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Motorola
BoringCrypto Android
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Software Version:
dcdc7bbc6e59ac0123407a9dc4d1f43dd0d117cd
Date: August 23, 2022
Prepared for: Prepare by:
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Introduction
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but
Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140
program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP validates
modules meeting FIPS 140 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and
tested against the FIPS 140 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at:
https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Motorola BoringCrypto Android
module provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the overall
Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
The Motorola BoringCrypto Android module may also be referred to as the “module” in this document.
Disclaimer
The contents of this document are subject to revision without notice due to continued progress in
methodology, design, and manufacturing. Motorola Mobility, Inc. shall have no liability for any error or
damages of any kind resulting from the use of this document.
The software referenced in this document is licensed to you under the terms and conditions
accompanying the software or as otherwise agreed between you or the company that you are
representing.
Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
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Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................................ 2
About this Document.................................................................................................................................. 2
Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................................... 2
Notices........................................................................................................................................................ 2
1. Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 6
2. FIPS 140-2 Security Levels................................................................................................................... 7
3. Cryptographic Module Specification................................................................................................... 8
3.1 Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................................. 8
4. Modes of Operation............................................................................................................................ 9
5. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................... 9
6. Roles, Authentication and Services................................................................................................... 10
7. Physical Security ............................................................................................................................... 12
8. Operational Environment ................................................................................................................. 12
9. Cryptographic Algorithms & Key Management................................................................................. 13
9.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms......................................................................................... 13
9.2 Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................... 15
9.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms................................................................................. 15
9.4 Cryptographic Key Management............................................................................................... 16
9.5 Public Keys ................................................................................................................................ 16
9.6 Key Generation ......................................................................................................................... 17
9.7 Key Storage ............................................................................................................................... 17
9.8 Key Zeroization.......................................................................................................................... 17
10. Self-tests ....................................................................................................................................... 18
10.1 Power-On Self-Tests.................................................................................................................. 18
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests................................................................................................................ 18
11. Mitigation of other Attacks........................................................................................................... 19
12. Guidance and Secure Operation ................................................................................................... 20
12.1 Installation Instructions............................................................................................................. 20
12.2 Secure Operation ...................................................................................................................... 21
12.2.1 Initialization....................................................................................................................... 21
12.2.2 Usage of AES OFB, CFB and CFB8 ...................................................................................... 21
12.2.3 Usage of AES-GCM ............................................................................................................ 21
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12.2.4 Usage of Triple-DES........................................................................................................... 21
12.2.5 RSA and ECDSA Keys.......................................................................................................... 21
13. References and Standards ............................................................................................................ 23
14. Acronyms and Definitions............................................................................................................. 23
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Tested Operational Environments............................................................................................... 6
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section ........................................................................................ 7
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................... 9
Table 4 – Approved Services, Roles and Access Rights ............................................................................. 10
Table 5 – non-Approved or non-security relevant services....................................................................... 10
Table 6 - Non-Security Relevant Services.................................................................................................. 11
Table 7 – Approved Algorithms and CAVP Certificates ............................................................................. 15
Table 8 – Allowed Algorithms ................................................................................................................... 15
Table 9 – Non-Approved Algorithms......................................................................................................... 15
Table 10 – Keys and CSPs supported......................................................................................................... 16
Table 11 – Public keys supported.............................................................................................................. 16
Table 12 – Power-on Self-tests ................................................................................................................. 18
Table 13 – Conditional Self-tests............................................................................................................... 19
Table 14 – References and Standards....................................................................................................... 23
Table 15 – Acronyms and Definitions ....................................................................................................... 25
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Logical Boundary ........................................................................................................................ 8
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1. Introduction
Motorola BoringCrypto Android module (hereafter referred to as the “module”) is an open-source,
general-purpose cryptographic library which provides FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic algorithms to
serve BoringSSL and other user-space applications. The validated version of the library is
dcdc7bbc6e59ac0123407a9dc4d1f43dd0d117cd. For the purposes of the FIPS 140-2 validation, its
embodiment type is defined as multi-chip standalone.
The cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environments on the general-
purpose computer (GPC) platforms detailed below:
# Operational Environment Processor Family
1 Android 12 on Motorola Edge+
(2022)(a.k.a. Motorola Edge+ UW
or Motorola edge 30 pro)
Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 gen 1(SDM845) 64-bit (with PAA)
2 Android 12 on Edge+
(2022)(a.k.a. Motorola Edge+ UW
or Motorola edge 30 pro)
Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 gen 1(SDM845) 64-bit (without
PAA)
Table 1 – Tested Operational Environments
Note: The platform tested on, Motorola Edge+ (2022), is also marketed as two other names, Motorola
Edge+ UW or Motorola edge 30 pro, depending on the country the platform is sold in. All three
marketed platforms are identical.
The cryptographic module is also supported on the following operating environments for which
operational testing and algorithm testing was not performed:
Android Version Processor Product/Pltaform
12 Qualcomm SD 695 5G
moto g stylus 5G (2022), moto g62 5G, moto g82 5G,
motorola edge 30 neo
12 Qualcomm SD 680 4G moto g32, moto g42, moto g52
12 Qualcomm SD 778 5G motorola edge 30
12 Qualcomm SD 888+ 5G motorola edge 30 fusion
12 Qualcomm SD 8+ gen1 motorola edge 30 ultra
12 Mediatek Dimensity 700 moto g 5G (2022)
12
Mediatek Dimensity
1050 Motorola edge(2022)
12 Mediatek NextG moto g72
12 Mediatek HelioG37 Moto g pure (2022)
Table 2 - Vendor Affirmed Operating Environments
As per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5, compliance is maintained for other versions of the
respective operational environments where the module binary is unchanged. No claim can be made as
to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys if any source
code is changed and the module binary is reconstructed.
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The GPC(s) used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined
by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B. FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained
when the module is operated on other versions of the GPOS running in single user mode, assuming that
the requirements outlined in FIPS 140-2 IG G.5 are met.
The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of
the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation
certificate.
2. FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 3 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section
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3. Cryptographic Module Specification
3.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The module is a software library providing a C-language Application Program Interface (API) for use by
other processes that require cryptographic functionality. All operations of the module occur via calls
from host applications and their respective internal daemons/processes. As such, there are no untrusted
services calling the services of the module.
The physical cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.
The logical boundary of the module is a single object file named bcm.o, which is linked into the
libcrypto.so shared library. The module performs no communications other than with the calling
application (the process that invokes the module services) and the host operating system.
Figure 1 shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software and hardware
components of the computer:
Figure 1 – Logical Boundary
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4. Modes of Operation
The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and Non-Approved. The module will be in FIPS-
approved mode when all power up Self-Tests have completed successfully, and only Approved or
allowed algorithms are invoked. See Table 7 (below) for a list of the supported Approved algorithms and
Table 8 for allowed algorithms. The non-Approved mode is entered when a non-Approved algorithm is
invoked. See Table 9 for a list of non-Approved algorithms.
5. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output
interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface consists of
the actual API input parameters. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API
functions.
FIPS Interface Physical Ports Logical Interfaces
Data Input Physical ports of the tested platforms API input parameters
Data Output Physical ports of the tested platforms API output parameters and return
values
Control Input Physical ports of the tested platforms API input parameters
Status Output Physical ports of the tested platforms API return values
Power Input Physical ports of the tested platforms N/A
Table 4 – Ports and Interfaces
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside the module scope. However, when the
module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the module’s logical data output
interfaces is inhibited.
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6. Roles, Authentication and Services
The cryptographic module implements both User and Crypto Officer (CO) roles. The module does not
support user authentication. The User and CO roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing
services implemented by the module. A user is considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the
module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.
The Approved services supported by the module and access rights within services accessible over the
module’s public interface are listed in the table below:
Service Approved security
functions
Keys and/or CSPs Roles Access rights to keys
and/or CSPs
Module Initialization N/A N/A CO N/A
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
AES, Triple-DES AES, Triple-DES
symmetric keys
User, CO Execute
Keyed hashing HMAC-SHA HMAC key User, CO Execute
Hashing SHS None User, CO N/A
Random Bit
Generation
CTR_DRBG DRBG seed, internal
state V and Key
values
User, CO Write/Execute
Signature generation/
verification
CTR_DRBG
RSA
ECDSA
RSA, ECDSA private
key
User, CO Write/Execute
Key Transport RSA RSA private key User, CO Write/Execute
Key Agreement KAS ECC SSC
KAS FFC SSC
EC DH, DH private
key
User, CO Write/Execute
Key Derivation TLS KDF TLS Pre-Master
Secret, TLS Master
Secret
User, CO Write/Execute
Key Generation CTR_DRBG
RSA
ECDSA
RSA, ECDSA private
key
User, CO Write/Execute
On-Demand
Self-test
N/A N/A User, CO Execute
Zeroization N/A All keys User, CO Write/Execute
Show status N/A N/A User, CO N/A
Table 5 – Approved Services, Roles and Access Rights
The module provides the following non-Approved services which utilize algorithms listed in Table 9:
Service Non-Approved Functions Roles Keys and/or CSPs
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
AES (non-compliant), DES,
Triple-DES (non-
compliant)
User, CO N/A
Hashing MD4, MD5, POLYVAL User, CO N/A
Signature generation/
verification
RSA (non-compliant)
ECDSA (non-compliant)
User, CO N/A
Key Transport RSA (non-compliant) User, CO N/A
Key Generation RSA (non-compliant)
ECDSA (non-compliant)
User, CO N/A
Table 6 – non-Approved or non-security relevant services
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The module also provides the following non-Approved or non-security relevant services over a non-
public interface:
Service Approved Security
Functions
Roles Access rights to keys
and/or CSPs
Large integer operations None User, CO N/A
Disable automatic
generation of CTR_DRBG
"additional_input"
parameter
CTR_DRBG User, CO N/A
Wegman-Carter hashing
with POLYVAL
None User, CO N/A
Table 7 - Non-Security Relevant Services
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7. Physical Security
The cryptographic module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
8. Operational Environment
The cryptographic module operates under Android 12. The module runs on a GPC running one of the
operating systems specified in Table 1. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads
in a logically separated manner. The module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application
that instantiates the module.
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9. Cryptographic Algorithms & Key Management
9.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements the following FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms:
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CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Mode/Method/Size Use
A2751 AES FIPS 197
SP 800-38A
128, 192, 256 CBC, ECB,
CTR
Encryption, Decryption
A2751 AES SP 800-38D 128, 192, 256 GCM Authenticated
Encryption,
Authenticated
Decryption
A2751 AES SP 800-38C 128 CCM Authenticated
Encryption,
Authenticated
Decryption
A2751 KTS SP 800-38F 128, 192, 256 KW, KWP Key Wrapping, Key
Unwrapping
A2751 CVL SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 KDF1
Key Derivation
A2751 DRBG SP 800-90Arev1 AES-256 CTR_DRBG Random Bit Generation
A2751 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Key Pair Generation,
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification,
Public Key Validation
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521
Digital Signature
Services
A2751 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-
256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
Generation,
Authentication
A2751 RSA FIPS 186-4 Key Generation,
Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
PKCS 1.5 and PSS
(1024, 2048, 3072, 4096)
Note: Key size 1024 is
only used for Signature
Verification
Digital Signature
Services
A2751 SHA FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512,
SHA-512/256
Digital Signature
Generation, Digital
Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature
Applications
A2751 Triple-DES SP 800-67
SP 800-38A
Three Key (provides 112
bits of security strength)
TCBC, TECB
Encryption, Decryption
A2751 KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
SP 800-56rev3 EC Diffie-Hellman P-224,
P-256, P-384 and P-521
Diffie-Hellman FB, FC
Key Agreement Scheme
Shared Secret
Computation (KAS-SSC)
per SP 800-56Arev3
A2751 KAS-ECC
KAS-FFC
SP 800-56rev3
SP 800-135rev1
EC Diffie-Hellman P-224,
P-256, P-384 and P-521
Diffie-Hellman FB, FC
with TLS 1.0/1.1 or 1.2
KDF
Key Agreement Scheme
per SP 800-56Arev3
with key derivation per
SP 800-135rev1
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Table 8 – Approved Algorithms and CAVP Certificates
9.2 Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 Approved but allowed algorithms that may be used
in the Approved mode of operation:
Algorithm Use
RSA Key Transport Key establishment methodology using PKCS#1-v1.5 provides between 112
and 256 bits of encryption strength
MD5 When used with the TLS protocol version 1.0 and 1.1
Table 9 – Allowed Algorithms
9.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module employs the methods listed in Table 9, which are not allowed for use in a FIPS-Approved
mode. Their use will result in the module operating in a non-Approved mode.
MD5, MD4 DES
AES-GCM (non-compliant) AES (non-compliant)
ECDSA (non-compliant) RSA (non-compliant)
POLYVAL Triple-DES (non-compliant)
Table 10 – Non-Approved Algorithms
1
The module supports FIPS 140-2 approved/allowed cryptographic algorithms for TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2.
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9.4 Cryptographic Key Management
The table below provides a complete list of Private Keys and CSPs used by the module:
Key/CSP Name Key Description Generated/ Input Output
AES Key AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt
key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
AES-GCM Key AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt
/ generate / verify key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
AES Wrapping Key AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
Triple-DES Key Triple-DES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt
key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
ECDSA Signing Key ECDSA (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521)
signature generation key
Internally Generated
or input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
EC DH Private Key EC DH (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521)
private key
Internally Generated
or input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
HMAC Key Keyed hash key
(160/224/256/384/512)
Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
RSA Key (Key
Transport)
RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key
decryption (private key transport)
key
Internally Generated
or input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
RSA Signature
Generation Key
RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature
generation key
Internally Generated
or input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
Shared Secret; 48 bytes of pseudo-
random data
Internally Generated Output via API in
plaintext
TLS Master Secret Shared Secret; 48 bytes of pseudo-
random data
Internally Derived via
key derivation
function defined in
SP 800-135 KDF
(TLS).
Output via API in
plaintext
CTR_DRBG V (Seed) 128 bits Internally Generated Does not exit the
module
CTR_DRBG Key 256 bits Internally Generated Does not exit the
module
CTR_DRBG Entropy
Input
384 bits Input via API in
plaintext
Does not exit the
module
Table 11 – Keys and CSPs supported
9.5 Public Keys
The table below provides a complete list of the Public keys used by the module:
Public Key Name Key Description
ECDSA Verification Key ECDSA (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521) signature
verification key
EC DH Public Key EC DH (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521) public key
RSA Key (Key Transport) RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key
transport) key
RSA Signature Verification Key RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification
public key
Table 12 – Public keys supported
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9.6 Key Generation
The module supports generation of ECDSA, EC Diffie-Hellman, and RSA key pairs as specified in Section 5
of NIST SP 800-133. The module employs a NIST SP 800-90A random bit generator for creation of the
seed for asymmetric key generation. The module receives entropy passively. A minimum of 112 bits of
entropy must be supplied.
The output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected from processes
performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the data output
interface when the module zeroizes keys.
9.7 Key Storage
The cryptographic module does not perform persistent storage of keys. Keys and CSPs are passed to the
module by the calling application. The keys and CSPs are stored in memory in plaintext. Keys and CSPs
residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed
using the module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from
unauthorized access.
9.8 Key Zeroization
The module is passed keys as part of a function call from a calling application and does not store keys
persistently. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module. The
Operating System and the calling application are responsible to clean up temporary or ephemeral keys.
All CSPs can be zeroized by power cycling or by rebooting the host test platform.
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10. Self-tests
FIPS 140-2 requires the module to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the
correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. Some functions require conditional tests
during normal operation of the module. The supported tests are listed and described in this section.
10.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module and do not require operator
intervention to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will not initialize. The module will enter an error
state and no services can be accessed.
The module implements the following power-on self-tests:
Type Test
Integrity Test HMAC-SHA-256
Known Answer
Test
AES-CBC KAT (encryption and decryption. Key size: 128-bits)
AES-GCM KAT (encryption and decryption. Key size: 128-bits)
Triple-DES TCBC KAT (encryption and decryption. Key size: 168-bits)
ECDSA KAT (signature generation/signature verification. Curve: P-256)
HMAC KAT (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-512)
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT (Key size: 256-bits)
RSA KAT (signature generation/signature verification and
encryption/decryption. Key size: 2048-bit)
TLS v1.2 KDF KAT
KAS-ECC-SSC primitive KAT (Curve P-256)
KAS-FFC-SSC primitive KAT (2048-bit)
SHA KAT (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512)
Table 13 – Power-on Self-tests
By default, all power up self-tests are executed at module initialization. The module can be configured
to only run the integrity test on subsequent instantiations by setting the environmental variable
BORINGSSL_FIPS_SELF_TEST_FLAG_FILE, as allowed by FIPS 140-2 IG 9.11. If configured, after the self-
tests have passed, the module creates a temporary file named after the module’s HMAC-SHA-256
integrity value (this value does not persist across power cycles). This file is checked for existence
whenever subsequent instantiations of the module are initialized. If it exists, only the integrity test is
run. If the environmental variable is not set, the file does not exist, or the file cannot be accessed for any
reason, the entire set of power-on self-tests (KATs and integrity test) are run. The power-on self-tests
must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power-on self-tests can be run
on demand by power-cycling the host platform.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are run during operation of the module. If any of these tests fail, the module will
enter an error state, where no services can be accessed by the operators. The module can be re-
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initialized to clear the error and resume FIPS mode of operation. Each module performs the following
conditional self-tests:
Type Test
Pair-wise
Consistency Test
ECDSA Key Pair generation
RSA Key Pair generation
CRNGT Performed on the passively received entropy
DRBG Health
Tests
Performed on DRBG, per SP 800‐90A Section 11.3. Required per IG
C.1.
Table 14 – Conditional Self-tests
Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and
Encrypt/Decrypt.
11. Mitigation of other Attacks
The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2.
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12. Guidance and Secure Operation
12.1 Installation Instructions
On a Linux workstation, issue the following commands to download and verify repo:
curl curl https://storage.googleapis.com/git-repo-downloads/repo > ~/repo
chmod u+x ~/repo
gpg --recv-key 8BB9AD793E8E6153AF0F9A4416530D5E920F5C65
curl https://storage.googleapis.com/git-repo-downloads/repo.asc | gpg --verify - ~/repo
Download the manifest from: https://ci.android.com/builds/submitted/7110836/aosp_arm64-
userdebug/latest/manifest_7110836.xml
Verify the manifest using the following command:
sha256sum ~/manifest_7110836.xml
Manually validate that the output from this command indicates the following expected hash values for
each of these files:
07a6844a64ffd33ae7e187d1d7b1114ef314802e59b665309617fbd11f11df16 manifest_7110836.xml
The module can be obtained by issuing the following commands:
mkdir aosp
cd aosp
~/repo init -u https://android.googlesource.com/platform/manifest --depth 1
~/repo init -m ~/manifest_7110836.xml
~/repo sync -q -c -j 20
. build/envsetup.sh
Once downloaded, the module can be built using the following commands:
For 64 bit
lunch aosp_arm64-userdebug
m clean
m -j 20 adb bssl acvp_modulewrapper
For 32 bit
lunch aosp_arm-userdebug
m clean
m -j 20 adb bssl acvp_modulewrapper
Upon completion of the build process, the module can be deployed to the Android device over ADB and
have its FIPS status verified by issuing the following commands:
For 64 bit
$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/bin/adb devices -l
$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/bin/adb push $ANDROID_PRODUCT_OUT/system/bin/bssl /data/local/tmp
$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/bin/adb push $ANDROID_PRODUCT_OUT/system/bin/modulewrapper /data/local/tmp
$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/bin/adb shell /data/local/tmp/bssl isfips
For 32 bit
$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/bin/adb devices -l
$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/bin/adb push $ANDROID_PRODUCT_OUT/system/bin/bssl32 /data/local/tmp
$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/bin/adb push $ANDROID_PRODUCT_OUT/system/bin/modulewrapper32 /data/local/tmp
$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/bin/adb shell /data/local/tmp/bssl32 isfips
The module will print “1” if it is in a FIPS 140-2 validated mode of operation.
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12.2 Secure Operation
12.2.1 Initialization
The cryptographic module is initialized by loading the module before any cryptographic functionality is
available. In User Space the operating system is responsible for the initialization process and loading of
the library. The module is designed with a default entry point (DEP) which ensures that the power-up
tests are initiated automatically when the module is loaded.
12.2.2 Usage of AES OFB, CFB and CFB8
In approved mode, users of the module must not utilize AES OFB, CFB and CFB8.
12.2.3 Usage of AES-GCM
In the case of AES-GCM, the IV generation method is user selectable and the value can be computed in
more than one manner.
AES GCM encryption and decryption are used in the context of the TLS protocol version 1.2 (compliant
to Scenario 1 in FIPS 140-2 A.5). The module is compliant with NIST SP 800-52 and the mechanism for IV
generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The module ensures that it is strictly increasing and thus cannot
repeat. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first
party (client or server) to encounter this condition may either trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key in accordance with RFC 5246, or fail. In either case, the module prevents and IV
duplication and thus enforces the security property.
The module’s IV is generated internally by the module’s Approved DRBG, which is internal to the
module’s boundary. The IV is 96-bits in length per NIST SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.2 and FIPS 140-2 IG A.5
scenario 2.
The selection of the IV construction method is the responsibility of the user of this cryptographic
module. In approved mode, users of the module must not utilize GCM with an externally generated IV.
Per IG A.5, in the event module power is lost and restored the consuming application must ensure that
any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
12.2.4 Usage of Triple-DES
In accordance with CMVP IG A.13, when operating in a FIPS approved mode of operation, the same
Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 220
or 216
64-bit data blocks.
The TLS protocol governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES keys. Please refer to IETF RFC 5246
(TLS) for details relevant to the generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is
responsible for ensuring that the module limits the number of encrypted blocks with the same key to no
more than 220
when utilized as part of a recognized IETF protocol.
For all other uses of Triple-DES, the user is responsible for ensuring that the module limits the number of
encrypted blocks with the same key to no more than 216
.
12.2.5 RSA and ECDSA Keys
The module allows the use of 1024 bit RSA keys for legacy purposes including signature generation,
which is disallowed in FIPS Approved mode as per NIST SP 800-131A. Therefore, the cryptographic
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operations with the non-approved key sizes will result in the module operating in Non-Approved mode
implicitly.
The elliptic curves utilized shall be the validated NIST-recommended curves and shall provide a
minimum of 112 bits of encryption strength.
Non-approved cryptographic algorithms shall not share the same key or CSP as an approved algorithm.
As such approved algorithms shall not use the keys generated by the module’s Non-Approved key
generation methods or the converse.
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13. References and Standards
The following Standards are referred to in this Security Policy:
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of
Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping
SP 800-56A Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
Block Cipher
SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
SP 800-131A Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
SP 800-133 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
Table 15 – References and Standards
14. Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
ADB Android Debug Bridge
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKG Cooperative Key Generation
CMVP Crypto Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter-mode
CVL Component Validation List
DEP Default Entry Point
DES Data Encryption Standard
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Acronym Definition
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS Digital Signature Standard
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EC DH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Authority
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GPC General Purpose Computer
GPOS General Purpose Operating System
HMAC Key-Hashed Message Authentication Code
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IG Implementation Guidance
IV Initialization Vector
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KTS Key Transport Scheme
KW Key Wrap
KWP Key Wrap with Padding
LLC Limited Liability Company
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD4 Message Digest algorithm MD4
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Not-Applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NVLAP National Voluntary Lab Accreditation Program
OFB Output Feedback
PAA Processor Algorithm Accelerator
RAM Random Access Memory
RFC Request For Comment
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SP Special Publication
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Acronym Definition
SSL Secure Socket Layer
TCBC Triple-DES Cipher-Block Chaining
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TECB Triple-DES Electronic Code Book
TLS Transport Layer Security
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
Table 16 – Acronyms and Definitions