1 February 15, 2023
Symantec, A Division of Broadcom
Symantec Content Analysis Virtual
Appliance
Software Version: 3.1.3.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 1
Document Version: 0.9
2 February 15, 2023
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CONTACT INFORMATION
Symantec, A Division of Broadcom
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San Jose, CA 95131
www.broadcom.com
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Symantec Content Analysis FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Purpose..........................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 References .....................................................................................................................................................5
1.3 Document Organization.................................................................................................................................5
2 SYMANTEC CONTENT ANALYSIS.....................................................................................................................6
2.1 Overview........................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Module Specification .....................................................................................................................................8
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary ..........................................................................................................8
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary............................................................................................................9
2.3 Module Interfaces........................................................................................................................................10
2.4 Roles and Services .......................................................................................................................................11
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role ..............................................................................................................................13
2.4.2 User Role..............................................................................................................................................16
2.4.3 Authentication Mechanism .................................................................................................................17
2.5 Physical Security ..........................................................................................................................................19
2.6 Operational Environment ............................................................................................................................19
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management .................................................................................................................20
2.8 Self-Tests......................................................................................................................................................29
2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................29
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests ..........................................................................................................................30
2.8.3 Critical Function Tests..........................................................................................................................30
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks .........................................................................................................................30
3 SECURE OPERATION.....................................................................................................................................31
3.1 Initialization .................................................................................................................................................31
3.1.1 Management .......................................................................................................................................32
3.1.2 Zeroization...........................................................................................................................................32
3.2 User Guidance..............................................................................................................................................33
4 ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................................................34
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Typical Deployment of CAS..............................................................................................................................6
Figure 2 Block Diagram of the SSP-S410-10 hardware ..................................................................................................9
Figure 3 CAS VA Cryptographic Boundary ...................................................................................................................10
List of Tables
Table 1 Benefits and Advantages...................................................................................................................................7
Table 2 Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section ...............................................................................................................7
Table 3 CAS Virtual Appliance Configuration.................................................................................................................8
Table 4 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings for the CAS VA...................................................................................11
Table 5 FIPS and CAS Roles..........................................................................................................................................13
Table 6 Crypto Officer Role Services and CSP Access ..................................................................................................13
Table 7 User Service and CSP Access...........................................................................................................................16
Table 8 Authentication Mechanisms Used by Module................................................................................................17
Table 9 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for the CAS Cryptographic Library v1.0.....................................20
Table 10 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for VA Blue Coat Boot Loader Library v5.28............................22
Table 11 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for CAS LRNG Library v1.0 .......................................................23
Table 12 FIPS-Allowed Algorithms...............................................................................................................................23
Table 13 List of Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs ........................................................................................24
Table 14 Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................................34
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a Non-Proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Symantec Content Analysis Virtual
Appliance (Version 3.1.3.0) from Symantec, A Division of Broadcom. This Non-Proprietary Security Policy describes
how CAS meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2,
which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information
about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
This document also describes how to run the appliance in the Approved mode of operation. This policy was
prepared as part of the Level 1 validation of the module. Content Analysis Virtual Appliance is referred to in this
document as CAS, the crypto module, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
 The Symantec website (www.broadcom.com) contains information on the full line of products from
Symantec.
 The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-
modules/search/) contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related
questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Non-Proprietary Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to
this document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Model document
 Entropy Assessment Report document
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is proprietary to
Symantec and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents,
please contact Symantec.
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2 Symantec Content Analysis
2.1 Overview
The Symantec Content Analysis (CAS) is a critical component of effective protection against advanced targeted
attacks achieved via multi-layer file inspection and sandboxing. Together with ProxySG or Symantec Messaging
Gateway (SMG), it offers the most complete advanced threat protection in the marketplace for blocking known
threats and analyzing zero-day and other advanced threats.
See Figure 1 below for a typical deployment scenario for CAS appliances.
Figure 1 Typical Deployment of CAS
The Content Analysis solution blocks all known threats through inspection of sources and signatures and can
centrally analyze unknown content locally and worldwide, leveraging Symantec’s Global Intelligence Network. This
community-watch effect constantly fortifies your security.
Zero-day threats are escalated automatically within Content Analysis to powerful, dual-detection sandboxing
technology. This offers a unique hybrid analysis protocol, including the customizable IntelliVM virtualized sandbox
to replicate production environments, and a bare-metal sandbox emulator for accurate analysis and detection of
VM-evasive malware. File filtering by Content Analysis mitigates false positive identification of malware and it
significantly improves sandbox efficiency by reducing the number of files unnecessarily sent for analysis.
Unlike other sandboxing solutions, information derived from the analysis of malware files is automatically shared
with the ProxySG appliances and Content Analysis, so future instances of the malware will be blocked at the
gateway.
The solution is powered by the Symantec Global Intelligence Network, informed threat data from more than 70
percent of the Fortune Global 500. The discovery of new malware, threats, or malicious files is shared both locally
within your infrastructure, and out through this global community for faster protection against advanced malware
and attacks targeting your web, email or mobile environment.
Symantec brings together the full range of products, services, and technologies to deliver advanced threat
protection at the web gateway. The table below summarizes its business advantages.
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Table 1 Benefits and Advantages
Benefit Advantage
Scalable, effective defense
against advanced targeted
attacks, advanced
persistent threats, and
zero-day malware
Up-to-the-minute threat intelligence is collected
from our millions of users to identify unknown
threats and shift protection to the gateway.
Defense in depth against
advanced threats
At the web and mail gateways, combine real-time
blocking and malware scanning, with URl and file
whitelisting/blacklisting, static code analysis, and
dynamic malware detonation.
More complete detection of
zero-day threats
A customizable IntelliVM virtualized sandbox and a
bare metal sandbox emulator deliver more
accurate analysis and detection of VM evasive
malware.
CAS is validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels in Table 2.
Table 2 Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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2.2 Module Specification
For the FIPS 140-2 validation, the crypto module was tested on the following appliance configurations listed in
Table 3.
Table 3 CAS Virtual Appliance Configuration
Virtual Appliance Model Number of Devices
CASVA-100 100
CASVA-C4S 1000
Symantec CAS is a module with a Multi-chip Standalone embodiment. The overall security level of the module is 1.
The cryptographic boundary is defined by the virtual appliance, which surrounds all software. The module
software, version 3.1.3.0, contains the following cryptographic libraries:
 CAS Cryptographic Library v1.0
 VA Blue Coat Boot Loader Library v5.28
 CAS LRNG Library v1.0
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary
As a software module, the virtual appliance has no physical characteristics; however, the physical boundary of the
cryptographic module is defined by the hard enclosure around the Symantec Security Platform (SSP) S410-10 on
which it runs. Figure 2 shows the block diagram of the SSP-S410 (the dashed line surrounding the hardware
components represents the module’s physical cryptographic boundary, which is the outer case of the hardware
platform), and identifies the hardware with which SSP-S410-10 processor interfaces.
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Figure 2 Block Diagram of the SSP-S410-10 hardware
The module’s physical cryptographic boundary is further illustrated by the black dotted line in Figure 3 below.
The module makes use of the physical interfaces of the tested platform hosting the virtual environment upon
which the module is installed. The hypervisor controls and directs all interactions between the CAS VA and the
operator, and is responsible for mapping the module’s virtual interfaces to the GPC’s physical interfaces. These
interfaces include the integrated circuits of the system board, processor, network adapters, RAM1
, hard disk,
device case, power supply, and fans. Figure 2 shows the block diagram of the SSP-S410-10 (the solid black line
surrounding the hardware components represents the module’s physical cryptographic boundary, which is the
outer case of the hardware platform), and identifies the hardware with which the SSP-S410-10’s processor
interfaces.
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The logical cryptographic boundary of the module (shown by the solid yellow line in Figure 3) consists of the OS
(CentOS 7), which contains the VA Blue Coat Boot Loader Library v5.28, the CAS OS Cryptographic Library v1.0, and
the CAS LRNG Library v1.0.
1 RAM – Random Access Memory
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Figure 3 CAS VA Cryptographic Boundary
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module’s physical ports can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
 Data input
 Data output
 Control input
 Status output
As a software module, the virtual appliance has no physical characteristics. The module’s physical and electrical
characteristics, manual controls, and physical indicators are those of the host system (SSP-S410-10). The Linux
KVM hypervisor provides virtualized ports and interfaces for the module. Interaction with the virtual ports created
by the hypervisor occurs through the host system’s Ethernet port. Management, data, and status traffic must all
flow through the Ethernet port. Direct interaction with the module via the host system is possible over the serial
port; however, the Crypto Officer (CO) must first map the physical serial port to the CASVA using vSphere Client.
The mapping of the module’s logical interfaces in the software to FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces is described in Table
4 below.
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Table 4 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings for the CAS VA
Physical Port / Interface Logical Port/Interface FIPS 140-2 Interface
Host System Ethernet
(10/100/1000) Ports
Virtual Ethernet Ports
Virtual Serial Ports
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Host System Serial Port Virtual Serial Port Control Input
Status Output
Data input and output are the packets utilizing the services provided by the modules. These packets enter and exit
the module through the Virtual Ethernet ports. Control input consists of Configuration or Administrative data
entered into the modules. Control input enters the module via the Virtual Ethernet and Virtual Serial Port
interfaces (Web Interface, SSH CLI, and Serial CLI). Status output consists of the status provided or displayed via
the user interfaces (such as Web Interface, SSH CLI, and Serial CLI) or available log information. Status output exits
the module via the user interfaces (such as Web Interface, SSH CLI, and Serial CLI) over the Virtual Ethernet or
Virtual Serial Ports
2.4 Roles and Services
Before accessing the modules for any administrative services, COs and Users must authenticate to the
module according to the methods specified in
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Table 5. The modules offer the following management interface:
 CLI2
– This interface is used for management of the modules. This interface must be accessed locally via
the serial port to perform the initial module configurations (IP address, DNS server, gateway, and subnet
mask) and placing the modules into the Approved mode. When the module has been properly
configured, this interface can be accessed via SSH3
. Management of the module may take place via SSH or
locally via the serial port. Authentication is required before any functionality will be available through the
CLI.
 Web Interface – This interface is used for management of the module. It is accessible remotely with a web
browser that supports TLS4
. Authentication is required before any functionality will be available through
the Web Interface
When managing the module over the CLI, COs and Users both log into the module with accounts entering the
“standard”, or “unprivileged” mode on the CLI. Unlike Users, COs have the ability to enter the “enabled” or
“privileged” mode after initial authentication to the CLI by supplying the “enabled” mode password. Additionally,
COs can only enter the “configuration” mode from the “enabled” mode via the CLI, which grants privileges to make
configuration level changes. Going from the “enabled” mode to the “configuration” mode does not require
additional credentials. The details of these modes of operation are found below in Table 5.
2
CLI – Command Line Interface
3
SSH – Secure Shell protocol
4 TLS – Transport Layer Security
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Table 5 FIPS and CAS Roles
FIPS Roles Module Roles and Privileges
CO The CO is an administrator of the module that has been granted “enabled” mode access
while using the CLI. When the CO is using the CLI, and while in the “enabled” mode of
operation, COs may put the module in its Approved mode, reset to the factory state, and
query if the module is in the Approved mode. In addition, COs may do all the services
available to Users while not in the “enabled” mode. Once the CO has entered the “enabled”
mode, the CO may then enter the “configuration” mode via the CLI. The “configuration”
mode provides the CO management capabilities to perform tasks such as account
management and key management.
When the CO is administering the module over the Web Interface, they can perform all the
same services available in CLI (equivalent to being in the “configuration” mode in the CLI)
except the module may not be into the Approved mode via the Web Interface
User The User is an administrator of the module that operates only in the “standard” or
“unprivileged” mode and has not been granted access to the “enabled” mode in the CLI.
The User may access the CLI and Web Interface for management of the module. When the
User is administering the module over the Web Interface, they perform all the same
services available in CLI (“standard” mode only services).
Descriptions of the services available to a Crypto Officer (CO) and User are described below in Table 6 respectively.
For each service listed below, COs and Users are assumed to already have authenticated prior to attempting to
execute the service. There are no additional services that are unauthenticated. Please note that the keys and CSPs
listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:
 R: The CSP is read
 W: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized
 X: Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role
Descriptions of the FIPS 140-2 relevant services available to the Crypto-Officer role are provided in Table 6 below.
Additional services that do not access CSPs can be found in the Symantec Content Analysis Command Line
Overview, v3.2 located here:
https://techdocs.broadcom.com/us/en/symantec-security-software/web-and-network-
security/content-analysis/3-1/cli-index.html
Table 6 Crypto Officer Role Services and CSP Access
Service Description CSP and Access Required
Set up the module (serial port only) Set up the first-time network
configuration, CO username and
password, and enable the module
in the Approved mode of
operation. For more information,
see section 3 in this Security Policy.
CO Password: W
“Enabled” mode password: W
Enter the “enabled” mode Manage the module in the
“enabled” mode of operation,
“Enabled” mode password: RX
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Service Description CSP and Access Required
granting access to higher privileged
commands
* Enter the “configure” mode Manage the module in the
“configuration” mode of operation,
allowing permanent system
modifications to be made
None
* Disable FIPS mode Take the module out of the
approved mode of operation and
restore it to a factory state
SSH Session Key: W
SSH Integrity Key: W
TLS Session Key: W
TLS Integrity Key: W
TLS Pre-Master Secret: W
TLS Master Secret: W
KAS-FFC private key: W
KAS-ECC private key: W
DRBG CSPs: W
DPK: W
DPK: private key: W
MDEK: W
Syslog over TLS Configure the module to use syslog
via TLS
RSA public key: RX
RSA private key: RX
KAS-FFC public key: WRX
KAS-FFC private key: WRX
KAS-ECC public key: WRX
KAS-ECC private key: WRX
TLS Session Key: W
TLS Integrity Key: W
TLS Pre-Master Secret: W
TLS Master Secret: W
DRBG CSPs: WRX
** Firmware Load5 Loads new external firmware and
performs an integrity test using an
RSA digital signature using the
“installed-systems load” command.
Integrity Test public key: WRX
Create remote management
session
Manage the module through the
CLI (SSH) or Web Interface (TLS)
remotely via Ethernet port.
RSA public key: RX
RSA private key: RX
KAS-FFC public key: WRX
KAS-FFC private key: WRX
KAS-ECC public key: WRX
KAS-ECC private key: WRX
SSH Session Key: WRX
SSH Integrity Key: WRX
DRBG CSPs: WRX
DPK: RX
CO Password: R
5 Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate
FIPS 140-2 validation
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Service Description CSP and Access Required
** Create, edit, and delete User
Groups
Create, edit and delete operator
groups; define common sets of
operator permissions.
None
**Create, edit, and delete
operators
Create, edit and delete operators
(these may be COs or Users);
define operator’s accounts, change
password, and assign permissions.
Crypto-Officer Password: W
User Password: W
DPK: RX
Show FIPS-mode status The CO logs in to the module using
the CLI. Entering the command
“show version” will display if the
module is configured in Approved
mode.
None
* Zeroize keys Zeroize keys by taking the module
out of the Approved mode and
restoring it to a factory state. This
will zeroize all CSPs. The
zeroization occurs while the
module is still in Approved-mode.
SSH Session Key: W
SSH Integrity Key: W
TLS Session Key: W
TLS Integrity Key: W
TLS Pre-Master Secret: W
TLS Master Secret: W
KAS-FFC private key: W
KAS-ECC private key: W
DPK: W
Modify Scan Service Settings  Antivirus (AV) Patterns
 Scan Behavior
 AV File Types
 File Reputation
 Predictive Analysis Detection
sensitive level
 Sandboxing
 Whitelist/Blacklist settings
None
View Threat Analysis Statistics  View Cache hits
 View Sandboxing reports
 View Static Analysis Report
 View File Reputation Report
 View Whitelist/Blacklist
Reports
 View system Logs
None
Configure and query password
policy
Configure and view the current
password policy employed by the
module.
None
** Change password Change Crypto-Officer password Crypto-Officer Password: RW
DPK: RX
* Perform self-test Perform self-test on demand by
rebooting the machine
KAS-FFC public key: W
KAS-FFC private key: W
KAS-ECC public key: W
KAS-ECC private key: W
SSH Session Key: W
SSH Integrity Key: W
TLS Session Key: W
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Service Description CSP and Access Required
TLS Integrity Key: W
TLS Pre-Master Secret: W
TLS Master Secret: W
DRBG CSPs: W
* - Indicates services that are only available once the CO has entered the “enabled” mode of operation.
** - Indicates services that are only available once the CO has entered the “enabled” mode followed by the
“configuration” mode of operation.
2.4.2 User Role
Descriptions of the FIPS 140-2 relevant services available to the User role are provided in Table 7 below.
Additional services are that do not access CSPs can be found in the Symantec Content Analysis Command Line
Overview, Version 3.1.3.0:
https://techdocs.broadcom.com/us/en/symantec-security-software/web-and-network-security/content-
analysis/3-1/cli-index.html
Table 7 User Service and CSP Access
Service Description CSP and Access Required
Create remote management
session
Manage the CAS Module using the
CLI (SSH) or Web Interface (TLS)
remotely via Ethernet port.
RSA public key: RX
RSA private key: RX
Client RSA public key: RX
KAS-FFC public key: RX
KAS-FFC private key: RX
KAS-ECC public key: RX
KAS-ECC private key: RX
SSH Session Key: WRX
SSH Integrity Key: WRX
DRBG CSPs: WRX
DPK: RX
Show FIPS-mode status Entering the command “show
version” will display if the module
is configured in Approved Mode.
None
View Threat Analysis Statistics  View Cache hits
 View Sandboxing reports
 View Static Analysis Report
 View File Reputation Report
 View Whitelist/Blacklist
Reports
View system Logs
None
Show password policy View the current password policy
employed by the module using the
“show password-policy-
configuration” command.
None
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2.4.3 Authentication Mechanism
The module supports role-based authentication. COs and Users must authenticate using a private key (user ID and
password), or can alternatively use public key authentication for SSH to set up the secure session. Secure sessions
that authenticate Users have no interface available to access other services (such as Crypto Officer services). Each
CO or User SSH or TLS session remains active (logged in) and secured until the operator logs out or inactivity for a
configurable amount of time has elapsed.
The authentication mechanisms used in the module are listed in Table 8.
Table 8 Authentication Mechanisms Used by Module
Role Authentication
Type
Authentication Strength
Crypto-
Officer
Password The modules support password authentication internally. For password
authentication done by the modules, passwords are required to be at
minimum 8 characters in length, and at maximum 64 bytes (number of
characters is dependent on the character set used by system). An 8-character
password allowing all printable American Standard Code for Information
Interchange (ASCII) characters (95) with repetition equates to a 1:(958
), or
1:6,634,204,312,890,625 chance of false acceptance. The Crypto-Officer may
connect locally using the serial port or remotely after establishing a TLS or SSH
session.
The fastest network connection supported by the module is 1000 Mbps.
Hence at most (1000 ×10^6 × 60 = 6 × 10^10 =) 60,000,000,000 bits of data
can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is:
1 : [95^8 possible passwords / ((6 ×10^10 bits per minute) / 64 bits per
password)]
1: (95^8 possible passwords / 937,500,000 passwords per minute)
This equals 1: 7,076,484 or approximately 1 in 7.0 million; this is less than
1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
Password
(“Enabled”
Mode)
The modules support password authentication internally. For password
authentication done by the modules, passwords are required to be at least 8
characters in length and maximum of 64 bytes (number of characters is
dependent on the character set used by system). An 8-character password
allowing all printable American Standard Code for Information Interchange
(ASCII) characters (95) with repetition equates to a 1: (958
), or
1:6,634,204,312,890,625 chance of false acceptance. This password is entered
by the Crypto-Officer to enter the “enabled” mode; this is entered locally
through the serial port or remotely after establishing an SSH session.
The fastest network connection supported by the module is 1000 Mbps.
Hence at most (1000 ×10^6 × 60 = 6 × 10^10 =) 60,000,000,000 bits of data
can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is:
1 : [95^8 possible passwords / ((6 ×10^10 bits per minute) / 64 bits per
password)]
1: (95^8 possible passwords / 937,500,000 passwords per minute)
This equals 1: 7,076,484 or approximately 1 in 7.0 million; this is less than
1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
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Role Authentication
Type
Authentication Strength
Password The modules support password authentication internally. For password
authentication done by the modules, passwords are required to be at least 8
characters in length and maximum of 64 bytes (number of characters is
dependent on the character set used by system). An 8-character password
allowing all printable American Standard Code for Information Interchange
(ASCII) characters (95) with repetition equates to a 1:(958
), or 1:
6,634,204,312,890,625 chance of false acceptance. The User may connect
remotely after establishing a TLS or SSH session.
The fastest network connection supported by the module is 1000 Mbps.
Hence at most (1000 ×10^6 × 60 = 6 × 10^10 =) 60,000,000,000 bits of data
can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is:
1 : [95^8 possible passwords / ((6 ×10^10 bits per minute) / 64 bits per
password)]
1: (95^8 possible passwords / 937,500,000 passwords per minute)
This equals 1: 7,076,484 or approximately 1 in 7.0 million; this is less than
1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
SSH RSA Client
keys
The module supports using SSH RSA client keys for authentication of COs
during SSH. Using conservative estimates and equating a 2048-bit RSA key to a
112-bit symmetric key, the probability for a random attempt to succeed is
1:2112
or 1: 5.19 x 1033
.
The fastest network connection supported by the module is 1000 Mbps.
Hence at most (1000 ×106
× 60 = 6 × 10^10 =) 60,000,000,000 bits of data can
be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is less
than 1: (2^112 / 6×10^10), or 1: 86,538,280,975,580,460,475,508, which is
less than 1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
Password The modules support password authentication internally. For password
authentication done by the modules, passwords are required to be at least 8
characters in length and maximum of 64 bytes (number of characters is
dependent on the character set used by system). An 8-character password
allowing all printable American Standard Code for Information Interchange
(ASCII) characters (95) with repetition equates to a 1:(958
), or 1:
6,634,204,312,890,625 chance of false acceptance. The User may connect
remotely after establishing a TLS or SSH session.
The fastest network connection supported by the module is 1000 Mbps.
Hence at most (1000 ×10^6 × 60 = 6 × 10^10 =) 60,000,000,000 bits of data
can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is:
1 : [95^8 possible passwords / ((6 ×10^10 bits per minute) / 64 bits per
password)]
1: (95^8 possible passwords / 937,500,000 passwords per minute)
This equals 1: 7,076,484 or approximately 1 in 7.0 million; this is less than
1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
SSH RSA Client
keys
The module supports using SSH RSA client keys for authentication of Users
during SSH. Using conservative estimates and equating a 2048-bit RSA key to a
112-bit symmetric key, the probability for a random attempt to succeed is
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Role Authentication
Type
Authentication Strength
1:2112
or 1: 5.19 x 1033
.
The fastest network connection supported by the module is 1000 Mbps.
Hence at most (1000 ×106
× 60 = 6 × 10^10 =) 60,000,000,000 bits of data can
be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is less
than 1: (2^112 / 6×10^10), or 1: 86,538,280,975,580,460,475,508, which is
less than 1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
2.5 Physical Security
The CAS VA is a software module, which FIPS defines as a Multi-Chip Standalone cryptographic module. As such, it
does not include physical security mechanisms. Thus, the FIPS 140-2 requirements for physical security are not
applicable.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-2 requirements on the following operational
environment and hardware:
 Symantec Security Platform (SSP) S410-10 appliance
 Intel Xeon Silver 4210 (Cascade Lake)
 KVM on CentOS 7
All cryptographic keys and CSPs are under the control of the guest operating system, which protects the CSPs
against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. The module does not provide a general-purpose
operating system. The operating system is not modifiable by the operator, and only the modules’ signed image can
be executed. All software upgrades are digitally-signed, and a conditional self-test (RSA signature verification) is
performed during each upgrade.
NOTE: Only FIPS-validated firmware may be loaded to maintain the module’s validation.
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2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed below in Table 9.
Table 9 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for the CAS Cryptographic Library v1.0
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or Moduli Use
A1764 AES SP 800-38A, FIPS
197
CBC, CTR, GCM6
AES 128, 256 CBC
AES 128, 192, 256 CTR
AES 128, 192, 256 GCM
Data Encryption / Decryption
N/A KTS7
SP 800-38F AES (CBC, CTR, GCM)
and HMAC
AES 128, 256 CBC
AES 128, 192, 256 CTR
AES 128, 1928
, 256 GCM
Key Transport
A1764 AES SP 800-38E XTS9
128, 256 Data Encryption / Decryption At
Rest
A1764 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-110
, SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512
Message Digest
6 AES GCM IV generation method complies with technique #2 in section A.5 of the Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2. The AES GCM IV is used in the TLS protocol and in the SSH protocol.
In all cases, the AES GCM IV is internally generated via RBG-based construction in compliance with Section 8.2.1 of NIST SP 800-38D using the Approved DRBG within the module’s physical boundary
and is at least 96 bits in length
7 KTS - Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength
8 192 GCM – While this key size was algorithm tested, it is not callable by the module.
9
XTS mode is only approved for storage device applications
10
SHA-1 is only used for hashing as part of the SSH and TLS KDFs.
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or Moduli Use
A1764 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, HMAC-SHA-512
128,
256,
384,
512
Message Authentication
A1764 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256, SHA-384
PKCS1 v1.5
2048, 3072, 4096 Digital Signature Generation,
Digital Signature Verification
A1764 RSA FIPS 186-4 PKCS1 v1.5 2048, 3072, 4096 Keypair Generation
A1764 KTS-RSA SP 800-56B rev 2 KTS-IFC (RSA-OAEP
Basic)
2048 Key Transport
A1764 CTR-DRBG SP 800-90A CTR-based AES-256 Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG11
SP 800-133 Key Generation
A1764 KAS-SSC SP 800-56A rev 3 FFC (2048, 256) Key Agreement Scheme – Key
Agreement Scheme Shared
Secret Computation (KAS-SSC)
per SP 800-56Arev3, Key
Derivation per SP 800-135rev1
(TLS KDF CVL. Cert. A1764 and
SSH KDF CVL Cert. A1764).
11
CKG – Symmetric cryptographic key generation uses the direct output of an approved DRBG with no post-processing per section 4 of NIST SP 800-133rev2. Symmetric keys are generated for
CBC, CTR, GCM, and XTS modes.
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or Moduli Use
A1764 KAS-SSC SP 800-56A rev 3 ECC P-256, P-384, P-52112
Key Agreement Scheme – Key
Agreement Scheme Shared
Secret Computation (KAS-SSC)
per SP 800-56Arev3, Key
Derivation per SP 800-135rev1
(TLS KDF CVL. Cert. A1764 and
SSH KDF CVL Cert. A1764).
A1764 CVL
TLS 1.0/1.1,
TLS 1.2
SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 SHA Sizes =
SHA-256, SHA384
Key Derivation
A1764 CVL
SSH
SP 800-135rev1 AES-128 CBC, AES-256
CBC
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 Key Derivation
FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for the three libraries are in Table 10 and Table 11 below.
Table 10 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for VA Blue Coat Boot Loader Library v5.28
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or Moduli Use
A1762 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-113
, SHA-256 Message Digest as part of Integrity
Check
A1762 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256;
PKCS1 v1.5
2048 Digital Signature Verification as part
of Integrity Check
12
While the P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves were tested, only P-256 can be called by the module in the Approved mode.
13 SHA-1 is as part of HMAC-SHA-1 and is only used for verification purposes as part of the module integrity check.
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or Moduli Use
A1762 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1 128 Integrity Check
Table 11 FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations for CAS LRNG Library v1.0
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths, Curves, or Moduli Use
A1763 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-512 Vetted conditioning component
A1763 CTR-DRBG SP 800-90A CTR-based AES-256 Vetted conditioning component
A1763 AES SP 800 38A ECB 256 Vetted Conditioning component
- ENT (NP14
)15 SP 800-90B Entropy Generation - Seeding for
the FIPS-Approved DRBG
(SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG)
Table 12 FIPS-Allowed Algorithms
Algorithm Caveat Use
RSA Signature Verification 1536, 2048 Signature Verification
MD5 No security is provided by this algorithm. In TLS 1.0/1.1 Protocol
NOTE: No parts of the TLS or SSH protocols, other than the KDF, have been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. FIPS-Allowed algorithms are listed
above in Table 12.
14 NP - Non-Physical
15
ENT (NP) - For seeding the DRBG, the module uses an ENT (NP). The ENT (NP) is implemented by the cryptographic module compliant with SP800-90B and marked as ENT on the certificate. The
ENT (NP) provides a 2,048-bit seed with at least 1,139 bits of entropy to the DRBG. The DRBG is thus capable of supporting a minimum of 256 bits of encryption strength in its output
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The module supports the CSPs listed below in Table 13 below.
Table 13 List of Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Data Protection
Key (DPK)
AES XTS 256-bit
key
Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
(per IG A.9)
Never exits the module Stored in
plaintext on
non-volatile
memory
By disabling the
FIPS-Approved
mode of operation
Encrypting Crypto-
Officer password,
User password,
“Enabled” mode
password, and RSA
private key
Firmware Load Test
Public Key
RSA public key
2048 bits
Externally generated,
Imported in encrypted
form via a secure SSH
session
Never exits the module Stored in
plaintext on
non-volatile
memory
Overwritten after
upgrade by the key
in the newly signed
image
Verifying the integrity
of the system image
during upgrade or
downgrade
RSA Public Keys 2048-, 3072-,
and 4096-bits
Modules’ public key is
internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Output during
TLS/SSH17
negotiation
in plaintext.
Stored in
encrypted
form on non-
volatile
memory
Module’s public key
is deleted by
command
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
SSH RSA Client key 2048, 3072, and
4096-bits
Other entities’ public
keys are sent to the
module in plaintext
Never exits the module Other entities’
public keys
reside on
Other entities’
public keys are
cleared by power
cycle
Authentication for
SSH sessions.
17
SSH session negotiation can only use RSA key pairs of 2048-bits. TLS session negotiation can use RSA key pairs of 2048-bits, 3072-bits and 4096-bits.
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
RSA Private Keys 2048-, 3072-,
and 4096-bits
Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Imported in encrypted
form via a secure TLS or
SSH session
Imported in plaintext via
a directly attached cable
to the serial port
Never exits the module Stored in
encrypted
form on non-
volatile
memory
Inaccessible by
zeroizing encrypting
DPK
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
KAS-FFC public key 2048-bits Module’s public key is
internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Public key of a peer
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s Public
key exits the module in
plaintext
Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
KAS-FFC private
key
224-bits Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Never exits the module Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
KAS-ECC private
key
P-256 key18
Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Never exits the module Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
18 While the P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves were tested, only P-256 can be called by the module in the Approved mode.
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
KAS-ECC public key P-256 key19
Module’s public key is
internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Public key of a peer
enters the module in
plaintext
The module’s Public
key exits the module in
plaintext
Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Negotiating TLS or
SSH sessions
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
384-bit key Input in encrypted form
from TLS client
Never Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Establishing the TLS
Master Secret
TLS Master Secret 384-bit key Generated internally
during session
negotiation
Never exits the module Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Establishing the TLS
Session Key
TLS Session key AES CBC128-,or
256-bit key, AES
GCM 128 or 256-
bit key
Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Output in encrypted
form during TLS
protocol handshake
Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Encrypting TLS data
SSH Session Key AES CBC 128 or
256-bit key, AES
CTR 128, 192, or
256-bit key, AES
GCM 128 or 256-
bit key
Internally generated via
FIPS-Approved DRBG
Output in encrypted
form during SSH
protocol handshake
Stored in
plaintext on
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Encrypting SSH data
TLS Integrity key HMAC SHA-1-,
256-bit, 384-bit
key
Internally generated Never exits the module Resides in
volatile
Rebooting the
modules
Data authentication
for TLS sessions
19 While the P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves were tested, only P-256 can be called by the module in the Approved mode.
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
memory in
plaintext
Removing power
SSH Integrity key HMAC SHA-1-,
256-, 512-bit key
Internally generated Never exits the module Resides in
volatile
memory in
plaintext
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Data authentication
for SSH sessions
Crypto Officer
Password
User Password
Minimum of
eight (8) and
maximum of 64
bytes long
printable
character string
Externally generated.
Enters the module in
encrypted form via a
secure TLS or SSH
session.
Enters the module in
plaintext via a directly
attached cable to the
serial port
Exits in encrypted form
via a secure TLS session
for external
authentication
Stored in
encrypted
form on non-
volatile
memory
Inaccessible by
zeroizing the
encrypted DPK
Locally authenticating
a CO or User for Web
Interface or CLI
“Enabled” mode
password
Minimum of
eight (8) and
maximum of 64
bytes long
printable
character string
Enters the module in
encrypted form via a
secure SSH session
Enters the module in
plaintext via a directly
attached cable to the
serial port
Exits in encrypted form
via a secure TLS session
for external
authentication
Stored in
encrypted
form on non-
volatile
memory
Inaccessible by
zeroizing the
encrypting DPK
Used by the CO to
enter the “privileged”
or “enabled” mode
when using the CLI
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Seed20
384-bit random
number
Internally generated Never exits the module Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing Power
Seeding material for
the SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
20
The CTR DRBG Seed requires a 384-bit number and uses 256 bits of entropy with the derivation function to create the 384-bit value. The 256-bits of CTR DRBG Entropy is obtained from an
entropy-generating ENT (NP) inside the module’s cryptographic boundary
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Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy21
256-bit random
number with
derivation
function
Internally generated Never exits the module Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing Power
Entropy material for
the SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value
Internal state
value
Internally generated Never Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing Power
Used for the SP 800-
90A CTR_DRBG
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V value
Internal state
value
Internally generated Never exits the module Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Rebooting the
modules
Removing power
Used for the SP 800-
90A CTR_DRBG
NOTE: The Approved DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 384-bits from an entropy-generating ENT (NP) inside the module’s cryptographic boundary.
21
The CTR DRBG Entropy required by the FIPS-Approved SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG (with AES-256) is supplied by the ENT (NP). The ENT (NP) provides a full 256 bits of entropy per IG 7.14 Scenario
1A.
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2.8 Self-Tests
If the module fails the POST Integrity Test, the following error is printed to the CLI (when being accessed via the
serial port):
Boot system failed signature verification
If a self-test fails in the CAS Cryptographic Library, the following error is printed to the CLI (when being accessed via
the serial port):
Open ssl FIPS POST Test failed. Rebooting…
When these errors occur, the modules halt operation and provide no functionality. The only way to clear the error
and resume normal operation is for the Crypto-Officer to reboot the modules. The status output provided below is
shown only over the CLI (when being accessed via the serial port).
The sections below describe the self-tests performed by the module.
2.8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The module performs the following self-tests using the VA Blue Coat Boot Loader Library:
 Known Answer Tests
o HMAC KAT using SHA-1; and
o RSA Sign/Verify KAT with SHA-256
 Firmware integrity check using HMAC-SHA-1
The module performs the following self-tests using the CAS LRNG Library:
 Known Answer Tests
o SHA-512
o AES ECB KAT for encryption and decryption
o SP800-90A DRBG KAT
The module then performs the following self-tests using the CAS Cryptographic Library at power-up:
 Known Answer Tests
o AES KAT for encryption and decryption
o AES GCM KAT for encryption and decryption
o AES XTS KAT for encryption and decryption
o HMAC KAT using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
o RSA Sign/Verify KAT with SHA-256
o SP800-90A DRBG KAT
o KAS-FFC-SSC KAT
o KAS-ECC-SSC KAT
No data output occurs via the data output interface until all power-up self-tests have completed.
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2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs the conditional self-tests for its CAS Cryptographic Library.
 RSA pairwise consistency check upon generation of an RSA keypair
 Continuous RNG test (CRNGT) for the SP800-90A DRBG
 CRNGT for the ENT (NP)
 Firmware Load Test using RSA Signature Verification
The module performs the conditional self-tests for its LRNG Cryptographic Library.
 Entropy Health Tests:
o Repetition Count Test (RCT22
) specified in SP800-90 section 4.4.1
o Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) as specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.2
2.8.3 Critical Function Tests
The module performs the following critical function tests in the VA Blue Coat Boot Loader:
 RSA Signature Verification
The modules performs the following critical function tests on both the CAS OS and CAS LRNG:
 CTR DRBG Instantiate Critical Function Test
 CTR DRBG Reseed Critical Function Test
 CTR DRBG Generate Critical Function Test
 CTR DRBG Uninstantiate Critical Function Test
CAS runs a health check on the CTR DRBGs every 2^24 requests, which is less than the CTR DRBG reseed interval of
2^48 per NIST SP800-90A.
Additionally, per the IG A.9 requirements, the CAS Cryptographic Library performs the following critical functions
test for AES XTS to ensure that the two keys used in this operation are not identical (Key_1 ≠ Key_2):
 AES XTS Duplicate Key Test
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the Level 1 requirements
for this validation.
22 The implemented APT and RCT entropy health tests run on the first 1024 entropy samples at startup.
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3 Secure Operation
The module can be configured into an explicit FIPS mode of operation as per the instructions provided below in
Section 3.1. However, the module supports a non-compliant state, the initialization of which requires an explicit
separate configuration. When the module is operating in non-compliant state, the services have access to non-
Approved and non-Allowed algorithms. The logical boundary of the module is defined such that all functionality
available in non-compliant state is scoped out from the module boundary. Thus, when the module is operating in
FIPS Approved mode of operation, it can access only FIPS Approved or Allowed algorithms as access to non-
Approved and non-Allowed algorithms are explicitly inhibited by design of the module.
The module meets FIPS-140-2 Level 1requirements. The sections below describe how to place and keep the
module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
Caveat: This guide assumes that a virtual environment is already setup and ready for accepting a new virtual
appliance installation
3.1 Initialization
Physical access to the module’s host hardware shall be limited to the Crypto-Officer, and the CO shall be
responsible for putting the module into the Approved mode.
Once the VM has been deployed, the CO must place the module in the Approved mode using the Console Tab
which provides access to the virtual serial connection.
1. Download the Virtual Appliance Package (VAP), which consists of the deployment .ISO file.
2. Verify that you have downloaded the .iso file to a directory for which you have privileges.
3. Enter the following command to verify that the kernel module is loaded:
a. #lsmod |grep kvm
4. Enter the following command to create and launch the KVM instance
a. # virt-install --name kvm_instance_name \
5. Enter the following command to open the console on the Management Center KVM instance.
a. # virsh console mc_vm_name
6. Enter the serial number provided (You may need to press “Enter” a few times to display the CLI prompt).
7. Press Enter three times.
Welcome to the Symantec Content Analysis Virtual Appliance Serial
Console
Version: Content Analysis 3.1.3.0. Release id: 263357 64-bit
-------------------------- MENU -------------------------------
1) Command Line Interface
2) Setup Console
---------------------------------------------------------------
Enter option:
8. Enter 1 to access the Command Line Interface.
9. Type enable and press Enter.
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10. Enter the following command: fips-mode enable.
When prompted for confirmation, select Y to confirm.
 NOTE 1: The fips-mode enable command causes the device to power cycle, zeroing the appliance and
returning the configuration values set in steps 1 and 2 to their factory state.
11. After the system has finished rebooting, press Enter three times.
12. Enter the properties for the following:
a. IP address
b. IP subnet mask
c. IP gateway
d. DNS server parameters
13. The module will prompt for the console account credentials:
DIRECTIONS:
The console username, password and enable password are special administrative
credentials which can be used to log into the command line interface or web
management interface.
Enter console password:
Verify console password:
Enter enable password:
Verify enable password:
Upon completion of these initialization steps, the module is considered to be operating in its Approved mode of
operation. There are no additional non-Approved services while operating in the Approved mode.
3.1.1 Management
The Crypto-Officer is able to monitor and configure the module via the Web Interface (HTTPS over TLS) and the CLI
(serial port or SSH).
The Crypto-Officer should monitor the module’s status regularly. If any irregular activity is noticed or the module is
consistently reporting errors, customers should consult Symantec’s Product Documentation portal and the
administrative guidance documents to resolve the issues. If the problems cannot be resolved through these
resources, Symantec customer support should be contacted.
The CO password and “enabled” mode password must be at least 8 characters in length.
3.1.2 Zeroization
The CO can return the module to its factory state by entering the “enabled” mode on the CLI, followed by the
“fips-mode disable” command. This command will automatically reboot the module and zeroize the DPK. The RSA
private key, Crypto-Officer password, User password, “Enabled” mode password, “Setup” password, SNMP Privacy
key, and the SNMP Authentication key are stored encrypted by the DPK. Once the DPK is zeroized, decryption
involving the DPK becomes impossible, making these CSPs unobtainable by an attacker.
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In addition, rebooting the module causes all temporary keys stored in volatile memory (SSH Session key, TLS
session key, DRBG entropy values, and ENT (NP) entropy values) to be zeroized. The Crypto-Officer must wait until
the module has successfully rebooted in order to verify that zeroization has completed.
3.2 User Guidance
The User is only able to access the module remotely via SSH (CLI) or HTTPS (Web Interface). The User must change
his or her password at the initial login. The User must be diligent to pick strong passwords (alphanumeric with
minimum 8 characters) that will not be easily guessed and must not reveal their password to anyone. Additionally,
the User should be careful to protect any secret/private keys in their possession, such as TLS or SSH session keys.
The User should report to the Crypto-Officer if any irregular activity is noticed.
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4 Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms used throughout this document. See Table 14 below.
Table 14 Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DNS Domain Name System
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
TLS Transport Layer Security