Apple Inc. Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy document version 1.4 November, 2022 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation 9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260 Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Trademarks Apple’s trademarks applicable to this document are listed in https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-property/trademark/appletmlist.html. Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 2 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table of Contents 1. General........................................................................................................................................5 2. Cryptographic Module Specification.............................................................................................6 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces................................................................................................12 4. Roles, services, and authentication .............................................................................................13 5. Software/Firmware security .......................................................................................................20 5.1. Integrity Techniques ..................................................................................................................................20 5.2. On-Demand Integrity Test .........................................................................................................................20 6. Operational Environment ............................................................................................................21 7. Physical Security .......................................................................................................................22 8. Non-invasive Security ................................................................................................................23 9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management .................................................................................24 9.1. Random Number Generation .....................................................................................................................26 9.2. Key / SSP Generation.................................................................................................................................26 9.3. Keys/SSPs Establishment ..........................................................................................................................26 9.4. Keys/SSPs Import/Export...........................................................................................................................27 9.5. Keys/SSPs Storage ....................................................................................................................................27 9.6. Keys/SSPs Zeroization...............................................................................................................................27 10.Self-tests ..................................................................................................................................28 10.1.Pre-operational Software Integrity Test.....................................................................................................28 10.2.Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................................................28 10.2.1.Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests ................................................................................28 10.2.2.Conditional Pairwise Consistency Test ..............................................................................................29 10.3.Error Handling............................................................................................................................................29 11. Life-cycle assurance..................................................................................................................30 11.1. Delivery and Operation ..............................................................................................................................30 11.2.Crypto Officer Guidance............................................................................................................................30 12.Mitigation of other attacks..........................................................................................................31 © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 3 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy List of Tables Table 1 - Security Levels 5 .......................................................................................................................................... Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments 6 ............................................................................................................. Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments 7 ............................................................................................. Table 4 - Approved Algorithms 9 ................................................................................................................................ Table 5 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation 10 ......................................... Table 6 - Interfaces 12 ................................................................................................................................................ Table 7 - Approved Services 15 .................................................................................................................................. Table 8 - Non-Approved Services 18 .......................................................................................................................... Table 9 - SSPs 24 ....................................................................................................................................................... Table 10 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 25 ............................................................ Table 11 - Pre-Operational Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests 28 ............................................................................ Table 12 Error Indicators 28 ........................................................................................................................................ © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 4 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 1. General This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 module. This document provides all tables and diagrams (when applicable) required by NIST SP 800-140B. The column names of the tables follow the template tables provided in NIST SP 800-140B. Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas. Table 1 - Security Levels ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. [Number Below] FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level 1 General 1 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 1 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 1 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1 5 Software/Firmware Security 1 6 Operational Environment 1 7 Physical Security Not Applicable 8 Non-invasive Security Not Applicable 9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 1 10 Self-tests 1 11 Life-cycle Assurance 1 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks Not Applicable © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 5 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2. Cryptographic Module Specification The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a software module running on a multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing platform. The version of module is 11.1, written as v11.1. The module provides implementations of low-level cryptographic primitives to the Host OS’s (macOS Big Sur 11.0.1) Security Framework and Common Crypto. The module has been tested by atsec CST lab on the following platforms with and without AES-NI: Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments In addition to the platforms listed in Table 2, Apple Inc. has also tested the module on the following platforms and claims vendor affirmation on them: # Operating System Hardware Platform Processor PAA/Acceleration 1 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Air Intel i5-8210Y (Amber Lake) AES-NI 2 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Air Intel i7-1060NG7 (Ice Lake) AES-NI 3 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro Intel i7-8850H (Coffee Lake) AES-NI 4 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro Intel i9-9880H (Coffee Lake) AES-NI 5 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 iMac Pro Xeon W-2140B (Sky Lake) AES-NI 6 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 Mac Pro Xeon W-3223 (Cascade Lake) AES-NI # Operating System Hardware Platform Processor Release Year 1 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro i5 (Ice Lake) 2020 2 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro i5 (Coffee Lake) 2020, 2019, 2018 3 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro i7 (Amber Lake) 2019, 2018 4 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro i7 (Coffee Lake) 2020, 2019, 2018 5 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro i7 (Ice Lake) 2020 6 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro i9 (Coffee Lake) 2019, 2018 7 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Air i5 (Ice Lake) 2020 8 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Air i7 (Ice Lake) 2020 9 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Air i5 (Amber Lake) 2019, 2018 10 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Air i7 (Amber Lake) 2018 11 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 Mac mini i5 (Coffee Lake) 2018 12 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 Mac mini i7 (Coffee Lake) 2018 13 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 iMac i5 (Comet Lake) 2020 14 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 iMac i7 (Comet Lake) 2020 © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 6 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. The table below lists all Approved or Vendor-affirmed security functions of the module, including specific key size(s) employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. The module is in the Approved mode of operation when the module utilizes the services that use the security functions listed in the table below. The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 8 - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode. 15 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 iMac i9 (Comet Lake) 2020 16 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 iMac i5 (Coffee Lake) 2019 17 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 iMac i7 (Coffee Lake) 2019 18 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 iMac i9 (Coffee Lake) 2019 © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 7 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy CAVP Cert. Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) Use / Function A943 (vng_asm) A945 (c_asm) A976 (c-aesni) A973 (vng_aesni) CTR_DRBG [SP800-90A] AES-128, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled No Prediction Resistance Key Length: 128, 256 Random Number Generation A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) HMAC_DRBG [SP800-90A] SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 No Prediction Resistance Key Length: 112 bits or greater Random Number Generation A945 (c_asm) A976 (c_aesni) AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A] CBC, ECB, CFB128, CFB8, OFB, CTR Key Length: 128, 192, 256 Symmetric Encryption and Decryption A978 (asm_aesni) A977 (asm_x86) AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A] [SP 800-38E] CBC, ECB, XTS Key Length: 128, 192, 256 XTS (128 and 256-bits key size only) Symmetric Encryption and Decryption A943 (vng_asm) A973 (vng_aesni) AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A] [SP 800-38C] [SP 800-38D] ECB CCM, CTR, GCM Key Length: 128, 192, 256 Symmetric Encryption and Decryption A945 (c_asm) A976 (c_aesni) KTS (AES) [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38F] AES- KW Key Length: 128, 192, 256 Key Wrapping and Unwrapping A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) RSA [FIPS 186-4] Key Generation (ANSI X9.31) (CKG using method in Sections 4 and 5.1 [SP 800-133]) Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096 Asymmetric Key Generation A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) RSA [FIPS 186-4] Signature Generation (PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS) Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096 Digital Signature Generation A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) RSA [FIPS 186-4] Signature Verification (PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS) Modulus: 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 Digital Signature Verification A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) ECDSA ANSI X9.62 [FIPS 186-4] Key Pair Generation (CKG using method in Sections 4 and 5.1 [SP 800-133]) Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Asymmetric Key Generation © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 8 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 4 - Approved Algorithms This module does not have any non-Approved algorithms used in the Approved mode of operation (with or without security claimed). The table below lists the non-Approved algorithms and security functions that are used in the non-Approved mode of operation: A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) ECDSA ANSI X9.62 [FIPS 186-4] Public Key Validation (PKV) Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Asymmetric Key Validation A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) ECDSA ANSI X9.62 [FIPS 186-4] Signature Generation Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Digital Signature Generation A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) ECDSA ANSI X9.62 [FIPS 186-4] Signature Verification Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Digital Signature Verification A990 (c_ssse3) A979 (vng_Intel) A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) SHS [FIPS 180-4] SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256 (except for A979) N/A Message Digest A979 (vng_Intel) A974 (c_avx2) A975(c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) HMAC [FIPS 198] SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 SHA-512/256 (except for A979) 112 bits or greater Keyed Hash A990 (c_ssse3) KBKDF [SP800-108] KDF Mode: Counter and Feedback MAC Mode: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC- SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA251 Supported Lengths: 8-4096 Increment 8 Fixed Data Order: Before Fixed Data Counter Length: 32 Key Derivation N/A ENT (P) [SP800-90B] ENT (NP) [SP800-90B] N/A Seeding for the DRBG. (is provided by the underlying operational environment) Random Number Generation CAVP Cert. Algorithm and Standard Mode / Method Description / Key Size(s) Use / Function Algorithm/Functions Use/Function Notes RSA Key Pair Generation ANSI X9.31 Key Pair Generation Key Size < 2048 Non-Approved RSA Signature Generation PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Generation Key Size < 2048 Non-Approved RSA Signature Verification PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Verification Key Size < 1024 Non-Approved © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 9 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 5 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation RSA Key Wrapping OAEP, PKCS#1 v1.5 and -PSS schemes Non-Approved Ed25519 Key Agreement Key Generation Signature Generation Signature Verification Non-Approved ANSI X9.63 KDF Hash based Key Derivation Function Non-Approved RFC6637 Key Derivation Function Non-Approved HKDF [SP800-56C] Key Derivation Function Non-Approved DES Encryption / Decryption Key Size 56-bits Non-Approved CAST5 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 40 to 128-bits in 8-bit increments Non-Approved RC4 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 4096-bits Non-Approved RC2 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 1024-bits Non-Approved MD2 Message Digest Digest size 128-bit Non-Approved MD4 Message Digest Digest size 128-bit Non-Approved MD5 Message Digest Digest size 128-bit Non-Approved RIPEMD Message Digest Digest size 160-bits Non-Approved ECDSA PKG: Curve P-192 PKV: Curve P-192 Signature Generation: Curve P-192 Signature Verification: Curve P-192 Non-Approved due to the small curve size Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points Non-Approved Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves (ECIES) Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved Blowfish Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC) MAC generation Non-Approved Triple-DES [SP 800-67] ECB, CBC Encryption/Decryption Note The module itself does not enforce the limit of 216 encryptions with the same Triple-DES key, as required by FIPS 140-3 IG C.G. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 10 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] executes within the kernel space of the computing platforms and operating systems listed in Table 2. Figure 1 below shows the logical block diagram representing the following information: o The location of the logical object of the module with respect to the operating system, other supporting applications, and the cryptographic boundary so that all the logical and physical layers between the logical object and the cryptographic boundary are clearly defined; and o The interactions of the logical object of the module with the operating system and other supporting applications resident within the cryptographic boundary. Figure 1 - Logical block diagram. Kernel extension (KEXT) is a bundle that performs low-level tasks. KEXTs run in kernel space, which gives them elevated privileges and the ability to perform tasks that user-space apps cannot. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 11 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-3 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which it runs. The logical interfaces are the application program interface (API) through which applications request services and the Operating System calls that the module invokes. The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Kernel Interfaces (KPIs). In detail these interfaces are described in (Table 6): Table 6 - Interfaces The module is optimized for library use within the macOS kernel space and does not contain any terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as a macOS dynamically loadable library. The dynamically loadable library is loaded into the macOS kernel, and its cryptographic functions are made available to macOS kernel services only. Any internal error detected by the module is reflected back to the caller with an appropriate return code. The calling macOS kernel service must examine the return code and act accordingly. The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return codes, thus indicating the module’s status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle exceptional conditions in a FIPS 140-3 appropriate manner. Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers. Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by the module .
 Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface Data Input Data inputs are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers Data Output Data outputs are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers Control Input Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated parameters, namely the kernel module plist whose information is supplied to the module by the kernel module loader. Control Output Not Applicable Status Output Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each KPI lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language KPIs within the module is provided in the header files and the KPI documentation. Messages are also documented in the KPI documentation. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 12 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 4. Roles, services, and authentication The module supports a single instance of one authorized role: The Crypto Officer. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a Maintenance Operator. FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not implement an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer role is authorized to access all services provided by the module (see Table 7 - Approved Services and Table 8 - Non-Approved Services below). The module implements a dedicated KPI function to indicate if a requested service utilizes an approved security function. For services listed in Table 7 - Approved Services, the indicator function returns 1. For services listed in Table 8 - Non-Approved Services, the indicator function returns 0. The table below lists all approved services that can be used in the approved mode of operation. The abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation: G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. N/A= The service does not access any SSP during its operation Service Description and Input/ Output Approved Security Functions Keys and/or SSPs Role Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs Indicator AES Encryption / Decryption Input for Encryption: key and plain text Output for Encryption: cipher text Input for Decryption: key and cipher text Output for Decryption: plain text AES-CBC, AES-ECB, AES- CFB128, AES-CFB8, AES-OFB, AES-CTR, AES-XTS, AES-GCM, AES-CCM AES key CO W, E 1 AES Key Wrapping Input: key encryption key and key to be wrapped Output: wrapped key AES-KW AES key- encryptio n key CO W, E 1 Secure Hash Generation Input: message Output: Hash value Message Digest SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256 none CO N/A 1 © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 13 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy HMAC generation and verification Generation: Input: HMAC key, message Output: keyed Hash value Verification: Input: HMAC key, message, keyed hash value Output: True or False HMAC Keyed Hash HMAC key CO W, E 1 RSA signature generation and verification Input for signature generation: RSA private key, message Output: signature Input for signature verification: RSA public key, signature Output: True or False RSA signature generation, RSA signature verification RSA key pair CO W, E 1 ECDSA signature generation and verification Input for signature generation: ECDSA private key and message Output: signature Input for signature verification: ECDSA public key and signature Output: True or False ECDSA signature generation, ECDSA signature verification ECDSA key pair CO W, E 1 Random number generation Input: Entropy input string, nonce Output: Random numbers HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG Entropy Input String, Seed, V value and Key CO G, R, E, Z 1 KBKDF Input: key derivation key Output: derived key Key Derivation key derivation key, derived key CO G, R, E 1 ECDSA Key- pair Generation Input: curve size Output: generated key pair ECDSA KeyGen ECDSA key pair CO G, R, E 1 RSA Key-pair Generation Input: key size Output: generated key pair RSA KeyGen RSA key pair CO G, R, E 1 Service Description and Input/ Output Approved Security Functions Keys and/or SSPs Role Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs Indicator © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 14 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 7 - Approved Services Release all resources of symmetric crypto function context Input: handler of symmetric crypto function context Output: zeroised and released memory space N/A AES key CO Z 1 Release all resources of hash context Input: handler of hash context Output: released memory space N/A HMAC key CO Z 1 Release of all resources of asymmetric crypto function context Input: handler of asymmetric crypto function context Output: zeroised and released memory space N/A RSA/ ECDSA keys CO Z 1 Release of all resources of key derivation function context Input: handler of key derivation function context Output: zeroised and released memory space N/A key derivation key CO Z 1 Self-test Input: power Output: Pass/Fail status AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-XTS, AES-CBC, AES-ECB, HMAC_DRBG CTR_DRBG, HMAC, , RSA Signature Generation, RSA Signature Verification, ECDSA Signature Generation, ECDSA Signature Verification, KBKDF Software integrity key CO E 1 Show Status Input: KPI invocation Output: Operational/Error status N/A None CO N/A N/A Show Module Info Input: KPI invocation Output: Module Base Name + Module Version Number N/A None CO N/A N/A Service Description and Input/ Output Approved Security Functions Keys and/or SSPs Role Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs Indicator © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 15 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy The table below lists all non-Approved services that can only be used in the non-Approved mode of operation. Service Description and Input/Output Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator Triple-DES encryption / decryption Module does not meet FIPS 140-3 IG C.G because it does not have a control over the number of blocks to be encrypted under the same Triple-DES key. Input for Encryption: key, plain text data Output for Encryption: cipher text data Input for Decryption: key, cipher text data Output for Decryption: plain text data Triple-DES CO 0 RSA Key Wrapping The CAST does not perform the full KTS, only the raw RSA encrypt/decrypt. Input (RSA encrypt): RSA public key, key to be wrapped Output (RSA encrypt): wrapped key Input (RSA decrypt): RSA private key, key to be unwrapped Output (RSA encrypt): plaintext key RSA encrypt/decrypt CO 0 RSA Key-pair Generation ANSI X9.31 Key Pair Generation key size < 2048 Input for PKG: key size Output: generated key pair RSA Key Gen CO 0 RSA Signature Generation PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Generation Key Size < 2048 Input: RSA private key, message Output: signature RSA SigGen CO 0 RSA Signature Verification PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Verification Key Size < 1024 Input: RSA public key, signature Output: true or false RSA SigVer CO 0 © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 16 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ECDSA Key-pair Generation (PKG) and ECDSA Key Validation (PKV) ECDSA PKG and PKV using curve P-192 Input for PKG: curve size (P-192) Output: generated (P-192) key pair Input for PKV: public key Output: true or false ECDSA Key Generation, ECDSA Key Validation CO 0 ECDSA Signature Generation ECDSA Signature Generation using curve P-192 Input: (P-192) private key, message Output: signature ECDSA Signature Generation CO 0 ECDSA Signature Verification ECDSA Signature Verification using curve P-192 Input: (P-192) public key, signature Output: true or false ECDSA Signature Verification CO 0 ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points Input: key size Output: generated private and public key pair ECDSA Key Generation CO 0 Ed25519 Key Generation Ed25519 Key Generation Input: none Output: generated Curve25519 key pair Ed25519 Key Generation CO 0 Ed25519 Signature Generation EdDSA Signature Generation over Curve25519 Input: (Curve25519) private key, message Output: signature Ed25519 Signature Generation CO 0 Ed25519 Signature Verification Ed25519 Signature Verification over Curve25519 Input: (Curve25519) public key, signature Output: true or false Ed25519 Signature Verification CO 0 Ed25519 Key Agreement Key Agreement Input: peer public key, own private key Output: shared secret Ed25519 Key Agreement CO 0 Service Description and Input/Output Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 17 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ECIES Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves Input for encryption: peer public key, plaintext Output for encryption: public key, ciphertext (with authentication tag) Input for decryption: authentication tag, ciphertext, own private key Output for decryption: plaintext message or error ECIES Encrypt/Decrypt CO 0 ANSI X9.63 Key Derivation SHA-1 hash-based key derivation function Input: key derivation key Output: derived key SHA-1 CO 0 SP800-56C Key Derivation (HKDF) SHA-256 hash-based key derivation function Input: key derivation key Output: derived key SHA-256 CO 0 RFC6637 Key Derivation SHA hash based key derivation function Input: key derivation key Output: derived key SHA-256, SHA-512, AES-128, AES-256 CO 0 OMAC Message Authentication Code Generation and Verification One-Key CBC MAC using 128-bit key For Message Authentication Code Generation Input: message and key Output: message authentication code For Message Authentication Code Verification Input: message, key and message authentication code Output: True or False OMAC CO 0 Message digest generation. Message digest generation using non-approved algorithms Input: message Output: message digest MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD CO 0 Service Description and Input/Output Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 18 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 8 - Non-Approved Services (other) symmetric encryption / decryption symmetric encryption / decryption using non- approved algorithms Input for Encryption: key and plain text data Output for Encryption: cipher text data Input for Decryption: key and cipher text data Output for Decryption: plain text data Blowfish, CAST5, DES, RC2, RC4 CO 0 Service Description and Input/Output Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 19 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 5. Software/Firmware security 5.1. Integrity Techniques The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software], which is made up of a single component, is provided in the form of binary executable code. A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module. The HMAC-SHA256 implemented in the module is used as an approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited i.e., the module is not operational. 5.2. On-Demand Integrity Test Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. It can also be invoked by self-test service or powering-off and reloading the module. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 20 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 6. Operational Environment The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module is supplied as part of macOS Big Sur 11.0.1, a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the computing platforms specified in section 2. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 21 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 7. Physical Security The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software], since it is a software module. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 22 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 8. Non-invasive Security Currently, the non-invasive security is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 23 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management The following table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module: Key/ SSP Name /Type Strength Security Function and Cert. # Generation Import /Export Establish ment Storage Zeroisation Use and related keys AES Key 128 to 256 bits AES Encryption/ Decryption A945 (c_asm) A976 (c_aesni) A978 (asm_aesni) A977 (asm_x86) A943 (vng_asm) A973 (vng_aesni) N/A Import from calling applicatio n. No Export N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down Symmetric Encryption and Decryption AES Key- wrapping Key 128 to 256 bits AES Key Wrapping A945 (c_asm) A976 (c_aesni) N/A Import from calling applicatio n. No Export N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down Key Transport HMAC Keys Min: 112 bits HMAC generation/ verification A979 (vng_Intel) A974 (c_avx2) A975(c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) N/A Import from calling applicatio n. No Export N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down Keyed Hash ECDSA Key Pair (including intermediat e keygen values) 112 to 256 bits ECDSA signature generation and verification A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) The key pairs are generated conformant to SP800-133r2 (CKG) using FIPS186-4 Key Generation method, and the random value used in the key generation is generated using SP800-90A DRBG Import and Export to calling applicatio n for key pair only. Intermedia te keygen values are not output. N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down. Intermediate keygen values are zeroized before the module returns from the key generation function. Digital Signature © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 24 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy RSA Key Pair (including intermediat e keygen values) 112 to 150 bits RSA signature generation and verification A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) The key pairs are generated conformant to SP800-133r2 (CKG) using FIPS186-4 Key Generation method, and the random value used in the key generation is generated using SP800-90A DRBG Import and Export to calling applicatio n for key pair only. Intermedia te keygen values are not output. N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down. Intermediate keygen values are zeroized before the module returns from the key generation function. Digital Signature Entropy Input String 256 bits Random Number Generation ENT (P) and ENT (NP) Obtained from two entropy sources Import from OS. No Export N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down Random Number Generation DRBG Seed, Internal State V value and Key 256 bits Random Number Generation A943 (vng_asm) A945 (c_asm) A976 (c-aesni) A973 (vng_aesni) A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) A990 (c_ssse3) Derived from entropy input string as defined by SP800-90A N/A N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down Random Number Generation KBKDF Key Derivation Key Min: 112 bits KBKDF A990 (c_ssse3) N/A imported from calling applicatio n, No Export N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down Key Derivation KBKDF Derived Key Min: 112 bits Internally generated via SP800-108 KBKDF key derivation algorithm No Import. Export to calling applicatio n N/A N/A: The module does not provide persiste nt keys/ SSPs storage. Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down Key Derivation © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 25 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 9 - SSPs 9.1. Random Number Generation A NIST approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as specified in NIST [SP 800-90A] is used. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The random numbers used for key generation are all generated by CTR_DRBG in this module. Per section 10.2.1.1 of [SP 800-90A], the internal state of CTR_DRBG is the value V, Key. The module also employs a HMAC_DRBG for random number generation. The HMAC_DRBG is only used at the early boot time of macOS kernel for memory randomization. The output of HMAC_DRBG is not used for key generation. Per section 10.1.2.1 of [SP 800-90A], the internal state of HMAC_DRBG is the value V, Key. The deterministic random bit generators are seeded by read_random. The read_random is the Kernel Space interface.Two entropy sources (one non-physical entropy source and one physical entropy source) residing within the TOEPP provide the random bits. The output of entropy pool provides 256-bits of entropy to seed and reseed SP800-90B DRBG during initialization (seed) and reseeding (reseed). Table 10 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 9.2. Key / SSP Generation The module generates Keys and SSPs in accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per [SP800-133r2] sections 4 and 5.1 (vendor affirmed), compliant with [FIPS186-4], and using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is a direct output from [SP800-90A] DRBG. The key generation service for RSA, ECDSA, as well as the [SP 800-90A] DRBG have been ACVT tested with algorithm certificates found in Table 4. 9.3. Keys/SSPs Establishment The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the Approved mode: • AES-Key Wrapping The module implements a Key Transport Scheme (KTS) using AES-KW compliant to [SP800-38F]. The SSP establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. • KBKDF Key Derivation The KBKDF is compliant to [SP800-108]. The module implements both Counter and Feedback modes with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC- SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, or HMAC-SHA2-512 as the PRF. Software integrity key N/A HMAC SHA-256 A990 (c_ssse3) A979 (vng_Intel) A974 (c_avx2) A975 (c_avx) N/A N/A N/A Stored in the module binary comput ed during build. N/A Self-Test Entropy Source Minimum number of bits of entropy Details NIST SP800-90B compliant ENT (P) and NIST SP800-90B compliant ENT (NP) 256 The seed is provided by post-processed entropy data from two entropy sources © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 26 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 9.4. Keys/SSPs Import/Export All keys and SSPs that are entered from, or output to module, are entered from or output to the invoking application running on the same device. Keys/SSPs entered into the module are electronically entered in plain text form. Keys/SSPs are output from the module in plain text form if required by the calling application. The module allows the output of plaintext CSPs (i.e., ECDSA/RSA Key Pairs). To prevent inadvertent output of sensitive information, the module performs the following two independent internal actions: 1. The module will internally request the random number generation service to obtain the random numbers and verify that the service completed without errors. 2. Once the keys are generated the module will perform the pairwise consistency test and verify that the test is completed without errors. Only after successful completion of both actions, are the generated CSPs output via the KPI output parameter in plaintext. 9.5. Keys/SSPs Storage The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] stores ephemeral keys/SSPs in memory only. They are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the calling application. The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage. The module protects all keys/SSPs through the memory separation and protection mechanisms provided by the operating system. No process other than the module itself can access the keys/SSPs in its process’ memory. 9.6. Keys/SSPs Zeroization Keys and SSPs are zeroised when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the system is powered down. Input and output interfaces are inhibited while zeroisation is performed. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 27 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 10. Self-tests This section specifies the pre-operational and conditional self-tests performed by the module. The pre-operational and conditional self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The module does not implement a bypass mode nor security functions critical to the secure operation of the cryptographic module and thus, does not implement neither a pre- operational bypass test nor pre-operational critical functions test. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. If the test fails either pre-operational and conditional self-tests, the module reports an error message indicating the cause of the failure and enters the Error State (See section 10.3). The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling). 10.1.Pre-operational Software Integrity Test The module performs a pre-operational software integrity automatically when the module is loaded into memory (i.e., at power on) before the module transitions to the operational state. A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] with HMAC-SHA256 used to perform the approved integrity technique. Prior to using HMAC-SHA-256, a Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) is performed. If the CAST on the HMAC-SHA-256 is successful, the HMAC value of the runtime image is recalculated and compared with the stored HMAC value pre-computed at compilation time. 10.2.Conditional Self-Tests Conditional self-tests are be performed by a cryptographic module when the conditions specified for the following tests occur: Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test, Pair-Wise Consistency Test. The module does not implement any functions requiring a Software/Firmware Load Test, Manual Entry Test, Conditional Bypass Test nor Conditional Critical Functions Test; therefore, these tests are not performed by the module. The following sub-sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software]. 10.2.1.Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests In addition to the pre-operational software integrity test described in Section 10.1, the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] also runs the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) for all cryptographic functions of each approved cryptographic algorithm implemented by the module during power-up as well. All CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the cryptographic algorithm. These tests are detailed in Table 11 - Pre-Operational Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests below. Table 11 - Pre-Operational Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests Cryptographic Algorithm Notes HMAC-SHA256 Used for module integrity test AES implementations selected by the module for the corresponding environment AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-XTS, AES-CBC, AES-ECB using 128-bit key Separate encryption / decryption operations are performed CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG Each DRBG mode tested separately HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512 KAT SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 Covered by high level HMAC self-test RSA, 2048-bit modulus with SHA-256 Separate Signature generation/ verification KAT are performed ECDSA, P-256 curve with SHA-256 Signature generation/verification KAT are performed KBKDF (counter and feedback modes) KAT © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 28 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 10.2.2.Conditional Pairwise Consistency Test The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] does generate RSA and ECDSA asymmetric keys and performs the required RSA and ECDSA pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs. 10.3.Error Handling If any of the above-mentioned self-tests described in Sections 10.1, 10.2.1 or 10.2.2 fail, the module reports the cause of the error and enters an error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to power cycle the device which results in the module being reloaded into memory and reperforming the pre-operational software integrity test and the Conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre- operational software integrity test and the Conditional CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the Error State and the status indicators reported. Table 12 Error Indicators Cause of Error Error Indicator Failed Pre-operational Software Integrity Test print statement “FAILED: fipspost_post_integrity” to stdout Failed Conditional CAST print statement “FAILED:” to stdout ( refers to any of the cryptographic functions listed in Table 11.) Failed Conditional PCT Error code “CCEC_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY” returned for ECDSA Error code “CCRSA_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY” returned for RSA © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 29 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 11. Life-cycle assurance 11.1. Delivery and Operation The module is built into macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 and delivered with macOS. There is no standalone delivery of the module as a software library. The vendor’s internal development process guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its intended macOS version. For additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor, and it is verified during the integration into macOS. This digital signature-based integrity protection during the delivery/integration process is not to be confused with the HMAC-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of its pre-operational self-tests. 11.2.Crypto Officer Guidance The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 8 - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode. A Crypto Officer Role Guide is provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary technical information to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 systems. This guide walks the reader through the system’s assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary if module integrity requires remediation. A link to the Guide can be found on the Product security, validations, and guidance page found in [macOS]. The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module: • AES-GCM IV is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1b (IPsec-v3). The GCM IV generation follows RFC 4106 and shall only be used for the IPsec-v3 protocol version 3. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The module does not implement the IPsec protocol. The module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The design of the IPsec protocol implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed. This condition is not enforced by the module; however, it is met implicitly. The module does not retain any state when power is lost. As indicated in Table 10, column Storage, the module exclusively uses volatile storage. This means that AES-GCM key/IVs are not persistently stored during power off: therefore, there is no re-connection possible when the power is back on with re- generation of the key used for GCM. After restoration of the power, the user of the module (e.g., IKE) along with User application that implements the protocol, must perform a complete new key establishment operation using new random numbers (Entropy input string, DRBG seed, DRBG internal state V and Key, shared secret values that are not retained during power cycle, see table 10) with subsequent KDF operations to establish a new GCM key/IV pair on either side of the network communication channel • AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS data unit does not exceed 220 blocks. The module checks explicitly that Key_1 ≠ Key_2 before using the keys in the XTS-Algorithm to process data with them compliant with IG C.I. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 30 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 12. Mitigation of other attacks The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks. © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 31 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy A. Glossary and Abbreviations AES Advanced Encryption Standard AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test CAST5 A symmetric-key 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit key CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB Cipher Feedback CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter Mode DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book ENT NIST SP 800-90B Compliant Entropy Source FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication GCM Galois Counter Mode HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code KAT Known Answer Test KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function KDF Key Derivation Function KEXT Kernel Extension KW AES Key Wrap MAC Message Authentication Code KPI Kernel Programming Interface NIST National Institute of Science and Technology OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding OFB Output Feedback PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration PKG Key-Pair Generation PKV Public Key Validation PRF Pseudo-Random Function PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS TEOPP Secure Hash Standard Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 32 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy B. References FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3 SP 800-140x CMVP FIPS 140-3 Related Reference https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-standards FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program September 2020 https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-ig-announcements FIPS140-3_MM CMVP FIPS 140-3 Draft Management Manual https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/ fips%20140-3/Draft%20FIPS-140-3-CMVP%20Management%20Manual%2009-18-2020.pdf SP 800-140 FIPS 140-3 Derived Test Requirements (DTR) https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140/final SP 800-140A CMVP Documentation Requirements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140a/final SP 800-140B CMVP Security Policy Requirements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140b/final SP 800-140C CMVP Approved Security Functions https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140c/final SP 800-140D CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment Methods https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140d/final SP 800-140E CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140e/final SP 800-140F CMVP Approved Non-Invasive Attack Mitigation Test Metrics https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/ 800-140f/final FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS )
 March 201 2
 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS )
 July 201 3
 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard November 200 1
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 200 8
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2. 1
 February 200 3
 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm September 200 2
 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm September 200 9
 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 33 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Technique s
 December 200 1
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 200 4
 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/ Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Device s
 January 201 0
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 201 2
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 August 202 0
 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf SP800-57 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 - Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General 
 May 202 0
 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf SP800-67 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher January 201 2
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf SP800-90Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generator s
 June 201 5
 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generatio n
 January 201 8
 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf SP800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised )
 October 200 9
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf SP800-131Ar2 Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths 
 March 201 9
 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications 
 December 201 0
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf SP800-133r2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation 
 June 202 0
 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 34 35 Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Intel, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy B. SP800-135 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions 
 December 201 1
 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf MACOS macOS Technical Overview https://developer.apple.com/macos/ SEC Apple Platform Security (Spring 2020) https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web macOS Product security certifications for macOS https://support.apple.com/HT201159 © 2022 Apple Inc., All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision. of 35 35