant with [SP 800-90B] and marked as ENT(NP) on the certificate. The entropy
source is tested with developer defined variants of RCT and APT Health tests as required by section 4 of [SP 800-90B]. The DRBG is seeded with
more than 256 bits of entropy strength from the CPU jitter RNG (e.g., 384 bits for the CTR_DRBG using AES-256). Therefore, the module ensures
that during initialization (seed) and reseeding, the entropy source provides the required amount of entropy to meet the security strength of the
CTR DRBG.
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9. Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and conditionally during operations to
prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are functioning correctly. Self-tests
may be run on-demand by power cycling the module.
9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 appliances perform the following power-up self-tests when power is
applied to the module. These self-tests require no inputs or actions from the operator:
Firmware Integrity Test
• Firmware Integrity Test (RSA 2048/SHA-256)
Mocana Cryptographic Library Self-Tests
• AES CBC 256-bit (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• Triple-DES CBC (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-384 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test;
• KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56arev3 Primitive “Z” Known Answer Test (Modp_2048 & Modp_3072);
• IKEV1/V2 SP800-135 rev1 KDF Known Answer Test; and
• RSA 2048-bit Signature Verification Test.
Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library Self-Tests
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test;
• AES ECB 128-bit (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• AES GCM 256-bit (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• Triple-DES CBC (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• SP 800-90A CTR DRBG Known Answer Test;
• KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56arev3 Primitive “Z” Known Answer Test (Modp_2048);
• KAS-ECC-SSC SP800-56arev3 Primitive “Z” Known Answer Test (P256 & P384);
• SP800-135 KDF Know Answer Tests: SSH KDF, TLS KDF, SNMP KDF and SRTP KDF;
• RSA 2048-bit sign/verify Known Answer Test; and
• ECDSA P-256 sign/verify PCT.
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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Nitrox Self-Tests
• AES CBC 128/256-bit (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• Triple-DES CBC (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test; and
• RSA 2048-bit Sign/Verify Known Answer Test.
Octeon II Self-tests
• AES CTR/ECB 128-bit (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test
Octeon III Self-tests
• AES GCM 128-bit (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• AES CBC 128/192/256-bit (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test
• AES CTR/ECB 128-bit (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test
• Triple-DES CBC (Encrypt/Decrypt) Known Answer Test;
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test;
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test; and
• RSA 2048-bit sign/verify Known Answer Test;
SP 800-90B Health Tests
• APT and RCT Start-up tests. (The start‐up tests are the continuous tests run on the first 1024 samples)
When the modules are in a power-up self-test state or error state, the data output interface is inhibited and
remains inhibited until the module can transition into an operational state. While the CO may attempt to restart
the module to clear an error, the module will require re-installation in the event of a hard error such as a failed
self-test.
9.2 Critical Functions Self-Tests
Acme Packet 4600, Acme Packet 6300 and Acme Packet 6350 appliances perform the following critical self-tests.
These critical function tests are performed for each SP 800-90A DRBG implemented within the module.
• SP 800-90A Instantiation Test
• SP 800-90A Generate Test
• SP 800-90A Reseed Test
• SP 800-90A Uninstantiate Test
9.3 Conditional Self-Tests
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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The module performs the following conditional self-tests when called by the module:
• Pair Wise consistency tests to verify that the asymmetric keys generated for RSA, and ECDSA work correctly by
performing a sign and verify operation;
• Continuous Random Number Generator test to verify that the output of approved-DRBG is not the same as the
previously generated value;
• Developer defined variants of Repetition Count Test (RCT) and Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) are run on the
output of noise source that are SP800-90B compliant to verify the output of the noise source;
• Bypass conditional test using HMAC-SHA-256 to ensure the mechanism governing media traffic is functioning
correctly, and;
• Firmware Load test using a 2048-bit/SHA-256 RSA-Based integrity test to verify firmware to be loaded into the
module.
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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10. Crypto-Officer and User Guidance
This section describes the configuration, maintenance, and administration of the cryptographic module. If the steps
outlined in Section 10.1 below are not followed, the module will be operating in a non-compliant state that is out
of scope of the validation.
10.1 Secure Setup for FIPS Mode of Operation
FIPS Mode is enabled by a license installed by Oracle, which will open the FIPS self-test features, and
implementing the following steps:
1. Open CLI: type “setup entitlements”
2. Select “5 Data Integrity (FIPS 140-2)” option and type “enabled”
3. Type “s” to save the above modified entitlements.
4. Then reboot the module for FIPS mode to take into effect.
5. Then from a CLI the operator must enable FIPS by selecting the FIPS 140-2 option and typing “enabled” and
then reboot the device.
Once the above secure setup and the secure Initialization and configuration is complete the module is in FIPS mode.
The steps outlined in 10.1.1 can be performed to ensure that the FIPS Approved mode was correctly configured.
Secure Initialization and Configuration Verification Steps
The crypto-officer can verify FIPS settings by following these steps:
• Verify that the firmware version of the module is Version S-Cz9.0 (“show version” section in Session Border
Controller ACLI Configuration Guide (SBC Guide).
• A new account for the Crypto-Officer and User shall be created as part of Setup and Initialization process.
Upon creation of the new CO and User accounts the “default” accounts shipped with the module shall be
disabled (“local-accounts” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure all management traffic is encapsulated within a trusted session by encapsulating in a TLS, SSH, or SRTP
tunnel as appropriate (“TLS-profile”, “SSH-config” and “Sdes-profile” sections in SBC Guide).
• HTTPS shall be enabled and configure the web server certificate prior to connecting to the WebUI over TLS (“http-
config” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure that SNMP V3 is configured with AES-128/HMAC only (“SNMP-Group-Entry” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure IKEv1 and IKEv2 is using AES CBC or CTR mode for encryption and HMAC-SHA-512 for authentication
(“IKE-sainfo” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure SSH is configured to use AES CTR mode for encryption (“Configure SSH Ciphers” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure SSH and IKEv1/IKEv2 only use Diffie-Hellman group 14 in FIPS approved mode (“IKE-config” & “SSH-config”
section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure RSA keys are at least 2048-bit keys for TLS, IKEv1/IKEv2. No 512-bit or 1024-bit keys can be used in FIPS
mode of operation (“Certificate-record” section in SBC Guide - 2048 is the default RSA modulus).
• All operator passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters in length (“password-policy” section in SBC Guide).
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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• Ensure use of FIPS-approved algorithms for TLS (“TLS-profile” in SBC Guide):
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• Be aware that when configuring High Availability (HA), only a local HA configuration to a directly connected box
via a physical cable over the management port is allowed in FIPS Approved Mode. Remote HA is not allowed in
FIPS Approved mode.
• Be aware that HA configuration data that contains keys and CSP’s must never be transported over an untrusted
network. Ensure that the HA ports used for the transport of HA data (including keys and CSP’s) are bound to a
private IP address range during setup.
• Be aware that only the HA state transactions between the two devices over the direct physical connection are
permitted over those dedicated ports.
• RADIUS and TACACS+ shall not be used in FIPS approved mode.
• Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this
validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
• 3-key Triple-DES has been implemented in the module and is FIPS approved until December 31, 2023. Should
the CMVP disallow the usage of Triple-DES post-December 31, 2023, then users must not configure Triple-DES.
For more details please refer to the Session Border Controller ACLI Configuration Guide (SBC Guide)
10.2 AES-GCM IV Construction/Usage
The AES-GCM IV is used in the following protocols:
• TLS: The TLS AES-GCM IV is generated in compliance with TLSv1.2 GCM cipher suites as specified in RFC 5288
and section 3.3.1 of NIST SP 800-52rev1. Per RFC 5246, when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the module will trigger a handshake to establish a
new encryption key.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall
be redistributed.
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 Security Policy
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11.Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate attacks beyond those identified in FIPS 140-2.
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
Page 39 of 40
Acronyms Terms and Abbreviations
Term Definition
ACLI Acme Command Line Interface
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BBRAM Battery Backed RAM
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CDR Call Data Record
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DHE Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ESBC Enterprise Session Border Controller
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESBC Enterprise Session Border Controller
EDC Error Detection Code
EMS Enterprise Management Server
HA High Availability
HMAC (Keyed) Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
LED Light Emitting Diode
MGT Management
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
POST Power On Self Test
PUB Publication
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SRTP Secure Real Time Protocol
TDM Time Division Multiplexing
TLS Transport Layer Security
Table 20: Acronyms
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
Page 40 of 40
References
The FIPS 140-2 standard, and information on the CMVP, can be found at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
More information describing the module can be found on the Oracle web site at
https://docs.oracle.com/en/industries/communications/session-border-controller/index.html.
This Security Policy contains non-proprietary information. All other documentation submitted for FIPS 140-2
conformance testing and validation is “Oracle - Proprietary” and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure
agreements.
Document Author Title
FIPS PUB 140-2 NIST FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
FIPS IG NIST Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex A NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex A: Approved Security Functions
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex B NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex C NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex D NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques
DTR for FIPS PUB 140-2 NIST Derived Test Requirements (DTR) for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules
NIST SP 800-67 NIST Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm TDEA Block Cypher
FIPS PUB 197 NIST Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS PUB 198-1 NIST The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS PUB 186-4 NIST Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS PUB 180-4 NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
NIST SP 800-131A NIST Recommendation for the Transitioning of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes
PKCS#1 RSA
Laboratories
PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA Cryptographic Standard
Table 21: References