FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: REDCOM Crypto Module
Document Version 1.2 © REDCOM Laboratories, Inc. Page 1 of 25
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
REDCOM Crypto Module
Software Version 2.2.1
Document Version 1.2
October 24, 2022
Prepared For:
Prepared By:
REDCOM Laboratories, Inc.
1 Redcom Center
Victor, NY 14564
www.redcom.com
SafeLogic Inc.
530 Lytton Ave, Suite 200
Palo Alto, CA 94301
www.safelogic.com
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: REDCOM Crypto Module
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Overview
This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for REDCOM Crypto Module.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: REDCOM Crypto Module
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Table of Contents
Overview..............................................................................................................................................................2
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 About FIPS 140 .............................................................................................................................................5
1.2 About this Document....................................................................................................................................5
1.3 External Resources .......................................................................................................................................5
1.4 Notices..........................................................................................................................................................5
2 REDCOM Crypto Module ...............................................................................................................................6
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification ............................................................................................................6
2.1.1 Validation Level Detail .............................................................................................................................6
2.1.2 Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................6
2.1.3 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms .......................................................................................................7
2.1.4 Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms...........................................................................9
2.1.5 Non-Approved Algorithms.....................................................................................................................10
2.2 Module Interfaces ......................................................................................................................................11
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication ...........................................................................................................13
2.3.1 Operator Services and Descriptions.......................................................................................................13
2.3.2 Operator Authentication .......................................................................................................................14
2.4 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................14
2.5 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................................14
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management ...............................................................................................................15
2.6.1 Random Number Generation ................................................................................................................18
2.6.2 Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Authorized Access and Use by Role and Service/Function .......18
2.6.3 Key/CSP Storage.....................................................................................................................................18
2.6.4 Key/CSP Zeroization...............................................................................................................................18
2.7 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................19
2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................19
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................21
2.7.3 Cryptographic Function .........................................................................................................................21
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks .......................................................................................................................21
3 Guidance and Secure Operation..................................................................................................................22
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance .............................................................................................................................22
3.1.1 Software Installation..............................................................................................................................22
3.1.2 Additional Rules of Operation ...............................................................................................................22
3.2 User Guidance ............................................................................................................................................22
3.2.1 General Guidance ..................................................................................................................................22
4 References and Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................24
4.1 References..................................................................................................................................................24
4.2 Acronyms....................................................................................................................................................25
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List of Tables
Table 1 - Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section ...........................................................................................................6
Table 2 - FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates ............................................................................................................7
Table 3 - Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping.............................................................................................13
Table 4 - Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions ....................................................................................................13
Table 5 - Tested Environments ....................................................................................................................................15
Table 6 - Module Keys/CSPs ........................................................................................................................................16
Table 7 - Power-On Self-Tests......................................................................................................................................19
Table 8 - Conditional Self-Tests ...................................................................................................................................21
Table 9 - References ....................................................................................................................................................24
Table 10 - Acronyms and Terms ..................................................................................................................................25
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram..................................................................................................12
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1 Introduction
1.1 About FIPS 140
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but
Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140
program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP validates
modules meeting FIPS 140 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and
tested against the FIPS 140 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-
module-validation-program.
1.2 About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for REDCOM Crypto Module from REDCOM
Laboratories, Inc. (REDCOM) provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it
meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document contains details on the module’s
cryptographic keys and critical security parameters. This Security Policy concludes with instructions and
guidance on running the module in a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of operation.
REDCOM Crypto Module may also be referred to as the “module” in this document.
1.3 External Resources
The REDCOM website (www.redcom.com) contains information on REDCOM services and products. The
Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and
REDCOM contact information.
1.4 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
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2 REDCOM Crypto Module
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
The REDCOM Crypto Module is a standards-based cryptographic engine for unified communications
devices and infrastructure. REDCOM Crypto Module offloads functions for secure key management, data
integrity, data at rest encryption, and secure communications to a trusted implementation.
The module’s software version is 2.2.1.
The module is a software module that relies on the physical characteristics of the host platform. The
module’s physical cryptographic boundary is defined by the enclosure of the host platform, which is the
General Purpose Device that the module is installed on. For the purposes of FIPS 140-2 validation, the
module’s embodiment type is defined as multi-chip standalone.
All operations of the module occur via calls from host applications and their respective internal
daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted services calling the services of the module.
The module's logical cryptographic boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC
files.
2.1.1 Validation Level Detail
The following table lists the module’s level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
Table 1 - Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports two modes of operation: FIPS Approved mode and non-Approved mode. The
module will be in the FIPS Approved mode when all power-up self-tests have completed successfully,
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and only Approved algorithms are invoked. See Section 2.1.3 - Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
below for a list of the supported Approved algorithms and Section 2.1.4 - Non-Approved but Allowed
Cryptographic Algorithms for a list of supported allowed algorithms. The non-Approved mode is entered
when a non-Approved algorithm is invoked. See Section 2.1.5 - Non-Approved Algorithms for a list of
non-Approved algorithms.
2.1.3 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module’s cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers
from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP):
Table 2 - FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard
Mode/Method and Key Lengths,
Curves or Moduli1 Use
A2305 AES FIPS 197,
SP 800-38
series
CBC (e/d; 128, 192, 256)
CFB1 (e/d; 128, 192, 256)
CFB8 (e/d; 128, 192, 256)
CFB128 (e/d; 128, 192, 256)
ECB (e/d; 128, 192, 256)
OFB (e/d; 128, 192, 256)
CTR (external counter only; 128, 192,
256)
CMAC (Generation/Verification: 128,
192, 256)
CCM (128, 192, 256)
GCM2
(e/d: 128, 192, 256)
Data encryption/
decryption and
authentication
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG SP 800-133 Cryptographic key
generation per IG D.12.
The resulting
symmetric key or
asymmetric seed is an
unmodified output
from a DRBG. (Ref.
Security Policy Section
2.6.1)
A2305 DRBG SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG (SHA-1, SHA-2)
HMAC_DRBG (SHA-1, SHA-2)
CTR_DRBG (128, 192, 256)
Random number
generation. No
assurance of the
minimum strength of
generated keys.
1
The module’s CAVP certificates include additional algorithm functionality that is not supported by the module.
Algorithms supported by the module are as specified in this table.
2
IV generation is compliant with IG A.5. See Security Policy sections 2.6.1 and 3.2.1.
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A2305 DSA FIPS 186-4 Key Pair Gen:
(2048, 224), (2048, 256), (3072, 256)
PQG Gen:
(2048, 224), (2048, 256), (3072, 256)
(SHA-2)
PQG Ver:
(1024, 160), (2048, 224), (2048, 256),
(3072, 256) (SHA-1 and SHA-2)
Sig Gen:
(2048, 224), (2048, 256), (3072, 256)
(SHA-2)
Sig Ver:
(1024, 160), (2048, 224), (2048, 256),
(3072, 256) (SHA-1 and SHA-2)
Digital signatures
A2305 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Key Pair Gen:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
PKV:
P-192, P224, P-256, P-384, P-521
K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571
B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
Sig Gen: (using SHA-2)
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
Sig Ver: (using SHA-1 and SHA-2)
P-192, P224, P-256, P-384, P-521
K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571
B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
Digital signatures
A2305 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-224
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
Message
authentication
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A2305 RSA FIPS 186-4 ANSIX9.31
Sig Gen: 2048, 3072, 4096 (using
SHA-2)
Sig Ver: 1024, 2048, 3072 (any SHA
size)
PKCS1 V1.5
Sig Gen: 2048, 3072, 4096 (using
SHA-2)
Sig Ver: 1024, 2048, 3072 (any SHA
size)
PSS
Sig Gen: 2048, 3072, 4096 (using
SHA-2)
Sig Ver: 1024, 2048, 3072 (any SHA
size)
Digital signatures
FIPS 186-2 ANSIX9.31
Sig Ver: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072,
4096 (any SHA size)
PKCS1 V1 5
Sig Ver: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072,
4096 (any SHA size)
PSS
Sig Ver: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072,
4096 (any SHA size)
A2305 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
Hashing
A2305 Triple-
DES
SP 800-67 TCBC (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)
TCFB1 (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)
TCFB8 (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)
TCFB64 (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)
TECB (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)
TOFB (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)
CMAC (KS: 3-Key;
Generation/Verification; Block
Size(s): Full / Partial)
Data encryption/
decryption and
authentication
2.1.4 Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
The module does not support any FIPS 140-2 non-Approved but allowed algorithms that may be used in
the FIPS Approved mode of operation.
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2.1.5 Non-Approved Algorithms
The module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. The algorithms listed in this section are not to
be used by the operator in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.
The following algorithms shall not be used:
• AES XTS (KS: XTS_128 (e/d) (f/p), KS: XTS_256 (e/d) (f/p)
• EC Diffie-Hellman
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides up to 256 bits of encryption
strength)
The following algorithms are disallowed as of January 1, 2014 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm
transitions:
• FIPS 186-4 DSA PQG Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit, 3072-bit using SHA-1
Key Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit, 3072-bit using SHA-1
Sig Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit, 3072-bit using SHA-1
• FIPS 186-2 DSA PQG Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size)
Key Gen 1024-bit
Sig Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit, 3072-bit using SHA-1
• FIPS 186-2 RSA ANSIX9.31
Key Gen 1024 & 1536
ANSIX9.31
Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 using SHA-1
PKCSI V1 5
Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 using SHA-1
PSS
Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 using SHA-1
• FIPS 186-4 RSA ANSIX9.31
Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1
PKCSI V1 5
Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1
PSS
Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1
• FIPS 186-2 ECDSA Key Pair Generation Curves P-192, K-163, B-163
Sig Gen Curves All P, K & B
• FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Key Pair Generation: Curves P-192, K-163, B-163
Sig Gen Curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571,
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571) (using SHA-1)
P-192, K-163, B-163 (any SHA size)
• CVL (ECC CDH KAS)
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The following algorithms are disallowed as of January 1, 2016 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm
transitions:
• Random Number Generator Based on ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4
• Two-Key Triple DES Encryption
• Dual EC DRBG
The following algorithms are disallowed as of September 1, 2020 per the FIPS 186-2 transitions:
• FIPS 186-2 RSA (X9.31, PKCS #1.5, PSS)
o ANSIX9.31
▪ Key Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit
▪ Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)
▪ Sig Gen: 4096-bit using SHA-1
o PKCS1 V1 5
▪ Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)
▪ Sig Gen: 4096-bit using SHA-1
o PSS
▪ Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)
▪ Sig Gen: 4096-bit using SHA-1
2.2 Module Interfaces
The figure below shows the module’s physical and logical block diagram:
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Figure 1 - Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram
The module’s physical boundary is the boundary of the General Purpose Computer (GPC) that the
module is installed on, which includes a processor and memory. The interfaces (ports) for the physical
boundary include the computer’s network port, keyboard port, mouse port, power plug and display.
When operational, the module does not transmit any information across these physical ports because it
is a software cryptographic module. Therefore the module’s interfaces are purely logical.
The logical interface is provided through the Application Programming Interface (API) that a calling
daemon can operate. The API itself defines the module’s logical boundary, i.e. all access to the module is
through this API. The API provides functions that may be called by an application (see Section 2.3 –
Roles, Services, and Authentication for the list of available functions). The module distinguishes between
logical interfaces by logically separating the information according to the defined API.
The API provided by the module is mapped onto the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces, which relate to the
module’s callable interface as follows:
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Table 3 - Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping
FIPS 140-2 Interface Module Logical Interface GPC Physical Interface
Data Input Input parameters of API function
calls
Network Interface
Data Output Output parameters of API function
calls
Network Interface
Control Input API function calls Network Interface, Keyboard
Interface, Mouse Interface
Status Output For FIPS Approved mode, function
calls returning status information
and return codes provided by API
function calls.
Network Interface, Display
Controller
Power None Power Supply
As shown in Figure 1 - Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram and Table 4 - Module Services, Roles,
and Descriptions, the output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected
from processes performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the
data output interface when the module zeroizes keys.
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The module supports a Crypto Officer role (CO) and a User role. The module does not support a
Maintenance role. The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing
services implemented by the module.
2.3.1 Operator Services and Descriptions
The module supports services that are available to users in the various roles. All the services are
described in detail in the module’s user documentation. The following table shows the services available
to the various roles and the access to cryptographic keys and CSPs resulting from services:
Table 4 - Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions
Service Roles CSP / Algorithm Permission
Module initialization Crypto
Officer
None CO:
execute
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
User AES Key, Triple-DES Key User:
read/write/execute
Digital signature
generation
User RSA Private Key, DSA Private Key, ECDSA
Private Key
User:
read/write/execute
Digital Signature
verification
User RSA Public Key, DSA Public Key, ECDSA
Public Key
User:
read/write/execute
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Service Roles CSP / Algorithm Permission
Symmetric key
generation
User AES Key, Triple-DES Key User:
read/write/execute
Asymmetric key
generation
User DSA Private Key, ECDSA Private Key User:
read/write/execute
Keyed Hash (HMAC) User HMAC Key
HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA- 224, HMAC SHA-
256, HMAC SHA-384, HMAC SHA-512
User:
read/write/execute
Message digest (SHS) User SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512
User:
read/write/execute
Random number
generation
User DRBG Internal State, DRBG Entropy User:
read/write/execute
Show status Crypto
Officer
User
None User and CO:
execute
Self-test User None User:
read/execute
Zeroize Crypto
Officer
User
All CSPs CO:
read/write/execute
The operator is required to review the Sections 2.1.3 - Approved Cryptographic Algorithms, 2.1.4 - Non-
Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms, 2.1.5 - Non-Approved Algorithms, and 3 - Guidance
and Secure Operation to ensure only Approved algorithms are used.
2.3.2 Operator Authentication
As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles (a Crypto Officer role and User role) in the module that
operators may assume. As allowed by Level 1, the module does not support authentication to access
services. As such, there are no applicable authentication policies. Access control policies are implicitly
defined by the services available to the roles as specified in Table 4 - Module Services, Roles, and
Descriptions.
2.4 Physical Security
This section of requirements does not apply to this module. The module is a software-only module and
does not implement any physical security mechanisms.
2.5 Operational Environment
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The
module operates on a general purpose computer (GPC) running a general purpose operating system
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(GPOS). For FIPS purposes, the module is running on this operating system in single user mode and does
not require any additional configuration to meet the FIPS requirements.
The module was tested on the following platforms:
Table 5 - Tested Environments
Operating System Hardware Platform Processor (CPU) PAA (AES-NI)
CentOS 7.9 HPE ProLiant DL360 G7 Intel Xeon X5670 Yes
CentOS 7.9 HPE ProLiant DL360 G7 Intel Xeon X5670 No
FreeBSD 13.1 XRI-400 Intel Atom E3940 Yes
FreeBSD 13.1 XRI-400 Intel Atom E3940 No
macOS 12 (Monterey) Apple Mac Mini 9,1 Apple M1 N/A
Windows Server 2012 R2 Dell PowerEdge R420 Intel Xeon E5-2430 Yes
Windows Server 2012 R2 Dell PowerEdge R420 Intel Xeon E5-2430 No
FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained for compatible operating systems (in single user mode)
where the module source code is unmodified, and the requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are met. No
claim can be made as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated
keys when ported to an operational environment that is not listed on the validation certificate.
The module, when compiled from the same unmodified source code, is vendor-affirmed to be FIPS 140-
2 compliant when running on the following supported operating systems for which operational testing
and algorithm testing were not performed:
• FreeBSD 12 and 13
The GPC(s) used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined
by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B.
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and keys used within the
module. Access is indicated as follows:
R = Read W = Write D = Delete
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Table 6 - Module Keys/CSPs
Keys and CSPs
Storage
Locations
Storage
Method
Input
Method
Output
Method
Zeroization Access
AES Key (128, 192, 256 bits)
Used for Encrypt/Decrypt
operations.
Used to generate and verify
MACs with AES as part of the
CMAC algorithm.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
None power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
Triple-DES Key (168 bits, 112
bits – decrypt only)
Used for Encrypt/Decrypt
operations.
Used for generating and
verifying MACs with Triple-
DES as part of the CMAC
algorithm.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
None power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
RSA Public Key (1024, 1536,
2048, 3072, 4096 bits)
RSA public/private keys used
to sign and verify data.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
API call
parameter
power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
RSA Private Key (2048, 3072,
4096 bits)
RSA public/private keys used
to sign and verify data.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
API call
parameter
power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
DSA Public Key (1024, 2048,
3072 bits)
DSA public/private keys used
to sign and verify data.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
API call
parameter
power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
DSA Private Key (2048, 3072
bits)
DSA public/private keys used
to sign and verify data.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
API call
parameter
power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
HMAC Key (≥ 112 bits)
HMAC keys used to generate
and verify MACs on data.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
API call
parameter
power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
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Keys and CSPs
Storage
Locations
Storage
Method
Input
Method
Output
Method
Zeroization Access
Integrity Key Module
Binary
Plaintext None None None CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
ECDSA Private Key
(PKG/SigGen:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571,
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571)
PKV/SigVer:
All P, K & B curves)
ECDSA public/private keys
used to sign and verify data.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
API call
parameter
power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
ECDSA Public Key
(PKG/SigGen:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571,
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
PKV/SigVer:
All P, K & B curves)
ECDSA public/private keys
used to sign and verify data.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
API call
parameter
power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
DRBG Internal state (V, C,
Key value)
V and Key are used as part of
HMAC and CTR DRBG
process. V and C are used as
part of HASH DRBG process.
RAM Plaintext None None power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
DRBG Entropy
Entropy input strings used as
part of the DRBG process.
RAM Plaintext API call
parameter
None power cycle
cleanse()
CO:
RWD
U:
RWD
Please note that keys can be generated by the module for the services that require those keys, but the
keys will always be input via an API call.
The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization of the
key material. The module provides functions for key allocation and destruction which overwrite the
memory that is occupied by the key information with zeros before it is deallocated.
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2.6.1 Random Number Generation
The module uses SP 800-90A DRBGs for creation of asymmetric and symmetric keys.
The module accepts input from entropy sources external to the cryptographic boundary for use as seed
material for the module’s Approved DRBGs. The calling application of the module shall use entropy
sources that meet the security strength required for the random bit generation mechanism as shown in
NIST Special Publication 800-90A Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG) and Table 3 (CTR_DRBG). At a
minimum, the entropy source shall provide at least 128 bits of entropy to the DRBG.
The module performs continual tests on the random numbers it uses to ensure that the seed inputs to
the Approved DRBGs do not have the same value. The module also performs continual tests on the
output of the Approved DRBGs to ensure that consecutive random numbers do not repeat.
In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG) for symmetric keys and asymmetric seeds per NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed).
The resulting symmetric key or asymmetric seed is an unmodified output from a DRBG.
The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the RFC5288 and RFC5289 and shall only be used for
the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 (“TLS protocol IV
generation”); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52]. Refer to Section 3.2.1 – General Guidance
for additional detail.
2.6.2 Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Authorized Access and Use by Role and
Service/Function
An authorized application as user (the User role) has access to all key data generated during the
operation of the module.
2.6.3 Key/CSP Storage
Public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when
released by the appropriate API function calls or during power cycle. The module does not perform
persistent storage of keys.
2.6.4 Key/CSP Zeroization
The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the API. The
destruction functions then overwrite the memory occupied by keys with zeros and deallocate the
memory. This occurs during process termination / power cycle. Keys are immediately zeroized upon
deallocation, which sufficiently protects the CSPs from compromise.
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2.7 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the
correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, some functions require continuous
verification of function, such as the random number generator. All these tests are listed and described in
this section. In the event of a self-test error, the module will log the error and will halt. The module
must be reloaded into memory to resume function.
The following sections discuss the module’s self-tests in more detail.
2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power‐on self‐tests are executed automatically when the module is loaded into memory. The module
verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-1 digest computed at build time. If
the fingerprints match, the power-up self-tests are then performed. If the power-up self-tests are
successful, a flag is set to indicate the module is in FIPS Approved mode (the operator is still required to
follow the guidance in Section 3 – Guidance and Secure Operation to ensure the module is running in
FIPS Approved mode of operation).
Table 7 - Power-On Self-Tests
Test Type Test Details
Software Integrity Check • HMAC-SHA-1 on all module components (HMAC Cert. #A2305)
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Test Type Test Details
Known Answer Tests (KATs) • AES
o AES ECB 128 encrypt KAT
o AES ECB 128 decrypt KAT
o AES CMAC 128/192/256 encrypt KATs
o AES CMAC 128/192/256 decrypt KATs
o AES CCM 192 encrypt KAT
o AES CCM 192 decrypt KAT
o AES GCM 256 encrypt KAT
o AES GCM 256 decrypt KAT
• DRBG
o Hash_DRBG KATs
o HMAC_DRBG KATs
o CTR_DRBG KATs
• HMAC
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-224 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
• RSA
o RSA 2048 sign KAT (SHA-256, PKCS#1)
o RSA 2048 verify KAT (SHA-256, PKCS#1)
• SHS3
o SHA-1 KAT
• Triple-DES
o Triple-DES ECB 3-key encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES ECB 3-key decrypt KAT
o Triple-DES CMAC 3-key generate KAT
o Triple-DES CMAC 3-key verify KAT
Pairwise Consistency Tests
(PCTs)
• DSA sign/verify PCT using 2048 bit key, SHA-384
• ECDSA sign/verify PCT using P-224, SHA-512
• ECDSA sign/verify PCT using K-233, SHA-512
• RSA PCT (legacy test)
Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the module is in a self-test or
error state because the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until the
power-up self-tests are complete. If the power-up self-tests fail, subsequent calls to the module will also
fail - thus no further cryptographic operations are possible.
3
Note that all SHA-X KATs are tested as part of the respective HMAC SHA-X KAT. SHA-1 is also tested
independently.
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The module performs power-up self-tests automatically during loading of the module by making use of
default entry point (DEP) and no operator intervention is required.
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module implements the following conditional self-tests upon key generation, or random number
generation (respectively):
Table 8 - Conditional Self-Tests
Test Type Test Details
Pairwise Consistency Tests • DSA
• RSA (legacy test not run in FIPS Approved mode)
• ECDSA
Continuous RNG Tests • Performed on all Approved DRBGs, the non-approved X9.31
RNG, and the non-approved DUAL_EC_DRBG
Please note the DRBGs are tested as required by [SP800-90A]
Section 11
2.7.3 Cryptographic Function
The module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-1 digest that is computed
at build time. If this computed HMAC-SHA-1 digest matches the stored, known digest, then the power-
up self-test (consisting of the algorithm-specific Pairwise Consistency and Known Answer tests) is
performed. If any component of the power-up self-test fails, an internal global error flag is set to
prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. Any such power-up self-test failure is
a hard error that can only be recovered by reloading the module. The power-up self-tests may be
performed at any time by reloading the module.
No operator intervention is required during the running of the self-tests.
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not contain additional security mechanisms beyond the requirements for FIPS 140-2
Level 1 cryptographic modules.
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3 Guidance and Secure Operation
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
3.1.1 Software Installation
The module is provided directly to solution developers and is not available for direct download to the
general public. Only the compiled module is provided to solution developers. The module and its host
application are to be installed on an operating system specified in Section 2.5 – Operational
Environment or on an operating system where portability is maintained.
3.1.2 Additional Rules of Operation
1. The writable memory areas of the module (data and stack segments) are accessible only by the
application so that the operating system is in "single user" mode, i.e. only the application has
access to that instance of the module.
2. The operating system is responsible for multitasking operations so that other processes cannot
access the address space of the process containing the module.
3.2 User Guidance
3.2.1 General Guidance
The module is not distributed as a standalone library and is only used in conjunction with the solution.
The end user of the operating system is also responsible for zeroizing CSPs via wipe/secure delete
procedures.
If the module power is lost and restored, the calling application must ensure that any AES GCM keys
used for encryption or decryption are redistributed.
The counter portion of the AES GCM IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When
the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party to
encounter this condition shall trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key in accordance with
RFC 5246.
The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the RFC5288 and RFC5289 and shall only be used for
the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 (“TLS protocol IV
generation”); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52].
In the event the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a
given session key, either party (the client or the server) that encounters this condition shall trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key.
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The same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 216
64-bit blocks of data in accordance
with IG A.13.
At a minimum, the entropy source shall provide at least 128 bits of entropy to the DRBG.
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4 References and Acronyms
4.1 References
Table 9 - References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31 X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
SP 800-38C Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators
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4.2 Acronyms
The following table defines acronyms found in this document:
Table 10 - Acronyms and Terms
Acronym Term
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EC Elliptic Curve
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GPC General Purpose Computer
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD Message Digest
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Operating System
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus