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Trusted Platform Module 2.0 SLB 9672 FW 17.10,
17.12, 17.13 and SLB 9673 FW 27.10, 27.13
FIPS 140 2 Level 2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version: Release 1.3
Date: 2023-06-28
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents.............................................................................................................................. 2
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................... 3
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................... 4
1 Acronyms and Definitions ......................................................................................................... 5
2 Overview................................................................................................................................. 6
2.1 Version, Configurations and Modes of Operation..................................................................................6
2.2 Physical Characteristics and Cryptographic Boundary .........................................................................7
2.3 Operational Environment .......................................................................................................................8
2.4 TPM Composition....................................................................................................................................9
3 Cryptographic Functionality ................................................................................................... 11
3.1 Cryptographic Functions ......................................................................................................................11
3.2 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys ......................................................................................14
3.2.1 CSPs and Public Keys in TPM Full Operational Mode .....................................................................14
3.2.2 CSPs and Public Keys in Field Upgrade Mode.................................................................................16
4 Roles, Authentication and Services.......................................................................................... 17
4.1 TPM Identification and Authentication Methods.................................................................................17
4.1.1 Password Verification ......................................................................................................................17
4.1.2 HMAC Challenge-Response Authentication....................................................................................17
4.1.3 Enhanced Authorization for Authentication...................................................................................17
4.1.4 Role Based Authentication Method Summary................................................................................18
4.1.5 Strength of Mechanism....................................................................................................................18
4.2 Services..................................................................................................................................................19
4.2.1 Services in TPM Full Operational Mode...........................................................................................19
4.2.2 Services in Field Upgrade Mode ......................................................................................................25
5 Self-tests ............................................................................................................................... 26
6 Physical Security Policy .......................................................................................................... 28
7 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC)....................................................... 29
8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy............................................................................................ 30
9 Security Rules and Guidance ................................................................................................... 31
9.1 Requirements for Secure Operation.....................................................................................................31
10 Annex A – Module Initialization................................................................................................ 33
11 Annex B – Module Startup ....................................................................................................... 34
References ..................................................................................................................................... 35
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Pictures of SLB9672AU20....................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 Pictures of SLB9673AU20....................................................................................................................8
Figure 3 TPM Composition SLB 9672 ................................................................................................................9
Figure 4 TPM Composition SLB 9673 ..............................................................................................................10
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List of Tables
Table 1 Acronyms and Definitions...................................................................................................................5
Table 2 Security Level of Security Requirements............................................................................................6
Table 3 Configuration Part and Version Numbers ..........................................................................................6
Table 4 Types printed on packages.................................................................................................................8
Table 5 Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................................................8
Table 6 Approved Cryptographic Functions – Field Upgrade Mode.............................................................11
Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Functions – TPM Full Operational Mode.................................................11
Table 8 Allowed Cryptographic Functions – Field Upgrade Mode ...............................................................13
Table 9 Non-allowed Cryptographic Functions – TPM Full Operational Mode............................................14
Table 10 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs used in TPM Full Operational Mode ................................................14
Table 11 Public Keys used in TPM Full Operational Mode..............................................................................15
Table 12 Public Keys and Information used in Field Upgrade Mode..............................................................16
Table 13 Roles Supported by the Module .......................................................................................................17
Table 14 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication ...................................................................18
Table 15 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication ...................................................................18
Table 16 Modes of access.................................................................................................................................19
Table 17 Unauthenticated Services SSP Access .............................................................................................20
Table 18 Utility Support Services SSP Access .................................................................................................21
Table 19 User Authenticated Services SSP Access..........................................................................................22
Table 20 ADMIN (CO) Authenticated Services SSP Access..............................................................................23
Table 21 DUP Authenticated Services SSP Access..........................................................................................24
Table 22 TPM Challenge + Response Authentication and Encryption Services.............................................24
Table 23 Field Upgrade Mode Unauthenticated Services CSP Access ...........................................................25
Table 24 Operational mode Self-Tests............................................................................................................26
Table 25 Field Upgrade mode Self-Tests.........................................................................................................27
Table 26 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...............................................................................................................30
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Acronyms and Definitions
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1 Acronyms and Definitions
Table 1 Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
CSS ESS The Infineon group: Connected Secure Systems, Embedded Security Solutions
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRNGT FIPS 140-2 AS09.42 Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSP Critical Security Parameters
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
GPIO General Purpose Input Output
IC Integrated Circuit
I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit
KAT Known Answer Test
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function
MPU Memory Protection Unit
NVM Non-Volatile Memory (e.g., EEPROM, Flash)
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
PSP Public Security Parameters
RAM Random-Access Memory
ROM Read-Only Memory
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface; Motorola / de-facto standard for a synchronous serial
communication interface. An alternative to the LPC for the TPM.
SSP CSP or PSP
TCG Trusted Computing Group (http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org)
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TRNG True Random Number Generator (a form of hardware random number generator)
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2 Overview
This document defines the Security Policy for the Infineon Trusted Platform Module 2.0 SLB 9672 and SLB 9673
cryptographic module, hereafter denoted TPM. The SLB 9672 uses the SPI interface, the SLB 9673 uses the I2C
interface.
The TPM is a single chip module that provides computer manufacturers with the core components of a
subsystem used to assure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in e-commerce and internet
communications within a Trusted Computing Platform. The TPM is a complete solution implementing the TCG
specifications for the TPM 2.0 family, [1][2][3][4][5][6]. See http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org for further
information on TCG and TPM.
The TPM is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The FIPS 140-2
security levels for the TPM are as follows:
Table 2 Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks 2
2.1 Version, Configurations and Modes of Operation
Table 3 Configuration Part and Version Numbers
HW Part Variant Package Firmware Version
SLB 9672 AU20 PG-UQFN-32-3 17.10.16488
SLB 9672 AU20 PG-UQFN-32-3 17.12.16858
SLB 9672 AU20 PG-UQFN-32-3 17.13.17733
SLB 9673 AU20 PG-UQFN-32-3 27.10.16688
SLB 9673 AU20 PG-UQFN-32-3 27.13.17770
The TPM is intended for use in general purpose computing environments, as a device peripheral to the CPU,
with application controlling the usage of the module. The TPM is operated in the FIPS 140-2 Approved mode
when the application complies with the conditions listed in Section 9.1.
The module provides two modes of operations: TPM Full Operational Mode and Field Upgrade Mode.
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In TPM Full Operational Mode, all services and authentication mechanisms are available. The TPM Full
Operational Mode is entered as soon as One Time Initialization (first power-up) of the TPM is done.
In Field Upgrade Mode, the module mainly provides Field Upgrade services to load a new Firmware. The Field
Upgrade Mode is entered after successful Administrator Authentication to authorize an update to a newer
version of the installed Firmware. In addition recovery of the already authorized and installed Firmware is also
provided.
If the requirements for secure operation from section 9.1 are met, the TPM Full Operational Mode and Field
Upgrade Mode are Approved Modes of operation in the meaning of FIPS 140-2. For the detailed differences for
the Modes of Operation in terms of Algorithms, Services and Self-Tests please refer to section 3, section 4.2 and
section 4.2.2.
The security functions available in the non-approved mode are listed in Table 9.
The Show Status service (specifically TPM2_GetCapability with the capability=TPM_CAP_PROPERTIES and
property=TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1 qualifier) may be used to verify the FIPS-compliant version of the
TPM firmware is installed on the TPM.
2.2 Physical Characteristics and Cryptographic Boundary
The TPM cryptographic boundary is represented by the surfaces, edges and connection points of the IC
package. The chip comes with the support of one temperature range:
• The AU20 is the enhanced temperature type from -40°C to 105°C (Figure 1 and Figure 2)
The package is shown on a one (1) millimeter by one (1) millimeter grid to indicate size on the following figure.
The physical ports and logical interfaces are detailed in Table 5.
Figure 1 Pictures of SLB9672AU20
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Figure 2 Pictures of SLB9673AU20
Table 4 Types printed on packages
Package HW Part Type printed on package
PG-UQFN-32-3 SLB 9672 SLB9672AU20 (Figure 1)
PG-UQFN-32-3 SLB 9673 SLB9673AU20 (Figure 2)
Table 5 Ports and Interfaces
Port Ports common to all configurations Logical Interface Type
GND Ground Power
GPIO General Purpose I/O Control Input, Status Output
NC No connects Unused
VDD 1.8V or 3.3V Power
RST# Reset Control Input
SPI Interface Specific (SLB 9672) Ports and mapping to Logical Interfaces
MISO Master Input, Slave Output Control Input, Data Output, Status Output
MOSI Master Output, Slave Input Control Input, Data Input, Status Output
SCLK Serial Clock Control Input
CS# Chip Select Control Input
I2C Interface Specific (SLB 9673) Ports and mapping to Logical Interfaces
SDA Serial Data Control Input, Data Input, Status Output
SCL Serial Clock Control Input
2.3 Operational Environment
The module has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The module includes a
firmware load function to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation
must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of scope of
this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
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2.4 TPM Composition
Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict the TPM hardware block diagram, shown from logical perspective. The red outline
indicates the cryptographic boundary. Figure 3 depicts SLB 9672 (SPI) and Figure 4 depicts SLB 9673 (I2C).
Peripheral
Bus (APB)
Memory Bus (AIX)
Peripherals
Firmware
SPI
Interface
GPIO
Interface
Power
Mgmt
GND
RST#
MOSI
SCLK
CS#
MISO
Watchdog
timer
Crypto
accelerators
Core
RNG
Security
Peripherals
Memory
Volatile
Non-
Volatile
SOLID FLASHTM
Figure 3 TPM Composition SLB 9672
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Peripheral
Bus (APB)
Memory Bus (AIX)
Peripherals
Firmware
I2C
Interface
GPIO
Interface
Power
Mgmt
GND
RST#
SDA
SCL
Watchdog
timer
Crypto
accelerators
Core
RNG
Security
Peripherals
Memory
Volatile
Non-
Volatile
SOLID FLASHTM
Figure 4 TPM Composition SLB 9673
The major blocks of the TPM are:
• Peripherals:
− Power Mgmt: power management module to support low power modes
− GPIO: Bidirectional signal which can be set or read by the caller; not otherwise used by the TPM
− SPI / I2C: communication interface to receive TPM commands
• Security peripherals
• The RNG includes a physical, SP800-90B entropy source
• The core includes a 32-bit CPU with MPU and Cache
• The hardware crypto accelerators provide symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic functionalities
• The firmware provides the TCG functionality specified in [1][2][3][4][5] and the services described in Section
4.2. The firmware is stored in non-volatile memory.
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3 Cryptographic Functionality
3.1 Cryptographic Functions
The TPM implements the approved and allowed cryptographic functions listed in Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 and
Table 9 in the approved modes of operation.
Table 6 Approved Cryptographic Functions – Field Upgrade Mode
ACVP
Cert
Algorithm Standard(s) Mode/Method
Key Lengths/
Curves/Moduli
Use
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
ECDSA FIPS 186-4 [9] SHA-512 P-521 Signature Verification
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
SHA FIPS 180-4 [7] SHA-512
SHA-384
n.a. Message Digest
Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Functions – TPM Full Operational Mode
ACVP
Cert
Algorithm Standard(s) Mode/Method
Key Lengths/
Curves/Moduli
Use
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
AES FIPS 197
[10]
SP800-38A
[12]
CFB128 128 bits
192 bits
256 bits
Data
Encryption/Decryption
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
AES FIPS 197
[10]
SP800-38A
[12]
ECB used by CTR_DRBG:
AES-256
256 bits Deterministic Random
Bit Generation
Vendor
affirmed
CKG SP800-133
[21][17]
“Direct Generation” of Symmetric Keys
(section 6.1) and Key Pairs for Digital
Signature Schemes (section 5.1) are using
the output of the Approved DRBG (section 4)
Key Generation
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
CVL
RSADP
SP800-
56Br2 [15]
-- 2048 bits Key Transport Primitive
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ACVP
Cert
Algorithm Standard(s) Mode/Method
Key Lengths/
Curves/Moduli
Use
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
CVL
RSASP
FIPS 186-4
[9]
-- 2048 bits Tested, but not used
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
DRBG SP800-90A
[17]
CTR_DRBG: AES-256
(with derivation function)
256 bits Deterministic Random
Bit Generation
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
ECDSA FIPS 186-4
[9]
-- P-256
P-384
Key Generation,
Public Key Validation
SHA-384
SHA-256
P-384 Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
SHA-256
SHA-384
P-256 Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
SHA-1 P-256, P-384 Signature Verification
N/A ENT (P) SP 800-90B
[19]
Internal entropy source Minimum
entropy of
7.51729 bits per
8-bit bloc.
Provide a
minimum
entropy of 256
bits to the
DRBG.
Seeding/Reseeding of
the DRBG
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
HMAC FIPS 198-1
[11]
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-
256, HMAC-SHA-384
160 bits, 256
bits, 384 bits
Message
Authentication, output
data are not truncated
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
KAS SP800-
56Ar3 [14]
SP800-
56Cr1 [16]
One-Pass DH,
Initiator/Responder, No
Key Confirmation,
oneStepKdf using SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-384
P-256
P-384
Key Generation,
Partial Public Key
Validation, Key
Agreement
Key Derivation (key
establishment
methodology provides
128 or 192 bits of
encryption strength)
A1718
A2072
A2588
KAS-SSC SP800-
56Ar3 [14]
One-Pass DH,
Initiator/Responder
P-256
P-384
Key Agreement
Primitive
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ACVP
Cert
Algorithm Standard(s) Mode/Method
Key Lengths/
Curves/Moduli
Use
A3736
A3738
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
KBKDF SP800-108
[19]
CTR mode
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-
256, HMAC-SHA-384
160 bits, 256
bits, 384 bits
Key Derivation
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
KTS FIPS 197
[10]
FIPS 198-1
[11]
SP800-38F
[13]
AES-128, AES-192, AES-
256 CFB & HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-384
128 bits (AES),
192 bits (AES)
256 bits (AES)
&
160 bits (SHA-
1), 256 bits
(SHA-256), 384
bits (SHA-384)
Key
Wrapping/Unwrapping
(key establishment
methodology provides
between 128 and 256
bits of encryption
strength)
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
KTS-RSA SP800-
56Br2 [15]
KTS-OAEP-basic
encapsulate &
decapsulate
2048 bits
3072 bits
4096 bits
Key Transport (key
establishment
methodology provides
between 112 and 150
bits of encryption
strength)
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
RSA FIPS 186-4
[9]
-- 2048 bits
3072 bits
4096 bits
Key Generation
SHA-256 & PKCS1-V1_5,
PSS
SHA-384 & PKCS1-V1_5,
PSS
2048 bits
3072 bits
4096 bits
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
SHA-1 & PKCS1-V1_5, PSS 2048 bits
3072 bits
4096 bits
Signature Verification
A1718
A2072
A2588
A3736
A3738
SHA FIPS 180-4
[8]
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 160 bits, 256
bits, 384 bits
Message Digest
Table 8 Allowed Cryptographic Functions – Field Upgrade Mode
Algorithm Use
XMSS (Extended Merkle Signature Scheme) Signature Verification
Note: This Post Quantum signature algorithm is used in parallel to the approved ECDSA signature. No
security is claimed for the XMSS signature algorithm.
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The following table shows the cryptographic functions of the TPM, which are neither approved nor allowed.
Table 9 Non-allowed Cryptographic Functions – TPM Full Operational Mode
Algorithm Use
ECDAA For Elliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation used to generate anonymous
signatures with the Barreto-Naehrig (BN) elliptic curve BN-256
RSA 1024-bit (non-
compliant)
Key Generation,
Signature Generation,
Key Wrapping (non-compliant because less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
SHA-1 (non-compliant) Signature Generation using SHA-1
3.2 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys
All CSPs and PSPs used by the Module are listed in the following sections.
3.2.1 CSPs and Public Keys in TPM Full Operational Mode
Table 10 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs used in TPM Full Operational Mode
Name Description and usage
DRBG-EI TPM DRBG Entropy Input – produced by the NDRNG, used during DRBG instantiation and
reseed.
DRBG-STATE TPM DRBG State – Current values of AES 256 CTR_DRBG state (128 bit V and 256 bit K).
TPM-EPS TPM Endorsement Primary Seed – Minimum of 512 bits random value; used as master seed
value to derive primary keys and secrets in the Endorsement Hierarchy;
TPM-PS TPM Platform, Storage Primary Seed – Minimum of 512 bits random value; used as master
seed value to derive primary keys and secrets in the Platform respective Storage Hierarchy.
TPM-Proof TPM Proof Value – 512 bits random value used as KW-KDK Key in an HMAC-SHA-384 KBKDF
(to derive confidentiality keys KW-CK) and used as KW-IK for HMAC-SHA-384 Integrity
Protection of CSP wrapping in the TPM Context Management Service. Also used as HMAC-
SHA-384 Integrity Key to prove that data structures have only been generated by a specific
TPM module.
AS-AD-K Authorization Session Authentication Data Key – 160-bit or 256-bit or 384-bit secret
authentication data known by the Object Owner or Hierarchy Owner. E.g. used to derive
TPM AS-SK for Bound Authorization Sessions.
AS-SALT Authorization Session Salt – 160-bit or 256-bit or 384-bit Salt value used to derive a TPM AS-
SK for Salted Authorization Sessions. The AS-SALT serves as the Key Derivation Key within
the SP800-108 KBKDF.
AS-SK Authorization Session – Session Key – HMAC-SHA-1 160-bit or HMAC-SHA-256 256-bit or
HMAC-SHA-384 384-bit session key used for message authentication in a bound and/or
salted TPM Authorization Session.
ES-KDK Encryption Session Key Derivation Key – 160-bit or 256-bit or 384-bit Key used to derive ES-
EK.
ES-EK Encryption Session Ephemeral Key – AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 ephemeral key used in
CFB mode for message parameter encrypt/decrypt within a secure messaging session.
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Name Description and usage
KW-KDK Key Wrap – Key Derivation Key – 160-bit or 256-bit or 384-bit secret used to derive KW-IK and
KW-CK.
KW-IK Key Wrap – Integrity Key – HMAC-SHA-1 160-bit or HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384 Key
used for integrity protection of encrypted data used in the TPM for Key Wrapping
Mechanism.
KW-CK Key Wrap – Confidentiality Key – AES-128 or AES-256 key used to protect CSP confidentiality
via Key Wrapping used in the TPM.
SIGK Signing Key – RSA 2048-bit or RSA 3072-bit or RSA 4096-bit or ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 private
key used for TPM Protocols and User Signature Generation Services.
IFX-PE-KEK Infineon Primary Endorsement Key Establishment Key – RSA 2048-bit or RSA 3072-bit or RSA
4096-bit (key transport) or ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 (key agreement) private key used in TPM
Protocols and uniquely associated with each TPM device via an Infineon X509 Certificate;
installed at the factory.
TPM-KEK TPM Key Establishment Key – RSA 2048-bit or RSA 3072-bit or RSA 4096-bit (key transport) or
ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 (key agreement) private key used in TPM Protocols.
U-KEK User Key Establishment Key – RSA 2048-bit or RSA 3072-bit or RSA 4096-bit (key transport)
or ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 (key agreement) private key used in a User Key Agreement
Primitive Services.
U-MACK User HMAC Key – 160-bit or 256-bit or 384-bit HMAC key used in User HMAC Services.
U-E-KAK User Ephemeral Key Agreement Key – ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 private key used in a User Key
Agreement Primitive Services.
U-KDK User Key Derivation Key – 160-bit or 256-bit or 384-bit secret used to derive U-MACK.
U-EDK User Encryption/Decryption Key - AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 key used in CFB mode or CTR
mode in AES Encrypt/Decrypt Service.
Table 11 Public Keys used in TPM Full Operational Mode
Name Description and usage
SIGK-PUB Public Signing Key – RSA 2048-bit or RSA 3072-bit or RSA 4096-bit or ECC P-256 or ECC P-
384 public signature verification key used for TPM Enhanced Authorization Protocols and
User Signature Verification Service.
TPM-KEK-PUB TPM Public Key Establishment Key – RSA 2048-bit or RSA 3072-bit or RSA 4096-bit (key
transport) or ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 (key agreement) used in TPM Protocols.
U-KEK-PUB User Public Key Establishment Key – RSA 2048-bit or RSA 3072-bit or RSA 4096-bit (key
transport) or ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 (key agreement) key used in User Key Agreement
Primitive Services.
U-E-KAK-PUB User Public Ephemeral Key Agreement Key – ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 ephemeral public
key used in User Key Agreement Primitive Services.
IFX-PE-KEK-PUB Infineon Public Primary Endorsement Key Establishment Key – RSA 2048-bit or RSA 3072-
bit or RSA 4096-bit (key transport) or ECC P-256 or ECC P-384 (key agreement) public key
used in TPM Protocols and uniquely associated with each TPM device via Infineon X509
Certificate; installed at the factory.
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3.2.2 CSPs and Public Keys in Field Upgrade Mode
No cryptographic Keys nor CSPs are used in Field Upgrade Mode
Table 12 Public Keys and Information used in Field Upgrade Mode
Name Description and usage
PUB-SIGK-SIA Public Signature Verification Key for Source and Integrity Authentication – ECDSA NIST P-
521 public key for field upgrade signature verification to verify source and integrity
authentication of a Firmware Manifest; installed at factory
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4 Roles, Authentication and Services
The TPM supports three roles, a CO role, a User role and a DUP role, as described in Table 13.
The TPM:
• Does not support a maintenance role or concurrent operators.
• Requires re-authentication following a power-cycle.
Table 13 Roles Supported by the Module
Role ID Role Description
CO Cryptographic Officer, also known as the TPM Administrator or Admin Role.
Controls certification of objects and changes Authentication Data of objects.
User User, also known as the object owner.
Uses the TPM to create cryptographic objects and to obtain cryptographic services for
cryptographic objects.
DUP Duplication Officer.
Uses the TPM to duplicate TPM objects.
4.1 TPM Identification and Authentication Methods
The TPM supports the following Authentication Methods:
4.1.1 Password Verification
Operators in the CO or User roles are authenticated by a demonstration of knowledge of a Password as
authentication data. Typically, this will be used (but is not restricted) in a limited pre-boot environment.
4.1.2 HMAC Challenge-Response Authentication
This Challenge-Response Authentication is described as HMAC Authorization Session within TCG Specifications.
Operators in the CO or User roles are authenticated by a challenge and response demonstration of knowledge
of a shared secret. The shared secrets are HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384 cryptographic keys.
The TPM HMAC authorization session mechanism includes nonce values to prevent replay attacks.
4.1.3 Enhanced Authorization for Authentication
Enhanced Authorization is also referred to as Policy Authorization Session within TCG Specifications. Enhanced
Authorization allows object creators to define specific actions and test which have to be performed before the
service using CSP key can be executed. The specific policy is encapsulated in a policy digest being SHA-1/SHA-
256/SHA-384 Digest Value and associated with the CSP key.
Operators in the CO or User roles can be authenticated via policy digest, which requires as action the use of an
authentication mechanism. Password Verification or HMAC Challenge-Response Authentication as described
above, or Challenge-Response Authentication based on a Public Key Digital Signature Algorithm (2048-bit or
3072-bit or 4096-bit or 256-bit ECDSA or 384-bit ECDSA) can be used as authentication mechanism. The TPM
policy authorization session mechanism includes nonce values to prevent replay attacks. For guidance on the
use of Enhanced Authorization for authentication please refer to Section 9.1.
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4.1.4 Role Based Authentication Method Summary
The following table shows the allowed authentication mechanisms and data options for each Role. Enhanced
Authorization is always allowed for each Role. For CO and User roles the TPM object attributes control if
Password and Challenge-response Mechanism is allowed in addition.
Table 14 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role ID Role Description Authentication Data
Admin (CO) Password verification Password
Challenge-response authentication using HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384
Cryptographic Key (HMAC 160-bit key,
HMAC 256-bit key or HMAC 384-bit key)
Enhanced Authorization requiring an
authentication mechanism
Password or Cryptographic Key included
as reference in the policy digest
User Password verification Password
Challenge-response authentication using HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384
Cryptographic Key (HMAC 160-bit key,
HMAC 256-bit key or HMAC 384-bit key)
Enhanced Authorization requiring an
authentication mechanism
Password or Cryptographic Key included
as reference in the policy digest
DUP Enhanced Authorization requiring an
authentication mechanism
Password or Cryptographic Key included
as reference in the policy digest
4.1.5 Strength of Mechanism
Table 15 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Password
verification
When using the password verification mechanism, a password consisting of at least 12
alphanumeric characters shall be used, see Section 9.1 for details. Assuming as a worst
case that the operator uses 12 decimal digits only, but still randomly chosen, the
probability that a single random authentication attempt (by guessing the password value)
will succeed is:
10-12
< 10-6
A very conservative estimate of the maximum authentication rate is 106
/minute (60µs per
attempt). Under this assumption the probability that random authentication attempts will
succeed within one-minute interval is:
106
x 10-12
= 10-6
< 10-5
Challenge-
response
authentication
using HMAC
As a worst case it is assumed that for challenge-response authentication HMAC-SHA-1 is
used, which has smaller key length and smaller tag length (160-bit each) than HMAC-SHA-
256 and HMAC-SHA-384. Under this assumption the probability that a random
authentication attempt (by guessing key value or tag value) will succeed is:
2-160
= 6.8x10-49
< 10-6
With the same assumed maximum authentication rate of 106/minute as above, the probability that
random authentication attempts will succeed within a one-minute interval is:
106
× 6.8×10-49
= 6.8×10-43
< 10-5
Enhanced
Authorization
For the strength of this mechanism when using password verification or HMAC challenge-
response authentication as required authentication mechanism see the two rows above.
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Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
requiring an
authentication
mechanism
For challenge-response authentication using a Public Key Digital Signature Algorithm as
required authentication mechanism it is assumed as worst case that RSA 2048-bit is used,
which provides 112 bits of security strength (ECDSA 256-bit provides 128-bit security
strength, ECDSA 384-bit provides 192 bits of security strength). Therefore, the probability
that a random authentication attempt will succeed using this authentication mechanism
is:
2-112
= 1.9x10-34
< 10-6
With the same assumed maximum authentication rate of 106
/minute as above, the
probability that random authentication attempts will succeed within a one-minute interval
is:
106
x 1.9x10-34
= 1.9x10-28
< 10-5
4.2 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below, with corresponding access to SSPs
indicated according to the legend below.
All services are grouped according to the Mode, in which they are available. For a detailed description of
available Modes please see section 2.1.
Table 16 Modes of access
Code Description
E Execute: The TPM executes using the SSP
G Generate: The TPM generates the CSP
O Output: A SSP is output from the TPM
I Input: A SSP is input to the TPM
Z Zeroize: The TPM zeroizes the CSP
-- Not accessed by the service
4.2.1 Services in TPM Full Operational Mode
See [1] [2][3][4] for a public description of all commands.
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Table 17 Unauthenticated Services SSP Access
Un-
authenticated
Services
DRBG-EI
DRBG-STATE
TPM-EPS
TPM-PS
TPM-Proof
AS-AD-K
AS-SALT
AS-SK
ES-KDK
ES-EK
KW-KDK
KW-IK
KW-CK
SIGK
IFX-PE-KEK
TPM-KEK
U-KEK
U-MACK
U-E-KAK
U-KDK
SIGK-PUB
TPM-KEK-PUB
U-KEK-PUB
U-E-KAK-PUB
IFX-PE-KEK-PUB
U-EDK
TPM Full Operational Mode
TPM DRBG
Services 1)
DRBG
Generated
Random
Number
GZ GEZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
DRG Reseed GZ GEZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM
Credential
Protection
External Entity
Authentication
2)
-- EI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- E --
User
Cryptographic
Support
Function
RSA Key
Transport
Scheme 2)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- --
ECC CDH
Primitive 2)
-- EI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- --
Verify Digital
Signature
[RSA, ECC]
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- --
Create HASH -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM
Protected
Storage
[Public Keys
Only]
Write & Read
Public Keys 4)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- OI OI OI -- O --
TPM
Enhanced
Authorization
Create + Verify
HMAC
Signature 3)
-- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Verify Digital
Signature
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- --
TPM Startup
DRGB
Instantiate
GZ GEZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize CSP -- -- -- -- -- Z -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Z Z Z Z Z -- Z Z Z Z -- -- Z
TPM SelfTest
& Show
Status Service
SelfTest -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Show Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Note: Unauthenticated Services Notes:
1. Generation of Random Numbers based on SP800-90A, allowed per IG 3.1
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2. This service uses the Static Public Key of the relevant Key Establishment Method in the Module and does not
disclose, modify, or create any CSP, allowed per IG 3.1.
3. This service is used for local TPM Data Structure Verification and Generation Services for the purpose of re-
signing of data and does not disclose, modify or create any CSP, allowed per IG 3.1.
4. This service is only used for Public Key Entry and does not modify or substitute any CSP.
Utility Support services are unauthenticated services, which are always associated with larger set of operations
or services. These larger sets of operations or services comply with FIPS CSP Authentication Requirements.
Table 18 Utility Support Services SSP Access
Utility Support
Services
DRBG-EI
DRBG-STATE
TPM-EPS
TPM-PS
TPM-Proof
AS-AD-K
AS-SALT
AS-SK
ES-KDK
ES-EK
KW-KDK
KW-IK
KW-CK
SIGK
IFX-PE-KEK
TPM-KEK
U-KEK
U-MACK
U-E-KAK
U-KDK
SIGK-PUB
TPM-KEK-PUB
U-KEK-PUB
U-E-KAK-PUB
IFX-PE-KEK-PUB
U-EDK
TPM Full Operational Mode
TPM Context
Management 1)
Derive Keys
based on
KBKDF
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Wrap CSPs [AES
and HMAC
Protection]
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E EZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Backup CSP -- -- -- -- -- O -- O -- O -- -- -- O O O O O -- O -- -- -- -- -- O
Restore CSP -- -- -- -- -- I -- I -- I -- -- -- I I I I I -- I -- -- -- -- -- I
Zeroize CSP -- -- -- -- -- Z -- Z -- Z -- -- -- Z Z Z Z Z -- Z -- -- -- -- -- Z
TPM Session
Service
Initialization 2)
RSA Key
Transport
Scheme
-- -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
ECC Key
Agreement
Scheme
-- -- -- -- -- -- G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- IEZ -- --
Derive Keys
based on
KBKDF
-- -- -- -- -- E EZ GI GEZ GI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Note: Utility Support Service Notes:
1. CSP can only be backed up if their associated set of operations (e.g., creation or loading of the CSP) complies
with FIPS CSP Authentication Requirements. Restored CSPs can only be used by the associated operations (e.g.,
Signature Creation), which comply with FIPS CSP Authentication Requirements. Backup and Restore Services
are protected via FIPS Approved Key Wrapping KTS AES & HMAC.
2. CSPs are only generated if the CSPs involved in the generation have been loaded via Authentication Service.
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Table 19 User Authenticated Services SSP Access
User Authenticated
Services
DRBG-EI
DRBG-STATE
TPM-EPS
TPM-PS
TPM-Proof
AS-AD-K
AS-SALT
AS-SK
ES-KDK
ES-EK
KW-KDK
KW-IK
KW-CK
SIGK
IFX-PE-KEK
TPM-KEK
U-KEK
U-MACK
U-E-KAK
U-KDK
SIGK-PUB
TPM-KEK-PUB
U-KEK-PUB
U-E-KAK-PUB
IFX-PE-KEK-PUB
U-EDK
TPM Full Operational Mode
TPM Protected Storage
Derive Primary Asym Key
Pair (RSA, ECC)
-- -- E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- G G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Derive Primary Sym Keys
(HMAC, KDK, AES)
-- -- E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- G -- -- -- -- -- G
Write Primary Sym Key
(HMAC, KDK, AES)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- I -- I -- -- -- -- -- I
Derive Primary KDK for
Asym Storage & Sym Key
-- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Generate Asym Key (RSA,
ECC)
-- EI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- G G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Generate Sym Key (HMAC,
KDK, AES)
-- EI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- G -- -- -- -- -- G
Write Sym Key (HMAC,
KDK, AES)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- I -- I -- -- -- -- -- I
Derive Sym Key (HMAC,
KDK, AES)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- EG -- -- -- -- -- G
Generate Sym KDK for
Asym Storage & Sym Key
-- EI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Derive Keys based on
KBKDF
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E G G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Wrap CSPs [AES and
HMAC Protection]
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EZ EZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Create HMAC Signature -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Write CSP -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- I -- -- I -- I I I -- I I I I -- -- I
Read CSP -- -- -- -- -- O -- -- -- -- O -- -- O -- O O O -- O O O O -- O O
TPM Hierarchy
Management
Generate CSP -- EI GI GI GI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize CSP1)
-- -- Z Z Z Z -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Z Z Z Z Z -- Z -- -- -- -- -- Z
Write CSP [Authentication
Data]
-- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM Import Services
RSA Key Transport
Scheme
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
ECC Key Agreement
Scheme
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- -- -- E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- IE
Z
-- --
Derive Keys based on
KBKDF
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EZ G G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Re-Wrap CSPs [AES and
HMAC Protection]
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EZ EZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Read CSP -- -- -- -- -- O -- -- -- -- O -- -- O -- O O O -- O O O O -- O O
TPM Attestation
Create Digital Signature
[RSA, ECC]
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Verify HMAC Signature -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
User Cryptographic
Support Function
RSA Key Transport
Scheme
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
ECC CDH Primitive -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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User Authenticated
Services
DRBG-EI
DRBG-STATE
TPM-EPS
TPM-PS
TPM-Proof
AS-AD-K
AS-SALT
AS-SK
ES-KDK
ES-EK
KW-KDK
KW-IK
KW-CK
SIGK
IFX-PE-KEK
TPM-KEK
U-KEK
U-MACK
U-E-KAK
U-KDK
SIGK-PUB
TPM-KEK-PUB
U-KEK-PUB
U-E-KAK-PUB
IFX-PE-KEK-PUB
U-EDK
Create Digital Signature
[RSA, ECC]
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Create HMAC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Create HASH -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
AES Encrypt/Decrypt2)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E
TPM Enhanced
Authorization &
Validation
Create & Verify HMAC
Signature
-- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM Context
Management
Write CSP -- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- I -- -- I I I I I -- I I I I -- I I
Zeroize CSP -- -- -- -- -- Z -- -- -- -- Z -- -- Z Z Z Z Z -- Z Z Z Z -- Z Z
Note: User Authenticated Services Notes
1. This service can be activated, deactivated or permanently activated or deactivated for TPM-EPS and IFX-PE-KEK
by configuration service (see Table 20). For permanent deactivation see [9.1].
2. This service can be activated, deactivated or permanently activated or deactivated by configuration service (see
Table 20).
Table 20 ADMIN (CO) Authenticated Services SSP Access
ADMIN (CO)
Authenticated
Services
DRBG-EI
DRBG-STATE
TPM-EPS
TPM-PS
TPM-Proof
AS-AD-K
AS-SALT
AS-SK
ES-KDK
ES-EK
KW-KDK
KW-IK
KW-CK
SIGK
IFX-PE-KEK
TPM-KEK
U-KEK
U-MACK
U-E-KAK
U-KDK
SIGK-PUB
TPM-KEK-PUB
U-KEK-PUB
U-E-KAK-PUB
IFX-PE-KEK-PUB
TPM Full Operational Mode
TPM Credential
Protection
External Entity
Authentication
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM Key Attestation
Create Digital
Signature [RSA, ECC]
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM Protected
Storage
Management
Write CSP
[Authentication Data]
-- -- -- -- -- I -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM Field Upgrade
Service
Activate Field
Upgrade Mode &
Install Manifest
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM Hierarchy
Management
Zeroize CSP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Z -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
TPM Misc
Management
Configuration1)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Note: ADMIN (CO) Authenticated Services Notes
1. This service can activate, deactivate or permanently activate or deactivate AES Encrypt/Decrypt or Zeroization
service for TPM-EPS and IFX-PE-KEK (see Table 19). For permanent deactivation see [9.1].
Table 21 DUP Authenticated Services SSP Access
DUP
Authenticate
d Services
DRBG-EI
DRBG-STATE
TPM-EPS
TPM-PS
TPM-Proof
AS-AD-K
AS-SALT
AS-SK
ES-KDK
ES-EK
KW-KDK
KW-IK
KW-CK
SIGK
IFX-PE-KEK
TPM-KEK
U-KEK
U-MACK
U-E-KAK
U-KDK
SIGK-PUB
TPM-KEK-PUB
U-KEK-PUB
U-E-KAK-PUB
IFX-PE-KEK-PUB
U-EDK
TPM Full Operational Mode
TPM
Duplication
RSA Key
Transport
Scheme
-- EI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- E --
ECC Key
Agreement
Scheme
-- EI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- GE
Z
-- E -- GO
Z
E --
Derive Keys
based on
KBKDF
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EZ G G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Wrap CSPs
[AES and
HMAC
Protection]
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- EZ EZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Read CSPs -- -- -- -- -- O -- -- -- -- O -- -- O -- O O O -- O O O O -- -- O
The following unauthenticated services are part of the authentication process and do not create, modify,
disclose or substitute cryptographic keys or CSPs in accordance with IG 3.1.
Table 22 TPM Challenge + Response Authentication and Encryption Services
TPM Challenge
+ Response
Authentication
and Encryption
DRBG-EI
DRBG-STATE
TPM-EPS
TPM-PS
TPM-Proof
AS-AD-K
AS-SALT
AS-SK
ES-KDK
ES-EK
KW-KDK
KW-IK
KW-CK
SIGK
IFX-PE-KEK
TPM-KEK
U-KEK
U-MACK
U-E-KAK
U-KDK
SIGK-PUB
TPM-KEK-PUB
U-KEK-PUB
U-E-KAK-PUB
IFX-PE-KEK-PUB
U-EDK
TPM Full Operational Mode
Message
Authentication
-- -- -- -- -- E -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Message
Encryption using
AES Encrypt
Decrypt
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize CSP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Z -- Z -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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4.2.2 Services in Field Upgrade Mode
Table 23 Field Upgrade Mode Unauthenticated Services CSP Access
Unauthenticated Field Upgrade Services
PUB-SIGK-SIA
Field Upgrade Process Manifest Service 1)
Verify Digital Signature [ECDSA-P-521] E
Field Upgrade Process Payload Finalize Service
Create Hash, Post-Installation Digest [SHA-512] --
Verify Hash, Post-Installation Digest [SHA-512] --
SelfTest & Show Status Service
SelfTest --
Show Status --
Note: Unauthenticated Services Notes
1. This service is indirectly authenticated since the Manifest has been installed via ADMIN Authenticated TPM Field
Upgrade Service from Table 23.
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5 Self-tests
On power-on or reset, the TPM must ensure that all self-tests as described in Table 24 and Table 25 below have
been performed. All KATs/PCT must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the
TPM. If one of the KATs/PCTs fails, the system is halted (in the Failure Mode state). In this mode only
TPM2_GetTestResult and TPM2_GetCapabiliy is accepted by the TPM; no CSP access is possible.
In Field Upgrade Mode, self-tests may be invoked at any time using TPM2_SelfTest with self-test results
returned in TPM2_GetTestResult.
In Full Operational Mode, self-tests may be invoked at any time using TPM2_FullFipsSelfTestVendor with self-
test results returned.
According to [22], IG 9.11, self-tests for Full Operational Mode are not done during each power on or reset but
only once after the following events:
• First startup after installation of the TPM
• First startup after a Field Upgrade of the TPM firmware
Table 24 Operational mode Self-Tests
Self-Test Description
Critical Function Self-Tests
Hardware Integrity Test The TPM perform a hardware integrity test at power-up and at fixed
periods. In either case, if the hardware integrity test fails, TPM
hardware immediately enters security reset state (the TPM is mute).
Self-Tests performed on each power up
Firmware Integrity Test The startup code uses an EDC with at least 16 bits. The startup code
measures the TPM application with a SHA-256.
Error Detection Code with at least 16 bits performed over Code
located in NVM.
SHA-1, SHA-384 KAT (Certs. #A1718,
#A2072, #A2588, #A3736 and
#A3738)
Performs a fixed input KAT for SHA-1 and SHA-384
Note: There is no explicit test for SHA-256. It is implicitly tested by the
Firmware integrity test which uses SHA-256 as a checksum.
AES-128 KAT (Certs. #A1718,
#A2072, #A2588, #A3736 and
#A3738)
Performs encrypt KAT using AES-128 key in CFB mode.
Self-Tests performed only once according to IG 9.11
DRBG KAT (Certs. #A1718, #A2072,
#A2588, #A3736 and #A3738)
Performs a fixed input KAT, inclusive of the SP800-90A [17] health
monitoring tests.
RSA KATs (Certs. #A1718, #A2072,
#A2588, #A3736 and #A3738)
Performs RSA Digital Signature (RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 using SHA-256)
Generation and Verification KATs using RSA 2048-bit key and RSA
3072-bit key.
ECDSA PCT (Certs. #A1718,
#A2072, #A2588, #A3736 and
#A3738)
Performs an ECDSA pairwise consistency test (PCT) using NIST
recommended curve P-256 with SHA-256
ECC KAS KAT (Certs. #A1718,
#A2072, #A2588, #A3736 and
#A3738)
Performs ECC CDH primitive Z computation using NIST- recommended
curve P-256.
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Self-tests
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KBKDF KAT (Certs. #A1718,
#A2072, #A2588, #A3736 and
#A3738)
Performs fixed input KAT of the KDF [19] using HMAC-SHA-256
Note: There is no explicit test for HMAC SHA-256. It is implicitly tested
by the KBKDF KAT which uses HMAC SHA-256 as allowed per IG 9.4.
Concatenation KDF KAT (Certs.
#A1718, #A2072, #A2588, #A3736
and #A3738)
Performs fixed input KAT of Concatenation KDF (KDFe) using SHA-256
(SP 800-56Cr1 one-pass KDF)
Conditional Self-Tests
NDRNG CRNGT The TPM performs testing according to DTR AS09.42 to assure the NDRNG output is
different than the previous value. Failure of this NDRNG CRNGT is treated as an attack;
the TPM enters an error state. This conditional self-test is also performed in operational
mode when DRBG is reseeded (and therefore new entropy from the NDRNG is collected).
RSA Key Gen PCT On generation of RSA key pair, the TPM performs a pairwise consistency test. For key
transport keys, the PCT sequence is encrypt/decrypt; for signature keys, the PCT
sequence sign/verify is applied.
ECC Key Gen PCT On generation of an ECDSA key pair, the TPM performs an ECDSA pairwise consistency
test. Before usage of the key, a full public key validation will be done.
Key load test When RSA or ECC key pairs or public keys are loaded into TPM, TPM performs –
depending on the key type – pair-wise consistency or key regeneration tests and or
assurance tests as required by SP 800-56Ar3 and SP 800-56Br2. Key material is loaded
only if corresponding key load tests succeeds.
Table 25 Field Upgrade mode Self-Tests
Self-Test Description
Critical Function Self-Tests
Hardware Integrity Test The TPM perform a hardware integrity test at power-up and at fixed periods. In
either case, if the hardware integrity test fails, TPM hardware immediately
enters security reset state (the TPM is mute).
Self-Tests performed on each power up
Firmware Integrity Test Error Detection Code with at least 16 bits performed over Code located in NVM.
SHA-384, SHA-512 KAT
(Certs. #A1718, #A2072,
#A2588, #A3736 and
#A3738)
Performs a fixed input KAT for SHA-384 and SHA-512.
Self-Tests performed only once according to IG 9.11
ECDSA KAT (Certs.
#A1718, #A2072, #A2588,
#A3736 and #A3738)
Performs an ECDSA Verify Test (KAT) using NIST recommended curve P-521.
Conditional Self-Tests
Firmware Load Test 1 The TPM performs ECDSA NIST P-521 asymmetric signature verification with
SHA-512 over firmware manifest to be loaded. New Firmware is only processed
if verification succeeds.
Firmware Load Test 2 SHA-512 message digest performed as Approved Integrity Technique over the
Loaded Firmware. The new Firmware is only executed after restart if Approved
Integrity Verification succeeds.
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Physical Security Policy
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6 Physical Security Policy
The TPM is a single-chip implementation that meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature,
reliability, and shock/vibrations. The TPM employs standard passivation techniques. The TPM is intended for
deployment on standard PCBs or similar assemblies. TPM packaging provides opacity and tamper evidence
protections and will cause serious damage to the module, sufficient to meet FIPS 140-2 Physical Security
Level 3.
TPM comes with a hard and opaque coating (see images in Section 2.2). Any attempt of physical tampering by
mechanical means will leave evidence in form of scratches, broken edges of the coating or similar.
The TPM shall be visually inspected for evidence of tampering at least once before integration into a host
device. After integration, it is possible to check for tamper evidence by opening the host device and inspecting
the TPM.
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Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
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7 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The Module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by part 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15,
Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B.
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Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
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8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The TPM implements the mechanism listed in Table 26 to mitigate attacks beyond the requirements of FIPS
140-2 Security Level 2. There are no specific limitations for any of these attack mitigations.
Table 26 Mitigation of Other Attacks
Other Attack Mitigation Mechanism
Fault induction External clock conditions, temperature and electromagnetic radiation (e.g.,
light) are monitored using sensors. Operation outside specific parameters
causes the chip to enter the Security reset state until condition is cleared.
Software fault induction The address mapping together with the memory protection unit (MPU) gives
the possibility to define different access rights for memory areas. In case of
an access violation (e.g., embedded software trying to read memory of IC-
dedicated software) hardware enters the Security reset state.
Design analysis and
surveillance attacks (in
operational or power off
condition)
The TPM integrated circuit level layout uses masking, critical circuit
shielding and synthesized logic to deter attacker knowledge of the part
design. Outer layer lines are protected with a proprietary masking
technique, with active shielding in internal layers to protect the masking
mechanism. The use of synthesized logic deters attackers from pattern
recognition of logic clusters. As well, a dedicated CPU with non-public bus
protocol is used which makes analysis complicated.
Physical probing of memory
and data buses
Proprietary memory and bus masking to deter probing memories or busses.
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Security Rules and Guidance
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9 Security Rules and Guidance
The TPM implementation also enforces the following security rules:
• The module provides three distinct operator roles: Duplication Officer, User and Cryptographic Officer.
• The module provides role-based authentication.
• The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
• Power-up self-tests do not require any operator action.
• No additional interface or service is implemented by the module which would provide access to CSPs.
• Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, Zeroization, and error states.
• There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the Zeroization service.
• The module does not support manual key entry.
• The module does not output plaintext CSPs or intermediate key values.
• Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that is misused could lead to compromise of the
module.
9.1 Requirements for Secure Operation
The application must assure the following conditions are met for operation of the TPM in the FIPS 140-2
Approved mode:
Requirements for Approved and Allowed Function Usage:
• Only Approved and allowed cryptographic functions as listed in Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 may be used.
• Non-approved cryptographic functions listed in Table 9 shall not be used.
• TPM2_ChangeEPS must not be permanently disabled.
Requirements for Key Management:
• When using U-KDK to derive other Keys only symmetric Keys (e.g. HMAC) shall be derived and asymmetric
Keys (e.g. ECC Keys) shall not be derived
• When using U-KDK to derive symmetric Keys, Key Separation Requirements [19], Section 7.5 shall be met
Requirements for Key Entry and Output to and from the Module:
• When entering CSP keys into the module the operator shall ensure usage of FIPS Approved Key Wrapping via
usage of Message Encryption using AES Encrypt Decrypt in combination with Message Authentication using
HMAC Service listed in Table 22.
• When generating CSP keys for ‘TPM Duplication’ Service listed in Table 21 (export) the operator shall set the
CSP key attribute encryptedDuplication, which enforces
− FIPS Approved key transport when using RSA Keys or
− FIPS Approved key agreement when using ECC Keys
− In combination with FIPS Approved Key Wrapping using AES and HMAC during export.
• When using ‘TPM Import Service’ listed in Table 19, for importing CSP keys into the module the operator
shall only import CSP keys, which attribute encryptedDuplication set, enforcing
− FIPS Approved key transport when using RSA Keys or
− FIPS Approved key agreement when using ECC Keys
− In combination with FIPS Approved Key Wrapping using AES and HMAC Keys by the module.
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Security Rules and Guidance
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FIPS 140 2 Level 2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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• As a consequence imported CSPs (and hence CSP protected under these imported CSPs) shall not be used
in any service of the CSP attribute encryptedDuplication is not set.
• Unauthorized loading of Secret Keys into the module via TPM2_LoadExternal shall not be used.
• When using approved KTS with 3072-bit and 4096-bit RSA, the module shall obtain an assurance from a
Trusted Third-Party that a partial public-key validation was performed on the public key received by the
module.
Requirements for Authentication:
• When using the password verification mechanism for operator authentication, a password consisting of at
least 12 randomly chosen characters, containing at least one character of the following 4 groups: uppercase
letters, lowercase letters, numerals and symbols but still randomly chosen shall be used.
• When using Enhanced Authorization the operator shall ensure that the policy will require at least one of the
following authentication mechanisms:
− Password verification
− Challenge-response mechanism based on a Message Authentication Code
− Challenge-response mechanism based on a Public Key Digital Signature Algorithm
Requirements for Initialization:
• In case the TPM is in an un-owned state (e.g. default state after shipment) the operator shall initialize the
authentication data to control the Owner and the Endorsement Hierarchy via usage of the Write CSP Service
[Authentication Data] listed in the TPM Hierarchy Group in Table 19. For detailed information how to perform
this please refer to section 10.
• After each Reset the operator shall initialize the authentication data to control the Platform Hierarchy via
usage of the Write CSP Service [Authentication Data] listed in the TPM Hierarchy Group in Table 19.
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Annex A – Module Initialization
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10 Annex A – Module Initialization
When the TPM 2.0 is in an un-owned state (e.g., when the TPM is in the default state after shipment) the TPM
shall be initialized, since all authentication values have a default value set to an EmptyAuth. Module
Initialization (also referred to as Taking Ownership of the TPM 2.0) basically means to initialize several
authorization and policy values and optionally to create a primary storage key. Initializing the authorization
values (endorsementAuth, ownerAuth, lockoutAuth) will be performed with TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth and
initializing the policies (endorsementPolicy, ownerPolicy, lockoutPolicy) will be done with
TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy. The following flow shows a secure way to initialize the module:
• Check capabilities to see if ownership is enabled
− TPM2_GetCapability with TPM_PT_PERMANENT and TPM_PT_STARTUP_CLEAR checking for
ownerAuthSet == 0 and shEnable == 1
• TPM2_CreatePrimary to get the IFX-PE-KEK, for which a certificate exists
• Check the Endorsement Key certificate to verify that ownership is taken of an authentic Infineon TPM
• Start an encrypted authorization session using the IFX-PE-KEK-PUB to protect the secret
• TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth using parameter encryption to protect the new auth values (endorsementAuth,
ownerAuth, lockoutAuth)
• TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy using the previously set auth values to set the corresponding policies
(endorsementPolicy, ownerPolicy, lockoutPolicy)
• Optional: TPM2_CreatePrimary to create a storage primary key
• Optional: TPM2_EvictControl to make the storage primary key persistent
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Annex B – Module Startup
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11 Annex B – Module Startup
When the TPM 2.0 is reset (e.g., when power is supplied to the TPM) the TPM shall be correctly started up since
some authentication values have a default value set to an EmptyAuth. The TPM 2.0 sets the platformAuth to an
EmptyAuth after a TPM reset (_TPM_Init) by default, which can be easily satisfied using the NULL password. To
avoid control of the TPM 2.0 Platform Hierarchy using platformAuth from other entities than the platform BIOS,
it is required to change the platformAuth to a secure random value immediately after a TPM reset. The changed
platformAuth may be stored at a secure storage location, if needed by the BIOS or other processes during
platform boot. Before transitioning to the OS the platformAuth value must be securely discarded at the stored
secure location (e.g., overwritten with zeroes). The following flow shows a secure way to start up the module:
• Check the Endorsement Key certificate to verify that ownership is taken of an authentic Infineon TPM
• Start an encrypted authorization session using the IFX-PE-KEK-PUB to protect the secret
• TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth using parameter encryption to protect the new auth values (platformAuth)
• TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy using the previously set auth values to set the corresponding policies
(platformPolicy)
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FIPS 140 2 Level 2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
References
public
References
[1] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision 1.59, November 8
2019
[2] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision 1.59, November 8 2019
[3] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 3: Commands, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision 1.59, November 8
2019
[4] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision 1.59,
November 8 2019
[5] Errata for TCG Trusted Platform Module Library, Version 1.1, June 18, 2020
[6] TCG PC Client Platform TPM Profile Specification for TPM 2.0, Version 1.05 Revision 14, May 13, 2020
[7] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS Publication 140-2, May 25, 2001
[8] NIST, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Publication 180-4, August 2015
[9] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS Publication 186-4, July 2013
[10] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[11] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS Publication 198-1, July 2008
[12] NIST Special Publication SP 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001
[13] NIST Special Publication SP 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for
Key Wrapping, December 2012
[14] NIST Special Publication SP 800-56A, Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[15] NIST Special Publication SP800-56B, Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, March 2019
[16] NIST Special Publication SP800-56C, Revision 1, Recommendation for Key Derivation Methods in Key-
Establishment Schemes, April 2018
[17] NIST Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators, June 2015
[18] NIST Special Publication 800-90B, Recommendation for Entropy Sources Used for Random bit
Generation, January 2018
[19] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
(Revised), October 2009
[20] NIST Special Publication 800-131A, Revision 2, Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, March 2019
[21] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Revision 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, June
2020
[22] NIST, January 5, 2021, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
[23] PKCS #1 v2.1, RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 200
Edition 2023-06-28
Published by
Infineon Technologies AG
81726 Munich, Germany
© 2023 Infineon Technologies AG.
May be reproduced only in its original
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