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Juniper Networks SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200 and SRX4600
Services Gateways
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Version: 1.3
Date: November 15, 2023
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................5
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.........................................................................7
1.2 Mode of Operation.......................................................................................................................8
1.3 Zeroization..................................................................................................................................10
2 Cryptographic Functionality......................................................................................... 11
2.1 Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................11
2.2 Allowed Algorithms....................................................................................................................14
2.3 Allowed Protocols ......................................................................................................................14
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms................................................................................................................16
2.5 Critical Security Parameters.......................................................................................................16
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................. 18
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles .......................................................................18
3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................18
3.3 Services.......................................................................................................................................19
3.4 Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................................20
4 Self-tests ..................................................................................................................... 22
5 Physical Security Policy................................................................................................ 24
5.1 General Tamper Evident Label Placement and Application Instructions...................................24
5.2 SRX1500 (10 seals) .....................................................................................................................24
5.3 SRX4100 & SRX4200 (13 seals)...................................................................................................27
5.4 SRX4600 (15 seals) .....................................................................................................................30
6 Security Rules and Guidance ........................................................................................ 33
7 References and Definitions .......................................................................................... 34
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations..........................................................................................5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................6
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................8
Table 4 – Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions ..........................................................................11
Table 5 – Control Plane QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions ......................................................11
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions..............................................................................12
Table 7 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions.............................................................................13
Table 8 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................................................................13
Table 9 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................................................................14
Table 10 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions .............................................................................................14
Table 11 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode................................................................................................14
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...........................................................................................16
Table 13 – Public Keys.................................................................................................................................17
Table 14 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................19
Table 15 – Unauthenticated traffic.............................................................................................................19
Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................20
Table 17 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................21
Table 18 – Unauthenticated traffic.............................................................................................................21
Table 19 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................24
Table 20 – References.................................................................................................................................34
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................35
Table 22 – Datasheets.................................................................................................................................35
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - SRX1500 ........................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 - SRX4100 ........................................................................................................................................7
Figure 3 - SRX4200 ........................................................................................................................................7
Figure 4 - SRX4600 ........................................................................................................................................7
Figure 5 - SRX1500 Front View: TEL 1 - 6 ....................................................................................................25
Figure 6 - SRX1500 Top-Front View: TEL 1 & 2 ...........................................................................................25
Figure 7 - SRX1500 Rear View: TEL 7 & 8....................................................................................................25
Figure 8 - SRX1500 Top - Rear View: TEL 7 .................................................................................................26
Figure 9 - SRX1500 Bottom View: TEL 8, 9 & 10 .........................................................................................26
Figure 10 - SRX1500 Right Side View: TEL 9................................................................................................27
Figure 11 - SRX1500 Left Side View: TEL 10................................................................................................27
Figure 12 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Top View: TEL 1, 2, 6, 8 & 10...................................................................28
Figure 13 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Left-Side View: TEL 1...............................................................................28
Figure 14 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Right-Side View: TEL 2.............................................................................28
Figure 15 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Bottom View: TEL 3, 4, 5 .........................................................................29
Figure 16 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Front View: TEL 6-11 ...............................................................................29
Figure 17 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Rear View: TEL 12-13...............................................................................30
Figure 18 - SRX4600 Front View: TEL 1 – 8 .................................................................................................30
Figure 19 - SRX4600 Top Front View: TEL 1, 3, 5, 7, 8.................................................................................30
Figure 20 - SRX4600 Rear View: TEL 9-15 ...................................................................................................31
Figure 21 - SRX4600 Top Rear View: TEL 9 – 10..........................................................................................31
Figure 22 - SRX4600 Right Side View: TEL 12..............................................................................................31
Figure 23 - SRX4600 Left Side View: TEL 11................................................................................................32
Figure 24 - SRX4600 Bottom View: TEL 2, 4, 11, 12....................................................................................32
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1 Introduction
The Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways are a series of secure routers that provide essential
capabilities to connect, secure, and manage work force locations sized from handfuls to hundreds of
users. By consolidating fast, highly available switching, routing, security, and applications capabilities in
a single device, enterprises can economically deliver new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end
user experience. All models run Juniper’s JUNOS firmware. The JUNOS firmware is FIPS-compliant, when
configured in FIPS-MODE called JUNOS-FIPS-MODE, version 19.2R1. The firmware image is junos-
srxentedge-x86-64-19.2R1.8.tgz for the SRX1500, junos-srxmr-x86-64-19.2R1.8.tgz for the SRX
4100/4200 and junos-srxhe-x86-64-19.2R1.8.tgz for the SRX4600. The firmware status service identifies
itself as “Junos 19.2R1.8”.
This Security Policy covers the following models – the SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200 and SRX 4600 models.
They are meant for mid-size enterprise and data center environments.
The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple-chip standalone modules that execute the JUNOS-FIPS
firmware on the Juniper Networks SRX-series models listed in the table below .
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Model Hardware Versions Firmware Distinguishing Features
SRX1500
SRX1500 SYS-JB-AC
SRX1500 SYS-JB-DC
JUNOS OS
19.2R1
12x1GbE ports; 4x1GbE SFP ports;
4x10GbE SFP ports+; 2 PIM slots (not used
in validation)
SRX4100
SRX4100 SYS-JB-AC
SRX4100 SYS-JB-DC
JUNOS OS
19.2R1
8 x 1GbE/10GbE ports
SRX4200
SRX4200 SYS-JB-AC
SRX4200 SYS-JB-DC
JUNOS OS
19.2R1
8 x 1GbE/10GbE ports
SRX4600
SRX4600 (AC)
SRX4600 (DC)
Junos OS
19.2R1
8 x 1GbE/10Gb Ethernet SFP+ ports,
4 x 40/100Gb Ethernet QSFP21 ports
All JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS N/A Tamper-Evident Seals
Each Hardware Version for a model is identical in physical form factor, materials, and assembly
methods. The Hardware Version differences for a model are considered non-security relevant. The
differences denoted by the various suffixes are described below:
• AC – Alternating current power
• DC – Direct current power
• JB – Junos Base licensing
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The module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 overall:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 2
2 Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles and Services 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-test 2
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 2
The modules have a non-modifiable operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. They
include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of
this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the
module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
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1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical forms of the modules are depicted in Figures 1-4 below. The cryptographic boundary is
defined as the outer edge of the chassis. The modules do not rely on external devices for input and output
of critical security parameters (CSPs).
Figure 1 - SRX1500
Figure 2 - SRX4100
Figure 3 - SRX4200
Figure 4 - SRX4600
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Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Device (# of ports) Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet
SRX1500 (21: 1
Management, 12
10/100/1000 Base-T, 4 SFP,
4 SFP+),
SRX4100 (9: 1
Management, 8 SFP+),
SRX4200 (9: 1
Management, 8 SFP+)
SRX4600 (13: 4 QSFP28, 8
SFP+, 1 Management,)
LAN Communications
Control in, Data in, Data out,
Status out
Serial
SRX1500 (1), SRX4100 (1),
SRX4200 (1), SRX4600 (1)
Console serial port Control in, Status out
Power
SRX1500 (1), SRX4100 (1),
SRX4200 (1), SRX4600 (2)
Power connector Power
Reset
SRX1500 (1), SRX4100 (1),
SRX4200 (1), SRX4600 (1)
Reset Control in
LED
SRX1500 (6), SRX4100 (3),
SRX4200 (3), SRX4600 (6)
Status indicator
lighting
Status out
ToD SRX4600 (1)
RJ-45 Time of Day
Port
Control in, Status out
BITS SRX4600(1) BITS RJ-45 port Control in, Status out
GPS
SRX4600(2: 1 input, 1
output)
10 Mhz clock
synchronization
Control in, Status out
PPS
SRX4600(2: 1 input, 1
output)
1 pulse per second Control in, Status out
Offline SRX4600(1) Offline button Control in
HA
SRX1500 (1), SRX4100 (2),
SRX4200 (2), SRX4600 (4)
Cluster Control Ports
Tamper Evident Label –
Inaccessible
SSD SRX4600(2) Solid state storage
Tamper Evident Label –
Inaccessible
USB
SRX1500 (1), SRX4100 (2),
SRX4200 (2), SRX4600 (1)
Firmware load
port/Storage device
Tamper Evident Label –
Inaccessible
1.2 Mode of Operation
The JUNOS firmware image must be installed on the device. Once the image is installed, the Crypto-Officer
(CO) shall follow the instructions in Section 5 to apply the tamper seals to the module. Next, the module
is configured in FIPS-MODE, as described below, and rebooted. Once the module is rebooted and the
integrity and self-tests have run successfully on initial power-on in FIPS-MODE, the module is operating in
the FIPS-Approved mode. The Crypto-Officer (CO) must create a backup image of the firmware to ensure
it is also a JUNOS-FIPS-MODE image by issuing the request system snapshot command.
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If the module was previously in a non-Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must
zeroize the CSPs by following the instructions in Section 1.3
The CO shall enable the module for FIPS mode of operation by performing the following steps.
1. Enable the FIPS mode on the device.
user@host# set system fips level 2
2. Commit and reboot the device.
user@host# commit
When AES GCM is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec, the CO must configure the
module to use IKEv2 by running the following commands:
IKE:
root@host# set security ike proposal <ike_proposal_name> encryption-algorithm aes-256-
gcm
IPSec:
root@host# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec_proposal_name> encryption-algorithm aes-
128-gcm
root@host# set security ike gateway <gateway_name> version v2-only
root@host# commit
In order to ensure compliance with [IG A.13], the module must be configured to limit the number of blocks
encrypted by a specific key bundle with the Triple-DES algorithm to a value less than 2^20. Both IPsec and
IKEv2 may utilize Triple-DES encryption. In IPsec, Triple-DES may be used for transfer of data packets and
in IKEv2 Triple-DES may be utilized for re-keying operations that occur when the IPsec protocol reaches a
configured limit for the number of packets transmitted.
When Triple-DES is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IPsec, the CO must configure the IPsec
proposal lifetime-kilobytes to comply with [IG A.13] using the following command, setting <kilobytes> to
a value less than or equal to 8192 which is the maximum amount of kilobytes permitted to be encrypted
by a key:
co@fips-srx:fips# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec_proposal_name> lifetime-kilobytes
<kilobytes>”
co@fips-srx:fips# commit
Whenever <kilobytes> of data has been transmitted by the IPsec protocol, a re-key operation is triggered
to establish a new key bundle for IPsec. This rekey operation is negotiated by the IKE protocol. If the IKE
protocol is configured to use Triple-DES, it must also be configured to limit the number of blocks to a value
less than 2^20. Because the Maximum lifetime of IKE key is 24 hours, the IPsec limit needs to be set to
ensure that the number of rekey operations in a 24-hour period won’t cause the IKE protocol to encrypt
more than 2^20 blocks. To reduce the number of rekey operations requested by the IPsec protocol, it is
necessary to increase the number of blocks transmitted by the IPsec protocol. Therefore, when Triple-DES
is the encryption-algorithm for IKE, the lifetime-kilobytes for the associated IPsec proposal in the above
command must be greater than or equal to 6913080.
Because the lifetime-kilobytes cannot be set to a value that is less than 8192 and greater than 6913080,
Triple-DES encryption may not be used for IKE and IPsec simultaneously. e.g. if IKE is configured to use
Triple-DES, IPsec would be configured to use AES.
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The show version command will display the version of the Junos OS on the device so that the CO can
confirm it is the FIPS validated version. The CO should also verify the presence of the suffix string “:fips”
in the cli prompt, indicating the module is operating in FIPS mode.
The show configuration security ike and show configuration security ipsec commands display the
approved and configured IKE/IPsec configuration for the device operating in FIPS-approved mode.
1.3 Zeroization
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-approved
cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of
operation and the Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must run the following
commands to zeroize the Approved mode CSPs:
user@host> request system zeroize hypervisor
This command wipes clean all the CSPs/configs as well as the disk. After zeroization, the device will have
to be reimaged to bring it back into FIPS mode, as all the disk partitions are securely erased. The CO must
follow the instructions in Section 1.2, including installing the FIPs validated image on the device and new
tamper evident labels after reimaging.
Use of the zeroize command is restricted to the Cryptographic Officer. The cryptographic officer shall
perform zeroization in the following situations:
1. Before FIPS Operation: To prepare the device for operation as a FIPS cryptographic module by
erasing all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its operation as a FIPS
cryptographic module.
2. Before non-FIPS Operation: To conduct erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a
device in preparation for repurposing the device for non-FIPS operation.
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 below. Although the module may have been tested for additional algorithms
or modes, only those listed below are actually utilized by the module. Table 11 summarizes the allowed
high-level protocol and algorithm support.
2.1 Approved Algorithms
Table 4 – Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1046
AES
PUB 197-38A CBC Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
SP800-38D GCM Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits, λ =
128
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Digest Generation
Triple-DES1
SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 5 – Control Plane QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1045
AES
PUB 197-38A CBC Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
SP800-38D GCM Key Sizes: 128, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
N/A2
CKG
SP800-133Rev2
(IKE)
Section 4
Asymmetric key generation using
unmodified DRBG output
C1045
CVL SP 800-135
IKEv1 SHA 256, 384
Key Derivation
IKEv2 SHA 256, 384
DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
1
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
2
Vendor Affirmed.
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HMAC PUB 198
SHA-256
Key size: 256bits
λ = 256 Message Authentication, KDF
Primitive
SHA-384
Key size: 384 bits,
λ = 384
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #C1045 and HMAC Cert.
#C1045
key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Triple-DES Certs. #C1045 and HMAC
Certs. # C1045
key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
C1045
RSA PUB 186-4
PKCS1_V
1_5
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigGen, SigVer3
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest Generation
Triple-DES4
SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves,
or Moduli
Functions
C1049
AES PUB 197-38A
CBC
CTR
Key Sizes: 128, 192,
256
Encrypt, Decrypt
DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
N/A5
KAS-SSC SP800-56A Rev3
FFC DH
MODP-2048 (ID=14) Key Agreement (IKE/SSH)
MODP-2048 (ID=24) Key Agreement (IKE)
ECC
DH
P-256
P-384
Key Agreement (IKE)
N/A6
CKG
SP800-133Rev2
(SSH)
Section 4
Asymmetric key generation using
unmodified DRBG output
C1049
ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
SigGen, KeyGen, SigVer
HMAC PUB 198 SHA-1
Key size: 160 bits,
λ = 160
Message Authentication
3
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
4
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
5
Vendor affirmed as per IG D.1-rev3.
6
Vendor Affirmed.
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SHA-
256
Key size: 256 bits,
λ = 256
Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
SHA-
512
Key size: 512 bits,
λ = 512
Message Authentication
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #C1049 and HMAC
Cert. #C1049
key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Triple-DES Cert. # C1049 and
HMAC Cert. # C1049
key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
C1049
RSA PUB 186-4
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
KeyGen7
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigGen
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigVer8
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-
256
SHA-
384
SHA-
512
Message Digest Generation,
KDF Primitive
Triple-
DES9 SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 7 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1050 CVL SP 800-135 SSH SHA 1, 256, 384 Key Derivation
Table 8 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1043 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1
Key size:160 bits,
λ = 160 Password Hashing
SHA-256 Key size:256bits,
7
RSA 4096 KeyGen was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 KeyGen was tested and testing for RSA 4096 KeyGen is not available.
8
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance,
because RSA 2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
9
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
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λ = 256
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation
Table 9 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode
Key Lengths, Curves, or
Moduli
Functions
C1044
DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
HMAC PUB 198 SHA-256
Key size:256 bits,
λ = 256
DRBG Primitive
SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
2.2 Allowed Algorithms
Table 10 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
NDRNG [IG] 7.14
Scenario 1a
The module generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for key generation.
Seeding the DRBG
2.3 Allowed Protocols
Table 11 – Protocols using approved algorithms in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Groups Auth Cipher Integrity
IKEv110
KAS-FFC
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
Triple-DES
CBC11
AES CBC
128/192/256
HMAC-
SHA-256
HMAC-
SHA-384
KAS-ECC
P-256
P-384
IKEv212
KAS-FFC
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Triple-DES
CBC13
HMAC-
SHA-256
10
RFC 2409 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the IKEv1 protocol
11
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
12
IKEv2 generates the SKEYSEED according to RFC7296, from which all keys are derived, including Triple-
DES keys.
13
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
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KAS-ECC
P-256
P-384
Pre-Shared
Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM14
128/256
HMAC-
SHA-384
IPsec
ESP
IKEv1 with
optional KAS-
FFC
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
IKEv1
Triple-DES
CBC15
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM16
128/192/256 HMAC-
SHA1-96
HMAC-
SHA-256-
128
IKEv1 with
optional KAS-
ECC
P-256
P-384
IKEv2 with
optional KAS-
FFC
MODP-2048 (ID=24)
MODP-2048 (ID=14)
IKEv2
Triple-DES
CBC17
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM18
128/192/256
IKEv2 with
optional KAS-
ECC
P-256
P-384
SSHv219
KAS-FFC MODP-2048 (ID=14)
RSA 2048
ECDSA P-256
Triple-DES
CBC20
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC-
SHA-1-96
HMAC-
SHA-1
HMAC-
SHA-256
HMAC-
SHA-512
No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The IKE and SSH
algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In reference
to the Allowed Protocols in Table 10 above: each column of options for a given protocol is independent
14
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC5282 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
15
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
16
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
17
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
18
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol
as allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
19
RFC 4253 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the SSHv2 protocol
20
Use of Triple-DES in this module is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A.
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and may be used in any viable combination. These security functions are also available in the SSH connect
(non-compliant) service.
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms
These algorithms are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an
Approved mode of operation.
• RSA with key size less than 2048
• ECDSA with ed25519 curve
• ECDH with ed25519 curve
• ECDH with P-256, P-384 and P-521 (used with SSH)
• ARCFOUR
• Blowfish
• CAST
• DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-RIPEMD160
• UMAC
2.5 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the HMAC DRBG
DRBG State V and Key values for the HMAC DRBG
DRBG Entropy
Input
256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate HMAC DRBG
DH Shared
Secret
The shared secret used in Diffie Hellman (DH) key agreement (256 bits).
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. RSA 2048, ECDSA
P-256. Used to identify the host.
SSH DH
SSH Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used in SSH.
DH (L=2048, N=2047)
SSH-SEKs
SSH Session Keys: SSH Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; SSH Session Integrity
Key: HMAC
ESP-SEKs
IPSec ESP Session Keys: IKE Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; IKE Session
Integrity Key: HMAC
IKE-PSK Pre-Shared Key used to authenticate IKE connections.
IKE-Priv IKE Private Key. RSA 2048, RSA 4096 ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
IKE-SKEYID IKE SKEYID. IKE secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys.
IKE-SEKs
IKE Session Keys: IKE Session Encryption Key: TDES (3key) or AES; IKE Session Integrity Key:
HMAC
IKE-DH-PRI
IKE Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used in IKE.
DH (L = 2048, N = 256), ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384
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HMAC key The libMD HMAC keys: message digest for hashing password and critical function test.
CO-PW Password used to authenticate the CO.
User-PW Password used to authenticate the User.
Table 13 – Public Keys
Name Description and usage
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. RSA 2048, ECDSA P-256.
SSH-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in SSH key
establishment. DH (L=2048, N=2047)
IKE-PUB IKE Public Key. RSA 2048, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
IKE-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in IKE key
establishment. DH (L = 2048, N = 256), ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384
Auth-User Pub
User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P256,
P-384, P-512, RSA 2048, RSA 3072 or RSA 4096
Auth-CO Pub
CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P256, P-
384, P-512, RSA 2048, RSA 3072 or RSA 4096
Root-CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
Package-CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent
operators, but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the
separation of roles using either of the identity-based operator authentication methods in section 3.2.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As
root or super-user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module
and establish VPN tunnels.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The user role cannot not change the
configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-based authentication: username and password over the
Console and SSH, as well as username and public key over SSH.
Password authentication
The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the 96 human readable ASCII
characters. The maximum password length is 20-characters; thus the probability of a successful random
attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0
time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-second
delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-second
delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of 7 possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best approach
for the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be spawned.
This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per hour/60
mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus
the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million. The probability of
a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 9/9610
, which is less than
1/100,000.
Signature verification
Public key authentication in SSH uses either RSA or ECDSA signatures. Let 𝑥 denote the maximum number
of signature verifications that the IUT can perform in a minute. Assuming a minimum security strength of
112 bits for the signature algorithm (corresponding to 2048-bit key RSA signatures as per SP800-57 Part1
Rev3), the probability of success for a single random attempt is at most 1/2^112 , which is less than
1/10^6. It follows that the probability of a successful brute-force attack with multiple consecutive
attempts in a one-minute period is at most 𝑥/2^112 . For this probability to be greater than 1/100,000,
the number of verifications per minute should be 𝑥 > 2^112/10^5 ≅ 2^197, which is clearly an
infeasible amount of signature verifications. To see this, note that if the IUT was able to compute one
signature verification per CPU cycle, this would amount to 60 × 3.2 × 10^9 ≅ 2^37 ≪ 2^197, for the
fastest processor, which is 3.2GHz for the SRX1500. Thus, the success probability of a brute-force attack
during a one-minute period is less than 1/100,000, as required by FIPS 140-2.
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 16 lists the access to CSPs by
each service.
Table 14 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure
security
Security relevant configuration X
Configure Non-security relevant configuration X
Secure Traffic IPsec protected connection (ESP) X
Status Show status X X
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs X
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
X X
IPsec connect Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) X
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) X X
Remote reset Software initiated reset X
Load image
Verification and loading of a validated firmware
image into the switch.
X
Table 15 – Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services
SERVICE
CSP
DRBG
Seed
DRBG
State
DRBG
Entropy
Input
DH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
DH
SSH-SEK
ESP-SEK
IKE-PSK
IKE-Priv
IKE-SKEYID
IKE-SEK
IKE-DH-PRI
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure
security
-- E -- -- GWR -- -- -- WR GWR -- -- -- G W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure
traffic
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- E -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z Z Z -- Z Z Z Z Z Z -- -- -- -- Z Z
SSH
connect
-- E -- GE E GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
IPsec
connect
-- E -- GE -- -- -- G E E GE G GE -- -- --
Console
access
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z Z Z Z
Local
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z -- Z Z
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Load
Image
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts except for SSH Connect
(non-compliant) and IPSec Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security
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functions identified in Section 2.4 and the SSHv2 row of Table 10. The IPsec (non-compliant) supports the
DSA in Section 2.4 and the IKEv1, IKEv2 and IPSec rows of Table 10.
Table 17 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration X
Configure (non-
compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration X
Secure Traffic (non-
compliant)
IPsec protected connection (ESP) X
Status (non-
compliant)
Show status X x
Zeroize (non-
compliant)
Destroy all CSPs X
SSH connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
X x
IPsec connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) X
Console access (non-
compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) X x
Remote reset (non-
compliant)
Software initiated reset X
Load image (non-
compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware
image into the router.
X
Table 18 – Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset (non-
compliant)
Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic (non-
compliant)
Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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4 Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module.
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be completed
successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the module
enters the Critical Failure error state.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
• Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
• Data Plane KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
• Control Plane QuickSec KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o ECDSA P-256 w/ SHA-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Decrypt KAT
o KDF-IKE-V1 KAT
o KDF-IKE-V2 KAT
• OpenSSL KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate.
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o DH (L=2048, N=256) KAT
▪ Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o ECDH P-256 KAT
▪ Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
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o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
• OpenSSH KATs
o KDF-SSH KAT
• LibMD KATs
o HMAC SHA-1
o HMAC SHA-256
o SHA-512
• Kernel KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-1
• Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a non-modifiable operational
environment, and verification of optional non-critical packages.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG
• Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
• Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA, and RSA key pairs.
• SP800-56A assurances as per SP 800‐56A Sections 5.5.2,5.6.2, and/or 5.6.3, in accordance to IG
9.6.
• Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification)
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5 Physical Security Policy
The module’s physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 2 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated,
cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits,
cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within
the cryptographic boundary. Tamper-evident seals allow the operator to tell if the enclosure has been
breached. These seals are not factory-installed and must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer. (Seals
are available for order from Juniper using part number JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS.) The tamper-evident
seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS mode of operation.
The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals
and the direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the
tamper-evident seals or security appliances are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module
is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to a FIPS Approved state.
Table 19 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper seals (part # JNPR-
FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS),
opaque metal enclosure.
Once per month by the
Cryptographic Officer.
Seals should be free of any tamper
evidence.
If the Cryptographic Officer observes tamper evidence, it shall be assumed that the device has been
compromised. The Cryptographic Officer shall retain control of the module and perform Zeroization of
the module’s CSPs by following the steps in section 1.3 of the Security Policy and then follow the steps in
Section 1.2 to place the module back into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
5.1 General Tamper Evident Label Placement and Application Instructions
For all seal applications, the Cryptographic Officer should observe the following instructions:
• Handle the seals with care. Do not touch the adhesive side.
• Before applying a seal, ensure the location of application is clean, dry, and clear of any residue.
• Place the seal on the module, applying firm pressure across it to ensure adhesion. Allow at least
1 hour for the adhesive to cure.
5.2 SRX1500 (10 seals)
Six tamper evident labels (TEL) must be applied to the following location:
• The front of the SRX1500 has two slot covers. The slot covers should be secured with two screws
each and then tamper evident labels (TEL #1 & #2) applied as shown by the red boxes in following
two figures. The TEL go from the front of the SRX1500 to the top (Figures 4 & 5).
• 2 Tamper labels (#5 & #6) are used to cover the USB port and two tamper labels (#3 & #4) are
used to cover the High Availability port (Figure 4).
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Figure 5 - SRX1500 Front View: TEL 1 - 6
• The rear of the SRX1500 has two TELs (TEL #7 and TEL #8). The TEL #7, at the top of the rear-view
wraps to the top of the device and covers the fourth screw from side containing the power supply
(see Figure 7). TEL #8 wraps from the rear of the SRX1500, on the SSD slot cover, to the bottom of
the SRX1500 (see Figure 8).
Figure 7 - SRX1500 Rear View: TEL 7 & 8
Figure 6 - SRX1500 Top-Front View: TEL 1 & 2
1 2
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Figure 8 - SRX1500 Top - Rear View: TEL 7
Figure 9 - SRX1500 Bottom View: TEL 8, 9 & 10
7
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• TEL #9 and TEL #10 cover the indicated screw on the left and right side of the SRX1500 (Figure
10 andFigure 11) and wrap to the bottom of the SRX1500 as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 10 - SRX1500 Right Side View: TEL 9
Figure 11 - SRX1500 Left Side View: TEL 10
5.3 SRX4100 & SRX4200 (13 seals)
The placement of the tamper evident labels for the SRX4100 and SRX4200 are the same in that the outside
of the devices is identical. Thirteen tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations:
• The top of the chassis, covering one screw on the top-back left and one screw on the top-back
right (TEL #1 and TEL #2). The TELs cover the screws on the top of the chassis and wrap down each
side of the chassis.
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Figure 12 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Top View: TEL 1, 2, 6, 8 & 10
Figure 13 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Left-Side View: TEL 1
Figure 14 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Right-Side View: TEL 2
• Bottom chassis, covering 3 screws that secure the faceplates on the front of the chassis. TEL #3,
#4, #5 are entirely on the bottom of the chassis they do not wrap around to any other portion of
the chassis
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Figure 15 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Bottom View: TEL 3, 4, 5
• Tamper evident seals 6 & 7 cover the two USB ports on the front of the SRX4100 and the SRX4200
• Two tamper evident labels cover each HA port. Tamper evident labels #8 & #9 cover one HA port
and tamper evident labels #10 & #11 cover the second HA port.
Figure 16 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Front View: TEL 6-11
• The rear of the SRX4100 & SRX4200 require 2 tamper evident labels (TEL #12 and #13) as shown
in Figure 17. Each label is applied on the power supply plate and wraps around the bottom.
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Figure 17 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Rear View: TEL 12-13
5.4 SRX4600 (15 seals)
Fifteen tamper evident labels (TEL) must be applied to the following location:
• The front of the SRX4600 has 4 HA ports, 1 USB port, and 2 Solid State Drives (SSDs) that must be
protected with 8 tamper evident labels.
• Referring to Figure 18 and Figure 19, the front panel requires 4 tamper evident labels (#1 - #4)
cover the HA ports, 2 tamper evident labels cover the USB port and top screw (#5, #6), 1 tamper
evident label (#7) to cover the first SSD, and 1 tamper evident label (#8) to cover the second SSD.
Figure 18 - SRX4600 Front View: TEL 1 – 8
Figure 19 - SRX4600 Top Front View: TEL 1, 3, 5, 7, 8
• The rear of the SRX4600 requires 7 tamper evident labels (TEL #9 -#15) as shown in Figure 20
TEL #9 and TEL #10 wrap over the top and cover the back plate of each power supply and the
adjacent chassis edge. Each of TEL#11 to TEL #15 = wraps over the top and attaches to a fan
cover.
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Figure 20 - SRX4600 Rear View: TEL 9-15
Figure 21 - SRX4600 Top Rear View: TEL 9 – 10
• The right and left sides have 1 TEL each (TEL 11 and 12) over the 4th
screw from the front and
wrapping around to the bottom. Figures 6 & 7 show the placement of the side TELs.
Figure 22 - SRX4600 Right Side View: TEL 12
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Figure 23 - SRX4600 Left Side View: TEL 11
• The bottom view (Figure 8) shows the TELs wrapping around from the front and sides of the
SRX4600.
Figure 24 - SRX4600 Bottom View: TEL 2, 4, 11, 12
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6 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically
refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements
indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext
CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the
firmware load service.
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. If the module loses power and then it is restored, then a new key shall be established for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption processes.
14. The cryptographic officer must configure the module to IPsec ESP lifetime-kilobytes to ensure the
module does not encrypt more than 2^20 blocks with a single Triple-DES key when Triple-DES is the
encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec ESP. The operator is required to ensure that Triple-DES keys
used in SSH do not perform more than 2^20 encryptions.
15. The module must be configured to disallow the use of ECDH in SSH by using the following CLI
command:
co@fips-qfx# s e t s y s t e m s e r v i c e s s s h k e y - e x c h a n g e d h - g r o u p 1 4 - s h a 1
16. Triple-DES is only allowed until December 31st, 2023, as per SP 800-131A. From January 1st, 2024,
the module should be configured to disallow the use of Triple-DES.
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7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 20 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, Revision 1, March 2019
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1,
December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Special Publication 800-
56A, March 2007
[56ARev3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Special Publication 800-
56A Revision 3, April 2018
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-
1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, Revision 2,
November 2017
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
June 2015.
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[133Rev2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation, Special Publication 800-133, Revision 2, June 2020
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
Table 22 – Datasheets
Model Title URL
SRX1500 SRX1500 Services
Gateway
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/1000551-
en.pdf
SRX4100
SRX4200
SRX4100 and
SRX4200 Services
Gateways
http://www.juniper.net/assets/de/de/local/pdf/datasheets/1000600-
en.pdf
SRX4600 SRX4600 Services
Gateway
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/1000628-
en.pdf