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SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs
HFS960GECTX098N
HFS1T9GECTX098N
HFS3T8GECTX098N
HFS7T6GECTX098N
HFS800GECTX098N
HFS1T6GECTX098N
HFS3T2GECTX098N
HFS6T4GECTX098N
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.3
Date: 1/23/2023
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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CHANGE RECORD
Revision Date Author Description of Change
1.0 10/25/2021
Chandra Chebrolu
Dharma Nagarajan
First release
1.1 5/18/2022
Chandra Chebrolu
Dharma Nagarajan
EMI/EMC updated to Security Level 3; AES-XTS
footnote added for below Table 4; correction to MEKj
listing in Table 7
1.2 7/28/2022
Chandra Chebrolu
Dharma Nagarajan
NDRNG replaced by ENT (P) in Tables 4, 15 and 19;
added description of ENT (P) self-tests in Table 14
1.3 1/23/2023
Chandra Chebrolu
Dharma Nagarajan
Added Section 8.4 Firmware Update
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Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 5
1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary ...................................................................... 6
1.2 Firmware and Module Block Diagram ......................................................................................... 7
1.3 Mode of Operation ...................................................................................................................... 8
Cryptographic Functionality........................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Critical Security Parameters....................................................................................................... 10
2.2 Public Security Parameters ........................................................................................................ 11
Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................................. 12
3.1 Assumption of Roles .................................................................................................................. 12
3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................ 13
3.3 Services ...................................................................................................................................... 14
Self-Tests..................................................................................................................................... 21
Physical Security Policy................................................................................................................ 23
Operational Environment ............................................................................................................ 29
Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ............................................................................................... 30
Security Rules and Guidance........................................................................................................ 31
8.1 Invariant Rules ........................................................................................................................... 31
8.2 Cryptographic Officer Initialization............................................................................................ 31
8.3 Un-Initialize the Module ............................................................................................................ 32
8.4 Firmware Update ....................................................................................................................... 32
References and Definitions .......................................................................................................... 34
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Level of Security Requirements.........................................................................................5
Table 2: Module Configurations ................................................................................................................... 5
Table 3: Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................................ 6
Table 4: Approved Cryptographic Functions.................................................................................................9
Table 5: Critical Security Parameters..........................................................................................................10
Table 6: Public Security Parameters ...........................................................................................................11
Table 7: Authenticated Roles...................................................................................................................... 12
Table 8: Unauthenticated Roles..................................................................................................................13
Table 9: Authentication Description...........................................................................................................13
Table 10: Unauthenticated Services ...........................................................................................................14
Table 11: Authenticated Services ...............................................................................................................15
Table 12: CSP Access within Services..........................................................................................................17
Table 13: PSP Access within Services..........................................................................................................19
Table 14: Power-On Self-Tests.................................................................................................................... 21
Table 15: Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................................22
Table 16: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines......................................................................................23
Table 17: Figures of all Modules with Production Label and Tamper-Evident Seals.................................24
Table 18: References................................................................................................................................... 34
Table 19: Acronyms and Definitions ...........................................................................................................36
List of Figures
Figure 1: PE8010/PE8030 U.2/U.3 Form Factor............................................................................................6
Figure 2: Module Block Diagram................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 3: Module Physical Enclosure – Bottom View .................................................................................23
Figure 4 : PE8000 Series NVMe OPAL SEDs Tamper Evidence....................................................................28
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Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the SK Hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs
cryptographic module, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a multiple chip embedded self-
encrypting drive (SED) compliant with TCG Core, TCG Opal, TCG Single User Mode (SUM), PCIe, NVMe and
NVMe-MI specifications. The cryptographic module’s controller has a built-in AES-XTS HW engine which
encrypts and decrypts the user data without any performance loss. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall
Security Level 2.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 1: Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
The Module has the following configurations:
Table 2: Module Configurations
HW P/N and Version FW Version Description
PE8010 Family
1 HFS960GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 960GB
2 HFS1T9GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 1.9TB
3 HFS3T8GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 3.8TB
4 HFS7T6GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 7.6TB
PE8030 Family
5 HFS800GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 800GB
6 HFS1T6GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 1.6TB
7 HFS3T2GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 3.2TB
8 HFS6T4GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 6.4TB
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1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary
The Module is designed to be embedded in a general-purpose computer (host) and is connected through
the PCIe connecter. The Module is protected by a tamper-evident enclosure and two (2) opaque tamper-
evident seals. To ensure evidence of tampering, the seals are affixed as indicated in Figure 1 (numbered).
The only component exposed is the PCIe connector (NVMe, SMBus and Power) port. The physical
boundary is defined as the entire enclosure and it is protected by opaque, tamper evident seals as
indicated in Figure 1. The module does not support maintenance access interface.
The Module PE8010 and PE8030 is provided in a U.2/U.3 physical form factor as depicted in Figure 1. The
red outline depicts the cryptographic boundary as well as the physical boundary.
Figure 1: PE8010/PE8030 U.2/U.3 Form Factor
Table 3: Ports and Interfaces
Port Interfaces Description Logical Interface Type
PCIe
Connector
Power Power Connector Power
NVMe NVMe interface Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
SMBus Management Interface Control in, Status out
1.1.1 NVMe Interface
The NVMe interface provides the primary interface to interact with the Module. Most services provided
by the Module are accessed via the NVMe Interface including Opal configuration, reading and writing user
data, retrieving FIPS capability support, and retrieving FIPS status reporting.
1.1.2 SMBus Interface
The SMBus interface provides the ability to audit the SSD environment (temperature, Vital Product Data).
1 2
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1.2 Firmware and Module Block Diagram
The Module uses a single chip controller (Aquarius) with a PCIe/NVMe and SMBus interface on the
systems side and SK Hynix NAND flash internally. The following figure depicts the Module operational
environment. The red outline in the figure depicts the cryptographic boundary which is the physical
boundary outside the enclosure of the device. All firmware runs on the controller inside the cryptographic
boundary.
Aquarius Controller
Nand
Nand
SK HYNIX NAND Memory
PCIe/NVMe
SK HYNIX DRAM
NAND
Interface
ROM
CPU
PMC
SRAM
ECC
DRAM Interface
PCIe/
NVMe
Interface
SMBus
Interface
AES 256
TRNG CTR DRBG
SHA/HMAC
SMBus
Power
Figure 2: Module Block Diagram
The Module is composed of the following components:
• Aquarius Controller – The controller SoC (System on Chip). This component is responsible for
terminating PCIe/NVMe commands; reading or writing data to the Host platform; encrypting or
decrypting data from the Host platform; and storing or retrieving data to SK Hynix NAND nonvolatile
memory.
• PMC – Power Management Controller – Manages power control of the Module
• PCIe/NVMe Interface – Provides PCI/NVMe Interface access to the controller
• SMBus Interface – Provides SMBus Interface access to the controller
• CPU – Central Processing Unit of the controller
• ROM – Read only memory – Non-volatile memory which has first bootable code for controller
• ECC – Error Correction Code memory provides error correction and detection access to the
controller
• SRAM – Static Random Access memory
• DRAM Interface – Provides access to SK hynix DRAM
• NAND Interface – Provide access to SK hynix NAND Memory
• SK hynix DRAM – Dynamic Random Access Memory. DRAM provides variable storage, instruction
memory, data mapping tables, and a buffer for user data going into and out of the device.
• SK hynix NAND memory – NAND flash is the storage medium where encrypted user data, firmware
for the Aquarius controller, and other non-volatile configuration data that is needed by the Aquarius
controller during execution.
The Module relies on the PCIe/NVMe interface as input/output devices.
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1.3 Mode of Operation
The Module is always in the FIPS Approved Mode of operation. The module has two distinct operational
modes in the approved mode of operation as described below.
• Uninitialized Mode – In this operational mode, the ownership of the drive is not taken. Once the
ownership is taken, the module transitions to initialized mode.
• Initialized Mode - In this operational mode, the ownership of the drive is taken. To initialize the
drive, the module owner must take ownership of the device and activate Locking SP by following
steps in the Crypto Officer Initialization section from the uninitialized mode.
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Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic functions listed in the tables below. The term
FIPS Approved cryptographic function is defined by FIPS 140-2 specifications.
Table 4: Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
A913 AES [197]
ECB
[38A]
Key Sizes: 256
Boundary: Hardware
Encrypt, Decrypt
Underlying for XTS, KW
and CTR-DRBG.
XTS
[38E]0F
1
Key Sizes: 256
Per IG A.9, the module
assures Key1 and Key2 are not
equal.
Boundary: Hardware
Encrypt, Decrypt
A913 AES [197] KW [38F]
Forward
Key Sizes: 256
Boundary: Hardware
Authenticated Encrypt,
Authenticated Decrypt
VA CKG [IG D.12]
[133 Rev2] Section 6.11F
2
Direct Symmetric Key
generation using
unmodified DRBG output
[133 Rev2] Section 6.2.32F
3 Derivation of symmetric
keys from a Password
A912 DRBG [90A] CTR
Prediction Resistance: Yes, No
Supports Reseed
Mode: AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled: Yes
Additional Input: 0-2048
Increment 128
Entropy Input: 256-2048
Increment 128
Nonce: 128-1024 Increment 128
Personalization String Length: 0-
2048 Increment 128
Returned Bits: 512
Additional Input used: 256 Bit
Entropy Input used: 896 Bit
Nonce used: 512 Bit
Personalization String used: 256
Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
1
The module uses AES XTS only for storage purposes per SP 800-38E.
2
CKG – The module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) meeting the requirements in FIPS 140-
2 IG D.12 and SP 800-133 rev2, Section 6.1. The generated symmetric key is the unmodified output from
the Approved SP 800-90A AES-256 CTR DRBG.
3
CKG – The module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) meeting the requirements in FIPS 140-
2 IG D.12 and SP 800-133 rev2, Section 6.2.3. The symmetric key is derived from a password using the
Approved SP 800-132 PBKDF. The key can only be used for storage applications.
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
Boundary: Firmware
A913
HMAC [198-
1]
SHA-256
Key Sizes: 256 bits
λ = 32 bytes
Boundary: Hardware
Integrity Check PSP and
PBKDF
ENT(P)
ENT (P) [90B]
[Annex C]
–
Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG;
minimum of 512 bits per access
Boundary: Hardware
The ENT (P) output is used
to seed the Approved
DRBG.
Synopsys
A912 PBKDF [132]
Option
1a
sLen = 32 bytes salt
C = 1,000 iterations
HMAC SHA-256 Cert. #A913
Boundary: Firmware
Password Based Key
Derivation. The keys
derived from passwords
are used only in storage
application. The
probability of guessing the
key is 1/(2^256) =
1.16e+77.
A912 RSA [186-4] PSS
n = 2048 SHA 256
Boundary: Firmware
SigVer used for Digital
Signature verification
(Firmware Download,
Maker Authentication)
Firmware
A914 RSA [186-4] PSS
n = 2048 SHA 256
Boundary: Hardware
SigVer used for Digital
Signature verification
(ROM Secure Boot)
Hardware
A913 SHS [180-4] SHA-256 Boundary: Hardware
Firmware Integrity Self-
Test and HMAC-SHA-256
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs is described in the
services detailed in Section 4.
Table 5: Critical Security Parameters
CSP Description / Usage
DRBG-EI Deterministic Random Bit Generator – Entropy Input
Size: 896 bits of entropy data with 268 bits of security strength. (268.8 bits
of min-entropy input without a nonce.)
DRBG V The secret value V (128 bits) in the current DRBG internal working state
DRBG Key The secret Key (256 bits) in the current DRBG internal working state
DRBG seed_material The DRBG-internal seed_material value (1664 bits) used within the
CTR_DRBG algorithm
CO Password Crypto Officer password
Type: Password
Purpose: Used for authenticating the CO role
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CSP Description / Usage
User Password User Password
Type: Password
Purpose: Used for authenticating User roles
HRK Hidden Root Key
Type: AES wrapping key
Purpose: Used to wrap following keys: PSP_HMAC_KEY, MEK_KEK,
TPER_SALT_KEK, and KS_HMAC_KEY.
PSP_HMAC_KEY Public Security Parameter HMAC Key
Type: 256-bit
Purpose: Key is used for PSP Integrity Check
MEK_KEK Type: AES 256
Purpose: Key wraps the MEKs.
TPER_SALT_KEK Type: AES 256
Purpose: Key wraps the SALT PSP.
KS_HMAC_KEY Type: HMAC
Purpose: Key is used to RSA public key integrity check
TPER_KEK Type: AES 256
Purpose: Key wraps the MEKs.
SUM_KEKi
Where i is 0-8 keys.
Type: AES 256
Purpose: It is the key wrapping key used for MEKs.
MEKj
Where j is 0-8 keys.
Type: AES 256
Purpose: MEK0 is the Global Range Key. MEK1-8 are User Range MEKs. MEKs
are used for User data encryption.
AUTH_KEYm
Where m is 0-18 keys.
Type: key derived from PBKDF2 using password provided by the host. This
includes the CO and User passwords.
Purpose: Key is used for KEK wrapping.
2.2 Public Security Parameters
Table 6: Public Security Parameters
Key Description / Usage
SALT This is the 256-bit salt used as input to the PBKDF2. A unique salt is associated
with the derivation of each AUTH_KEY.
PSID PIN This 32-byte PIN is used to access the TCG Revert service. The PSID PIN is
visibly printed on a production label on the Module.
MSID PIN This 32-byte default PIN is used to authenticate the CO role (Admin SP SID)
during the Initialize service. It can be displayed via the Show Status/Read
Security Configuration service.
FW Public Key Type: 2048-bit RSA Public Key
Purpose: Key is used for RSA signature verification of the firmware image.
Maker Public Key Type: 2048-bit RSA Public Key
Purpose: Key is used to authenticate Maker role to access Zeroize service.
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Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports Cryptographic Officer (CO), User, Maker and PSID roles. The cryptographic module
enforces the separation of roles by enforcing re-authentication with the appropriate password (or PIN)
when changing roles. Note that although each TCG role includes a unique identifier (UID) as part of the
authentication process, authentication is still considered role-based because the UID corresponds to the
TCG role itself, not an individual operator.
Table 7 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Module does not support a maintenance role
and/or bypass capability. The Module does not support concurrent operators. Authentication data is
stored encrypted and never output from the module. Authentication is cleared during each power cycle.
Table 7: Authenticated Roles
Role
Name
Description / Corresponding Roles Authentication Data
Authentication
Type
CO Crypto Officer –
- Admin SP SID - This Role is responsible
for transitioning from uninitialized
mode to initialized mode.
- Admin SP Admin 1, 2, 3, and 4 – This
Role is disabled by default but can be
enabled by SID authority. When
enabled, it can transition the Module
back to uninitialized mode from
initialized mode.
- Locking SP Admin 1, 2, 3, and 4 –This
role is used to enable and disable Users,
create and delete user ranges, lock or
unlock the ranges and cryptographically
erase the user ranges
Password
- After five (5) failure
attempts, requires
power cycle to
authenticate again
Role-based
User User –
- Locking SP User 1 – 9 - This role can
unlock and lock the drive to allow the
operator to read and write data to the
drive. This user can also call the
Cryptographic Erase service.
Password
- After five (5) failure
attempts, requires
power cycle to
authenticate again
Role-based
Maker Maker –
This is an assumed role which enables
the operate to execute Zeroize Service
command.
RSA Signature
- After five (5) failure
attempts, requires
power cycle to
authenticate again
Role-based
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PSID TCG PSID Authority – This authority is used
with the PSID PIN (32 bytes) that is visibly
printed on a label on the Module. The PSID
PIN is intended to only be available to an
operator that is physically present with the
Module. This role is used to access PSID
Revert service.
Password
-After five (5) failure
attempts, it requires
a power cycle to
authenticate again
Role-based
Table 8: Unauthenticated Roles
Role Name Description
Anybody TCG Anybody Authority – This authority is considered unauthenticated because no
password is needed for this authority. This authority can read the MSID PIN, and other
security configuration data through TCG Get method. The authority has a 64-bit UID.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module enforces PIN authentication and RSA Signature verification methods. The strength of
authentication is described in Table 9. Minimum PIN lengths are enforced by the module.
Table 9: Authentication Description
Authentication
Method
Description
Password
(or PIN)
PINs are a minimum of 80 bits, providing 2^80 possible values. The probability that
a random attempt succeeds is 1/(2^80) = 1/1.2e+24 which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur sequentially. Any
authentication attempt consumes at least 1 millisecond. After five (5) consecutive
unsuccessful password validation attempts have occurred, the Module requires a
reset before any more login attempts can be attempted. The reset time required in
performing a reset to the Module is eight (8) seconds. Therefore, a maximum of
(60/8)*5 = 37 authentication attempts are possible in one minute and the
probability that a false acceptance occurs over a one-minute interval is 37/(2^80) =
3.06e-23, which is smaller than 1/100,000.
RSA Signature Key Length is 2048-bit, Key strength is equal to 112 bits.
RSA 2048 has a key strength of 112 bits, which is the minimum approved by CMVP.
The probability of guessing the key of 112 bit strength is 1/(2^112) = 1/(5.19e+33)
= 1.9e-34, which is less than 1/1,000,000. This effectively eliminates the possibility
of determining the private key through exhaustive methods. Each verification takes
86 milliseconds. Limiting it to less than eleven (11) attempts per second.
After five (5) consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts have occurred, the
Module requires a reset before any more login attempts can be attempted. The
reset time required in performing a reset to the Module is eight (8) seconds.
Therefore, a maximum of (60/(11 + 8))*5 = 15 attempts are possible in one minute
and the probability that a false acceptance occurs over a one minute interval is
15/(2^112) = 2.89e-33, which is smaller than 1/100,000.
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. CSP usage for each service
described is specified in Table 10 below. The services highlighted in bold in Table 10 and Table 11 can be
called in uninitialized mode.
The unauthenticated Anybody role can do unauthenticated services.
Table 10: Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Power Cycle
(Self-Test)
Powers the module off and on again. This triggers the following:
1. Power-On Self-Tests of the Module.
2. Unblock locked-out authorities that have exhausted their Try Limit.
3. Enable CO authority (Admins SP SID) if it is previously blocked by the Block
SID Authentication service.
Hot reset Resets one of the ports of the Module by performing a PCIe Hot Reset.
Warm reset Resets the Module by performing an NVMe Subsystem Reset or PCIe Warm reset.
Show Status This is a set of commands from the TCG and NVMe protocols to read Security
Configuration. Specifically, this includes NVMe Security Send/Receive, Identify
Controller commands, which can be used for reading FIPS mode
(Initialized/Uninitialized), error messages and other status information.
The FIPS Mode indicator is a subset of the NVMe Security Receive command (TCG
Level 0 Discovery) and the returned word of the NVMe Identify Controller
command (word at offset 4092, bit 0).
Read FIPS
Compliance
The Module’s FIPS 140 Compliance descriptor (hardware and firmware versions)
can be retrieved in the format specified by SFSC specification using TCG IF-RECV
command with Protocol Id 0 and ComID 2.
Block SID
Authentication
Disables CO (Admin SP SID) authentication when ownership of the drive is not
taken.
TCG Authentication Authenticates an operator using TCG PIN through Start session or TCG
Authentication method.
Enable Zeroization
Service
Authenticates an operator using RSA 2048 signature verification using Zeroization
Public Key (the Maker Public Key).
Get Random
Number
TCG Random method used to generate and output a random number from the
DRBG.
Firmware update Loads a firmware image. All firmware loaded into the module is authenticated
with RSA signature verification over the entire firmware image. Loaded firmware
only executes if the firmware load test is successful. The version of the loaded
firmware must be listed on the Module’s FIPS certificate in order to remain in an
Approved Mode.
Telemetry logs The Module allows the collection of debugging information through NVMe log
pages. The purpose of the telemetry log data is to provide information required to
debug firmware issues remotely.
NVMe MI Specific
commands
MI specific commands provide MI physical port information, NVM Subsystem and
NVMe controller information and statuses, SMART warnings, access to VPD data.
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Service Description
Read/Write User
Data
Reads/Writes user data. This service is only successful if the module is in
uninitialized mode.
Note:
• CO= Cryptographic Officer Role
• U = User Role
• M = Maker Role
• ASP = Admin SP (Security Provider)
• LSP = Locking SP (Security Provider)
• P = PSID Role
Table 11: Authenticated Services
Service Description
CO U M P
ASP
SID
ASP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
User
1
-
9
Maker
PSID
Take ownership
Changes default password of SID to a value other than
MSID
X - - - - -
Activate OPAL
Enables Locking SP via TCG Activate method. Activate
method can enable SUM.
X - - - - -
Deactivate OPAL
Reverts the drive back to the Original Factory State
through TCG Revert or Revert SP methods.
Note: For Revert SP,
1. Global Range data is preserved if KeepGlobal
parameter is TRUE.
2. TPER_SALT_KEK and PSP_HMAC_KEY are also
preserved.
X X X - - -
Admin Set PIN Updates Admin authority PIN. X X X - - -
User Set PIN
Updates User authority PIN.
Locking SP Admins can set PINs for any Non-SUM Users.
- - X X - -
Enable/Disable
User Set PIN
Disables a non-SUM User’s ability to change its own PIN - - X - - -
Enable/Disable
Admin SP
authorities
Enables or disables an Admin SP authority X - - - - -
Enable/Disable
Locking SP
authorities
Enables or disables a Locking SP Admins and non-SUM
Users
- - X - - -
Enable/Disable
SUM
Configures users and ranges in SUM through TCG
Reactivate method.
- - X - - -
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Service Description
CO U M P
ASP
SID
ASP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
User
1
-
9
Maker
PSID
Locking Range
Configuration
For non-SUM ranges: Used to modify a Range starting
address, capacity, and attributes of non-SUM ranges
- - X - - -
For SUM Policy 1: Used to modify a SUM Range starting
address, capacity, and attributes by Admins if allowed.
- - X - - -
For SUM Policy 0: Used to modify a SUM Range starting
address, capacity, and attributes by SUM Users if
allowed.
- - - X - -
Lock/Unlock
range
Controls read and write access to a Range by either
locking or unlocking the LBA range. In Non-SUM, Admins
and Users (if allowed by Admins) have access. In SUM,
only Users have access.
- - X X - -
Format NVM /
Namespace
Management
Wipes the data of a particular namespace by generating
new MEK. This service is only successful if the range is
unlocked for read/write access via Lock/Unlock range
service.
X X X X - -
Sanitize
Wipes the data of a particular namespace by generating
new MEK. This service is accessible only in Uninitialized
mode.
X X - - - -
Set common
name
Customizes the name of a TCG Authority. Admins and
Users (if allowed by Admins) have access.
- - X X - -
Data store table
Set
Writes a stream of bytes to unstructured storage.
Admins and Users (if allowed by Admins) have access.
- - X X - -
Crypto Erase of a
range
For Non-SUM ranges: Erases a range by destroying its
existing MEK and generating a new one. This service is
performed via TCG GenKey method. By default, Admins
have access. If Admins allows, Users also have access.
- - X X - -
For SUM ranges via TCG Erase method: Erases a range by
destroying its existing MEK and generating a new one.
The range’s LBA range is unlocked, and the User PIN is
reset to the NULL password. This service is performed via
the TCG Erase method.
- - X X - -
For SUM ranges via TCG GenKey method: Erases a range
by destroying its existing MEK and generating a new one.
This service is performed via the TCG GenKey method.
- - - X - -
Read/Write User
Data
Reads/Writes user data. This service is only successful if
the range is unlocked for read/write access via
Lock/Unlock range service.
- - X X - -
Zeroization
Destruction of plaintext keys and CSPs. This service
decommissions the drive.
- - - - X -
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Service Description
CO U M P
ASP
SID
ASP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
User
1
-
9
Maker
PSID
PSID Revert
TCG Revert method using PSID. This service returns the
Module to its original factory state. The authentication
data (PSID) is printed on the label of the Module.
- - - - - X
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the CSP.
• I = Input: The CSP is input into the Module.
• X = Execute: The Module reads and uses the CSP.
• W = Write: The Module writes the CSP to storage.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
• - = Not accessed by the service.
Table 12: CSP Access within Services
Service
CSPs
CO
Password
User
Password
DRBG-EI
DRBG
V
DRBG
Key
DRBG
seed_material
HRK
PSP_HMAC_KEY
MEK_KEK
TPER_SALT_KEK
KS_HMAC_KEY
TPER_KEK
SUM_KEK
i
MEK
j
AUTH_KEY
m
Authenticated Services
Take ownership
I,
X,
Z
-
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X -
G,
X
- -
G,
X, Z
Activate OPAL
I,
X,
Z
X
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - -
G,
X
-
G,
X, Z
Deactivate OPAL X -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
-
X,
Z
X,
Z
X,
Z,
G
G,
X, Z
Admin Set PIN
I,
X,
Z
-
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - X -- -
G,
X, Z
User Set PIN -
I,
X,
Z
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - X X -
G,
X, Z
Enable/Disable User Set
PIN
- - - - - - - X - - - - - - -
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Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 18 of 36
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Service
CSPs
CO
Password
User
Password
DRBG-EI
DRBG
V
DRBG
Key
DRBG
seed_material
HRK
PSP_HMAC_KEY
MEK_KEK
TPER_SALT_KEK
KS_HMAC_KEY
TPER_KEK
SUM_KEK
i
MEK
j
AUTH_KEY
m
Enable/Disable Admin SP
authorities
X -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - - - -
G,
X, Z
Enable/Disable Locking SP
authorities
X X
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - X - -
G,
X, Z
Enable/Disable SUM
I,
X,
Z
X
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X -
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
-
G,
X, Z
Locking Range
Configuration
- -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X X - - X X
G,
X,
Z
-
Lock/Unlock range - - - - - - - X - - - X X
X,
Z
-
Format / Namespace
Management
- -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X X - - X X
Z,
G,
X
-
Sanitize - -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X X - - - -
Z,
G,
X
-
Set common name - - - - - - - X - - - - - - -
Data store table Set - - - - - - - X - - - - - - -
Crypto Erase of a range - X
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X X X - X X
Z,
G,
X
G,
X, Z
Read/Write User Data - - - - - - - - - - - - - X -
Zeroization - - - Z Z Z Z Z, Z Z Z Z Z Z -
PSID Revert X -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
- Z Z
Z,
G
G,
X, Z
Unauthenticated Services
Power Cycle
(Self-Test)
- - -
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X X X X X - - X -
Hot reset - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Warm reset - - - - - - - X - - - - - - -
Show Status - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 19 of 36
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Service
CSPs
CO
Password
User
Password
DRBG-EI
DRBG
V
DRBG
Key
DRBG
seed_material
HRK
PSP_HMAC_KEY
MEK_KEK
TPER_SALT_KEK
KS_HMAC_KEY
TPER_KEK
SUM_KEK
i
MEK
j
AUTH_KEY
m
Read FIPS Compliance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Block SID Authentication - - - - - - - - - X - - - -
G,
X, Z
TCG Authentication
I,
X,
Z
I,
X,
Z
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X -
G,
X
X -
G,
X, Z
Enable Zeroization Service - -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- - - - - - - - -
Get Random Number - -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- - - - - - - - -
Firmware update - - - - - - X - - - X - - - -
Telemetry logs - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NVMe MI Specific
commands
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Read/Write User Data - - - - - - - - - - - - - X -
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the PSP.
• I = Input: The PSP is input into the Module.
• X = Execute: The Module reads and uses the PSP.
• - = Not accessed by the service.
Table 13: PSP Access within Services
PSPs
SALT
PSID
PIN
MSID
PIN
FW
Public
Key
Maker
Public
Key
Authenticated Services
Take ownership G, X - - - -
Activate OPAL G, X - - - -
Deactivate OPAL G, X - X - -
Admin Set PIN G, X - - - -
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 20 of 36
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PSPs
SALT
PSID
PIN
MSID
PIN
FW
Public
Key
Maker
Public
Key
User Set PIN G, X - - - -
Enable/Disable User Set PIN - - - - -
Enable/Disable Admin SP authorities G, X - - - -
Enable/Disable Locking SP authorities G, X - - - -
Enable/Disable SUM G, X - - - -
Locking Range Configuration - - - - -
Lock/Unlock range - - - - -
Format / Namespace Management - - - - -
Sanitize - - - - -
Set common name - - - - -
Data store table Set - - - - -
Crypto Erase of a range G, X - - - -
Read/Write User Data - - - - -
Zeroization - - - - -
PSID Revert G, X - X - -
Unauthenticated Services
Power Cycle
(Self-Test)
- - - X -
Hot reset - - - - -
Warm reset - - - - -
Show Status - - - - -
Read FIPS Compliance - - - - -
Block SID Authentication - - X - -
TCG Authentication G, X I, X - - -
Enable Zeroization Service - - - - X
Get Random Number - - - - -
Firmware update - - - X -
Telemetry logs - - - - -
NVMe MI Specific commands - - - - -
Read/Write User Data - - - - -
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 21 of 36
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Self-Tests
Each Time the Module is powered up, tests are run to guarantee the proper functioning of the crypto
algorithms. Power on self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module.
On power-on or reset, the Module performs self-tests as described in Table 14 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails
during the ROM boot stage of the device, then the Module enters an internal error state. If the Module
has exited ROM boot stage, the Module enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state which can be retrieved by NVMe
Identify Controller command word at offset 4092, bit 0 will be 1. Power cycle is required to recover the
Module from self-test failure.
Table 14: Power-On Self-Tests
Test Target Description Failure Behavior
Firmware
Integrity
RSA PSS 2048-bit and SHA-256 signature
verification is performed over all firmware
located in NAND storage on the Aquarius
controller. The calculation of the Approved
digital signature is when the firmware is
installed. The self-test fails upon failure of the
signature verification.
Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR state.
The SSD will not enumerate,
PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be 0x0100
RSA (Cert.
#A914)
RSA PSS verify with 2048-bit key is
implemented in hardware and is used for the
firmware integrity test.
Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR state.
The SSD will not enumerate,
PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be 0x0100.
(This error would be found during the
firmware integrity test.)
SHA RSA is used to verify the signature of the
firmware and a KAT of the underlying SHA-256
hashing function is not required. SHA-256 is
tested in the Firmware Integrity test.
Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR state.
The SSD will not enumerate,
PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be 0x0100.
(This error would be found during the
firmware integrity test.)
RSA (Cert.
#A912)
RSA PSS verify with 2048-bit key is
implemented in firmware and is used for the
firmware integrity test.
Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR state.
The SSD will not enumerate,
PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be 0x0100
AES-XTS Performs encrypt and decrypt KATs using a
256-bit key.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
AES-ECB Encryption and Decryption KATs
Key size: 256 bits
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
AES-KW KATs: Both forward and inverse ciphers are
tested via encryption and decryption. See IG
9.4
Modes: KW
Key size: 256 bits
Note: This test covers AES-ECB as per IG 9.4,
#4 (c).
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 22 of 36
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Test Target Description Failure Behavior
HMAC Performs HMAC generate and verify KATs
using a 256-bit key.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
PBKDF Performs KAT using a known password and
256-bit key.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
DRBG Performs a fixed input KAT inclusive of the SP
800-90A Rev 1 instantiate, generate, and
reseed health tests.
Mode: AES CTR DRBG
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
ENT (P) Performs ENT (P) startup tests including seven
(7) statistical tests on each block of
consecutive 1024 raw samples.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
Table 15: Conditional Self-Tests
Test Target Description Failure Behavior
ENT (P) The Module performs a Continuous Random
Number Generator Test (RCT and APT) for each
call to the ENT (P).
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
AES XTS Key
generation
An IG A.9 key comparison test is performed on
Key1 and Key2 for each generation.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
Firmware
load Test
The Module performs a SHA-256 and RSA 2048
(Cert. #A912) signature verification on all
firmware loaded into the Module.
The Module returns invalid image for
download commit command and the
image is discarded. The module
transitions back to the
Unauthenticated Service Processor
state without entering an error state.
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 23 of 36
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Physical Security Policy
The Module implemented the following physical security mechanisms:
• An aluminum alloy enclosure that protects the production-grade components of the Module. The
enclosure is opaque within the visible spectrum.
• Two (2) opaque tamper-evident seals that are affixed on the sides of the Module as shown in the
following image. These two (2) seals are required to ensure the detection of tamper attempt.
These seals cannot be removed or reapplied without tamper evidence.
Figure 3: Module Physical Enclosure – Bottom View
The following table summarizes the actions required by the Crypto Officer Role to ensure that physical
security is maintained:
Table 16: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Physical
Enclosure
On initial receipt of the Module and when
feasible afterwards.
Inspect the entire enclosure for
cracks, bending and other signs of
tampering. Remove from service if
tampering found.
Tamper-Evident
Seals
On initial receipt of the Module and when
feasible afterwards.
Inspect the seals for evidence of a
removal attempt. If any peeling,
scratching, discoloration, and/or
disfiguration is observed, then
remove the Module from service.
1
2
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 24 of 36
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The following table depicts the pictures of all hardware modules with tamper-evident seals:
Table 17: Figures of all Modules with Production Label and Tamper-Evident Seals
Part Number Top View Bottom View
HFS960GECTX098N
HFS1T9GECTX098N
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 25 of 36
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Part Number Top View Bottom View
HFS3T8GECTX098N
HFS7T6GECTX098N
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 26 of 36
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Part Number Top View Bottom View
HFS800GECTX098N
HFS1T6GECTX098N
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 27 of 36
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Part Number Top View Bottom View
HFS3T2GECTX098N
HFS6T4GECTX098N
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 28 of 36
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Examples of tamper evidence are depicted in the following figure:
Figure 4: PE8000 Series NVMe OPAL SEDs Tamper Evidence
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 29 of 36
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Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. The Module will not load or
execute firmware which is not signed with SK hynix 2048-bit RSA Private Key. The mechanism available to
perform a firmware load is through NVMe Firmware Download and Commit command. New firmware
versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the CMVP under FIPS 140-2. Any
other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS
140-2 validation.
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 30 of 36
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Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module does not support the mitigation of other attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2.
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 31 of 36
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Security Rules and Guidance
The Module design corresponds to the Module Security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the Module and the Cryptographic Officer instructions that are necessary to implement in
order to maintain compliance with FIPS 140-2 security requirements.
8.1 Invariant Rules
The Module implementation also enforces the following security rules:
1. No additional interface or service is implemented by the Module which would provide access to
CSPs.
2. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, Key generation, Zeroization and in error states.
3. Data output is logically disconnected while the Module is performing key generation and
zeroization.
4. All CSPs are zeroized by zeroization service. Zeroization service is accessible only by the Maker
role.
5. The module does not support manual key entry.
6. The module does not output plaintext CSPs or intermediate key values.
7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
8. The Module does not support a bypass capability.
9. The Module shall provide four (4) distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer, User, Maker, and
PSID.
10. The Module shall provide role-based authentication.
11. The Module shall clear previous authentication on power cycle.
12. When the Module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any
cryptographic services.
13. The operator shall be capable of commanding the Module to perform the power up self-tests by
power cycling or resetting the Module.
14. Power on self –tests do not require any operator action.
15. The Module does not support the update of the serial number and vendor ID.
16. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
8.2 Cryptographic Officer Initialization
The Module is shipped from the factory in an approved mode of operation (uninitialized mode). The keys
generated during manufacturing are used to encrypt/decrypt the user data. The shipping container
protecting the Module or set of Modules in transit should be verified for evidence of tampering. On receipt
of the module, the CO should examine the product to ensure it has not been tampered with during
shipping according to the procedures outline in the module Physical Security Policy, Section 5.
Upon verification that the module has not been tampered, the CO should initialize the Module by taking
the following steps:
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 32 of 36
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8.2.1 Verifying the Module is in an approved mode of operation
To verify that a module is in the Approved mode of operation the operator will perform the Read FIPS
Compliance by issuing TCG IF-RECV command with Protocol Id 0 and ComID 2. Refer [SFSC] spec.
For example, the sample of data below is returned from the module:
----------------FIPS 140 compliance descriptor------------------------
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR INFORMATION LENGTH -> 528
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTOR TYPE -> 1
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTOR LENGTH -> 520
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR RELATED STANDARD -> FIPS 140-2
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR OVERALL SECURITY LEVEL -> Level-2
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR HARDWARE VERSION -> HFS1T6GECTX098N
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR VERSION ->11080A10
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR MODULE NAME -> SK Hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs
----------------------------------------------------------------------
8.2.2 Initialize the Module
1. Take Ownership - Set Admin SP SID password to a value other than MSID
2. Activate Opal with Single User Mode
3. Set WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled column of all valid Locking ranges
4. Set PINs for all authorities (Admins and Users) that are enabled
5. PIN length at least 10 bytes or more but 32-byte length is recommended
6. Power cycle the Module
7. Verify the module is in initialized mode by checking the:
• LockingEnabled bit of the TCG Level 0 Discovery Locking Feature Descriptor is set to 1
• WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled column of all valid Locking ranges in the Locking
Table are set to True
8.3 Un-Initialize the Module
The TCG Revert or Revert SP Methods may be invoked either by authenticated role or PSID role to affect
a transition into the uninitialized mode of operation. This is analogous to restoring the module to factory
default state.
8.4 Firmware Update
A firmware update loads a firmware image. All firmware loaded into the module is authenticated with
RSA signature verification over the entire firmware image. Loaded firmware only executes if the firmware
load test is successful. The version of the loaded firmware must be listed on the Module’s FIPS certificate
to remain in an Approved Mode.
The firmware update process could be performed with and without the reset, for the first one the host:
1. Issues NVM Firmware Image Download command [NVMe, 5.12].
2. Issues NVM Firmware Commit command [NVMe, 5.11].
3. Performs a Reset.
Reset causes the loaded firmware to be activated. For the firmware update without the reset, the host:
1. Issues NVM Firmware Image Download command.
2. Issues NVM Firmware Commit command with Commit Action set to 3.
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 33 of 36
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Following the Commit Action, the NVMe controller completes the firmware commit by activating the
loaded firmware.
SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 34 of 36
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References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy
Table 18: References
Acronym Full Specification Name
[FIPS 140-2] NIST, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[Annex C] NIST, Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, June 10, 2019
[180-4] NIST, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Publication 180-4, August 2015
[186-4] NIST, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS Publication 186-4, July 2013
[197] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198-1] NIST, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS Publication 198-1, July
2008
[IG] NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, last update: May 4, 2021
[NVMe] Standard spec available online https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM-Express-
1_3c-2018.05.24-Ratified.pdf Revision 1.3C May 24, 2018
[NVMe-MI] Standard spec available online
https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM-Express-Management-Interface-1.1-
Ratified.pdf Revision 1.1, April 29, 2019
[PKCS#1] PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002
[SFSC] Information technology – Security Features for SCSI Commands (SFSC), Revision 2.0, 15
September 2015
[38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,
December 2001
[38E] NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, January 2010
[38F] NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods for Key Wrapping, December 2012
[90A Rev1] NIST Special Publication 800-90A Rev 1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, June 2015
[90B] NIST Special Publication 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random
Bit Generation, January 2018
[108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions (Revised), October 2009
[132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation,
December 2010
[133 Rev2] NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic
Key Generation, June 2020
[TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, version 2.01 Revision 1.0, 5 August 2015
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Acronym Full Specification Name
[TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.01 Revision 1.00, 5
August 2015
[TCG SIIS] TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version .08, 14 August 2018
[TCG ADS] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Additional Datastore Tables Specification, Version 1.00
Revision 1.00, 24 February 2012
[TCG SUM] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Single User Mode Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 2.00,
5 August 2015
[TCG PSID] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: PSID, Version 1.00 Revision 1.00, 5 August 2015
[TCG Block SID] TCG Storage Feature Set: Block SID Authentication, Version 1.00 Final, Revision 1.00, 5 August
2015
[IEEE 1667] IEEE Std 1667-2018 – IEEE Standard for Discovery, Authentication, and Authorization in Host
Attachments of Storage Devices, February 2018
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Table 19: Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APT Adaptive Proportion Test
CO Cryptographic Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter, see [FIPS 140-2]
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book mode of AES Encryption/Decryption
ENT (P) Entropy – Physical validated entropy source
KAT Known Answer Test
PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function
LBA Logical Block Address
MSID Manufactured Security Identifier
MEK Media Encryption Key
NVMe Non-Volatile Memory express
PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PSP Public Security Parameter
PIN Personal Identification Number (or Password)
PSID Physical Security Identifier
RCT Repetitive Count Test
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SID Security Identifier
SSD Solid-state Drive
SSC Security Subsystem Class
TCG Trusted Computing Group
UID Unique Identifier
XTS XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Cipher text Stealing